

United States
Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board

Transcript

Spring, 2024 Board Meeting

Wednesday
May 22, 2024

PUBLIC MEETING
In-Person and Virtual

Knoxville, Tennessee

NWTRB BOARD MEMBERS IN-PERSON

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Ronald Ballinger

Tissa Illangasekare
Scott Tyler, Deputy Chair
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Davonya Barnes
Jayson Bright
Kimberly Brown

1 [Music]

2 SIU: Okay, let's get rolling. It's 8:00. Hello, welcome back to
3 the U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board Summer Meeting.

4 I'm Nathan Siu, Chair of the Board. Just as a reminder we have
5 information on the Board at our website www.NWTRB.gov. And as a
6 response to one of the comments we received yesterday, our
7 question, just a reminder the Archive webcast recording will be
8 available on our website by May 30th and the transcript will be
9 available by June 25th, again on our website.

10

11 Yesterday we had a busy schedule. Tim Gunter of the DOE Office
12 of Nuclear Energy gave our opening remarks and then we heard
13 from National Laboratory Researchers on various aspects related
14 to geological disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high level
15 radioactive waste in crystal and host rocks. We also heard from
16 Laura Pyrak-Nolte from Purdue regarding fracture
17 characterization and representation of fractures in fluent
18 transport models. So again it was a busy day. It was great
19 information for us.

20

21 Today we'll start with a presentation by Erika Holt from VTT
22 Finland and Barbara Pastina from Posiva Oy. And they'll provide

23 an overview on current status of the Finnish Disposal Program.
24 Their presentation will include a description of flow and
25 transport models used to support the safety case for a deep
26 geological repository being constructed in Finland now. They'll
27 also discuss some of the technical challenges and lessons
28 learned from the implementation of the Finnish Disposal Program.
29 And I know we're all excited to hear about that.

30

31 Following that Andy Parmenter from the Nuclear Waste Management
32 Organization, Canada, will present the overview and status of
33 the Canadian Disposal Program. And Andy I do apologize for
34 misspeaking on your name yesterday. He'll describe the site
35 characterization efforts at the Wabigoon Lake Ojibway Nation
36 Ignace site, which is being considered as one of the sites for
37 deep geologic repository in Canada.

38

39 We'll have a ten minute break after that and then we'll have two
40 presentations related to the corrosion of commercial spent
41 nuclear fuel left after disposal. The first presentation will
42 provide an overview of the R&D efforts and international
43 collaborative programs by Dave Sassani and Brady Hanson. The
44 second presentation will describe the implementation of the fuel

45 matrix degradation model and the geologic disposal safety
46 assessment framework, the GDSA and electrochemical testing by
47 Paul Mariner and Sara Thomas.

48

49 We'll have a public comment period after this presentation at
50 12:10 pm Eastern Daylight Time. As a reminder those attending
51 the meeting in person wanting to provide oral comments are
52 encouraged to sign the public comment register at the check in
53 table, near the entrance to the meeting room. Oral commenters
54 will be taken in the order in which they are signed in. Public
55 comments can also be submitted during the meeting during the
56 online meeting viewing platform using the Comment for the Record
57 form. Time for each comment may be limited depending on the
58 number of comments we receive. But the entirety of the submitted
59 comments will be included as part of the meeting record. This
60 meeting will end at approximately 12:15 pm Eastern Daylight
61 Time. In the do as I say not do as I do department, please
62 remember to identify yourself when you use the microphone, so
63 our online viewers know whose speaking.

64

65 So without further ado, we can start with the first presentation
66 from Erika Holt and VTT. And that's online. Thank you, Erika.

67

68 HOLT: Thank you. Welcome to the Board members and distinguished
69 guests. Ladies and gentlemen, my name is Erika Holt from VTT,
70 the Technical Research Center of Finland. I'm joined by my
71 colleague Dr. Pirjo Hella as well as Barbara Pastina from
72 Posiva. And we look forward to sharing with you today some of
73 the experiences from here in Finland to advance the
74 understanding for the DGR and the crystalline rock.

75

76 The route that we will take through our presentation is first
77 just to give you a status update, where we are in the Onkalo and
78 the repository program as the first repository to have
79 construction and soon hopefully an operating license. We will
80 actually have a spoiler alert. We would like while you're still
81 fresh in morning attention to start by telling you some of the
82 key lessons and then we'll go into a little bit deeper dive
83 about what we see as the features, events, processes that are
84 really affecting the safety and Barbara will cover those areas
85 and then we'll go a little bit more detail into some of these
86 key takeaway messages and conclusions.

87

88 We ask that you please maybe hold the questions to the end
89 because they might come up a bit during our presentation. We
90 also really gained a lot of insight to yesterday in hearing the
91 various presentation from the labs and it really set a good
92 basis for what we're going to share with you about today on
93 issues for instance in bentonite erosion and high temperature
94 issues and what type of models to use, why are the fractures
95 important, the salinity. A lot of those topics that we have been
96 reviewing and developing for years and a lot of those that we
97 have done in cooperation there in the United States and we
98 anticipate to keep cooperating together to solve those
99 challenges for crystalline DGR solutions.

100

101 So first just to tell you where we're at right now in the
102 Finland disposal program for the DGR and to remind you where
103 we're at. Finland, Scandinavia, Nordic country have to handle
104 the spent fuel from five existing reactors owned by to different
105 utilities. One of those being TVO, Teollisuuden Voima in
106 Finnish, which is on the west coast on the peninsula of
107 Olkiluoto and then Fortum Nuclear Power, which is located a
108 couple, having two plants located approximately 100 kilometers
109 to the east of Helsinki. Posiva, the high level repository owner

110 is operated at the same Olkiluoto site. They are taking only
111 spent fuel. So, the low and intermediate level wastes, those are
112 the responsibilities of our two utilities and they have their
113 own repositories that have been in operation since the 1990s.
114 And please be aware in Finland also we do have a research
115 reactor. That's here at VTT, the technical research center of
116 Finland that has recently been decommissioned. And we also have
117 a uranium mine. So, our regulatory authority STUK also oversees
118 these issues.

119

120 Talking a little bit about the who's who and these names that
121 you'll see we report and we receive a license from our Finnish
122 government, which is the Ministry of Employment in Economics. We
123 have the oversight by our Radiation and Nuclear Safety
124 Authority, STUK. And for each kilowatt hour of electricity that
125 is produced, we put in money to finance the Nuclear Waste
126 Management of Finland. And that also includes the National R&D
127 Program and is responsible for competence development in the
128 country and also national infrastructures. Posiva as the
129 operator and owner of this high level waste repository called
130 Onkalo is owned by the two utilities. So, it is not owned by the

131 government though the government is a shareholder in our two
132 utilities.

133

134 Pirjo and myself are from VTT, the National Research Center.
135 We've been operating for over 80 years and we also report to the
136 government so we are similar to a national lab like Sandia, but
137 covering all disciplines of science and engineering. And we are
138 one of the key players that is supporting Posiva with resources
139 and technical competences in a variety of fields among other
140 consultants, for instance, universities and the geological
141 survey.

142

143 Here is a bird's eye view of what Olkiluoto and the Onkalo
144 peninsula look like. In the back you will see three reactors of
145 Olkiluoto 1 and 2 which have been in operation for decades and
146 the Olkiluoto 3 reactor, which is the largest new-build reactor
147 in Europe, which went on the grid last year. The disposal
148 facility for Onkalo of spent fuel is on the same peninsula. It's
149 in the foreground of the picture. And we'll look at a few more
150 pictures of that in some later slides. The repository for the
151 low and intermediate level waste is the responsibility of TVO
152 Utility. And that is also adjacent to the plant. So, when we

153 talk about transport of spent fuel, we're looking at just a
154 distance here that as you can see is only about a mile away,
155 done by road, where spent fuel is moved from wet storage into an
156 encapsulation plant. The first spent fuel will come from that
157 near location and that near power plant and in a future cycle
158 will come to the farther transport distance from Fortnum.

159

160 Then just a bit of a timeline about where we've been. It has
161 been four decades that we get to this point where we are now in
162 getting ready to start operating for Finland and Posiva the
163 readiness of final disposal. It started in the 1980s in the site
164 investigations at a generic level and a governmental decision in
165 principle to prepare for high level waste disposal. The
166 construction of Onkalo started in the early 2000s where we went
167 through a very iterative process at the detailed designs and the
168 concepts in the facilities and that culminated in the year 2015
169 with the submission of the construction license.

170

171 We started first with excavation of the tunnels, encapsulation,
172 preparing the aboveground details of the encapsulation plant for
173 the spent fuel and getting ready for operations. But we really
174 also want to emphasize that this does not mean we stop doing R&D

175 or development. We need to operate the facilities for 100 years
176 going forward to account for the five plants and the time it
177 takes for our newest plant for the fuel to cool and we also need
178 to do a safety assessment every 15 years. So, we continue always
179 to look at the impacts of new technologies, of new materials, of
180 course keeping the processes safe, but looking at if we can do
181 it in a more efficient time cost manner and we need to keep our
182 competencies strong. So, we'll go into a little bit more about
183 this on the iterative nature also in some of the next slides.

184

185 Right now, we're in the phase of the getting ready to operate
186 that is called our EKA project here in Finland and the budget of
187 that is 850 million euros, which a lot of is related also to the
188 equipment and the purchasing and the excavations.

189

190 So where we're at now, the detailed design and construction of
191 Onkalo, the underground has been pretty much completed. We
192 submitted a construction license to our regulator at the end of
193 December in 2021 and we expect the final review comments will
194 come now during this year. For the past two years, Posiva has
195 been in the role of answering the questions that come from STUK
196 and VTT and others as technical supporting experts are assisting

197 in answering those questions. Next phase starting for actual
198 physical showing of a final full scale demonstration is called
199 the Trial Run. And I'll explain that a moment in the next slide.
200 And the anticipation for deposition of the spent fuel is
201 starting in the next year or two.

202

203 A few pictures here. On the top you see the picture of the
204 encapsulation plant where the spent fuel is opened and put into
205 the disposal canisters, non-destructive evaluation of the
206 quality ceiling with welds and transferring by the underground
207 hoists to the lower location you see the control room and
208 automated systems. And the lower pictures you see underground
209 how it looks for deposition holes and tunnels and the facilities
210 underground such as for the HVAC systems and vehicles. On the
211 right are, excuse me, the bottom left you see pictures for areas
212 where we're fabricating of the actual EBS kind of components
213 like canisters and bentonite.

214

215 As far as the underground, the site has been fully characterized
216 with dozens of boreholes. And we'll tell a little bit more about
217 these methodologies. But a lot of work in construction
218 methodologies and demonstrations in readiness underground. The

219 underground itself we've had the first five whole deposition
220 tunnels excavated and we've located where the first vertical
221 deposition holes will be in the KBS-3V configuration. The
222 elevators and HVAC system and those type of things are also
223 nearly ready underground. Above ground, the encapsulation plant
224 and control rooms is at 95 percent readiness. The materials for
225 the engineered barriers, the clay, the concretes, the canister,
226 those designs, all the emplacement vehicles, robotics and also
227 the method statement and the training of those people is also
228 ready.

229

230 So where we're at now, is to do the Trial Run for final
231 disposal. This is the last requirement to use all of the same
232 people and procedures and methods and equipment as it will be
233 operational. We will demonstrate the transport, the
234 encapsulation, the process of doing the final disposal and we
235 will actually retrieve one canister as if it were damaged to
236 show we know how to reverse the process back to the
237 encapsulation plant. So, the Trial Run will contain four
238 canisters and this one that is retrieved. Of course, this is
239 also considered a great learning experience for worldwide and
240 any other WMOs or, for instance, the Department of Energy or

241 others are welcome to join in and participate in this. There are
242 already multiple WMOs who have committed to co-funding and
243 participating in this project where they get firsthand oversight
244 and learning what happens for final disposal.

245

246 And the next two slides is a sneak preview of what's going to
247 come now as Barbara starts to tell in more detail. But some of
248 our most important lessons learned in these next two slides are
249 just to remember that the whole process to get where we are has
250 been very fundamentally based on setting the requirements and
251 the specifications and then verifying that the safety of the
252 disposal is met. We're always improving the experience and the
253 knowledge that we have as new information becomes available as
254 we actually practice it as we monitor it and we get through the
255 production processes. We've also had to optimize as we are doing
256 this quality control and the procedures to make them streamlined
257 and compatible. And we've had to have very detailed change
258 management processes. And that is allowing the traceability and
259 the iteration for the safety assessment.

260

261 So, we have these four components that are shown in the graphic.
262 A safety case with the performance assessment and scenarios that

263 leads into the fundamental safety cases. And then that is
264 iterated with the design basis to look at what are the safety
265 principles, understanding how the systems perform, what kind of
266 long-term loads and conditions they have, the performance
267 targets and then the design requirements. So, from that we can
268 specify the materials for the engineered barriers and the
269 processes and make sure that we have construction and
270 emplacement and design solutions that fulfill these
271 requirements. But then when we do implement it, when we do small
272 scale lab and upscale it to the full scale and handling of
273 transport and logistics we try to optimize the cost and
274 schedules and it gives feedback all the time between these. But
275 it's been important to have certain design basis freezes as
276 well.

277

278 And we really have a key message that we're going to elaborate
279 in the next slides too about these changes are normal. We know
280 that we're getting more information and this is an optimization
281 process. And that also comes from the wider and international
282 scientific community and also changes that might change from
283 social and economic environments and the demands of, for

284 instance, the local population about what they might want to be
285 monitored to ensure their safety.

286

287 So, this kind of iterative process and assessments is always
288 being done and making sure that the initial state continues to
289 fulfill the long term performance so that when we construct it
290 it's still going to function and as we bring in new materials
291 that it's not jeopardizing what is there. And this is really
292 handled through our configuration management.

293

294 With that, I will let Barbara continue and she'll tell about the
295 disposal system and the FEPs and touch on some of the key topics
296 we also heard yesterday in these different materials. So,
297 Barbara, please go ahead.

298

299 PASTINA: Hello, everybody. My name is Barbara Pastina. I work
300 for Posiva. I was the Project Manager for the safety cases in
301 the operating license application. And in my previous life I
302 actually used to work for the National Academy of Sciences and I
303 would like to say hello to my former, two committee members,
304 Alan Croft and Tissa Illangasekare and so it's great to see you
305 here. In my previous life I was a radiation chemist, so my area

306 of expertise is actually fuel processes and corrosion, copper
307 corrosion and insert metal corrosion processes. Enough said,
308 let's go down to the actual messages we would like to give you.

309

310 We have been analyzing the performance of two repositories
311 within the same disposal system, so within the same chunk of
312 rock, crystalline rock at Olkiluoto. So, we have at the depth of
313 430 meters as spent to be a fuel repository for 6,500 pounds of
314 spendable fuel. Some of it is boiling water reactor type fuel
315 and some of it is pressurized water reactor fuel. It's actually
316 in Olkiluoto we have the Olkiluoto 3 reactor running, PWR, like
317 western type PWR and then in Loviisa on the eastern side of
318 Finland it's the Russian type, VVER type of fuel. So, we are
319 disposing both of these fuel types in our repository. And then
320 we have another tiny repository at the depth about 180 meters.
321 If you look at the right hand side figure you have two boxes. So
322 the box on the bottom is Spent Nuclear Fuel Repository and then
323 there's one, it's not to scale, but it shows the repository that
324 is not yet built. It will serve the purpose of disposing low and
325 intermediate level waste coming from the encapsulation plant. So
326 it's different than the operating low and intermediate level
327 waste that is coming from the reactors. So we have our own

328 repository. It's a preliminary design and then we had to include
329 it in the license, because we know that one day we might need
330 it.

331

332 So if we go to the next slide, Erika, thank you. Yes, so I think
333 you are familiar with the KBS-3 disposal method. This was a
334 matter that was originally developed by our sister company, SKB,
335 in Sweden. We actually collaborated heavily on the development
336 and especially on the implementation of the method here in
337 Finland. So, it consists of, well, it's direct disposal of spent
338 nuclear fuel. First of all, the spent fuel assemblies are in
339 place in cast iron insert and then the cast iron insert is
340 enveloped by a copper shell. It's sealed tightly. We use
341 frictional steel welding for a sealing method. And then the
342 copper canisters are in place vertically, each in its own
343 deposition or disposal hole.

344

345 And this is the figure with the yellow color that is bentonite
346 swelling clay, bentonite buffer. And above it we have disposal
347 tunnels. They are backfilled with more swelling clay. High grade
348 bentonite, so it actually maintains a very low hydraulic
349 connectivity. And then, we ensure that the depth at which we

350 dispose our spent nuclear fuel is sufficient to separate the
351 processes that happen at the surface from what is happening on
352 the ground. We cannot completely isolate the two systems, but a
353 depth of 430 meters is, in our safety case we show that, in our
354 opinion, is enough to ensure isolation. Next slide, please,
355 Erika.

356

357 I think yesterday you have made a great background for this
358 slide, crystalline rock has great properties. Most important is
359 the stability. In Finland we have very low seismicity in this
360 area. And it is very easy, relatively easy to construct a
361 repository in crystalline rock. So, we have some very good
362 features. We know where the big fractures are. Those are
363 relatively easy to locate. But crystalline rock, as you said it
364 very well yesterday, has its own constraints. So we know that
365 there is water, there is advective flow in the system, so we
366 have to adjust. We use design tools to adjust the location of
367 the canisters to ensure that the performance of the EBS and then
368 radionuclide releases if there are any that they are very slow
369 and they do not cause any harm to the environment. So
370 crystalline rock, yes, it's very good medium. But it has its own

371 constraints and I will talk about it in the next slide. Thank
372 you, please, Erika.

373

374 So just one slide to let you know that we have produced a
375 digital safety case. So, this is actually our second one. We
376 produced one for the construction license application in 2012.
377 And at the end of 2021 we produced, we submitted the one for the
378 operating license application. You can access our reports. The
379 figure on the right shows the methodology. I do not have the
380 time today to go through the methodology we used. All I wanted
381 to let you know is that these reports are readable on this
382 portal, mentioned on this slide, and you have to register to
383 gain access to the portal. And it takes a few days between the
384 time you submit your request and then you're granted access.
385 It's just for security reasons, data security reasons. Yes, it's
386 a portfolio.

387

388 Our safety case is a portfolio of eight main reports. They have
389 different titles. The key reports for us are the design basis.
390 As Erika mentioned, we have to be able to explain how our
391 understanding of the site translates into safety functions and
392 performance targets and down to the design of the EBS. Then the

393 second, I would say, most important report is the initial state
394 report. We have to show that we understand how the barriers look
395 like or the system looks like once the barriers are installed
396 and then the repository is constructing at the time when we
397 actually do not have any more control over the system. So, at
398 the time where everything is said and done. So that is called
399 the initial state report and that's the report where we also
400 look at potential deviations. We acknowledge the fact that human
401 error is a possibility and that we can have some quality non-
402 conformances that are undetected and then what does it mean for
403 us. So that's the initial state report.

404

405 Then we have another masterpiece, I would say. No, I'm just
406 exaggerating. I just wanted to give a shout out to my colleague
407 Pirjo Hella here today, because she was the ... one of the main
408 editors of the report or the main editor of the PAFOS report,
409 it's performance assessment and formulation of scenarios report.
410 That is the report where we actually describe the evolution or
411 lines of evolution of our disposal system taking into account
412 different types of uncertainties. Of course, in our work, line
413 of work, as is in yours, we have to look at very long
414 timeframes. So all we can say is that we have scenarios. We

415 cannot say really this is going to go down like that. So, we
416 have different sources of uncertainties and we formulate
417 scenarios based on them and then we assess whether we have
418 possible risk of canister failures, how many and when. And that
419 is called the PAFOS report.

420

421 And then we have a different report that looks at the
422 radiological consequences that is the analysis of releases
423 report. That is the report that calculates the milliSievert per
424 year that could come out of a given scenario or the background
425 per year, depending on the timeframe. So, these are really the
426 cornerstone reports. And then, of course, there's the synthesis
427 report of bring it all together. But as I said, please register
428 to gain access to our reports and then if you have questions or
429 specific modeling details then we have actually a report called
430 the Models and Data. You might be interested in that one as
431 well.

432

433 The timeframe of our safety case is one million years and it's
434 not explicitly given in our regulations. The regulations only
435 mention several hundreds of thousands of years, but in practice

436 we follow what most countries do when we go to one million years
437 as our timeframe. Next slide, please.

438

439 So the overall conclusions is that we have explored, we have
440 accessed the performance of our components, engineer components
441 and natural barrier over one million years. We have assessed the
442 impact of uncertainties. There are always uncertainties
443 remaining so this is something that we acknowledge very
444 explicitly in our safety case. So, there are always residual
445 uncertainties and the point of a safety case is to show that we
446 can acknowledge live with them. We believe we have a robust
447 enough system that we can live with these uncertainties. Yes,
448 there might be potential releases, but the consequences remain
449 within the compliance limits and even in the bigger picture we
450 have also a look at what do these limits mean 0.1 milliSievert
451 per year is actually, in regulatory terms means negligible
452 consequences from our repository.

453

454 And, in fact, when we look at the bigger picture, even in the
455 worst case scenarios, we still remain within natural
456 backgrounds. Those ranges and even much less than what is caused
457 by non-nuclear industries. So, we try to frame also the releases

458 from, eventual releases from a repository so that we have more
459 elements to compare with. Next slide, please, Erika.

460

461 I think key features, events and processes for crystalline rock.
462 Yesterday you went through very well through all of them. We
463 have a report by McEwen and Aikas from 2000 that I very much
464 encourage you to read, because it describes very well the site
465 selection process and what kind of processes were considered at
466 the early site selection so that the slow and steady natural
467 phenomena, the slow periodical phenomena, sea level changes of
468 course. In Finland we have to think about future glaciations and
469 then the sea level changes that come after that. The fact that
470 we will go under water at some point after the melting of the
471 next ice sheets. So, we have to really consider these type of
472 processes. We have rapid periodical processes like discharge,
473 recharge off the natural groundwater. Sudden catastrophic
474 phenomena we called them today rare events, earthquakes,
475 volcanoes that we don't have today. But actually, I've learned
476 myself that Finland in the very, very, very early phase there
477 were actually volcanoes here. Very interesting.

478

479 But anyway, we consider this type of typical real events that
480 are common to all repository programs-flooding and, of course,
481 earthquakes are the main ones for us. And then human activities
482 always have been present from the beginning of the geologic
483 disposal programs that we have to consider the construction from
484 human activities search for natural resources and non-
485 deliberative results of other human activities like wars and
486 such. So, these are the ... I think common processes that
487 everybody looks at. But then when we are really approaching the
488 operating phase, we have to consider very much the interaction
489 between the site and our engineer barriers and how they actually
490 play together and the interfaces. Particularly these are very
491 important. And then, yes, of course, as we go further in the
492 safety case some of the FEPs have been excluded because we have
493 learned that they do not apply to our site or design, so we have
494 been screening FEPs as well. Next slide, please.

495

496 Yes, the safety concept. This is very important and you have
497 also identified this point yesterday that for crystalline rock
498 the main barrier is the canister, so we have to rely on the EBS
499 very much, although the geosphere provides given safety

500 functions, isolation for example and slow transport of solutes
501 and radionuclides out our main barrier is the canister.

502

503 So, if you look at the safety concept it has two colors. The
504 figure on the right has two colors and two types of pillars. We
505 have the blue pillars. The blue vertical ones they really talk
506 about the performance of the EBS. The right hand side is proven
507 technical quality of the EBS. That means that we have to use
508 materials that are well characterized and their behavior can be
509 predicted well enough in the future so that, we go to the left
510 vertical column, so that we can prove that we provide, the other
511 EBS provide favorable conditions to the canister. So we want to
512 make sure that the canisters stay alive, stay intact for as long
513 as possible as the canister provides containment. So that is our
514 main safety. That is the safety function for the canister.

515

516 So, the three yellowish pillars in the middle they are there
517 because in case we lose containment, we lose the canister
518 breaches in fact, the radionuclides are released slowly from our
519 spent nuclear fuel. I think you will talk about it more today.
520 The ceramic UO_2 is very, very slowly, releases very slowly
521 radionuclides. But then we have also the buffer, the clay buffer

522 which retains and retards transportation of our radionuclides
523 and the rock of course. There is absorption along the fractures.
524 There's absorption in the matrix of the rock. But this is very
525 important because it's a different safety concept. You're
526 looking at other host rock formations.

527

528 And then the safety concept again is important because it takes
529 into account the constraints in the system. As I mentioned
530 earlier, we have constraints due to the fact that we're working
531 with crystalline rock and we have constraints due to the type of
532 spent nuclear fuel that we have to dispose. That spent nuclear
533 fuel cannot be designed, so we have to design around the
534 constraints from the host rock and the spent nuclear fuel. And
535 then there are constraints that are also introduced by the
536 engineer, other engineer barrier system, for example, buffer.
537 You heard yesterday that it's sensitive to very high
538 temperatures. It's sensitive to very high pHs or very low pHs.
539 So there are come constraints we need to accommodate. And we do
540 this through the design tool. Next slide, please.

541

542 So from the safety concept then we develop, we use a top down
543 approach to develop the design basis. So we go from the very

544 high level laws and regulations that say that the repository
545 should be safe. In the long term what does it mean? Then we
546 spell out the safety functions that we are given to our
547 barriers. We define what our barriers are, EBS and natural
548 barrier. We give them safety functions. And from each of these
549 safety functions then we define performance targets. We call
550 them long term performance targets. Other waste management
551 organizations call them in different ways. But basically, this
552 is what the barrier should do in the long term. And this is
553 where the FEPs become very important. This is where the loads
554 and conditions become very important. This is where the site
555 understanding or the geologic, the area, understanding if you do
556 not have a site, at least you have some ideas of what loads and
557 conditions each area or geographical location might experience
558 in the evolution. And that is used to formulate the design
559 requirements for your barriers or for the construction of your
560 repository. For example, how far apart the disposal holes should
561 be or the disposal tunnel should be and so on and so forth.

562

563 So, this is very important. It's your first step before you even
564 start thinking about radionuclide releases you have to think
565 about the performance of your system, what does the design into

566 account and then what are the residual uncertainties that need
567 to be assessed in the safety case. And this is one of the main
568 lessons learned I would say, a key message is, for me at least,
569 because we have been struggling with many of the requirements
570 that were not spelled out explicitly or some assumptions were
571 not spelled out explicitly in the 80s or in the 90s and we had
572 to sort of backtrack the loads and condition or the design basis
573 scenario that was in the mind of our designers.

574

575 So the message is that at the early stage you will have some
576 assumptions, even many assumptions about the loads and the
577 conditions that you will encounter, might encounter in different
578 locations. But it's important to write them down, especially if
579 they are just assumptions. Write it down and label it as
580 assumptions so you can iterate them and can go back to them and
581 check them, is this assumption important? Yes. Then let's do
582 some characterization of that area to confirm or update the
583 assumption.

584

585 And the same thing is with data. If you have some hard data
586 about a region or an area, write down what that is, actual
587 measurement, but what the measurement tool or what was the

588 measurement method and the reliability of the data is, so you
589 know 10 years, 15 years in the future you will know what this
590 data is actually saying and can it be relied upon or not. So,
591 the idea is that the design basis is iterative and you will have
592 to go back to this assumptions, early assumptions and early
593 data. And it has to be traceable and transparent, so you can
594 explain the changes that have happened throughout the time.

595

596 So, then the next slides, because I think you have said many,
597 many things yesterday in your modeling slides, I think what I
598 want to show is the interaction between the design basis and all
599 this modeling work that we do in Posiva. The first thing we need
600 to do is we use this models to explain what the sites or what
601 are the key FEPs, put the understanding of the areas into
602 numbers. And then we need to make sure that we have a conceptual
603 model that is actually correct before we go into the numerical
604 model that has its own issues as well as you discussed yesterday
605 we have to first and foremost make sure we have a conceptual
606 model that is robust and we can explain how it relates to the
607 understanding of the different sides and then we use that to
608 formulate the performance targets and justify the requirements
609 on our barriers. And then we talk about the models that are

610 predictive in nature and that we use for radionuclides transfer,
611 for example.

612

613 So, the modeling approach changes, of course, as the level of
614 understanding changes and then computational efficiency changes.
615 So, the bigger the model, the fancier the model. Yes, all that
616 is great. But make sure it does not become a black box in the
617 end, because you have to be able to explain what is happening in
618 your model.

619

620 This slide I don't need to say much about it. It's just that you
621 have characterization activities that translated into
622 interpretation. There's a lot of interpretation between the hard
623 data and then what you use in your safety case. So, there's
624 interpretation, then you translate that into a conceptual model
625 and a numerical model. Next slide, please.

626

627 Yes, this is another example of conceptual model. So, showing
628 our DFN model and then how in the fractures we have different
629 features in our fractures. We have rock matrix, we have
630 absorption. We don't need to discuss it because yesterday you
631 have, I think you have covered a lot of these issues very well.

632

633 This is just to show that the conceptual model for groundwater
634 chemistry. We have a layered type of chemistry in our
635 repository. And we have shown here two pictures. One is from the
636 early 2000s and actually we had this type of conceptualization
637 even earlier than this. It is to show you that the conceptual
638 model has kept quite stable throughout the years. We just added
639 a few details and we have, of course now, monitoring results
640 that can help to corroborate the conceptual model. I just wanted
641 to show you this yellow feature in our groundwater chemistry. We
642 have a sulfite rich water, which is from early water, seawater
643 intrusion from the last glaciation. And that is one of the key
644 scenario drivers in our safety case is sulfite, the corrosion
645 for the copper canisters. So, we have this pocket or layer of
646 water with sulfate and then with microbial activities
647 transferring into sulfite and this is why we are very much
648 interested in everything concerning sulfite and for a sulfite
649 cycle and copper corrosion. Next slide, please.

650

651 Yes, another application of site understanding and the tool, the
652 design tool is the definition of Rock Suitability
653 Classification. So we have rules to select the location of

654 disposal cavities and disposal holes, so that we can design
655 around the constraints from our site so that we do not locate
656 canisters where they should not be, so near a fracture that
657 could move or near a fracture that could bring in sulfate and so
658 on so forth. So we define criteria. And then if we go into
659 scenarios. So, of course, we cannot design the other message is
660 that... we cannot design for any kind of load and condition. So,
661 we have a given design basis. That means that, okay, so the
662 design takes into account these type of conditions and then
663 there are residual uncertainties that are taking into account in
664 our safety case. And that means that those uncertainties are
665 included in the form of scenarios. So, we have three ways to
666 break the canister- 1)corrosion, 2)rock shear and 3)isostatic
667 failure. So I don't think I need to talk about the rock shear
668 for the earthquakes. I think this is quite self-explanatory. The
669 isostatic loading is, the maximum load comes from the icesheet,
670 when it will be on top of the repository.

671

672 HOLT: I need to jump to the last couple of slides, because our
673 time is up.

674

675 PASTINA: Yes. But these are very site specific I would say and
676 safety case specific. So, for this kind of questions, you might
677 have I don't think ... I think you can see the slides and then go
678 in our Safety Case reports. And if you have further questions
679 then we are happy to help you try to figure out. What else did I
680 have in terms of ... yeah, we have.

681

682 HOLT: I'm going to jump to the conclusion slides, because we
683 need to have sufficient time for Q&A.

684

685 PASTINA: Go ahead.

686

687 HOLT: I'll just note that we have done a lot of studies on the
688 stability of buffer, similar to what we heard about yesterday
689 and some of the citations that were also yesterday on issues of
690 erosion and clogging and looking at alternative bentonite
691 materials. We have also spent a lot of time on looking at issues
692 on the canister and the corrosion. Some examples there and
693 different scenarios that can be used and what type of releases
694 there are.

695

696 So if I take one extra minute to send kind of these key messages
697 and then you will have these slides and be able to review these
698 in more detail. But overall one of the main things we wanted to
699 emphasize is that the safety is really driven by the rock. And
700 until you select a site there's ... of course we can model and
701 model, but it needs to start at a very generic level. And for us
702 in Finland we had no difference between our final four sites.
703 There was ... the greatest impact was the deviation within one
704 site. So getting ready and preparing the safety of the
705 repository, first we need the site and after that we can design
706 the EBS and the layout.

707

708 And that means that it needs to be quite systematic. We start
709 with a very generic design and then we understand and phase
710 you're in there in the United States to understand the
711 techniques and what to model and where to measure your site, so
712 to set the requirements for the design and the site and the
713 suitability of the rock. So, of course, there's processes to
714 understand in the rock and as you gain more information from the
715 site characterization, it's allowed then to iterate that layout
716 design and the EBS and better assess what are the impacts of the
717 FEPs and the interaction on issues like geochemistry and that

718 modeling will change as it gets more detailed as the site is
719 selected. But it shouldn't be a black box as Barb noted.

720

721 And, of course, just emphasizing this iteration. It needs to be
722 really design basis from the top down with the requirements and
723 after that it gets more and more detailed. But really important
724 to have transparent documentation of the assumptions. And taking
725 care to have the requirements management. So I think some of the
726 presentations we heard yesterday also about setting up these
727 tools where it is transparent and open and well documented are
728 exactly the right way to be going. And then understand that
729 there is a lot of feedback that's going to come from safety
730 assessments from authorities, from the characterization and the
731 adaption of the wastes and keep that database and keep iterating
732 it and communicating accurately for the people who need to use
733 it.

734

735 And so our last two slides were a couple of recommendations for
736 what the focus of the programs could be there from an R&D
737 perspective, and I think there are many things that we talked
738 about already, but just really keeping it conceptual and being
739 prepared for when the site is further developed then the

740 modeling could get more accurate. So making sure you have good
741 inputs for the EBS and the design and making sure that you have
742 clear documentation of these assumptions and processes.

743

744 And, of course, ourselves and others around the world are doing
745 this too. We've been through it, we have these lessons. We could
746 spend days explaining safety cases and going into details on any
747 of these topics. And we're definitely here to help and we
748 really, really want to cooperate with anyone there. So please
749 feel free to reach out to us. So in summary you cannot design
750 the rock that you have and you cannot change your inventory, but
751 it is very possible and realistic to change your repository
752 designs and select the barriers to be able to fit these
753 constraints and successfully input the high level and spent
754 fuels safely underground.

755

756 So thank you for your attention. Here are references where you
757 can register to get the safety case documents as well as a few
758 of the citations that we gave with some of the details. So thank
759 you for your time. Apologies for going a few minutes over and
760 let's please take questions now.

761

762 SIU: Thank you very much, Erika and Barbara. That was excellent.
763 Lots of very great information and we'll be looking at the
764 slides too of course. And I do appreciate your sensitivity
765 towards the schedule. With that, open questions.

766

767 TYLER: Erika and Barbara, thank you very much. This is Scott
768 Tyler, member of the Board. Outstanding presentation. Thank you
769 very much for joining us. At least not too late on your time. So
770 much appreciated. I had maybe a question that came up just at
771 the end as Barbara was describing the operational side of the
772 repository of defining proximity to fractures and proximity to
773 where to place waste once you've chosen the site and as you
774 iterate. And I'm just curious how that process has progressed
775 both time wise and decision making wise. How is ... I'm curious, a
776 little more on how that process has evolved.

777

778 PASTINA: Should I say the first ...

779

780 HOLT: Go ahead Barbara.

781

782 PASTINA: If Pirjo has something to add, since Pirjo also has
783 been involved very much in the rock suitability criteria. This

784 is also an iterative process. So we started with ... well, we knew
785 where the big deterministic fractures are in our system. The
786 issue is not so much to avoid the big fractures is to avoid the
787 middle sized fractures that might move in the case of an
788 earthquake event. And then all this was like a blind exercise in
789 the beginning before we started to go underground and before we
790 started to build our first disposal tunnels.

791

792 So we had to use rules that were quite conservative in the
793 beginning knowing where the big fractures are and where the
794 middle sized fractures might be. And then as we progressed with
795 our construction of the repository, we could constrain the size
796 of some of these middle size fractures that might actually pose
797 an issue. And then the other assumption is that a fracture that
798 might move is big enough to move is also the fracture where
799 water flows. So we are also looking at corrosion issues based on
800 the not only the size, but the transmissivity of these
801 fractures.

802

803 We use the offset distances at first. Well, we still have offset
804 distances. But we had to adjust them given what we know about
805 the site. So, we were a bit more conservative in the beginning

806 and then the more we know about the rock then, of course, we
807 were able to optimize the system. And the process is still
808 ongoing. We still have many years of construction and
809 observations ahead of us.

810

811 HOLT: I could also add that during, you know, construction,
812 which is where I've been involved a lot, also that we are
813 changing the locations, you know, as we go. So, we do a very
814 small drill hole, we check that that tunnel is accurate and
815 okay, then we change and adapt and we've learned how to do
816 better excavation methods to minimize the ... for instance, how to
817 create a plug notch. And then even when we choose where we drill
818 a specific vertical hole, we may slightly adjust that to avoid a
819 certain fracture. So, every day it's an iterative and learning
820 process based on the tests that we're doing. And we're also
821 monitoring and we're modeling with flow rates the rock that
822 we're in to iterate the design as we're going where we place
823 something.

824

825 PASTINA: Does Pirjo have additional comments?

826

827 HELLA: The rock suitability classification or host rock
828 classification as it was first called started around year 2000.
829 So, it's now been ongoing for the last 25 years, around, or at
830 least 20 years. And I think one of the observations in the
831 development was that we really need the ... site is such that we
832 really need information from the local rock. So a very important
833 step in that development was building the Onkalo and creating
834 the disposal depth where the construction of the tunnel, from
835 early on already helped, but then especially then the conditions
836 when we got information of the rock condition. So even
837 everything was not ready with the RSE. That was really a big
838 thing and a big leap in how to develop and where the in the
839 criteria development. And I think what I've been discussing with
840 the people now working in the tunnel and so they have like a
841 good understanding of the rock conditions that although it is
842 known that the rock there is heterogeneous but the people kind
843 of understanding so that we have this type of rock ... they vary
844 and then you really have to look at the exact sites and the
845 tunnels.

846

847 HOLT: Maybe we need to go into some next questions though,
848 because I know we're only, we're less than 10 minutes to go. So

849 maybe when we answer we'll just take one person answering I

850 guess so that we can get through all the Board members.

851

852 ILLANGASEKARE: Yeah. Thank you very much. Again Barbara thanks.

853 Twenty years ago, we worked together. So again I'm going to make

854 my comments short and I really appreciate the time and efforts

855 spent on the slides and I'm sure there's a lot of information,

856 we may get back to you. But one of the questions which came out

857 yesterday was the issue of the dynamics stress field around ...

858 you did mention this ... but can you give a little bit of any

859 information you didn't say in your talk and the second one did

860 you attempt constraints, anything you learned as you go through

861 the process, you keep updating I think the conceptual model. You

862 mentioned the use update. As you learned the system you update

863 it. So can you give a little bit of the issue stress field and

864 the dynamic loading as well as how the conceptual ...

865

866 PASTINA: Yes. So, of course, this requires a lot of time and I

867 only have very little, very little time to answer. Yes, we do

868 consider the dynamic stress field as a result of both

869 temperature in the beginning and then glaciations and

870 earthquakes. And that I would say is one of the sources of

871 uncertainty is how that flow field vary with the stress field.
872 We know it varies, but how much and how to implement it in our
873 safety case, I think here, I would encourage you to look at the
874 safety case reports and if you have a specific question then I
875 can also point you to the expert that looks at that particular
876 expertise. But, yes, we do have a dynamic stress field and we do
877 try to take it into account. The other one was the temperature
878 sensitivity. Do you mean with respect to bentonite?

879

880 ILLANGASEKARE: Bentonite and the temperatures.

881

882 PASTINA: Yes, yes, we have done a lot of work with the
883 temperature, because, of course, we want to make the footprint
884 of our repository as small as possible. It's a matter of
885 optimization and sustainability of the costs. So I think
886 yesterday mentioned the HotBENT exercise, European project. We
887 have been involved with that because we have currently one
888 hundred degrees temperature constraint, but we think we could go
889 higher. But, of course, we need to characterize what happens to
890 the clay.

891

892 ILLANGASEKARE: Thank you.

893

894 TYLER: Can I just ask one quick follow up with respect to the
895 stress field? Because I think that is important. Can you tell us
896 where in the process of the repository design did you begin to
897 build the models that you're using to understand the stress
898 field as you're building the repository, so the impact of the
899 repository construction? Where was that in the process?

900

901 PASTINA: Again, a long story but very short answer. You have to
902 ... well, we have to understand the regional stress field, so
903 where the brittle ... how the site was ... how the rock in the site
904 was formed. So we understand the regional stresses and then we
905 understand how the local stresses might be, so that we can
906 design the repository in the correct way. So we align the
907 disposal tunnels according to the main stress. I will not go
908 into details because a, I'm not an expert in this and b, we do
909 not have time. But the short answer is as you understand the
910 site understanding and the brittle, the formations
911 understanding. That's where it all starts.

912

913 TYLER: Thank you very much. Thank you.

914

915 SIU: This is Nathan Siu. I think this might have been answered a
916 bit in one of the first questions, but I was curious about your
917 views on let's say realistic modeling versus good enough
918 conservative analysis to demonstrate the safety case and how far
919 would you go beyond this good enough, for example, do your
920 optimization?

921

922 PASTINA: Well, the final answer I think it's in the hands of our
923 regulator. They will determine eventually if it's good enough.
924 But we make a case showing that we believe we understand the
925 systems sufficiently to the extent that we can even incorporate
926 the residual uncertainties. We know that there are residual
927 uncertainties. We will never be able to say that we know
928 everything. So the matter is how far can we go or how well can
929 we make the case that we can live with residual uncertainties
930 and that we still preserve safety, long term safety. So that's
931 why we have scenarios.

932

933 SIU: I guess the question is more, let's say you think you have
934 a good enough and even the regulator decides that's good enough.
935 Would you still pursue more complex realistic modeling for other
936 reasons?

937

938 PASTINA: Of course. The drive to optimize the system is always
939 there. And we will have definitely changes as we go along with
940 construction and operation. We have new technologies and new
941 instruments. So there is always a push and a drive to optimize
942 our system. So, of course, every time we will have to ...

943

944 HOLT: Same thing. Like we're still going to keep modeling our
945 system and we're still going to get new data and we're going to
946 reduce the safety factors as we get better knowledge. But I
947 think as someone said also in one of the answers yesterday, we
948 do it to the point where we're ready to submit it to the
949 regulator and then it's up to the regulator to tell us have we
950 not answered or justified it well enough with the robustness of
951 the system.

952

953 SIU: Thank you. Chandrika?

954

955 MANEPALLY: Thank you all of you for a wonderful presentation. A
956 couple of quick questions. The first question was did you
957 actually ... Erika said something about, or maybe Barbara said

958 something about considering the temperature limit. Is that
959 correct? Did I understand you all?

960

961 HOLT: That is correct.

962

963 MANEPALLY: Okay.

964

965 HOLT: Right now, our licensing is done for a maximum temperature
966 of 100 degrees and Posiva, ourselves and Posiva and like a
967 project coordinated by VTT in high temperature, the EURAD HiTech
968 project that was cited yesterday has been looking at the impacts
969 of temperature at 150 degrees as well as the cooperative project
970 that's at Nagra on HotBENT. And that is directly for us, so that
971 we can change potentially our canister spacing from six meters
972 to a closer distance, which would impact the amount of
973 excavation and the amount of clay that we need and still
974 maintain the safety function. So, we kind of anticipate that it
975 will change and hopefully that is something that we can account
976 for in our revision of the next safety case or the next
977 licensing.

978

979 MANEPALLY: Okay.

980

981 HOLT: But again, at very, very international collaboration and
982 we know there's a high interest there from the United States
983 based on your inventory.

984

985 MANEPALLY: Are you also considering alternative buffer
986 materials?

987

988 HOLT: All the time. So, we have reference case and then we look
989 at alternative buffer materials and what the impacts are for
990 either the buffer or the backfill, because they have different
991 types of retention requirements and again very much dependent on
992 economics and supply.

993

994 MANEPALLY: Okay. Thank you. The other question that I had was
995 about your capacity of the facility in terms of how much waste
996 you are going to be emplaced. Is that a fixed value that you're
997 designing for or does that change as you go with the
998 construction?

999

1000 HOLT: For the licensing that we have it is a fixed value. And
1001 our safety case is based on a fixed value. If there are

1002 additional reactors in the ... for instance, we're looking at what
1003 are the implications when or if, probably when, small reactors
1004 come or other types of vendors. We had another reactor being
1005 built prior to the Ukrainian war. So, we have to have the
1006 readiness to expand the repository if we have more spent fuel in
1007 Finland in the future, which is anticipated.

1008

1009 HELLA: And it has changed over the 40 years. It has changed.

1010

1011 MANEPALLY: Okay. Thank you.

1012

1013 SIU: And we'll continue with questions a bit. I do appreciate
1014 you sticking to schedule, but this is really important to us. So
1015 Bret I think you...

1016

1017 LESLIE: Yeah, this is Bret Leslie from the Board staff. Thanks
1018 to you all for a really informative presentation, the slides
1019 especially. In particular one of the slides really resonated
1020 with me, slide 21, which is make sure you are evaluating what
1021 your inventory is. And so, you're only doing commercial spent
1022 nuclear fuel and for the U.S. program we have to worry about
1023 other waste forms. And I think that's a ... what you said there

1024 really helps the Board to kind of review what DOE's doing. So
1025 appreciate that. Thank you.

1026

1027 WOODS: Hello, Brian Woods. I'm a member of the Board as well.
1028 I'm real curious. I know you chatted a little bit about your
1029 relationship with Sweden, working with them and of course the
1030 U.S. I'm just kind of curious from your perspective what are
1031 kind of the major kind of international collaborations that
1032 you've had that have kind of helped you get to the place where
1033 you're at right now?

1034

1035 HOLT: We have a national research program that's been running
1036 for decades that is important. So that is here domestically. But
1037 as Barb mentioned the key alliance initially has been with SKB
1038 and the Swedish program. But they also had a different step that
1039 they had an underground research lab, which wasn't site
1040 specific. And we made a different choice to have an underground
1041 research lab integrated with our disposal facility.

1042

1043 In general, we have a tightest cooperation typically with the
1044 other crystalline host rocks, which would be, you know, Canada
1045 looking at their sites now, at the Czech Republic, Japan. But we

1046 also talk about 75 percent of the issues are exactly the same.
1047 No matter what type of host rock it is. So, there's times when
1048 we cooperated really closely, for instance, with Nagra in
1049 Switzerland. Our earlier backfilling protocol was by blocks. And
1050 Nagra and the international community developed a different
1051 technique to auger in place pellets, which was able to achieve
1052 the densities that were needed.

1053

1054 And therefore, even though we had a design freeze at the time of
1055 our construction license, we've changed our emplacement
1056 methodology just recently. And the same in the buffer blocks. We
1057 had solid rings or donuts as you might have seen in our earlier
1058 design, but we've changed that to segmented blocks. And that has
1059 come through partnership also with manufacturing methods and
1060 quality control in consistencies in bentonite. So, we have
1061 really strong cooperation on the European level within the
1062 Euratom or European Commission type of projects.

1063

1064 And we have, you know, Finland is contributing more than ten
1065 million euros every couple years in those projects and even
1066 going forward in the next five years we've had really strong
1067 discussions with the DOE and the National Labs of aligning the

1068 research programs between Europe and the U.S. to have added
1069 value, so that we're not all duplicating each other but that
1070 we're complementary each other. I know some of the topics that
1071 we talked on yesterday are exactly the topics we've discussed
1072 for looking at, you know, even future waste streams of SMRs, but
1073 issues about, you know, copper erosion and bentonite material
1074 robustness, preparing for climate change scenarios, how does
1075 that impact repositories. Those kind of topics.

1076

1077 WOODS: Thank you.

1078

1079 PASTINA: I have to say we also were inspired by the Yucca
1080 Mountain taught systems performance assessment. Some of the
1081 analyses were quite impressive.

1082

1083 HOLT: So we followed Yucca Mountain. I mean, we have pictures of
1084 our Finnish staff there in Yucca Mountain decades ago. So the
1085 cooperation with the United States has also been fundamental to
1086 our success and we hope what we're doing now is bringing back
1087 helping your momentum there, move your program forward as well.

1088

1089 ILLANGASEKARE: I also have a short question. There was a point
1090 made a little later in the discussion we had yesterday. When and
1091 where to measure. So when you show when and where to measure
1092 that information came from modeling? Or that information came as
1093 you start working on the system, understand the system? Can you
1094 give your short answer to that? When and where to measure, how
1095 did you come to those type of visions?

1096

1097 PASTINA: It's both modeling and understanding. I would say as
1098 Pirjo mentioned earlier our lottery winning ticket was to go
1099 underground and to have the opportunity to characterize the rock
1100 from below ground once we applied for the decision-in-principle
1101 in 2000. So we were allowed to construct and what was in the
1102 beginning an underground characterization facility that then
1103 became part of our repository. So, yes, it was, in the
1104 beginning, it was based from surface investigations and then we
1105 have had the chance really that ... something that you do not have
1106 in the United States the opportunity to go underground and
1107 measure directly in situ. And it's an iterative process again.

1108

1109 HOLT: But maybe we could also say regarding the EBS materials,
1110 you know, it is a process of developing for instance a very

1111 generic type of low pH concrete or cement matrices that were
1112 used for instance for rock grouting in the tunnel plugs and then
1113 as we learned more and more about what is the actual conditions
1114 at the site and the groundwater flows then we could and, for
1115 instance, the width of the apertures that are needed for the
1116 grout injection, then we could adapt our recipe once we got
1117 there on site.

1118

1119 So we did kind of robust type of materials with low pH injection
1120 grouts or bentonite materials that could handle a lot of
1121 different pressures or a lot of different microbes until we knew
1122 the really details of the site. And then we focused it again. So
1123 we always started very small in lab scales and even when we get
1124 ready for the full scale demonstrations we've done it at 1/20th
1125 scale and then 1/6th scale and then sometimes in Sweden,
1126 sometimes with us. So it has been a back and forth between
1127 models, but getting lab data and upscaling both in lab and in
1128 the models.

1129

1130 PASTINA: You can learn already from surface investigation with
1131 today's technology I would say. You don't have to drill

1132 boreholes everywhere. There is quite a bit of data that you can
1133 gain.

1134

1135 HELLA: And I would like to add that actually from the direct
1136 fracturing and even in the flow, groundwater flow, you kind of
1137 got a good understanding from the drillhole inspections. But
1138 that's kind of general statistic and you saw that in the rock...
1139 and you really need then the rock information inside, for
1140 example, to locate, know exactly where the bad deposits over the
1141 good deposits are. Even though there was the basic understanding
1142 from the host that is.

1143

1144 SIU: So thank you again very much. It was very interesting and
1145 very helpful to us. And I think we'll go onto our next
1146 presentation.

1147

1148 HOLT: Thank you.

1149

1150 SIU: Our next speaker is Andrew Parmenter from the NWMO, the
1151 Nuclear Waste Management Organization in Canada. Andrew
1152 obviously we ran a little late and thanks for your patience. We
1153 will still give you your time that you need. Thank you.

1154

1155 PARMENTER: Thank you very much. I'm just working on getting my
1156 screen sharing here. And how does that work? Looks good?

1157

1158 SIU: We don't see anything.

1159

1160 PARMENTER: Are you sure?

1161

1162 SIU: Now you're up.

1163

1164 PARMENTER: Okay. Perfect. Okay, thank you very much. I'll get
1165 started. And just to make sure my slides advance. But I just
1166 would like to say good morning and thank you very much to the
1167 Board members and good afternoon to our colleagues on the other
1168 side of the ocean. I really appreciate the opportunity to speak
1169 to you today. So my name is Andy Parmenter. And I am here on
1170 behalf of really a pretty broad technical team to provide an
1171 overview of Canada's Nuclear Waste Management Organization's
1172 crystalline rock site characterization program. Now I really
1173 appreciate seeing the Finnish contribution earlier. It's
1174 aspirational where we would like to eventually get to, being
1175 underground direct characterization. Canada's program we're

1176 maybe just a few steps behind in the process. So I'll be talking
1177 more about our surface characterization at this stage and
1178 getting into some of the deep borehole drilling work.

1179

1180 Just a wee bit about myself. I am a professional geologist and
1181 I've been working with the NWMO for over 14 years. And I'm
1182 currently the Director of our Geoscience program. Now I would
1183 like to just begin my presentation with a land acknowledgement.
1184 I would like to acknowledge that with the hybrid format of our
1185 meeting we are all collectively gathered together from various
1186 indigenous traditional territories. I do encourage all of us to
1187 take the time today to acknowledge the traditional territory
1188 that we individually live and work on and recognize that we are
1189 all gathered here together with a collective mind, heart and
1190 spirit.

1191

1192 So, I'm in the city of Toronto in Canada. And I do recognize
1193 that I live, work and play on the traditional territory of many
1194 nations including the Mississaugas of the Credit, the
1195 Anishnabeg, the Chippewa, the Haudenosaunee and the Wendat
1196 peoples. In Toronto it's a fascinating place. It is now home to
1197 many diverse first nations in Inuit and Métis peoples.

1198

1199 So today I'm going to first provide a brief overview of the NWMO
1200 then speak generally about our technical site evaluation
1201 process. And then this will lead into a bit more of a detailed
1202 look at the approaches and activities we've undertaken to
1203 complete the crystalline site characterization activities to
1204 date. Then finally I'll touch on a few lessons learned and then
1205 open up for questions.

1206

1207 So, the Nuclear Waste Management Organization was established in
1208 2002 as a requirement of Canada's Nuclear Fuel Waste Act. We are
1209 funded by Canada's Nuclear Energy Corporations and we do operate
1210 on a not-for-profit basis. Our approach was guided by a multi-
1211 year dialogue with Canadians, including representatives from
1212 indigenous communities and technical specialists across every
1213 province and territory in the country. And from these
1214 conversations, the NWMO began the development and implementation
1215 of our approach for the safe long term management of Canada's
1216 used nuclear fuel in a manner that is going to protect people
1217 and the environment for generations to come, as we can all
1218 understand. It's part of our business.

1219

1220 So a little of just a bit of our planning timelines. As we are
1221 all well aware, in this business timelines for this process are
1222 very long. We are in an important and exciting time at the NWMO
1223 with our plan to select a single site at the end of this year,
1224 at the end of 2024. After 2024, we move into the regulatory
1225 decision-making process with several milestones leading to the
1226 planned receipt of a license to construct a facility in the
1227 early 2030s and through to the beginning of operations planned
1228 for the early 2040s. Certainly there's a lot of documentation to
1229 do, a lot of interaction with communities and our regulators to
1230 get through this planning timeline. But over the next few slides
1231 I'm just going to go a bit further back into our history.

1232

1233 So, this map shows the location of all the communities that
1234 initially expressed interest to learn more about the NWMO's
1235 process. This process started in 2010. We had representatives
1236 going out to municipal forums and meeting with community leaders
1237 and, ultimately, we had 22 communities come forward and put
1238 their hands up and say that they wanted to learn more about our
1239 process. And now today again we've narrowed down to two
1240 communities remaining. One, and let me see if I can put my,
1241 maybe I won't get too fancy with the laser pointer here, but

1242 there we go. One is Saugeen Ojibway Territory, the community of
1243 South Bruce Ontario, an underlying by sedimentary rock. And I
1244 won't be speaking about our sedimentary rock site today. And in
1245 Treaty#3 territory, on the traditional lands of Wabigoon Lake
1246 Ojibway Nation, the community of Ignace Ontario, underlain by
1247 crystalline bedrock.

1248

1249 Now I'd like to share a bit of information about our technical
1250 site evaluation process. So, in 2010 again, the NWMO released
1251 our site selection process document that reinforced our
1252 commitment to the safe, security and protection of people in the
1253 environment and further provided a summary of the scientific and
1254 technical site evaluation factors against which the potential
1255 sites could be evaluated.

1256

1257 Now the evaluation process was driven by community willingness
1258 to participate and followed a stepwise approach. So first, you
1259 know, when we started out these communities, we looked at
1260 available geoscientific information through an initial screening
1261 and desktop preliminary assessment. So, at the desktop stage,
1262 we're not collecting new information or gathering understanding
1263 from available geological maps, any available borehole testing

1264 in areas, which is quite limited in this type of rock. But we
1265 certainly gathered what information that we could. Ultimately
1266 this led us to completing field work activities in a subset of
1267 the communities. And an important aspect of this was along with
1268 the geoscientific assessments that we carried out they were done
1269 in parallel with socioeconomic and cultural assessments to
1270 determine whether the site has the potential to meet the
1271 detailed requirements of the project.

1272

1273 So, following the initial screening and each of the preliminary
1274 assessment phases communities were either screened out or could
1275 voluntarily leave the site selection process. So, we are now, as
1276 a noted earlier, nearing the end of phase two of our preliminary
1277 assessments. And according to the current schedule, we'll carry
1278 on with detailed field investigations at one site as of 2025.

1279

1280 So, this slide just illustrates conceptually the approach of
1281 starting with assessments in relatively large areas within
1282 communities at the desktop stage considering general potential
1283 suitability and leading to more focused field activities in
1284 selected areas to better determine the potential to find
1285 repository scale sites. At the earliest stage, the potential was

1286 evaluated by assessing if the site has available land of
1287 sufficient size to accommodate surface and underground
1288 facilities. At the time, nominally, our surface facilities were
1289 on the order of about 500 meters by 500 meters and underground
1290 on the order of two to three kilometers by two to three
1291 kilometers. Pretty generic at that stage.

1292

1293 We assessed whether the available lands were ... you know, we had
1294 to be away for protected areas, heritage sites, provincial parks
1295 and national parks. We also looked at the availability of
1296 groundwater resources. We wanted our available land to not
1297 contain known groundwater resources at depth or other
1298 economically exploitable natural resources. And finally, we
1299 wanted to ensure that the available land must not be located in
1300 areas with known geological and hydrogeological characteristics
1301 that would prevent the site from being safe.

1302

1303 So work got more exciting when we transitioned from the desktop
1304 studies to starting to collect new geoscientific data in the
1305 communities. We collected airborne geophysics and did surface
1306 investigations. Importantly these activities really did provide
1307 us with an opportunity to engage with the local communities and

1308 our indigenous partners. We had support from our indigenous
1309 partners as guides for field work to help navigate the areas,
1310 take us out and walk the land. That was a very fascinating
1311 aspect of the work. And, you know, ultimately all of these
1312 activities led us to define potential locations for borehole
1313 drilling and testing.

1314

1315 So importantly as the process advanced and more geoscientific
1316 information was collected, we were able to more meaningfully
1317 assess the technical suitability of proposed sites. We needed to
1318 assess the depth and volume of the bedrock under investigation.
1319 We needed to understand key geosphere properties, including rock
1320 mineralogy, rock and water chemistry. You know, a lot of it,
1321 certainly I've seen yesterday and this morning the most
1322 important thing is the site specific geoscientific
1323 characteristics. So that really is part of the process, getting
1324 to the point of being able to collect more and more site
1325 specific information.

1326

1327 We certainly needed to understand the hydraulic character of the
1328 bedrock and have confidence that the proposed host rock will be
1329 able to withstand natural stresses and thermal stresses induced

1330 by the repository. Again, concepts that have come up over the
1331 last couple of days. And really all this information ultimately
1332 will be instrumental in developing a strong geoscientific safety
1333 case to demonstrate the safe long-term containment and isolation
1334 that is required of deep geological repositories.

1335

1336 So that's really just a general look at our general post site
1337 evaluation. And with some of those things in mind I'm now going
1338 to move to our overview of the site characterization program
1339 that we did undertake at our crystalline bedrock location in
1340 northwest Toronto, Canada where again we are currently in the
1341 final stages of our phase two program leading towards site
1342 selection.

1343

1344 So, this is a bedrock geology map of Ontario and our crystalline
1345 site is located in the northwestern part of the province in the
1346 area noted here. So, we focused our investigation within several
1347 large granitic bodies in the Wabigoon Lake Ojibway Nation,
1348 Ignace Area. These granitic rocks are shown in pink and they
1349 occur throughout the northwestern part of Ontario. This is
1350 really part of the Canadian shield where the majority of the

1351 bedrock is more than two and half billion years old. So quite
1352 old bedrock to work with.

1353

1354 Now focusing in on that area, previous area, this map has a
1355 footprint of approximately 75 kilometers in the north/south
1356 direction by about 100 kilometers in the east/west direction.
1357 And it does show the bedrock geology of the Wabigoon Lake
1358 Ojibway Nation, Ignace Area. This is typical of Northwestern
1359 Ontario, large bodies of varying granitic composition. In the
1360 dark pink are surrounded in some areas by older mafic material
1361 in the lighter pinks and in others super crustal rocks we call
1362 greenstone belts in dark green. And they do wrap around like
1363 ribbons in some cases around these granitic bodies.

1364

1365 Four areas outlined in orange here, here and the other two, are
1366 located within the boundaries of the granitic bodies. These
1367 areas were predefined based on earlier phases of desktop work
1368 and were the areas within which we focused our field mapping
1369 efforts. Now to support the planning and implementation of the
1370 ground field work, we also collected airborne geophysical data
1371 within these red bounded regions, so two larger footprint areas
1372 where we collected airborne geophysics. Note that I have

1373 specifically labeled the Revell Batholith here in the bottom
1374 left corner in the southwestern most part of this area, which as
1375 I will come back to later, is the location where we ultimately
1376 ended up undertaking our borehole drilling campaign.

1377

1378 So, gravity and magnetic airborne surveys were collected in the
1379 two regions in 2015. And this is just an example of the magnetic
1380 data. So, the magnetic data in the two regions that I showed
1381 earlier here and here. And it's sitting on top of Canada-wide
1382 geophysical data that's publicly available across the area. So
1383 we had collected some of this in earlier desktop studies and
1384 recognize that we wanted to collect some new data to support our
1385 investigations.

1386

1387 So, for comparison the new data that we acquired was flown at a
1388 line spacing of 100 meters, while the Canada-wide data were
1389 flown at 800 meter spacing. So the resolution, you can see the
1390 difference. The new data really allows for clear and sharp
1391 distinction between, for example, the green stone belt fabric in
1392 these magnetic high ribbons that wrap around the more granitic
1393 bodies which often are varying degrees of magnetic character.

1394

1395 And in particular, I'll focus on this relatively featureless low
1396 magnetic region of the Revell Batholith down here. There are
1397 very interesting things that come out of this data. For
1398 instance, the circular magnetic high region within the Revell
1399 Batholith does define a lake granitic intrusion, which supports
1400 the understanding that this body of rock is a composite of
1401 several intrusive events. There is a Proterozoic dyke that cuts
1402 through, also a magnetic high, very linear that cuts through the
1403 northern portion of the Revell Batholith. And other really neat
1404 things that come out of this data. In the broad area you can see
1405 to the north these subparallel sets of large fractures which are
1406 magnetic lows. So, this really is a fantastic data set to work
1407 with. And you know it starts to develop our understanding of
1408 fractures at a certain scale. And obviously crystalline rock
1409 fractures are a very important thing and that is a bit of an
1410 underlying theme to the story today.

1411

1412 Also to support the field-based geological mapping activities,
1413 we looked at locations of exposed bedrock. We predicted these
1414 locations using high resolution imagery. And I'm showing this
1415 because it's especially important and useful in planning daily
1416 traverses to go out and look at the bedrock in the areas. We had

1417 to estimate the number of field days that it will be required to
1418 cover certain areas. And our intent was to investigate all these
1419 predicted outcrop locations. Now it turned out some of these
1420 locations, especially in the central area here were actually
1421 chipped wood piles from logging operations that are ongoing in
1422 the area. But many areas, especially in the north and in the
1423 west, turned out to be bedrock to be examined very nicely.

1424

1425 So, after completion of the initial field studies, a decision
1426 was made, both on technical and social grounds, to move forward
1427 with work at an area that we identified as the Revell site, this
1428 oval here, which was in the northern part of the area that we
1429 were investigating in the Revell Batholith. And this was the
1430 area that was agreed that NWMO would begin its deep drilling
1431 program. Now one of the first things that we did once we
1432 narrowed down to this specific area was to recognize that we
1433 needed to update our bedrock geology map, develop a new good
1434 two-dimensional representation of the bedrock geology. We did
1435 have existing maps of 1:250,000 scale bedrock map available. But
1436 you can see even in a comparison of the outline of the boundary
1437 of the Revell Batholith compared to what we see in the magnetic

1438 data there's certainly a lot of detail that comes out of this
1439 new data.

1440

1441 So, we took this as an opportunity to refine the boundary
1442 between the batholith and the surrounding greenstone belts and
1443 better refined the nature of this Proterozoic dyke cutting
1444 through our area. Again, excellent data to work with. We also
1445 completed a structural lineament interpretation using the
1446 magnetic data and a digital elevation model built based on data
1447 from the LIDAR survey. So, the resulting bedrock shown on the
1448 right combines all of our available geological information,
1449 updated representation of the bedrock units and interpreted
1450 structures for the Revell site. And I'm just showing here where
1451 we drilled our six deep boreholes that I'll get into in a bit
1452 more detail in a moment. And for again a sense of scale here all
1453 of these fit within about a five by five kilometer box.

1454

1455 And importantly the relatively low intensity magnetic region
1456 that we can see in the bottom left corner in the magnetic data
1457 did turn out to be with boots on the ground mapping. We're able
1458 to ground truth it to understand that it is a relatively
1459 homogeneous granitic rock. This pink area here in the map.

1460 Compositionally defined as a biotype granodiorite tantalite,
1461 there are few inliers of greenstone belts and a few other
1462 compositional phases of the batholith. We focused the rest of
1463 our work really in this area.

1464

1465 So, another important thing we wanted to really do was take the
1466 surface representation and build a three-dimensional geological
1467 model. So, this schematic just simply shows the three-
1468 dimensional body of the Revell batholith just pulled out and
1469 extracted from the surrounding greenstone belt rocks. You know,
1470 we were able to use available information from regional datasets
1471 on rock properties to help constrain the model.

1472

1473 Surface mapping and structural data helped us to define the
1474 boundaries and again that magnetic data was instrumental in
1475 building the geometry. So, you know, while the geometry of the
1476 margins at depth are only loosely constrained, we were able to
1477 determine with reasonable certainty that the central part of the
1478 northern part of the Revell batholith, again up here where we're
1479 drilling our boreholes was at least two and half to three
1480 kilometers in thickness. So overall, you know, we went from this
1481 approach of updating the two-dimensional bedrock map to

1482 developing the three-dimensional model giving us a high degree
1483 of confidence that we're working in an area with sufficient
1484 volume of relatively homogenous bedrock.

1485

1486 So, with this prediction of our geology and the three dimensions
1487 in mind, we did begin to undertake our deep borehole drilling,
1488 coring and testing program. And, again, getting more exciting as
1489 we progress through the phases. So, this is just an example of a
1490 typical drilling pad, fenced off to prevent site creep and with
1491 plenty of space for the many trailers and infrastructure
1492 required to ensure safe and successful operations.

1493

1494 Now this aerial image shows the locations of all of our six deep
1495 boreholes drilled at the Revell site. All boreholes extend for a
1496 thousand meters along their length. The first borehole, IG_BH01
1497 here, was drilled vertically, while the latter five boreholes
1498 were all drilled nominally at 70 degrees to intersect various
1499 topographic lineaments in order to understand the nature of
1500 these features at depth. Notably the northern part of the site
1501 has seen relatively recent logging operations, so there's quite
1502 a bit of bedrock exposure up here as well. And in some cases,
1503 it's only partially regrown. In contrast, further to the south,

1504 you know, we're in thick boreal forest, so we did have to
1505 develop new roads in order to gain access to these sites. So, we
1506 developed these roads that lead to borehole 3, 6 and 2.

1507

1508 And this is just an example of the ground level view when these
1509 access roads were being developed. So the main objectives of the
1510 borehole drilling program was to obviously collect subsurface
1511 geoscientific information to advance our understanding of the
1512 site. Key to the program was completing a complete core
1513 recovery, so all 1,000 meters was collected to provide direct
1514 information on the bedrock and its structure. Along the way
1515 groundwater samples were collected at flowing fractures and core
1516 samples were collected for laboratory testing. After the
1517 drilling, geophysical logging and hydraulic testing were
1518 completed in all boreholes.

1519

1520 So this is just a schematic showing the construction of one
1521 angle borehole with a telescopic casing system. We had a
1522 conductor casing in the upper few meters and surface casing down
1523 to approximately 71 meters along the length of this particular
1524 hole. All of our surface casing were nominally between 70 and
1525 100 meters. And these are designed to disconnect the potential

1526 water bearing fractures of the near surface from the borehole
1527 itself. The open hole is 96 millimeters in diameter and we
1528 extracted a 61.1 millimeter core during the drilling.

1529

1530 In these crystalline rock conditions, we did find that each
1531 borehole used about 10 diamond drill bits. Each lasting for
1532 about 100 meters. And you can see the contrast on the right
1533 between a new, brand new drill bit and a used one on the left.

1534

1535 So certainly, not new to anyone in this group here but just want
1536 to share that, you know, core extracted from the drilling was
1537 sampled at varying lengths and locations and subject to numerous
1538 tests. Really again constructed to build site specific suite
1539 properties: rock strength, thermal character, geochemical
1540 character, both rock and water and absorption properties among
1541 other things. In addition, you know one of the challenges is
1542 that there is not a lot of water at this site, so we certainly
1543 go to the length of extracting core waters and noble gas is
1544 trapped in the bedrock, again to aid an understanding the long
1545 term evolution of the geosphere.

1546

1547 And certainly along with collecting core samples during drilling
1548 and sending those off to labs, we opportunistically collected
1549 groundwater samples where possible at flowing fractures. We
1550 looked at fluid loss or gain as indicators of the presence of
1551 these sampling opportunities, paused the drilling, lowered the
1552 equipment down to collect the water sample. Now the drilling
1553 water was traced with a fluorescent dye to distinguish it from
1554 naturally occurring groundwater in the fracture. So, we purged
1555 that drill water, often for many hours or days, to remove the
1556 drill water and allow for collection of a clean sample.

1557

1558 And after completion of the borehole drilling, we began the
1559 geophysical logging program, again to collect additional
1560 continuous data along each borehole. And certainly, this data
1561 was instrumental along with the visual core logging to develop
1562 the integrated geological description for each borehole. So,
1563 this image on the right shows an example of one of our
1564 integrated geological logs. It includes our rock log, alteration
1565 log here, mapping the alteration of the bedrock and then several
1566 geophysical logs. Now just to say the pink color on the rock log
1567 here from one of our boreholes does represent this biotype
1568 granodiorite tantalite, which again as predicted from the

1569 surface characterization represents the majority of the rock by
1570 length along the borehole.

1571

1572 Overall, the same granodiorite tantalite rock was encountered in
1573 more than 60 percent or, sorry, 90 percent, excuse me, more than
1574 90 percent of the six kilometers of recovered core by length.

1575 Minor addition rock types of varying mafic and felsic intrusive
1576 phases make up the rest of the length of each borehole. On
1577 composition variations that occur at rock type changes are often
1578 picked up by the geophysical log. For example, this summary log
1579 shows a sharp distinct density high right here and here and a
1580 few others and a neutron log low. So, this is a nice indicator
1581 of distinct rock type. And we were able to have again the direct
1582 comparison to the core to indicate that there is a spatial
1583 correlation with a suite of fine grain mafic bodies in the
1584 bedrock. And this same relationship was identified in all
1585 boreholes where similar mafic bodies were present. So again, the
1586 continuous geophysical data was very helpful in developing our
1587 understanding.

1588

1589 Certainly as well optical and acoustic televiewer logs were a
1590 fantastic dataset used to develop our integrated structural log.

1591 They allowed us to define true orientations for brittle and
1592 ductile structures. We did not orient the core in five
1593 boreholes. We made an attempt in one borehole, but really found
1594 that the televIEWer data gave us the most confidence in being
1595 able to reorient structures. And certainly, you can see things
1596 like variations in aperture, things that have been discussed in
1597 other presentations earlier. We can look at changes in rock type
1598 and really the key thing is some of these fundamental fracture
1599 relationships, orientation in particular, and intensity really
1600 come out of this data.

1601

1602 So, we have fractures at the regional scale, fractures at the
1603 core scale and now we're trying to ... we fill in some of that
1604 additional intermediate-scale with 2D seismic investigation. So,
1605 we acquired approximately 17 kilometers of seismic data,
1606 primarily along the road network that we developed and the array
1607 design allowed for imaging down to about one and a half
1608 kilometers. So, this map just shows the seismic coverage of all
1609 these different lines across the site.

1610

1611 We also collected vertical seismic profiling data in selective
1612 boreholes to support our overall seismic interpretation and

1613 implement all these mafic bodies that we identified in boreholes
1614 also have very strong reflections in the 2D and vertical seismic
1615 data. So, we have this direct correlation between borehole and
1616 seismic data that allowed us to develop a geological model that
1617 incorporates these mafic bodies as sheet like structures within
1618 the volume of the site. Now these bodies are important,
1619 especially to characterize because they do often correlate with
1620 increases in fracture intensity and in some cases flowing
1621 fractures.

1622

1623 And then speaking of hydraulic characterization certainly along
1624 with characterize in the rock we want to characterize its
1625 hydraulic character. So, we undertook hydraulic testing program.
1626 So specific intervals along the borehole were isolated using
1627 inflatable packers on either end of a 20 meter long tool and
1628 tested for their pressure response to water being pumped from
1629 the interval. We generally tested 20 to 30 intervals within each
1630 borehole, covering a mix of sparsely fractured bedrock and
1631 increased fracture intensity.

1632

1633 I just want to highlight on the right some ongoing complementary
1634 research done by folks at the University of Waterloo. Now they

1635 compiled permeability measurements from various Atomic Energy of
1636 Canada research sites on the Canadian Shield. Atomic Energy of
1637 Canada did a lot of research back in the late 70s and 80s on
1638 crystalline bedrock in and around the area. So, the data was
1639 mined and compiled to show... to develop a permeability
1640 database, which includes a best fit of data for intact rock mass
1641 on the left and fracture permeability on the right. And the
1642 value of having this dataset is that it can be used for
1643 comparison against our site specific hydraulic test results.
1644 And, as a general observation, permeability does tend to
1645 decrease with depth relatively high in the near surface, but
1646 with depth decreasing as we would expect as the stresses
1647 increase in the bedrock.

1648

1649 Now some of the boreholes had long-term monitoring equipment
1650 installed to monitor for pressure variation over time and it
1651 continued to attempt to retrieve groundwater samples. Now these
1652 longer-term installations were very helpful in collecting
1653 additional site specific information on water chemistry from
1654 zones that were not flowing at a high enough rate to collect
1655 samples during drilling.

1656

1657 We also, along with the deep boreholes we also installed shallow
1658 groundwater wells to a maximum depth of 100 meters in order to
1659 characterize the near-surface bedrock groundwater zone.

1660 Certainly, this is important to help define surface boundary
1661 conditions for meaningful groundwater flow modeling. And at each
1662 of three locations, three shallow boreholes were drilled 50
1663 meters apart in triangulated configurations. And another key
1664 aspect here is these boreholes required much less infrastructure
1665 than the deep boreholes.

1666

1667 So this map just shows both our deep, in the red dots, and our
1668 shallow groundwater wells, just showing the coverage at our
1669 site. Along with some of the watershed subcatchments of the
1670 area.

1671

1672 Additional site characterization work involved the ongoing
1673 collection of micro seismic data using a network of nine
1674 stations installed between 2020 and 2021. The pink triangles are
1675 the stations, including one at the center of our site at
1676 borehole 2. Now this network is able to identify events as low
1677 as magnitude one within a coverage zone that extends in a 50-
1678 kilometer radius around the site, which provides us the data

1679 coverage to support probabilistic seismic hazard assessments in
1680 the future. Right now, the key thing is collecting the data.
1681 Note that there are stations in the region. These blue
1682 triangles, which are part of, oops, right there, which are part
1683 of Canada's seismographic network with publicly available data.
1684 So, the results here I'm just showing indicate seismic events in
1685 magnitudes over an approximately one-year period, from the end
1686 of 2020 to the end of 2021. So, you can see that there are
1687 numerous, a very small magnitude events that occur in the area.
1688
1689 So, the previous slides provide a high level overview of the key
1690 activities that we completed leading up to and including the
1691 deep borehole drilling in the characterization program at the
1692 Revell site. I just would like to finish my presentation today
1693 by noting a few lessons learned along the journey to where we
1694 are today.
1695
1696 And really firstly I would like to share how much of an honor it
1697 has been to work with our local community and our indigenous
1698 partners. We're incorporating their traditional knowledge,
1699 participating in in ceremony and learning about their meaningful
1700 connection to the land. This work in particularly has truly

1701 opened my eyes to the reverence that our indigenous partners
1702 hold for the bedrock that we are studying. They call these rocks
1703 at the Revell site and elsewhere the grandfathers. And as a
1704 geologist, I can appreciate that that name signifies the wisdom
1705 of time and great strength that these rocks possess. We have
1706 also worked with our indigenous partners to interweave their
1707 world view into how we as Western scientists communicate about
1708 the journey that water takes within the bedrock, all these
1709 concepts looking at it from different lenses. And it's been
1710 fantastic conversations.

1711

1712 And really overall we tried to be very respectful towards our
1713 indigenous and local community partners while we're working on
1714 their traditional lands. Key logistical and safety protocols are
1715 translated into the local indigenous language and clearly posted
1716 at drill sites. We had monitors from the local first nations who
1717 were available to be onsite 24 hours a day to ensure that the
1718 site activities were done in a way so as to minimize overall
1719 impact.

1720

1721 And really this leads to another general lesson learned for us
1722 that this need to demonstrate a strong commitment to protecting

1723 people in the environment while doing our work. So especially
1724 these deep borehole drilling sites they become small industrial
1725 zones. But it is important to acknowledge that this is the land
1726 of many creatures and so, you know, part of the work we did was
1727 include multiple levels and styles of fencing, so really to keep
1728 these sites and our equipment contained. We also ran borehole
1729 tours so that members of the public could come and see the work
1730 during drilling operations and allowed people to come and see
1731 for themselves just how we were treading on the land.

1732

1733 This is just a nice drone image showing a defined borehole site.
1734 This one is approximately 50 meters, top bottom, by 70 meters in
1735 dimensions. And, again, with a very clearly defined boundary
1736 surrounded by several layers of protective fencing and plenty of
1737 space to move around safely and efficiently. Now I will say the
1738 first borehole, another lesson that we learned was our first
1739 boreholes very small, very tight. We really tried to contain it,
1740 but felt we needed to find a good balance between a reasonably
1741 sized site and ability to move around safely but still contain
1742 our work within the natural environment.

1743

1744 And, you know, again listening to the presentation before mine
1745 this morning and also, you know, the nature of being here with
1746 you all today is we are all learning from international
1747 experience. You know, I'm just holding up these two, the
1748 geoscientific site characterization programs and safety
1749 assessments of other crystalline sites are well ahead of the
1750 Canadian program. But, you know, again this is what we aspire to
1751 moving further in our licensing process and being able to
1752 eventually go underground. And although the design details vary
1753 from study to study, really, we are all able to understand that
1754 it is the geology that matters in these site specific locations.
1755 We need to demonstrate that the geology works, so that we can
1756 protect humans and environment from the long term hazards of the
1757 use of nuclear fuel.

1758

1759 And our Posiva colleagues would probably know exactly where this
1760 is underground. But again, just to say that other countries are
1761 doing this. These are real world examples that tell us that the
1762 bedrock can be excavated at depth in crystalline rock similar to
1763 the Revell site and be fit for purpose.

1764

1765 And, finally, really this aspect of documenting our findings and
1766 public-facing reports. All of us probably recognize, and the
1767 more years I'm on this job I understand and learn the key to
1768 success is communication, specifically communicating to an
1769 audience that is not familiar with the complexity of information
1770 that we collect while characterizing crystalline bedrock and how
1771 do we take this information and build a confident story of site
1772 understanding and safety that the public can accept. So, the
1773 NWMO has begun to tell our story for both of our remaining
1774 sites, discussing site suitability from a technical perspective,
1775 again relying on international best practices in terms of a
1776 multiple barrier system, which is again a whole other
1777 presentation in itself, and supporting key decision statements
1778 with results from site-specific technical studies.

1779

1780 Now in communicating this story we also do need to discuss
1781 results. And this is not my area of expertise, but my colleagues
1782 in safety assessment have completed preliminary safety analyses
1783 using site-specific data where available, and that's an
1784 important aspect, for both operational and post closure phases.
1785 So, the post-closure safety assessment really considers how any
1786 potential contaminants from the repository, regardless of

1787 amount, could get into the shallow groundwater, surface water,
1788 air, sediment and soil and then looking at the potential impact.
1789 So, the assessment gauges impact in part by estimating the dose
1790 a future person could receive under a variety of post-closure
1791 scenarios and then we compare those against benchmarks, such as
1792 the annual background dose from nature, about 1.8 milliSievert
1793 here, which is the Canada average and the Canadian regulatory
1794 public dose limit of 1 milliSievert per year.

1795

1796 In the result of our preliminary assessment are illustrated and
1797 show calculated peak doses after thousands of years for
1798 different scenarios, including a what-if scenario if all
1799 containers fail for an imaginary person living, soon to be
1800 living at the location of maximum exposure and for a rural
1801 person living in the general vicinity of the site. So, in all
1802 scenarios considered in our preliminary assessment currently the
1803 estimated impacts from the repository are well below the natural
1804 background and regulatory dose limits. Now this is even true if
1805 every container fails in our current assessments. The used fuel
1806 in the rocks still provide a substantial barrier and will
1807 contain and isolate the radioactivity in the used fuel from
1808 people and the environment. And certainly, I'm excited to

1809 continue our journey for myself from the geoscientific
1810 characterization point of view, collecting more site-specific
1811 data that we can work with our colleagues downstream to continue
1812 to refine our understanding of what the potential impacts are.
1813 So I will leave you with a few key references cited above and
1814 say thank you very much for your attention.

1815

1816 SIU: Thank you, Andrew. We'll start with some questions from the
1817 Board members.

1818

1819 ILLANGASEKARE: I'm a Board member and I'm going to leave my
1820 geology question to Scott. But I have a general observation and
1821 a question. So, you made in your site ... you said technical and
1822 social factors. So, when you said technical and social factors,
1823 which one came first? When you go to the site do you look at the
1824 social factors and decide the technical factors so you eliminate
1825 technical decisions before the social factors? And what are
1826 those social factors?

1827

1828 PARMENTER: Well, I guess I'd say in a lot of ways the social
1829 aspect came first, in the sense that, communities came forward
1830 and put up their hands to say that they wanted to be interested

1831 or involved in the process, to learn more. And then ultimately
1832 as we moved forward, even at the desktop phase, I'd say things
1833 happened pretty much in parallel. So as we were doing the
1834 geological investigations at varying levels of detail, you know,
1835 we have a broad engagement, social engagement, indigenous
1836 engagement teams that were out speaking with the community,
1837 learning about what their values are, what their vision is for
1838 their community going forward. So I'd really say that they were
1839 happening in parallel.

1840

1841 ILLANGASEKARE: The second question came from the previous
1842 Finnish presentation, they talked about surface. When the
1843 technology of surface monitoring of ... can become available, then
1844 they don't have to go underground. But in your case, you did a
1845 lot of surface investigation first and then you started
1846 drilling. So is an iterative process, you go back to validate
1847 the ground truth to the coring and then do you go back to the
1848 surface technologies again to see how good you are doing ... how
1849 good you have done?

1850

1851 PARMENTER: Yeah. It really is in practice a validation exercise.
1852 So as we, and again it's a whole other presentation, to show the

1853 development of our geological model, but, you know ... yeah, we
1854 develop the two-dimensional representation, our understanding of
1855 the surface of the type of bedrock that we were investigating
1856 and as we drilled the boreholes exactly that. We were verifying
1857 our assumptions, we were finding our understanding. But it
1858 really was this prediction outcome exercise every borehole. And
1859 then ... so ultimately it is a very iterative process, but as you
1860 say it's ... I mean, this is all really surface, characterization
1861 from the surface. And, you know, I guess to the point made in
1862 the previous presentation we, you know, with the 2D seismic data
1863 in the six boreholes that we have we feel like that is, even in
1864 a crystalline environment quite a lot of information to help us
1865 have confidence and develop a very good geological model that
1866 when we get to the next phase of work we continue to verify and
1867 prove out that conceptual understanding.

1868

1869 ILLANGASEKARE: And my last question, the slide 46 you had
1870 estimated impacts. So this estimated impacts based on models I
1871 assume. Is that correct?

1872

1873 PARMENTER: Yes, that's right.

1874

1875 ILLANGASEKARE: And then the models of course have uncertainties.
1876 So your numbers are very small. In your modeling it's a detail,
1877 but my question is that ... you are able to reduce the
1878 uncertainties I assume as you did site characterization and that
1879 information when you do a model and then now ... so how much
1880 confidence do you have in those numbers at the bottom of your
1881 inverted pyramid?

1882

1883 PARMENTER: I would say that we have confidence that the site is
1884 going to perform its job. I do agree that ... we are very careful
1885 in documenting our uncertainties and indicating that obviously
1886 the job is not done at this stage. Once we going to detailed
1887 characterization at one of our selected sites, we will continue
1888 drilling boreholes and learning more and hopefully shrinking
1889 that uncertainty. And that is part of the process. So this is
1890 what I call the preliminary illustration, but, you know, I do
1891 have confidence that this crystalline rock can do the job.

1892

1893 ILLANGASEKARE: It is possible that those numbers can go up also
1894 based on the uncertainties.

1895

1896 PARMENTER: Certainly. Yes. And that is all part of the process.

1897

1898 ILLANGASEKARE: Thank you.

1899

1900 PARMENTER: Yeah. You're very welcome.

1901

1902 ILLANGASEKARE: Thank you very much for a very nice presentation.

1903

1904 TYLER: Thank you, Andrew. Scott Tyler from the Board. Appreciate
1905 the presentation. I, too, was going to ask a little bit about
1906 how that inverted cone pyramid would be communicated to how it
1907 would be changed as we go forward, because it will change as you
1908 refine your models. And so that is a preliminary first cut or
1909 second cut. How do you plan to go forward communicating, as you
1910 said communication is critical, communicating those changes in
1911 your expected performance of the site?

1912

1913 PARMENTER: Great question. And I would say that, you know, at
1914 this stage we are being extremely conservative in the inputs
1915 that go into the modeling work. And it's not my area of
1916 expertise, but as the geoscience team our job really is to
1917 provide the data and the conceptual understanding to our
1918 downstream users in safety assessment to go through the modeling

1919 exercise. And, you know, ultimately really we just have to keep
1920 demonstrating to the public that as we collect additional
1921 information, keep going through this exercise and illustrating
1922 for them what the potential peak doses are. One of the things
1923 that I'm always thinking about is how can we have, develop
1924 simple illustrations to describe these very complex topics.

1925

1926 Now I would say is once we go down and select our single site we
1927 move into the regulatory process where we are going to need to
1928 be submitting a suite of documents for both technical and public
1929 and regulatory review. And that will be our first licensing
1930 phase to allow us to prepare the site. And so I'd say it's an
1931 iterative process and every time we're going to be submitting a
1932 new suite of documentation that advances our understanding,
1933 defines our uncertainties and presents our results with the
1934 information to date. So it's just an ongoing process where we
1935 will continue to provide the most up to date understanding of
1936 the geosphere.

1937

1938 TYLER: Okay. Thank you. Now I'll ask my geology question. Scott
1939 Tyler again from the Board. So I'm curious early on in your
1940 presentation you talked a little bit about, I'll call it site,

1941 generic site criteria where you had, you were looking for land
1942 areas that had, you know, two by two or three by three square
1943 kilometers on the surface, which I assume is based upon
1944 inventory, what you expect to be disposing of.

1945

1946 PARMENTER: That's right.

1947

1948 TYLER: But then you move to the idea of when you got your three-
1949 dimensional model of the granite intrusion where it was a few
1950 kilometers, two to three kilometers in thickness. And that was,
1951 I'll say that was positive in your view. And I'm just curious
1952 where in the process did the sort of, the siting criteria of how
1953 thick the crystalline, relatively unfractured crystalline rock
1954 where did that come into play just from a generic siting
1955 criteria? You know, could it have been 700 meters of granite?
1956 Would that have been a showstopper? Where did those design
1957 criteria, preliminary design criteria come from and how useful
1958 were they? And how did they evolve?

1959

1960 PARMENTER: So I guess nominally we've always spoken in terms of
1961 around 500 meters depth as an optimal repository location. We
1962 have done ... you know, prior to collecting site data we did many

1963 case studies with generic crystalline rock data, using
1964 information from our Scandinavian partners and, you know, we
1965 looked at varying depths between 500 and 800 meters. So, you
1966 know, ultimately, I'd say early in the process we did talk
1967 nominally about 500 meters. We in general think about a depth
1968 around 500 to 800, you know, deep enough, not too deep, but sort
1969 of that Goldilocks' depth.

1970

1971 So I would say there would be a minimum thickness, you know, 700
1972 meters might have been a bit borderline for a suitable target
1973 host rock. Now the challenge being that there's not a lot of
1974 boreholes in these crystalline rocks, so we might have developed
1975 a three-dimensional model that had some certainty or
1976 uncertainty, let's say 700 to 1,000 meters. It's possible we
1977 might have drilled in that location to ground truth that. But
1978 ultimately, you know, as I noted in the specific location we
1979 were very confident that we had a reasonable thickness of the
1980 same rock that would be both above, you know, a nominal 500 to
1981 800 meter repository and enough rock below it.

1982

1983 I guess, you know, it would be a very, again, as has come up in
1984 the theme here, a very site-specific to get to some of those

1985 questions of what would screen in or screen out community based
1986 on technical requirements.

1987

1988 TYLER: Thank you, Andrew.

1989

1990 SIU: Chandrika. And in the interest of time, if you could keep
1991 it concise. Thank you.

1992

1993 MANEPALLY: Hi, Andy. Chandrika Manepally, Board staff. I was
1994 just curious you talked about iterative, you know, exchange of
1995 information between I'm thinking geologists, hydrologists, so I
1996 understand information going to them. But I was curious if any
1997 of the site characterization, like your location of a particular
1998 borehole, came from their modeling?

1999

2000 PARMENTER: I would say specifically a location of boreholes
2001 didn't come from their modeling work. But what I would say is we
2002 developed an understanding of the surface fracture distribution,
2003 the larger fractures. And we worked with our safety assessment
2004 colleagues and our engineering colleagues to understand
2005 together, you know, which of the larger fracture zones we would
2006 want to investigate with our first round of drilling programs.

2007 So, I wouldn't say that at the time that we were defining the
2008 drilling that there was the opportunity to get that feedback.
2009 But now we're at the point where we are getting the feedback
2010 from these models. And that would, you know, if we move to the
2011 next phase of detailed characterization at either site,
2012 certainly now would be the time where we're starting to have
2013 that conversation about where to align next boreholes to fill in
2014 some of the gaps and understanding.

2015

2016 MANEPALLY: Thank you.

2017

2018 SIU: Scott, any further questions? Okay. Thank you very much,
2019 Andrew.

2020

2021 PARMENTER: Thank you.

2022

2023 SIU: And we're almost back on schedule. Okay. We'll take a very,
2024 very quick break. Just stretch please, and try to be back in
2025 about five minutes. [Break]

2026

2027 Okay, switching gears for something completely different. You
2028 have David Sassani and Brady Hanson.

2029

2030 SASSANI: Thank you. I'm Dave Sassani. I'll be talking for most
2031 of this. I know, I don't want to hear any groans, but then Brady
2032 will come on right towards the end and talk to our international
2033 work. I'm presenting work that Carlos Jove-Colon also put
2034 together. He's from Sandia as well. Brady, of course, is from
2035 Pacific Northwest National Laboratories. Carlos's son just
2036 graduated high school, so he couldn't be here. And he may be on
2037 the virtual if there's questions on that area that I can't
2038 address, always possible. We'll have Carlos on and Sara's also
2039 here from Argonne, may be able to address some aspects of this.

2040

2041 But I'm going to go over, do an overview of the commercial spent
2042 nuclear fuel degradation rate models within our program. I'll
2043 put it in the context of what goes on in some other programs.
2044 And we'll move through this and I just have to say, and I want
2045 to thank the Board for the presentations, for the whole meeting,
2046 but particularly today, because with Erika and Barbara talking
2047 to their program in Finland and what they've done there on the
2048 crystalline system and covering the large scale geologic aspects
2049 of the system and then Andy covering what Canada's looking at
2050 for crystalline repository host rocks.

2051

2052 I am a geologist, geochemist, I'm a performance assessment
2053 analyst by working on the Yucca Mountain project, but I love
2054 that stuff. And it also, and I believe it was maybe Erika that
2055 said it, and it was highlighted, you have to think about the
2056 inventory you're disposing of. In the U.S. we are leading the
2057 world in this area of inventory in a number of aspects, some
2058 diversity, magnitude, total mass, thermal load of some of the
2059 canisters we're thinking about. So we're leading the world in a
2060 number of ways still.

2061

2062 But what I love about it is it's the two ends of the spectrum
2063 for this issue. It's the large scale geology that you have to
2064 think about for the system and we're going right to the heart,
2065 which is the source term, the waste form, the spent fuel that
2066 will be put into the ground and how does that affect our
2067 understanding? What do we know about it and how does that affect
2068 our understanding of the safety performance of these systems? So
2069 I really want to thank you because this is ... and then there was
2070 a bonus because Andy talked about deep boreholes, which is
2071 another favorite aspect of mine, although I guess our concept in
2072 that context would be very deep boreholes for disposal. But all

2073 of this it's really great. I love it. And it's a lot of fun and
2074 I'm glad we're here to talk about it.

2075

2076 So with that, I'll go to my next slide. I have the controller.
2077 So just a real high level overview of what we're going to talk
2078 to today. Concepts of the degradation rate for spent nuclear
2079 fuel. Whenever I start out any new aspect or a project to
2080 constrain, I start with concepts. I want to think about the
2081 concepts that matter for the processes that we're looking at and
2082 get those together and see if there's alternate concepts that
2083 may give you a completely different picture or way of thinking
2084 of it. Constrain that.

2085

2086 So I'll go through some background on that. I'll talk to some of
2087 the degradation rates for spent fuel, constrain for repository
2088 system performances. Then I'll go into the models within our
2089 program that we've implemented, both for aspects of process
2090 understanding. As Erika and Barbara spoke to, they still look at
2091 the process understanding to figure out if there's anything else
2092 needed to be done. But also the way we build some of these into
2093 performance assessment and the way it's been done around the
2094 world. Professor Ballinger has said and asked there are multiple

2095 ways you can put these models into performance assessments. You
2096 can use a constant rate, you can do a stochastic selection,
2097 sampling methodology. Or you can build in something more
2098 mechanistic if you want to or really if you need to. The
2099 mechanistic aspects are more for understanding.

2100

2101 So I'll go into the fuel matrix degradation model and talk a
2102 little bit to the process models that make that up, look at the
2103 primary sensitivities, because this is also a question that's
2104 come up, how much do you need to keep doing and why would you
2105 need to go there and what is that? We look at sensitivities of
2106 these mechanistic models to see what actually matters the most
2107 and go after that if we need to refine it. We'll talk to the
2108 model couplings. A very high level overview of implementation
2109 for GDSA. Paul will speak to that in much more detail.

2110

2111 And then I'll talk to strategic approaches we've been taking
2112 thinking about doing additional spent nuclear fuel degradation
2113 testing for validation purposes, for a number of purposes. I'll
2114 go through the methodology for the prioritization, which relates
2115 to the prioritization on the large scale that we do for the road
2116 map reevaluation. I'll go through the activity status of this

2117 strategic spent fuel degradation testing and a little bit of why
2118 do you need to be strategic about it. And I'll talk to the path
2119 forward for that, because it's not complete, it's in process.
2120 And then I'll hand it off to Brady to talk about our
2121 international collaborations, some of which of course involve
2122 the EURAD-2 program coming up, starting this fall.

2123

2124 So a little bit of context. We've seen over the last, this
2125 morning and yesterday the context for a crystalline repository,
2126 the layouts, waste packages, different designs, different
2127 concepts for the waste packages in some of the reference cases
2128 on our program and these other programs. And this is just zoomed
2129 in on a breached waste package at some point, undefined point in
2130 the future. The package is breached, so you have fluid pathways
2131 in and out. The water comes in, it brings in some chemistry,
2132 which is dependent on the actual natural system plus the
2133 engineered barrier interactions. You have the fuel bundles. Some
2134 of these are corroding. There's fuel pins. So there's metal
2135 components in here reacting with the water. And then the spent
2136 nuclear fuel, of course, as it corrodes drives the radionuclide
2137 releases. And then you go away from the fuel surface and that
2138 fluid pathway interacts with corrosion products and then

2139 bentonite and at some point is evaluated either in the package
2140 and/or outside the package for solubility limited concentrations
2141 of a variety of radionuclides. Real high level overview of what
2142 we're going to talk to today in terms of source term aspects.

2143

2144 So in terms of the basic concepts when we put this together ...
2145 and this goes back to when I was working in detailed technical
2146 areas, because I was in charge of having this work set up when
2147 we came out of the Yucca Mountain project where we had models
2148 for spent nuclear fuel degradation in a highly oxidizing
2149 environment open to the atmosphere, lots of oxygen around. That
2150 was a primary driver. So we went and started doing a literature
2151 search, looking through what's known for the saturated systems,
2152 which are either anoxic and/or reducing, particularly giving all
2153 the metals that are put into the system.

2154

2155 And so to a first approximation we said let's start thinking
2156 about spent nuclear fuel. And this is one of the things I love
2157 about spent fuel, it's a people made rock, ceramic, which
2158 actually changes in terms of its mineralogy inside the nuclear
2159 reactor. You had other phases coming in besides the UO_2 initially
2160 that's enriched. And to me I love that kind of stuff. The phase

2161 equilibrium, phase interaction is very important. So if you
2162 think about it as UO_2 , we can think about it ore deposits as
2163 analogs.

2164

2165 These are stable for hundreds of millions to billions of years
2166 in saturated systems where your uraninite UO_2 is a primary ore
2167 mineral. So when we think about that we can then say, so these
2168 last for a really long time so they must have a very slow
2169 degradation rate. And, in fact, they may be sitting at
2170 thermodynamic equilibrium in these systems. But if you have any
2171 kind of fluid flux you can think about a lower bound on the
2172 degradation rate of this material as chemical dissolution. Well,
2173 what do I mean by that?

2174

2175 Well, that's the uranium-4 in the UO_2 dissolving directly to
2176 uranium-4 in the aqueous solution under very low redox
2177 conditions, very low EH in terms of electrochemical aspects. And
2178 that's a very small concentration, which then is moved out by
2179 whatever the water flux is. So the flux of the solvent controls
2180 the rate of the degradation, the dissolution, chemical
2181 dissolution. The analogy I use for this for a higher level
2182 discussion, as some of you in the room will remember the

2183 commercial about how many licks does it to get to the center of
2184 a Tootsie Pop, right? So you have a licking process, which is
2185 the chemical dissolution part.

2186

2187 But then if you introduce something new, some new process, like
2188 biting it, well, then you only take three licks to get to the
2189 center of a Tootsie Pop, right? It goes really fast. So the flux
2190 of solvent and chemical dissolution I think of as a reasonable
2191 minimum bound for the degradation rate of spent fuel. And we'll
2192 see that in some of the data sets. But then what we want to ask
2193 is what else can really matter for reality? How do you increase
2194 the rate of degradation above the minimum? And from a safety
2195 standpoint we view our role always as trying to figure out are
2196 we missing something that could mean higher releases?

2197

2198 That's a much larger concern than are we missing something that
2199 would mean we're overestimating by a bit? We want to make sure
2200 we're not missing something that could make higher releases
2201 occur. So what else really matters to increase the rate above
2202 this defined minimum? Well, oxidation of the uranium-4 to the
2203 uranium-6 is a primary first order effect. What are the sources
2204 of materials that could oxidize this ceramic waste form? There's

2205 little to no oxidants in the materials that get introduced, so
2206 we always look at the systems that go into the engineered
2207 barrier, because they become a very large mass constraint for
2208 the local chemistry in the drifts.

2209

2210 There's not really a lot of oxidizing materials in there,
2211 they're mainly strongly reducing materials, metallic materials.
2212 You can think about groundwater influx. There's possibilities
2213 for future events that are not continual or pervasive, but you
2214 could get oxidizing solutions coming in. So that's something to
2215 think about. But the big part is the difference between spent
2216 fuel and uranium oxide naturally occurring, which is the alpha
2217 radiation field from a lot of the fission products and the
2218 transuranics. So these drive an alpha radiation field that can
2219 generate radiolytic oxidants, things like hydrogen peroxide and
2220 others, depending on the chemistry of the system.

2221

2222 But that's what we view as the major source of oxidants
2223 potentially there. And the form directly at the surface of the
2224 spent fuel. So if the rate of production of those oxidants is
2225 used primarily to drive the spent fuel oxidation this would seem
2226 to be a reasonable maximum bound for the degradation rate of the

2227 spent fuel. So we know a lot about what the range might look
2228 like, unless something unthought about it could occur in terms
2229 of oxidation. In any case, that's what we would define
2230 conceptually as a maximum expectation. What else matters for
2231 reality again? Well, now we want to think about does it matter,
2232 this range is fairly large. Do we have a better feel for where
2233 we might be?

2234

2235 Well, the question becomes then are there any potential major
2236 sinks for the radiolytic oxidant production of hydrogen
2237 peroxide, which would decrease from the maximum this degradation
2238 rate? What are the other reductants in this system? There's
2239 other constituents in spent nuclear fuel, like americium and
2240 plutonium also have alpha decay. But these amount to a few
2241 percent of the spent fuel itself. So they're probably not going
2242 to offset that in a major way. There's steels in the package,
2243 but they're not directly at the oxidant source location, which
2244 is, and we'll get to it, within really microns of a water layer
2245 on the surface of the fuel, even if it's saturated, because the
2246 deposition of the alpha particles occurs in about 30 microns.

2247

2248 There's cladding. It's proximal to the fuel, but very unreactive
2249 at these relevant temperatures. But there's something to think
2250 about there. But there's hydrogen gas generation occurring in
2251 this canister from steel degradation, which occurs relatively
2252 rapidly relatively on a geologic time sense. There's potentially
2253 abundant H₂ generation from steel surface corrosion. It's labile
2254 and it could possibly reach the surface of the spent nuclear
2255 fuel and be reactive at that point. So these are the concepts
2256 that drive what goes into the modeling that we look at for the
2257 SNF degradation in a mechanistic sense.

2258

2259 And this didn't just occur to us sitting around talking about
2260 it. But there's a lot of work done in the literature, a lot of
2261 experimental data, a lot of discussion of the effects of
2262 hydrogen on the radiolytic oxidation effects. And Shoesmith and
2263 his group put together a mixed potential model, which considered
2264 all of these processes in a unidirectional fashion. And what do
2265 I mean by that? Well, if we look at a very high level for what
2266 we're thinking about we're thinking about reducing disposal
2267 environments. We do work on generic unsaturated systems still,
2268 but this is all for the reducing aspects, reducing environment
2269 concepts.

2270

2271 And there's two primary release process concepts that are
2272 incorporated into our safety assessment models. There's an
2273 instant release fraction model and we have a couple of different
2274 models for that. They are sampled distributions. One's from the
2275 Yucca Mountain project for multiple fission products, things
2276 like iodine. I think we might have technetium in there, possibly
2277 a couple others. But the other one is from Johnson, et al, 2005,
2278 which is a function of burnup. It goes up to 75 megawatts,
2279 megatons per ... sorry, gigawatt days per metric ton. So it gives
2280 us some ability to look at the variation as a function of
2281 burnup. So that comes from aspects that are in the cladding
2282 after the cladding fails in the gap and grain boundaries.

2283

2284 This is just a cross section schematic of what that fuel pellet
2285 in the fuel rod looks like with the cladding. And you have grain
2286 boundaries and the gaps between the cladding and the fuel pellet
2287 itself. So that's where primarily the incident release fraction
2288 comes from. It's about ten percent iodine 129 of the iodine 129
2289 inventory. In all of our models to this point we do not have
2290 cladding as a barrier. Yucca Mountain did not take credit for
2291 it. We are not yet. We are working on some of that moving

2292 forward. But currently when the canister fails the cladding is
2293 all considered fail. So the entire inventory in the package can
2294 do an instant release.

2295

2296 I'm not going to talk any more about that instant release
2297 fraction. There's been some updates in the international
2298 literature that we could look at and incorporate. But going
2299 forward we're going to talk about the Fuel Matrix Degradation
2300 Model, which is the degradation of the matrix grains. Again we
2301 mention uranium oxide solubility limits. If that's what the
2302 driver is it's very slow, very low degradation rate, oxidized
2303 dissolution is faster from these radiolytic oxidants. But also
2304 need to consider potential reductants that react with these
2305 moving forward.

2306

2307 We want to evaluate a bit of the role of the Epsilon phase. I
2308 believe Sara will talk to some of this with the electrochemical
2309 testing that's being done. Because it seems to protect the
2310 matrix grains from oxidation and seems this is a concept that's
2311 out there, but hasn't been demonstrated whether that is a
2312 cathodic coupling with the UO_2 or a catalytic phenomenon or a
2313 little bit of both. And that may matter for how you would

2314 understand how long that effect lasts and its duration in post
2315 closure.

2316

2317 So that model, this Fuel Matrix Degradation Model, FMDM, FMD
2318 Model, it includes all these above to assess the matrix
2319 degradation rate over time. So what do we know from some other
2320 programs? Why are we even thinking about this? We actually know
2321 a good bit. So this table here is some sources. The SKB source
2322 2006 is part of the Swedish program work. Pastina and Hella,
2323 that's part of the Finnish program work. Ollila is another
2324 compilation, which confirms this. These are measurements of
2325 rates that are constrained, built as a log triangular
2326 distribution based on the data in Werme et al, 2004. And this
2327 modeling work and King and Shoesmith and others this is built
2328 off of that for the Finnish program, this reference rate here.
2329 These are all in per year units. These are fractional
2330 degradation rates.

2331

2332 So a fractional degradation rate of 10^{-6} per year is a million
2333 year lifetime for the spent fuel. 10^{-8} per year that's 100
2334 million year lifetime. These are all primarily for anoxic
2335 conditions. These are from static batch dissolution tests. And

2336 you can see some of the exponents. I'm not going to speak to the
2337 leading numbers, but there all in here 10^{-6} , 10^{-8} . So there are
2338 datasets out there that demonstrate this. Well, these are all
2339 relatively short term experiments and that's fine, that's what
2340 we can do and they're under relevant conditions.

2341

2342 Down here are a couple more references. Cite from 2001 and work
2343 from our program down here with the code. And these are in mass
2344 per area per day or per year. And so you need the area, you need
2345 the surface area estimate to convert to these fractional rates.
2346 But they are consistent. We've done that. And over here what I'm
2347 showing, this is ... the source of this figure is the SKB 2006
2348 work on the Swedish program. This is from a paper that Peter
2349 Swift and I wrote about what matters for repository performance.
2350 And this was assessing where there is a very strong dependence
2351 on the degradation rate for the peak dose estimates out at one
2352 time here.

2353

2354 So the regulatory limit is shown here. I think those are in
2355 microsieverts right there. And that, you can see there's a
2356 couple of different sets of curves here. And the curves that are
2357 fractional dissolution rates from that is 10^{-6} to 10^{-8} . Those

2358 correspond to the fuel lifetimes of one million to hundred
2359 million years. And those are the basis that ... those are the ones
2360 that they believe to be the reasonable basis for these reduced
2361 system conditions. But they also include much higher rates of
2362 degradation out here.

2363

2364 The work done here is a sensitivity off of the basecase, looking
2365 primarily at the dissolution rate and failing the canisters over
2366 a number of realizations for the analytical model, but failing
2367 them out at long timeframe hundreds of thousands of years to see
2368 how much does that impact. And it's numbers of order of
2369 magnitude here for the rates that they expect to be the rates
2370 for this system. So this is why the degradation rate matters in
2371 a simple demonstration of that.

2372

2373 So why develop a mechanistic model? Well, we wanted to be
2374 efficient so we pulled the model, the original model out of the
2375 literature from Shoesmith, et al, 2003, because they had a nice
2376 approach to it. The model is really about what matters for the
2377 degradation rate of the spent fuel. There's some chemistry
2378 aspects to it. But it does not model all chemistry going on
2379 inside the canister. It takes chemical boundary conditions and

2380 imposes these and says, these are the primary things that matter
2381 for the spent fuel degradation and so we're going to use that.

2382

2383 Why do we care about that? Well, it's to understand process. It
2384 allows consideration of the environment and its context for the
2385 results of the model, provides a basis for interpreting
2386 experimentally determined data, understanding what processes are
2387 major and dominant and it permits relating short term data from
2388 experiments to expected long term system evolution are the
2389 experimental conditions what you actually think you have in the
2390 system. And it creates a more transparent construct of
2391 application versus random sampling application.

2392

2393 There's nothing wrong with the random sampling, it just doesn't
2394 connect you to any of the driving variables in the system. So
2395 that's the difference in the performance and the system model.
2396 You can do both. One's faster. Much faster than doing the
2397 mechanistic aspects. So those are the reasons why though, so we
2398 can continue to assess is there something else we have to think
2399 about?

2400

2401 So this is a mechanistic representation of UO_2 dissolution. The
2402 words over here talk about what's in the fuel matrix degradation
2403 model. Radionuclides are just released congruently according to
2404 their stoichiometry in the spent fuel. But this plot over here,
2405 which is from Poinssot et al, 2005 and Cachoir et al, 2005 shows
2406 an interesting aspect, which is what I talked about conceptually
2407 but is in fact shown here in detail with some measurements and
2408 some modeling work that's been done in these studies. And what's
2409 important to understand here is they've got, delineated a
2410 solubility controlled zone, so that's how many licks does it
2411 take to get to the center and there is a radiolytically
2412 dissolution oxidative corrosion going on over in here with a
2413 threshold range of specific alpha activity over here where they
2414 doped some UO_2 with U^{233} to have a known set of alpha activities.
2415
2416 And the curves on here, which are measured is there are some
2417 measured rates shown in the green curve from ITU in Karlsruhe
2418 and there's some measured solubility here in the black curve
2419 from ITU in Karlsruhe and there's measured solubility here in
2420 the blue curve from the Belgium program SCK. And what you can
2421 see is the solubility values are much lower than the measured
2422 values, both for solubility, a little bit, and you can see this

2423 curve going up here, which is moving up into higher values and
2424 there's also a deaerated hypothetical curve. And deaerated is
2425 somewhat anoxic and then there's anoxic and then there's
2426 reducing. This all was done because there was a lot of
2427 information in the literature about hydrogen effecting the
2428 degradation rate. Hydrogen coming from degradation of steels.
2429

2430 So this aspect indicates to us that, yes, we want to be able to
2431 consider both of these functions going on where it's the alpha
2432 activity and for spent fuel were somewhere up in this region
2433 that's driving the oxidative degradation of the spent fuel.
2434

2435 Okay. So I am going on to this. And I'm going to jump into the
2436 sensitivities that were evaluated in the Fuel Matrix Degradation
2437 Model. This is from a program report and it's work done at
2438 Argonne National Laboratory by Jim Jerden. And this is looking
2439 at the fuel dissolution rate. Again, it's mass per area per
2440 year. And it's looking at the primary variables in the model.
2441 And these are the model sensitivities. And there's a dose rate
2442 effect. The lower the dose rate goes ... we were working with the
2443 500 rad per second fuel characteristics, which is some higher
2444 burn up.

2445

2446 I think 60 megawatt gigawatt days per metric ton. If you go down
2447 from there it of course decreases the rate down. There's a
2448 temperature effect which was looked at 25 degrees to 200
2449 degrees. There are some uncertainties in the thermochemical data
2450 here in the reaction rate constance for these at higher
2451 temperature. They are larger. But you can see that's a little
2452 more than an order of magnitude effect. Carbonate complexation,
2453 carbonate strongly complexes uranium in solution so that it can
2454 have a primary effect.

2455

2456 We saw that on the Yucca Mountain project. It was a primary
2457 variable along with pH for solubility aspects and potential
2458 degradation rates. And then there are a couple. This is no CO₂.
2459 This is the oxygen content. And this is a pH variable which did
2460 not get varied quite very much. But it was on the basic side of
2461 neutral pH. This large line, this large purple arrow, this is
2462 the effect of hydrogen, the hydrogen overpressure in the system.
2463 This is a little bit more than five, close to six orders of
2464 magnitude.

2465

2466 This stood out as the dominant aspect in the model, which is
2467 seen also in the experimental work. The hydrogen partial
2468 pressure of the dissolved hydrogen, however you like to think
2469 about it. That has a primary control and mechanistically it's
2470 because it's available to react with the hydrogen peroxide. So
2471 it's almost a direct offset. So that's the sensitivities and
2472 this is why we want to take a look at some of the
2473 electrochemical work and see if we can understand the mechanism
2474 that's really driving that. That's all from a process
2475 standpoint.

2476

2477 These are kind of the details of Fuel Matrix Degradation Model.
2478 It's got, you know, there's Shoesmith, et al, 2003 reference.
2479 It's what it's based off of. We modified it. That was purely for
2480 reducing conditions. We modified it to be able to go into
2481 oxidative conditions with oxygen coming into the system for
2482 unsaturated. It's consistent with the other models of
2483 degradation and they're under oxygen conditions. It's got an
2484 electrochemical transport module. It has surface potentials
2485 based on major interfacial anodic and cathodic reactions, shown
2486 here. Some here. And all of the reaction in it is going on the
2487 surface.

2488

2489 When we developed these models back in, actually over a decade
2490 ago these were developed, this was a conceptual piece that was
2491 supplying hydrogen and potentially ferric and ferrous ions to
2492 the solution. But we weren't doing process models here. I think
2493 there have been some updates where there's actually an iron
2494 material. This is about five millimeters away from the spent
2495 fuel surface and it's used as boundary condition in the way it's
2496 implemented in PFLOTRAN currently. But the process model may
2497 actually have an iron source term over here now, a corrosion
2498 source term.

2499

2500 It's the major constraint on hydrogen production is the steel
2501 corrosion going on. That's the primary aspect of this. In the
2502 model some of the uranium dioxide it oxidizes in solution. Some
2503 of it precipitates out. I think schoepite and studtite has
2504 phases for precipitates have been looked at. There is no
2505 mechanistic aspect of the precipitates. We did not want to
2506 completely occlude the surface, as this would just shut off the
2507 material from corroding. And we don't have enough data to really
2508 say that's what would actually happen. So these are built up as
2509 what Jim Jerden used to refer to as French fries on the surface

2510 that still allows this degradation to go on, but reduces the
2511 surface area that's available to degrade.

2512

2513 So those are the surface precipitates. So those are the details
2514 in the model. And those are a lot of aspects that we'd like to
2515 look at in a little bit more detail, particularly the
2516 electrochemical testing. But moving forward ...

2517

2518 SIU: Excuse me, David, how are we doing, process check? Because
2519 we also have to hear about the international collaboration.

2520

2521 SASSANI: I'll speed up.

2522

2523 SIU: Thank you.

2524

2525 SASSANI: Sure. So these are the surface half reactions. Oops, it
2526 went back ... I'm not going to speak to these. You can see them on
2527 the other plot. There's some anodic, there's a chemical reaction
2528 with the surface of the fuel and also noble metal particles
2529 where I believe the reaction rates of these are put in as
2530 catalyzed.

2531

2532 This is a conceptual diagram of how it fits in the total system
2533 model. This was the old version. We had this going on here with
2534 concept of a steel canister that was breached, groundwater
2535 reaction with this. And that's the instant release fraction over
2536 there. Those two pieces go into, they're inside of cladding,
2537 which is breached and waste package internals. And then there's
2538 interaction with the engineer barrier system.

2539

2540 And then this is a more detailed mapping to summarize where this
2541 sits for in the GD Safety Assessment Framework. And we're going
2542 to look at some strategic testing activities. But this Waste
2543 Form Dissolution Model is over here. The cladding is a separate
2544 piece that's around it that we are putting together a conceptual
2545 model for its degradation. And then there's a Waste Package
2546 Degradation, which is sampled currently at this point. Paul
2547 Mariner will talk more to the GDSA work.

2548

2549 Then we've started developing a strategic testing plan where we
2550 wanted to review the conceptual processes to identify gaps,
2551 relate them to the existing models and data and integrate it
2552 within performance assessment approach, including uncertainty
2553 treatments and identifying what's a fundamental gap versus just

2554 better defining the uncertainties. We want to use this in the
2555 current approach for prioritizing gaps and new work in the
2556 program. We want this approach to be risk informed. This is in
2557 the process of evolving from what we had done that ended in 2019
2558 for the road map reevaluation. And it's evolving back to a FEP
2559 based process. So we are in the midst of redoing the
2560 prioritization methodology to evaluate those gaps.

2561

2562 So we want to look at what testing methods we have available to
2563 address whatever the highest priority gaps are that come out of
2564 that. So we pulled the testing mechanisms at all our labs and
2565 had those put together into a series of one to two page
2566 summaries giving a high level, I won't call it a technical
2567 readiness level, but saying how far along is this, how ready is
2568 it to deploy and make measurements to answer questions?

2569

2570 We're in the process doing this. It is based on our current
2571 draft is based on what we did in the methodology for the
2572 prioritization for the importance to safety for the road map
2573 reevaluation. It had three categories, a high importance, medium
2574 and low for importance to safety. This was covered in some
2575 detail in the 2020 meeting presentation that I had and links in

2576 my first overview on the program. Then there's another metric,
2577 which is the state of the art level, which has five levels,
2578 fundamental gaps and data needs. This is, we really don't know
2579 anything about this and we need to go do some basic work. That
2580 aspect it tended to be a little bit turgid for some folks as to
2581 whether it was the state of the art level existing in the world
2582 and the world of science or the state of the art level in what
2583 we've implemented in the program. So in terms of our discussion
2584 about TRLs I think we would break out state of the art level of
2585 knowledge in the world versus going into technical readiness
2586 level within the program. And that would make things clearer in
2587 the next stage.

2588

2589 These get combined. This combined prioritization was put group
2590 in Sevougian et al state of the art level across the top,
2591 importance to safety here and medium, high and high relate to
2592 these boxes over here. So this would be used to say these are
2593 things where we really want to get some work going and answer
2594 some questions and move forward. These are all in process and so
2595 the status is we identified preliminary gaps and defined those.
2596 We have this preliminary prioritization based on that road map
2597 prioritization methodology.

2598

2599 But we really want to use the FEP tool to map these gaps to the
2600 features, events and processes at the detailed level and assess
2601 the scoring methodology updates. This bringing in a technical
2602 readiness level is one of those aspects. We wanted to have the
2603 details of the risk informed bases. In other words, it's much
2604 more important to identify things that mean we're missing
2605 potentially higher releases then it is to get more detail in the
2606 uncertainty levels of the range.

2607

2608 And we want to do this review for the state of the art level and
2609 revise that prioritization. So once we do that we would
2610 reprioritize and identify those high priority gaps and then
2611 develop a testing strategy by taking those high priority gaps
2612 and our knowledge and understanding of our readiness level for
2613 our testing methods and which ones actually answer the relevant
2614 gap questions and then lay that out moving forward. But this is
2615 all going to be happening probably over the next year or two as
2616 we move to this different prioritization methods.

2617

2618 So I'm ready to hand it off to Brady. I don't know if this clock
2619 is right up here. I was watching this clock it says I have 18
2620 minutes to go. Oh, I'm sorry, I thought that was the time...

2621

2622 SIU: That's okay. That's okay.

2623

2624 SASSANI: I'll hand it off to Brady and I'll move the slides for
2625 him. Brady are you there?

2626

2627 SIU: He's unmuted, but he's not being projected yet. Brady can
2628 you continue to talk?

2629

2630 SASSANI: Brady has lots of good details to speak to on these
2631 bullets.

2632

2633 SIU: They're continuing to work on it in the back of the room.

2634

2635 SASSANI: There it is. Brady, does your headset have a mute
2636 button on it?

2637

2638 HANSON: No.

2639

2640 SIU: You are now muted.

2641

2642 HANSON: Now can you hear me?

2643

2644 SASSANI: Yes, we can.

2645

2646 HANSON: Alrightee. Cool. Thank you. Sorry about that. I'll give
2647 a brief and high level overview of the main international
2648 collaborations, past, present and future, specifically dealing
2649 with spent fuel degradation, which includes cladding performance
2650 and storage transportation and disposal. These collaborations
2651 are important to us, because they're both supplementary, where
2652 others are doing tests and models that we haven't done yet and
2653 also complementary where their data and models help to validate
2654 work that we've done.

2655

2656 So we were invited to be what's called an associated group for
2657 the last two major EURAD programs. First nuclides focused on the
2658 faster instant release fraction from spent fuel that David
2659 talked about. The big highlight of that effort was a significant
2660 expansion of the public database for the instant release
2661 fraction from boiling water reactor fuels to supplement the

2662 database we have in the U.S., which was largely on pressurized
2663 water reactors.

2664

2665 Disco focused on the effects of newer fuel designs on spent fuel
2666 dissolution. In particular the main conclusion from that program
2667 was it found that the addition of chromia and alumina, which are
2668 used to increase grain size had no discernable impact on
2669 dissolution rates. Under the International Nuclear Energy
2670 Research Initiative, which has concluded, but we had two
2671 successful collaborative efforts. In the first we worked with
2672 leading institutions in Germany and Switzerland. Those two
2673 countries tend to have spent fuel with significantly higher
2674 burnup than we have in the U.S. So working with them we were
2675 able to see the effects of higher burnup, which will help guide
2676 the U.S. program, especially as our industry here is now moving
2677 in the direction of higher burnup.

2678

2679 We had a second I-NERI where we worked with the Korean Atomic
2680 Energy Institute to look at hydride reorientation in different
2681 cladding types that they have as well as looking at it as a
2682 function of cooling rate during storage. The fourth iteration of
2683 what's called the Studsvik Cladding Integrity Project is

2684 actually ending next month. But this program has supplied key,
2685 albeit proprietary data on creep of fuel segments that still
2686 have fuel in them. And again that will help guide the future R&D
2687 efforts of the U.S. program.

2688

2689 And then with IAEA, DOE and the National Labs for over three
2690 decades have been part of the program, started as what was
2691 called BEFAST and SPAR, Spent Fuel Performance Assessment and
2692 Research. Again, looking at fuel and cladding performance and
2693 storage transportation and disposal. So seeing all the different
2694 fuel types, cladding types worldwide was very important and
2695 helpful. Next slide, David.

2696

2697 So we are currently part of what's called a Coordinated Research
2698 Program within IAEA on Spent Fuel Research and Assessment.
2699 That's a continuation of SPAR basically, although it was split
2700 into to look at specific tasks. So we're part of that. There's a
2701 new coordinated research program that is starting this fall,
2702 which will specifically look at storage transportation and
2703 disposal of spent fuel from small modular reactors.

2704

2705 And then as David and others have said EURAD-2 is the big one
2706 that we're excited about. It's a brand new very large program
2707 that just received approval from the European Commission. It
2708 starts in October of this year and will run for five years.
2709 Again, the DOE and National Labs are participating as an
2710 associated partner and we are very thankful to Erika Holt for
2711 all of her help and work in getting the U.S. heavily involved in
2712 that effort as an associated partner.

2713

2714 When I say big on the European side, there are 52 organizations
2715 from 21 member states and then there's an addition 22 associated
2716 partners from six different countries. I believe there's 15, 16
2717 different work packages specifically for this talk. We're
2718 looking at work package 8, which is the release of safety
2719 relevant nuclides from spent nuclear fuel under deep disposal
2720 conditions.

2721

2722 The purpose of that program is to improve the quantification and
2723 mechanistic understanding of release of safety relevant
2724 nuclides, covering a wide variety of representative types of
2725 spent fuel and looking at the evolution of fuel prior to and
2726 after contact with groundwater. This work package will have four

2727 main tasks. The first is looking at instant release fraction
2728 again and how it relates to fission gas release. The second, the
2729 role of grain boundaries in spent fuel corrosion. Third studies
2730 on what they call model materials, including mixed oxides or MOX
2731 fuels, the chromia and chromia alumina doped fuels and sim
2732 fuels, which you'll hear a little bit more about from the U.S.
2733 in the next talk. And then lastly a task on mechanistic
2734 modeling, very similar to what David just presented. So we're
2735 really excited to be part of that large program.

2736

2737 Lastly this year we will participate in the 32nd International
2738 Spent Fuel Workshop, which is obviously been going on for about
2739 three, four decades now and very useful. To conclude we use this
2740 information, the data, the models that we get from these
2741 collaborations to inform and guide the U.S. program and as I
2742 said have both supplementary and complementary aspects. And with
2743 that, David, next slide. You can cover the summary.

2744

2745 SASSANI: Thanks, Brady. I'm not going to speak to this slide
2746 because I was completely off in the time I thought we had left.
2747 But I appreciate the attention. And we'll take any questions.

2748

2749 SIU: Thanks, Dave, I apologize for the clock. We'll make sure
2750 that we get it right. Okay. Questions? Ron?

2751

2752 BALLINGER: Too many. Too many to list. At a high level, first
2753 off the canisters that we're going to be dealing with are
2754 probably C22, not steel.

2755

2756 SASSANI: I'm sorry, say that again.

2757

2758 BALLINGER: I think the canisters that we'll be dealing with here
2759 are not steel. Not carbon steel. They're C22.

2760

2761 SASSANI: Yeah, we look at a whole bunch of different kinds of
2762 canisters.

2763

2764 BALLINGER: Well, but your models and stuff are based on steel
2765 corrosion.

2766

2767 SASSANI: Inside the canisters.

2768

2769 BALLINGER: Inside the canisters. So that's something to be
2770 cognizant of hydrogen. I'm interested in the details. It's one

2771 thing to generate it radiolytically. It's another thing to get
2772 it into the material or have it on the surface. You know, they
2773 can be recombination in all kinds of things like that.

2774

2775 SASSANI: Yes.

2776

2777 BALLINGER: So we'll put that in our letter I'm sure. Let's see,
2778 I took a bunch of notes. I keep harping on this and that is all
2779 of these model attributes that you're going after the question
2780 that I keep asking is, how does it affect the dose? What's your
2781 criteria for needing to do research? Is it for the good of the
2782 research or is it aimed at some objective criteria that you're
2783 trying to meet? We heard this morning the presentation by the
2784 Finnish folks and I'm looking at their slides and they're a
2785 thousand times below any limit and they dump the fuel off and
2786 assume no, it's all dissolved. So I'm just trying to ...

2787

2788 SASSANI: Can I address that one a little bit?

2789

2790 BALLINGER: I'm trying to struggle with that. And then I'll keep
2791 going.

2792

2793 SASSANI: So in terms of the performance aspects as I showed we
2794 have ranges of values for spent fuel degradation that can be
2795 applied. And we have those built into the GDSA for sampling. We
2796 can assign fractional degradation rates and that's great. We
2797 think that conceptually in these reduced systems you will have
2798 very low slow degradation rates, slow release, waste form
2799 lifetimes on the order of hundred thousand plus years, maybe a
2800 million years, right, 10^{-6} per year. That's a million year
2801 lifetime.

2802

2803 You saw how it matters in the case for the Swedish safety
2804 assessment. It has a big effect on peak dose out on at long
2805 timeframes. So it depends what your regulation is that you're
2806 marking, right? We have a couple of different ones. But the
2807 question becomes what's driving that. Those are all rates that
2808 are derived from hydrogen suppressed degradation of the spent
2809 fuel degradation rate. Hydrogen's a key component. It matters
2810 over six orders of magnitude in the model. Hydrogen generated
2811 from corrosion of the metals in the package, not from the
2812 radiolytic aspects.

2813

2814 There's also hydrogen generated in the radiolytic aspects. So
2815 all of those questions go to is there at the technical basis
2816 level, not the PA level, but the technical basis level how do
2817 you support selecting amongst the various ranges of rates that
2818 can go to very high rates of degradation. So everyone of these
2819 programs has done it, right? But we don't have the same
2820 inventory in our canisters, the same canister size, the same
2821 temperature variation. We don't have any of those things. So you
2822 got to develop the basis for those fundamental aspects. That's
2823 why that other model exists.

2824

2825 BALLINGER: But these folks are considering that there's no
2826 cladding... it's complete dissolution instantly. The Finnish folks
2827 are saying we're going to dump it all out in the repository
2828 without any time period before you get, you start to get
2829 dissolution. And there's still a factor of a thousand below
2830 their dose limit.

2831

2832 SASSANI: No, they're using a range of degradation rates as well.
2833 It was in the table that I showed.

2834

2835 BALLINGER: Okay. I have to go back and look at the ... I'm looking
2836 at this cone looking thing where at the bottom there's the dose.

2837

2838 SASSANI: Right. And their safety assessment. So if you have a
2839 full safety assessment you can get to a dose estimate. We don't
2840 have a full safety assessment, because we don't have a site. And
2841 if you recall Erika and Barbara both said you start doing all
2842 your specific design aspects after you start collecting your
2843 site data. So we're looking at generic systems, so we're looking
2844 at a much broader range of potential variation. Not just in the
2845 geology of the system, but also in our spent fuel inventory.

2846

2847 BALLINGER: I don't doubt that for a moment. What I'm wondering
2848 about is what's the effect on the dose?

2849

2850 SASSANI: It's scales virtually directly. If you just think about
2851 iodine 129, which is what drives the dose. The iodine 129
2852 released from the spent fuel directly proportional to the
2853 degradation rate.

2854

2855 BALLINGER: Yep, I saw that yesterday. And that to me said that
2856 at least for their analysis that the time at which you breach

2857 the canisters is important because that's when you get the
2858 instant 10 percent.

2859

2860 SASSANI: Yes.

2861

2862 BALLINGER: You get the iodine release, which tells me that the
2863 canister itself is very important to the barrier.

2864

2865 SASSANI: Absolutely.

2866

2867 BALLINGER: So making an assumption that you don't have any
2868 cladding has a big effect on what's going to happen.

2869

2870 SASSANI: It can. Yes.

2871

2872 BALLINGER: And you've got a ... we're getting into the weeds here
2873 ... you've got an area ratio between the cladding and the breach
2874 of probably 10,000 to one. And so not considering the zirconium
2875 cladding in the modeling just to me makes ... it's a big gap.

2876

2877 SASSANI: It is. And you know the Yucca Mountain project had no
2878 cladding barrier in it. And it met the regulatory requirements.

2879

2880 BALLINGER: And it met the regulatory requirements.

2881

2882 SASSANI: Completely different system though and completely

2883 different degradation rates.

2884

2885 BALLINGER: I better shut up.

2886

2887 HANSON: David, if I may ...

2888

2889 SASSANI: Go ahead, Brady.

2890

2891 HANSON: Professor Ballinger, thanks for the question. I did want

2892 to note Barbara has posted in the Chat that the Finnish and

2893 Swedish programs do have fuel degradation rates of the 10^{-6} , 10^{-8}

2894 that David talked about. But you are absolutely correct that the

2895 programs do not take cladding credit and as David alluded to in

2896 the U.S. program we're actually putting together a test plan

2897 right now to look at what would it take in order for us to be

2898 able to look at cladding credit.

2899

2900 BALLINGER: Yes. Good idea.

2901

2902 SASSANI: We started that a couple of years ago, both based on a
2903 direct disposal of DPC work where cladding matters in a
2904 different manner. But also for post-closure performance.

2905

2906 BALLINGER: Again without including the cladding your
2907 electrochemical model just doesn't work.

2908

2909 SASSANI: Well, there may be an electrochemical aspect there, but
2910 you know all the data sets measured for spent fuel with and
2911 without cladding do not separate out into two groups of
2912 degradation rate. So that's my understanding of that.

2913

2914 SIU: For the purpose of the meeting can we make sure that we get
2915 the information that we need. We'll discuss, write the letter ...
2916 By the way before you go on, does Allen have any questions? No?
2917 Okay. You have more Ron? Or can we go to Andy? Andy do you have
2918 any questions?

2919

2920 JUNG: No. I'm fine.

2921

2922 SIU: We'll take a couple more minutes for Ron if you have
2923 anything.

2924

2925 BALLINGER: I don't want to dig my hole any deeper.

2926

2927 SIU: Okay.

2928

2929 SASSANI: I just want to say I'm happy to have the questions. I'm
2930 happy to talk about it.

2931

2932 TYLER: And Scott Tyler, Board. And this is not my area of
2933 expertise, I apologize for my ignorance when it comes out as
2934 opposed to if. But on the model of the fuel degradation model
2935 you're bringing in water through the breach in a diffusive
2936 manner I assume, which is causing ... which is the source for the
2937 iron oxidation. So you have this balance of sources of hydrogen
2938 coming in. You'll have a reducing environment in the groundwater
2939 system, which may be far less reducing than what the fluid may
2940 look like inside the canister as it's oxidizing. How are you
2941 dealing with the advective transport of water coming in and then
2942 potentially the advective transport of water out given perhaps
2943 buffers, erosion and things like that?

2944

2945 SASSANI: That's a good question. In terms of actual evaluation
2946 of flow in and out of the package at this point I don't know
2947 that we do a whole lot very mechanistically. It's at this point
2948 in the saturated systems, the packages will fill up with water
2949 relatively quickly, because once you saturate the bentonite
2950 and/or degrade it, you've got a pretty good fluid pressure
2951 around the canister so if it breaches the water's going to go
2952 in, potentially even some of the bentonite could go in, but the
2953 water's going in. And so once there's water in the canister the
2954 metals are way below the lower limit of the water stability, so
2955 corrosion goes on, hydrogen gets generated.

2956

2957 You might be asking well, does it use up all the water that
2958 comes in so that there's no water? But a 30 micron water film
2959 can form on the surfaces of these fuel pellets. It doesn't have
2960 to be a completely saturated system. So those are kind of
2961 conceptual assumptions at this point. But the flux of water into
2962 one of these canisters is relatively quick on a geologic time
2963 schedule.

2964

2965 BALLINGER: I feel compelled. Does the model consider ... I look at
2966 the radiolysis effect and alpha radiolysis versus beta and gamma
2967 radiolysis is very different?

2968

2969 SASSANI: Yes.

2970

2971 BALLINGER: And so let's say for argument purposes that you can
2972 increase the concentration of metal ions in solution because of
2973 radiolysis. When it gets out and starts migrating away from the
2974 package you're way above the solubility for those metal ions,
2975 which is typically around 10^{-6} , several ppm. So does it allow for
2976 precipitation? Does it allow for the fact that once this high
2977 saturated, super saturated solution ends up away from the
2978 canister, now away from its source of super saturation?

2979

2980 SASSANI: Yes. In fact, the system model does do solubility
2981 limits and those elements, like uranium, plutonium, they all
2982 precipitate out. They're not the issue. It's things like iodine
2983 129 that does not precipitate that just transports and can get
2984 into a fast fracture pathway. So there are other elements that
2985 are not solubility limited that are the issue. And that's why

2986 the degradation rate matters for those elements and their
2987 release.

2988

2989 BALLINGER: Thank you.

2990

2991 SIU: Okay. Thanks, David. And we will continue now with Paul
2992 Mariner and Sara Thomas. And could we make sure our clock is set
2993 to 40 minutes. No, no, no, no.

2994

2995 MARINER: Alright. Hello. My name is Paul Mariner. I'm with
2996 Sandia National Labs. I am one of the leads on the development
2997 of the performance assessment modeling capability for repository
2998 safety assessment. I'm going to be giving this talk with Sara
2999 Thomas. She's from Argonne National Laboratory. And the name of
3000 our talk is Fuel Matrix Degradation Modeling and Electrochemical
3001 Testing.

3002

3003 For the first part of this talk I'm going to talk about the fuel
3004 matrix degradation models that we're using in our repository
3005 reference cases. And then I'm going to talk quite a bit about
3006 the surrogate models that we're using to represent the fuel

3007 matrix degradation process model in our reference case
3008 simulations.

3009

3010 In Part 2 Sara will talk about electrochemical corrosion testing
3011 of simulated spent fuel and in particular how they help support
3012 the fuel matrix degradation process model that David was just
3013 talking about.

3014

3015 There are two general approaches that we use in the GDSA
3016 reference case simulations that the two approaches that Dave has
3017 talked about, one is the fractional degradation rate. We also
3018 call that the FDR model. The other is the fuel matrix
3019 degradation model, which is the more mechanistic model we were
3020 talking about earlier. When we simulate the fuel matrix
3021 degradation process model in our reference cases we do that with
3022 surrogate models.

3023

3024 The fractional degradation rate it's a fixed rate model. The
3025 rate does not change over time. The rate is sampled usually from
3026 a range like what is shown here, the 10^{-6} to 10^{-8} per year. And
3027 what that means is that is the fraction of the remaining fuel in
3028 the waste package that degrades in a year.

3029

3030 For the fuel matrix degradation surrogate models, because it's
3031 based on a more mechanistic model, we can get rates that change
3032 with time in our reference cases.

3033

3034 We have two different surrogate models that we've developed for
3035 representing that mechanistic model. One is a neural network
3036 surrogate model and the other is a K nearest neighbors surrogate
3037 model. We've developed them and we've implemented them and we've
3038 tested them on two different reference cases: the shale case and
3039 one of our crystalline reference cases. What I'm showing on the
3040 right here are two different results. I mean, two results from
3041 one of our shale case studies. In that shale case we in one
3042 application we used the fractional degradation rate model and in
3043 the other we used the neural network surrogate model. And they
3044 are both shown, one above the other.

3045

3046 The fractional degradation rate model, as you can see is just a
3047 constant rate. The waste packages fail and then they ... the rates
3048 are expressed here are in terms of uranium dioxide flux, in
3049 terms of moles per meter square per year. And that doesn't
3050 change over time. But when you simulate the ... you know, some of

3051 the mechanistic processes in the fuel matrix degradation model
3052 you do see a change in the fuel matrix degradation rate. It
3053 starts off quite a bit higher at earlier times and then
3054 decreases, the rate decreases and then eventually levels off at
3055 late times. This simulation that is demonstrated here is for a
3056 shale case with 2,000 failed 4-PWR waste packages.

3057

3058 It would be very nice if we could directly hook up the process
3059 model to our reference case. But we can't do that, because it
3060 runs too slowly. When we have probabilistic simulations we may
3061 have thousands of realizations we need to simulate and we will
3062 have thousands of waste packages in each simulation that are
3063 breaching. And so we just cannot run the slower process model in
3064 the PA reference case. The surrogate models run thousands of
3065 times faster. And so that's why we've developed them. The fuel
3066 degradation rates from the fuel matrix degradation process model
3067 they're sensitive to temperature and dose rate and they're also
3068 a function of the concentrations, the environment concentrations
3069 of dissolved hydrogen, oxygen, iron and carbonate. Our surrogate
3070 models are also a function of those same set of inputs. And
3071 that's why the surrogate models can do a really good job of
3072 emulating the process model. It uses the same set of inputs.

3073

3074 Here is a slide that talks about the two different surrogate
3075 modeling approaches that we've implemented so far. They're two
3076 very different surrogate approaches. They are both developed
3077 using machine learning techniques. The one on the left is the k
3078 nearest neighborhoods regression model. And what that does is it
3079 basically averages the nearest data points weighted by distance.
3080 In this very simple example you can think of the green points
3081 there as the true values. Those are the values that we get when
3082 we run our process model.

3083

3084 The surrogate model point is that yellow point there. We know
3085 what the input is, we look for data points that are in our
3086 database of results from our process model that are near that
3087 input value and then we average them. And we average them and
3088 weight them as well. So the closer the data point is to your
3089 interrogation point, the more you weight the value of that data
3090 point. So now imagine a database of millions of training data,
3091 millions of these green dots in six dimensional space. That's
3092 what we have for our fuel matrix degradation model surrogates.
3093 There are six different input parameters. So that's why we have
3094 a six dimensional space.

3095

3096 So what is happening here is that you find your values of your
3097 six inputs and you look in your training data set for the data
3098 points that are nearest to that interrogation point and you pull
3099 the nearest neighbors and you average them. So basically all
3100 this is really is just a very sophisticated multi-dimensional
3101 look up table.

3102

3103 The artificial neural network surrogate is very different. What
3104 we do there is we take all the training data sets, all the
3105 training data and we basically fit a response surface to it all.
3106 The way it's done in the artificial neural network is that it
3107 has neurons in a hidden layer that it uses them in order to
3108 optimize equations to fit all of the data. And so what ends up
3109 happening is you generate a whole bunch of coefficients that fit
3110 equations that fit all of your data.

3111

3112 This slide compares the training data, actually it doesn't
3113 compare training data, it compares test data from the process
3114 model to the neural network surrogate model. What it shows is
3115 the degradation rate on the Y axis, has a function of time. Both
3116 are in log scale. The solid lines in this graph are directly

3117 from the fuel matrix degradation model. And those are generated
3118 from random tests. So we're showing ten random tests. Those
3119 particular tests were not used to train the surrogates. The
3120 training data set was a completely different set. So that helps
3121 make this a fair, a more fair comparison.

3122

3123 So as you can see the surrogate model does a pretty good job of
3124 predicting what the process model would calculate. I'm sorry I
3125 didn't include also a plot like this for the K nearest neighbors
3126 regression. It also does a good job of predicting the trends and
3127 the magnitudes that you see there. But what it looks like, it's
3128 a little noisy. And that's just the nature of that approach
3129 versus this approach. The neural network approach produces very
3130 nice smooth curves.

3131

3132 In the upper right table that shows the range of input values
3133 that this surrogate was trained on. The temperature range is 300
3134 to 400 degrees Calvin, fuel burnup between 40 and 65 gigawatt
3135 days per metric ton. And you see there the ranges of
3136 environmental concentrations of carbonate, oxygen, iron and
3137 hydrogen.

3138

3139 In the lower right is an analysis of how well the surrogates did
3140 against the training set. So in other words these are aerometric
3141 for the entire training set that was generated over the entire
3142 ranges of the parameters that are in that upper figure.

3143

3144 And what you see on that last slide there is the mean absolute
3145 percentage error of 29 percent for the K nearest neighbors
3146 regressor and 14 percent for the neural network. Those values
3147 are actually pretty respectable considering that these surrogate
3148 models are predicting degradation rates over five orders of
3149 magnitude. You can see on the left side. It's predicting rates
3150 over five orders of magnitude. So to have mean absolute
3151 percentage errors that low is pretty good.

3152

3153 So for future improvements. We're actually going to be improving
3154 the process model in a way. Not mechanistically, but we are
3155 going to add a feature so that we can change the chemical
3156 conditions over time. And then we're also going to continue to
3157 work on surrogate models. We are now exploring a new surrogate
3158 model called the neural ordinary differential equation surrogate
3159 approach. The slide there shows kind of how that works. What
3160 that approach does is it fits a neural network to the time

3161 derivative of the process model data. We think that might be a
3162 really nice way to do it for our particular application. We'll
3163 see.

3164

3165 The other thing we're working on right now is a method for
3166 calculating the surrogate error for a specific repository
3167 reference case simulation. When we run our repository reference
3168 case simulation we are not pulling values from the entire
3169 surrogate training space. We're only probably pulling it from a
3170 very small section of that training space. So we want to know
3171 what is the error from the ... in the data values that we pull.
3172 And so we're developing a way to actually look into that.

3173

3174 And I think that's my last slide there. And it's onto Sara for
3175 Electrochemical Corrosion Testing of Simulated Spent Fuel.

3176

3177 THOMAS: Okay, I'll figure it out. Good morning. I'm Sara Thomas
3178 from Argonne National Laboratory. And I'll be presenting on
3179 electrochemical corrosion testing of simulated spent fuel or
3180 SIMFUEL.

3181

3182 Okay, so just a reminder on what the fuel matrix degradation
3183 model really does. It's an electrochemical model that calculates
3184 the dissolution rate of the UO_2 matrix fraction of the fuel as a
3185 function time since groundwater exposure. And it was developed
3186 as an electrochemical model because the dominate pathway for
3187 radionuclide release from the UO_2 matrix fraction of the fuel is
3188 an electrochemical process. So it's the oxidation of uranium
3189 four oxide to much more soluble uranium six species. So I've
3190 just included the generic UO_2 oxidation half reaction on the
3191 slide.

3192

3193 So in order to address the knowledge gaps on the factors that
3194 affect UO_2 matrix dissolution kinetics under repository relevant
3195 conditions, so these are the gaps that Dave Sassani briefly
3196 discussed in the previous section, the gaps on the fuel matrix
3197 degradation model, we're running an electrochemical corrosion
3198 test using SIMFUEL. And the gaps were specifically focused on
3199 are related to the effect of fuel chemistry, galvanic coupling
3200 to cladding and also certain environmental conditions, so how
3201 those affect UO_2 dissolution kinetics.

3202

3203 So this slide just covers some of our rationale for using
3204 SIMFUEL and electrochemical testing. So one nice thing about
3205 SIMFUEL is that we have composition control. So we can exclude
3206 the beta and gamma emitters from the composition to represent
3207 aged fuel in a repository. So this would not be possible if we
3208 were to be testing with actual irradiated spent nuclear fuel.
3209 And we're doing that because the fuel matrix degradation model
3210 assumes that the fuel has aged sufficiently prior to the waste
3211 package breached by groundwater. So only the alpha emitting
3212 fission products remain.

3213

3214 And another one of our main goals with this testing is to
3215 elucidate mechanisms. So we do that by conducting highly
3216 controlled electrochemical experiments in a laboratory. So some
3217 examples of the mechanisms we can better understand with our
3218 testing, and this is also something that was discussed in the
3219 previous session, is the role of the noble metal fission product
3220 particles or also known as the Epsilon phase in protecting the
3221 UO_2 matrix from dissolution.

3222

3223 So there's two proposed mechanisms by which these noble metal
3224 particles can protect the UO_2 matrix from dissolution. One is

3225 catalytic protection, because the noble metals are known
3226 catalyst. So they can actually catalyze surface reactions that
3227 donate electrons to the fuel surface and lower the surface
3228 potential protecting the matrix from dissolution. There's also
3229 galvanic protection where the molybdenum in the noble metal
3230 particles will actually preferentially degrade or corrode and do
3231 it instead of the UO_2 matrix. So another protective mechanism.

3232

3233 And then finally the nice thing about these electrochemical
3234 measurements that we run is that they can be conducted on a
3235 relatively short term timeframe. So we can generate valuable
3236 data to actually validate model predictions and calculate model
3237 parameters in a matter of weeks or months.

3238

3239 So our electrochemical tests. We systematically controlled
3240 single variables. So the variables under the first bullet point,
3241 those are already take into account in the fuel matrix
3242 degradation model. So we can perform our testing to just
3243 validate how they are incorporated into the model. So, for
3244 example, we can control the noble metal content in our SIMFUEL
3245 by preparing SIMFUEL with different concentrations of noble
3246 metals. We can control the dissolved hydrogen concentration in

3247 solution by purging the electrolyte solution with different
3248 hydrogen argon gas mixtures. We can control the carbonate
3249 concentration in the electrolyte solution and also the system
3250 temperature. And also we can control oxidant concentration. And
3251 by oxidants I just mean those produced due to alpha radiolysis.
3252 So mainly hydrogen peroxide. We can control that by either
3253 directly adding hydrogen peroxide to the solution or we could
3254 use the SIMFUEL doped with alpha emitters like U-233.

3255

3256 But our testing might also indicate that we need to include
3257 additional parameters or processes that are not currently in the
3258 model. So currently the model does not consider different noble
3259 metal alloy compositions, it just assumes one composition. It
3260 doesn't consider fuel composition and compositional changes over
3261 time, with the exception of considering the presence of noble
3262 metal fission product particles. It is calibrated to only an
3263 alkaline pH, meaning the rate constants in the model were
3264 determined from experiments that were conducted in alkaline
3265 solutions. It doesn't consider the effect of catalytic poisons
3266 that may inhibit catalytic effects of the noble metals. And also
3267 it does not include galvanic coupling between either the UO_2

3268 matrix and the noble metal particles in the fuel or the UO_2
3269 matrix in the waste package allies.

3270

3271 So this slide just covers some of the details on our SIMFUEL
3272 synthesis in electrode fabrication. So our SIMFUEL is composed
3273 of UO_2 , lanthanide oxides and different amounts of noble metal
3274 surrogate fission products, because we're interested in
3275 quantifying the effects of the noble metals that are present. To
3276 date we have made four SIMFUEL materials, each with a different
3277 noble metal concentration. And the compositions were inspired by
3278 depletion calculations in the literature. So the UO_2 L material
3279 that is to represent the composition for a burnup of three atom
3280 percent uranium and the UO_2 M material is to represent the
3281 concentration of noble metals expected for a fuel with a burnup
3282 of 6 atom percent uranium. And then the H material we just
3283 doubled the amount of noble metals present compared to the UO_2 M
3284 material, just to see if we could measure an affect.

3285

3286 So we prepared the SIMFUEL materials by mechanically mixing the
3287 reagent powders, pressing them into a pellet and then centering
3288 under vacuum. So that's just a picture of one of our pellets.
3289 It's about the size of an actual spent fuel pellet. And here I'm

3290 showing back scattered electron micrograph of the polished UO_2 H
3291 surface where I've identified the UO_2 matrix reaction and then
3292 different noble metal phases. And in order to use the SIMFUEL as
3293 an electrode we make an electrode by taking a section of the
3294 SIMFUEL pellet, embedding it in electrically conductive epoxy
3295 and attaching lead wires. And we do polish the surface of the
3296 SIMFUEL so it's pristine and flat before every test that we
3297 conduct in order to have a nice surface for measuring surface
3298 reaction rates.

3299

3300 So this one I included to just show how our electrochemical
3301 measurements relate to some of the electrochemical parameters in
3302 the fuel matrix degradation model. So the model includes 11 half
3303 reactions that occur on the fuel surface, either on the UO_2
3304 matrix fraction or the noble metal fraction of the fuel surface.
3305 And it calculates the corrosion potential or the E_{CORR} , the
3306 current densities of each half reaction simultaneously, such
3307 that the net current at the fuel surface is zero. So another way
3308 of explaining that is at the corrosion potential E_{CORR} the sum of
3309 the current densities of all the anodic half reactions occurring
3310 on the fuel surface plus the sum of all the current densities of

3311 the cathodic reactions or the reduction reactions occurring on
3312 the fuel surface is equal to zero.

3313

3314 And these current densities of half reactions are important
3315 because that's how the UO_2 dissolution rate is actually
3316 calculated. It's from the current densities of three surface
3317 reactions that involve the dissolution of UO_2 . And that's
3318 calculated with Faradays Law.

3319

3320 So I've provided a current density equation for a single half
3321 reaction at the bottom of the slide. And I just want to cover
3322 some of the important electrochemical parameters, not all of
3323 them to show how our measurements relate to the model. So the
3324 parameters in red we determined from our electrochemical
3325 measurements either directly or indirectly. And then there's the
3326 purple sigma term. That's the fraction of the fuel surface area
3327 that contains the site where the reaction occurs. So we can
3328 control that by our SIMFUEL compositions. We know that the
3329 relative surface areas of the UO_2 matrix and the noble metals.
3330 And then the concentration of chemical reactants at the fuel
3331 surfaces in blue. So that's ... we can control that through the
3332 composition of our electrolyte solution.

3333

3334 So our electrochemical tests they use the standard three
3335 electrode system with SIMFUEL as the working electrode and they
3336 mentioned this method allows us to control the solution pH,
3337 chemistry and temperature. And when we determined the effect of
3338 one variable it actually involves multiple types of
3339 measurements. It's not just electrochemical measurements,
3340 because sometimes the electrochemical responses aren't enough to
3341 identify a mechanism. So the electrochemical measurements that
3342 we run are open circuit potential measurements where we measure
3343 the surface potential of the SIMFUEL over time. There's
3344 potentiodynamic scans where we scan an applied potential at the
3345 SIMFUEL surface and measure the net current density and then
3346 there's potentiostatic tests where we apply a fixed surface
3347 potential and then measure current density over time.

3348

3349 And we do characterize the SIMFUEL surface during the
3350 electrochemical measurement using electrochemical impedance
3351 spectroscopy just to see how the electrichemical properties of
3352 the surface change throughout the measurements. And then we do
3353 scanning electron microscopy coupled to energy dispersive x-ray
3354 spectroscopy or SEM-EDS analysis on the SIMFUEL material before

3355 and after we test in order to see how the microstructure
3356 changes. And we also look at the solution composition after our
3357 electrochemical tests. So we take samples and we measure the
3358 dissolved metal concentration. So we're interested in dissolved
3359 uranium and also the noble metals. We do that using ICPMS.

3360

3361 And I just have one example of a type of electrochemical
3362 measurement that we run and I'm showing just one example of some
3363 interesting results, so it's the open circuit potential
3364 measurements. And I like these because they're relatively easy
3365 to understand and they provide insight into the stability of the
3366 SIMFUEL surface under the known exposure conditions. So I have
3367 two plots measuring open circuit potential which is just
3368 potential over time and it's the same SIMFUEL material UO_2 which
3369 is the material that does not contain noble metals and it's in
3370 air saturated solution or a hydrogen purged solution.

3371

3372 So as you can see in the plots the data kind of reach a
3373 stabilized value. So we run until we see that stabilized value.
3374 And you can compare that value to the threshold potential at
3375 which uranium-4 is known to oxidize to uranium-6 for the
3376 specific exposure conditions. And we can gain insight into the

3377 thermodynamic stability of the UO_2 under those conditions. So in
3378 the hydrogen purge solution the OCP stabilizes right on the
3379 boundary for U4 oxidation to U6. So that indicates that the UO_2
3380 matrix of the SIMFUEL is actually stable under those conditions.

3381

3382 And in contrast in the air saturated solution that has dissolved
3383 oxygen the stabilized OCP is much higher than the threshold
3384 potential for U4 or oxidation to U6. So we know that oxidation
3385 is actively occurring. Also this OCP measurement is nice,
3386 because we can directly compare it to the E_{CORR} parameter that the
3387 fuel matrix degradation model calculates. And, finally, we use
3388 this OCP measurement to select surface potentials to apply when
3389 we run potentiostatic tests. So those are the tests where we
3390 apply a surface potential and derive the corrosion I guess. So
3391 since we're interested in oxidation processes because the UO_2
3392 dissolution is an oxidation process, we select applied surface
3393 potentials that are above the stabilized OCP value. And these
3394 potentiostatic tests actually provide insight into the surface
3395 reaction kinetics.

3396

3397 Alright, so just to summarize what I presented we're running
3398 electrochemical experiments using simulated spent fuel and our

3399 goal is to quantify the effect of individual variables on
3400 surface reaction kinetics so we can identify mechanisms. And we
3401 do that by controlling the SIMFUEL composition, the solution
3402 chemistry and temperature and also the surface potential and
3403 some of our electrochemical measurements. And looking to the
3404 future. So our near term future electrochemical tests we aim to
3405 determine the effects of the concentration and composition of
3406 noble metal phases in SIMFUEL. So that's why we made SIMFUEL
3407 materials with four concentrations of noble metals.

3408

3409 And then the effect of the presence of catalytic poisons in
3410 solutions. That's related to the first bullet point, because
3411 noble metals are known catalysts, so what happens when you have
3412 a catalytic poison in solution? How does that effect UO_2
3413 dissolution kinetics? Also dissolved hydrogen concentration in
3414 solution. So that's what we're actually looking at this year.
3415 And then the galvanic coupling between the cladding and the UO_2
3416 matrix and noble metals in the UO_2 matrix.

3417

3418 And then we also have a capability to look at the effects of
3419 system temperature dissolved carbonate concentration pH and

3420 other solution chemistry parameters. But these four bullet
3421 points are the near term priorities.

3422

3423 Alright. So we would just like to acknowledge the other people
3424 that work on our projects. It's not just Paul and I. There's
3425 Bert at Sandia who's involved with the FMD surrogate modeling
3426 and Vineeth at Argonne National Lab who actually runs the
3427 electrochemical tests that I presented on. And then the
3428 references for the presentation. And we'll be happy to take any
3429 questions.

3430

3431 SIU: Thank you. Ron?

3432

3433 BALLINGER: The microstructure that you're showing on slide 12.
3434 How does that compare ... that's for SIMFUEL?

3435

3436 THOMAS: Yeah, that's the SIMFUEL.

3437

3438 BALLINGER: How does it compare with actual UO_2 microstructure?

3439

3440 THOMAS: Yes, I knew this question was coming. It is different.

3441 First, we see the noble metal particles are like embedded in the

3442 UO₂ matrix. And that does occur in actual irradiated spent
3443 nuclear fuel, but you see them also in the grain boundaries too
3444 in the actual irradiated spent nuclear fuel. But for this they
3445 are embedded in the UO₂ matrix. But it's useful for us, because
3446 we know that they're electrically connected. So we can see the
3447 coupled effects. And I know the grain size, you can't really see
3448 it in the SIMFUEL, but it's approximately the same as in actual
3449 spent nuclear fuel, like one micron diameter. And I'll note that
3450 they are a little less dense than the UO₂ matrix is a little more
3451 porous than actual spent fuel. But we do make all the materials
3452 the same way so we can compare relative effects.

3453

3454 BALLINGER: Because that little purple sigma makes a big
3455 difference.

3456

3457 THOMAS: Yeah. We have a good way of estimating the surface area
3458 of the noble metals, because they're nice and compact and flat.
3459 But we don't have a great way of estimating or measuring the
3460 solution exposed fraction, their surface area of the UO₂ matrix
3461 yet.

3462

3463 BALLINGER: Good work by the way.

3464

3465 THOMAS: That's Vineeth. Vineeth does it too. It's not just me.

3466

3467 BALLINGER: Tough work by the way.

3468

3469 THOMAS: Have a degree, yeah.

3470

3471 SIU: Other questions?

3472

3473 WOODS: Brian Woods, Board. Just to follow up on that question
3474 beyond like the porosity. Also there might be a lot of cracking
3475 and some irradiated fuels. Is this something that you may be
3476 potentially will look at, you know, SIMFUEL that doesn't look a
3477 nice annulus or a nice cylinder?

3478

3479 THOMAS: I mean, right now we're just focusing on those chemical
3480 methods that I presented on with the materials that we made. But
3481 I'm not really sure if it's appropriate to use electrochemical
3482 methods to look at cracking effects.

3483

3484 SIU: Just to ... so I understand the game plan here. At this point
3485 you're not changing the number of parameters, particular

3486 parameters in the FMDM, but you would upgrade the values of
3487 those parameters, which would change your surrogate models. Is
3488 that correct?

3489

3490 THOMAS: Right now we're just validating how the parameters are
3491 already incorporated in the models, see if they're capturing
3492 what we see experimentally. But we are making a list of
3493 processes that could be included in the model. And I think the
3494 metric for inclusion would be having like orders of magnitude
3495 effect on the dissolution behavior.

3496

3497 SIU: That would again conceivably lead to more parameters which
3498 then now in your surrogate modeling you'd have to accommodate.
3499 Is that fair?

3500

3501 MARINER: Yeah. She is actually more of an expert on this model
3502 than I am. She's really gotten to know well the fuel matrix
3503 degradation model. So if she sees some ways we can improve that
3504 model she'll bring it up and we will look at it.

3505

3506 OGG: Dan, Board staff. If we could I'd like to ask a question of
3507 Dave Sassani. And also if possible could we bring up his

3508 presentation and go to slide 21? This is all related. But really
3509 this question is sort of addressing the big picture perspective
3510 on how this fuel matrix degradation model fits with everything
3511 the U.S. program is doing. And I don't know if we can get that
3512 previous presentation slide 21. Let me set the stage ... and this
3513 gets some of Ron Ballinger's question, again, getting big
3514 perspective. So the U.S. doesn't have a repository so we're not
3515 yet doing a performance assessment. We're at the stage of
3516 developing the tools that may be able to do a performance
3517 assessment. So we heard yesterday as you're developing your
3518 tools, you're exercising them and you're doing these reference
3519 cases. Yesterday when we asked about the crystalline rock
3520 reference case we asked what are you using for fuel matrix
3521 degradation. And it was basically a constant rate degradation,
3522 correct?

3523

3524 So now looking at your slide here you say fuel matrix
3525 degradation model at the top, the third sub bullet says the
3526 model is implemented into GDSA as an alternative to the
3527 fractional degradation rate sampling. So my question here is do
3528 you expect and plan now that FMDM will be a part of GDSA or are
3529 you just doing R&D now to evaluate the value of this model to

3530 see if, in fact, it is a good alternative to the fractional
3531 degradation rate model?

3532

3533 SASSANI: The answer is yes. And I'll break it down. So the
3534 safety analysis, the original intent of developing this model
3535 was for it to provide a mechanistic model for the degradation
3536 rate for these saturated systems. When we coupled it ... it
3537 actually has been coupled as a FORTRAN code to an earlier
3538 version of the safety analysis. But when you do a system model,
3539 particularly the larger ones that are being done now it is the
3540 long pole in the tent. It's very slow to run it for every waste
3541 package in the system.

3542

3543 OGG: Understood.

3544

3545 SASSANI: So that initiated the surrogate modeling. But we also
3546 have the fractional degradation rate sampling. The real purpose
3547 of the model is to get after the mechanistic processes in
3548 various systems we're looking at with our expected evolution of
3549 those systems at higher temperatures under different conditions
3550 with very active potential corrosion once your canister fails as
3551 an alternative to assess these other variables, because in the

3552 literature and there are repository programs out there that have
3553 selected a range of rates and sample those and analyze those.
3554 They all reflect this very large effect of the hydrogen
3555 overpressure in those systems from the experimental work.

3556

3557 So we wanted a model that would span both the saturated systems
3558 and be able to go to oxidizing systems, because we were still
3559 looking generically, so we're still looking at things at a low
3560 level for like unsaturated alluvial systems where DPCs could
3561 have heat removal go on. So that model goes across that whole
3562 range. But it ties it to those chemical input parameters. So
3563 we're using it to evaluate the technical bases. It's not so much
3564 to evaluate the performance of the systems at this point,
3565 although the surrogate models reproduce it very well and are
3566 much faster.

3567

3568 But to do the detailed chemistry in an engineered barrier system
3569 we have some background work going on with like a 2D reactive
3570 transport model that represents the EBS components. So if you
3571 were going to do that to get ranges of locational performance,
3572 you might use this model as well.

3573

3574 OGG: Back thought to my bigger question for perspective, if and
3575 when this would really be used in a future performance
3576 assessment. My understanding is you still have a lot of
3577 uncertainties about this model. There are a lot of gaps in
3578 applying the model. There's a lot of research to be done in
3579 order to prove that this can really do what you want it to do.
3580 And so do you expect there's still a lot of filling in the gaps
3581 needs to be done before you really could apply this model in a
3582 performance assessment package?

3583

3584 SASSANI: There are gaps and then there are gaps in the barrier
3585 models. There's gaps in this model and there's gaps that are
3586 outside of this model that would be relevant to build in. But
3587 those are all like the cladding degradation model. We don't have
3588 one.

3589

3590 OGG: Right.

3591

3592 SASSANI: That could help. But that's not part of this model.
3593 It's something that would go around this model.

3594

3595 OGG: Well, I thought the question of the cladding is one of the
3596 gaps associated with FMDM.

3597

3598 SASSANI: It's one of the gaps we've identified. But it's
3599 actually a separate model in the safety analysis and it would be
3600 done as a separate model, unless there was a strong coupling
3601 chemically, which Professor Ballinger has raised as an issue.

3602

3603 OGG: Right.

3604

3605 SASSANI: We don't see that in the datasets that have been
3606 measured in the literature where cladding is in some of them and
3607 it's not in others. We don't see any discrimination there. So we
3608 think it's mainly a physical barrier to flow into the fuel pin.
3609 Also with unzipping aspects that were evaluated in the Yucca
3610 Mountain project if you're oxidizing the spent fuel you
3611 generally have a volume expansion, because the precipitates are
3612 much larger volume and this tends to unzip your cladding. So if
3613 you fail a fuel pin ... so maybe the model of cladding would be
3614 when do you expect the first failure to occur. But if it unzips
3615 over a hundred years that's essentially instantaneous on a
3616 geologic time scale.

3617

3618 OGG: Okay. This helps to understand the big picture a little bit
3619 better. Thank you.

3620

3621 SASSANI: Sure.

3622

3623 SIU: Bret?

3624

3625 LESLIE: Bret Leslie, Board staff. I'll too go to the big
3626 picture. So you primarily have developed GDSA, the fuel matrix
3627 degradation model using commercial spent nuclear fuel. If you
3628 were to include DOE spent fuel, which is quite a bit different
3629 and currently there's really no basis other than ... simultaneous
3630 release. Would you develop different models, different technical
3631 bases? If you look at some of the radionuclides in DOE's spent
3632 fuel and you can go to our 2017 DOE spent fuel report, appendix
3633 two. It lists which radionuclides in the DOE spent fuel
3634 inventory, even though it's a small fraction it's 40 percent of
3635 the total inventory in commercial spent nuclear fuel. So you
3636 might come up with different things to do. So have you done that
3637 and is that a plan for, as you reevaluate the FEPs? Dave?
3638

3639 SASSANI: Thanks for the questions. These are good questions. So
3640 we have ... when we were doing work on a defense only waste
3641 repository we actually talked about what the models for the DOE
3642 managed spent fuels would be. For any of the metallic fuels the
3643 models would be instantaneous degradation. It is ... there's data
3644 sets out there and I've seen reports form within DOE's program
3645 that say, oh, well, it's not quite instantaneous, so maybe we
3646 should do more R&D on it. Well, a hundred years is instantaneous
3647 on a geologic timescale. It's highly reactive and it's because
3648 these metals are way below the lower stability limit of water.
3649 So they decompose water, rip the oxygen off it and degas
3650 hydrogen.

3651

3652 So for those models we pretty much know what the degradation
3653 rate issue is. But they would need to be looked at in FEPs more
3654 for the other impact of processes of gas generation very rapidly
3655 and how that would affect engineered barriers around canisters
3656 where you need a bentonite backfill around them. That may be a
3657 local effect. It may disrupt the barrier. And in such a
3658 crystalline system that's a different mechanism for taking out
3659 the bentonite barrier other than just corrosion from influx of
3660 very low saline waters, very fresh waters. So we would look at

3661 those. They are a small inventory. In fact, N reactor fuel is
3662 about 85 percent of the DOE managed SNF by mass. It's a metallic
3663 fuel. So all the rest of them are kind of cats and dogs. But I
3664 know there are some ones that have particular radionuclides in
3665 them that don't necessarily get thought about directly in some
3666 of these safety assessments.

3667

3668 So they'd be important to look at and think about. I don't know
3669 that they would be prioritized, and this is my speculation, not
3670 the Department of Energy's, I don't know that they would be
3671 prioritized until we started going to actual sites and down
3672 selecting. But it's certainly something that would need to be
3673 done.

3674

3675 SIU: Andy Jung?

3676

3677 JUNG: This is Andy Jung staff. I have two quick questions. The
3678 first fuel matrix degradation model still I'm not quite
3679 confident why do you need it? Because this is fundamentally for
3680 in corrosion area. Many researchers agree the theory itself. But
3681 there are lots of experimental data and have this try to study
3682 by utilizing the constant, the field degradation rate model

3683 already in Swedish or Finnish and other countries. And also this
3684 current FMDM only can apply to clay base and granite
3685 crystalline, not prototype on Yucca Mountain could be possible.
3686 But the long term prediction you may need some mechanistic
3687 theory. But still in the ... Dan has already asked it, this model
3688 could be an alternative to fractional degradation rate sampling.
3689 So in your GDSA framework still their fractional degradation
3690 rate model is the conceptual? So FMD is kind of alternative
3691 process model and then ... so I'm still ... because this is the
3692 probably I'm guessing just the first attempt to use FMD for
3693 repository, the safety assessment, actually they applied it in
3694 this case. So I'm still not confident, because there's a lot of
3695 the extent of work is required to prove.

3696

3697 And the second ... for the experimental, the SIMFUEL because the
3698 actual, the high burnup fuel. The surface area is not very
3699 smooth. It's very rough and have a microcracks and the void. So
3700 utilizing this simulated spent nuclear fuel, Sara said that
3701 actual the surface area ratio, which is not actually ... is not
3702 quantitative yet. But surface area quantification is one of the
3703 key factors to apply to the actual ... the dose consequence

3704 analysis. So is there any plan to how you can quantify the
3705 fractional release rate for considering surface area?

3706

3707 THOMAS: So there is a way to measure surface area using EDT
3708 analysis. But that's just gas expose, not solution expose
3709 surface area. We can look into it. But what we're really doing
3710 with the SIMFUEL testing is trying to identify mechanisms using
3711 SIMFUEL prepared the same way. We're just one variable is
3712 changed. So that's the motivation for the testing with SIMFUEL.

3713

3714 JUNG: Yeah. Another one is like if you have the rough surface...
3715 some locally deep area it has the solution to be stagnant, kind
3716 of some crevice effect could be another mode of the acceleration
3717 of the fuel dissolution too. So maybe you may also have consider
3718 how you can reflect some surface ... to simulate actual spent
3719 fuel.

3720

3721 THOMAS: That's a good point.

3722

3723 SIU: Yes, please.

3724

3725 SASSANI: Dave Sassani, Sandia National Lab. So when we started
3726 putting safety analysis models together taking distributions out
3727 of the literature that were developed already and then sampling
3728 them within the safety analysis that's very straightforward. We
3729 can do that. That's what we've done. So there's bases out there
3730 for those. In terms of the generic system and you're right
3731 there, these are applied really only to granitic systems and to
3732 clay shale type systems. And that's primarily because in salt
3733 systems they're much higher ionic strength, they're brines. But
3734 the reliance on the waste form lifetime is much lower because in
3735 impermeable salt things like iodine 129 are not going to
3736 transport as readily through very minor impermeable areas.

3737

3738 Now that's a generic description of a salt system. If you get to
3739 an actual salt system you might have other features that could
3740 be transportable pathways and in an actual system you might want
3741 more performance from the waste form. But it's not a priority
3742 for the generic salt systems. Just like waste package corrosion
3743 lifetime is not a priority for the salt systems either. The
3744 reliance is very much so on the reconsolidation of the salt
3745 around the canister and then having very impermeable salt as
3746 your transport pathway.

3747

3748 As far as what's this in there for? It was after we looked at
3749 ranges of degradation rates and pulled some from the literature
3750 from some of the other programs we also went to the literature
3751 and looked at the datasets that those were based on and they
3752 primarily are driven by the delta in the hydrogen overpressure
3753 in the experimental work. But not in any fashion that anybody
3754 can identify the mechanism to. There's papers out there that
3755 identify the epsilon particles, the five metal particle, noble
3756 metal particle phases in the spent fuel as catalyzing hydrogen
3757 reacting with the spent fuel and with the radiolytic oxidants.

3758

3759 Other papers identify it as a cathodic protection. Other papers
3760 indicate that you don't need the epsilon phases at all. That
3761 it's just simply the reduction in the electrochemical potential
3762 because of the hydrogen overpressure. We went and found
3763 Shoesmith's work, which developed a mixed potential model, which
3764 is mostly what the fuel matrix degradation model is. It's an
3765 implementation of Shoesmith, et al's model with a coupled
3766 radiolytic model and it's coupled in as an expansion polynomial
3767 of the radiolytic production rate of hydrogen peroxide.

3768

3769 It's also developed so that it can go to much higher oxygen
3770 potentials. So those two modifications are what differentiates
3771 it from the mixed potential model developed by Shoesmith, et al
3772 back in 2003. So there wasn't an enormous amount of work that
3773 went into ... it took a while to figure out how to make them all
3774 couple together, but eventually we got there. And what drives
3775 the U.S. program in terms of heterogeneities or spatial
3776 variability depends enormously on the thermal loads and how
3777 those perturb the system and our perturbation tends to be much
3778 higher, that's why we're looking at much higher temperatures for
3779 bentonite stability and/or other higher temperature mineral
3780 buffers.

3781

3782 The U.S. program has much hotter canisters to consider much
3783 higher thermal loads, much more active perturbation to the
3784 geologic systems than most other repository systems in the
3785 world. So we thought about how does the degradation rate
3786 potentially vary due to those heterogeneities as driven by our
3787 engineered materials and these thermal perturbations. And if you
3788 wanted the couple in some kind of perturbed chemistry to the
3789 degradation rate of the fuel this is something that captures
3790 most of the major, if not all of the major chemical constituents

3791 that can affect that and the mechanistic aspects when we
3792 developed this back in 2011 to 2013 indicated that the hydrogen
3793 overpressure is absolutely the largest driver of variability to
3794 the model results.

3795

3796 So that identifying whether or not we could figure out
3797 electrochemically what the mechanism was, so that you could
3798 understand how to use it over long timeframes in these systems
3799 was the priority. And in about 2014 there was a program
3800 direction change, most of the work shut down. There was about a
3801 100K a year that was going on for model tweaking and
3802 development, but no testing. And this only really started back
3803 up I think after FY 2017 when the budgets went back up. So we've
3804 been grappling with what is it that we want to do. Is there a
3805 series of tests that we can do that could definitely answer the
3806 mechanistic question?

3807

3808 We're not spending enormous amounts of funds or energy on this.
3809 But it's the only thing out there that we've seen that allows
3810 one to consider coupling it to the potential chemical
3811 variability of the waste packages in the system.

3812

3813 SIU: Okay. Thank you very much. And I think we don't have any
3814 public comments. So thank you all presenters. Really appreciate
3815 the time and the valuable information. We will be meeting
3816 ourselves in cogitating over what we've heard. So with that, I
3817 think we'll call the meeting closed. Thank you again.