

EPRI's Yucca Mountain TSPA, 'Phase 5'

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Outline

- Purpose of EPRI TSPAs
- Scope of 'Phase 5' report [November 2000]
- Model Components and Assumptions
- Base Case Results
- Identification of 'Barriers'
- DOE and EPRI conservatisms/optimisms
- Performance confirmation

Purpose of EPRI Yucca Mountain TSPAs

- Independent assessment of technical issues
 - Inform smart business decisions through third-party expert scientific insight
 - Provide input to utilities on regulatory and legislative issues
- Provide insight to outside review bodies such as TRB, ACNW


EPRI TSPA Scope - Scenarios Considered and not Considered

- Considered: “Normal release scenario”
 - Container degradation, waste dissolution, contaminant transport, biosphere
- Not considered:
 - Colloid-aided transport
 - Volcanism
 - Human intrusion

EPRI TSPA Model Components

- IMARC: Integrated Multiple Assumptions and Release Code
 - *Mostly* logic tree format (i.e., not Monte Carlo)
 - Container failure times are Monte Carlo simulations
 - 54 branches total
- IMARC 'shell'
 - Time steps
 - Most 'global' inputs
 - Liberal use of lookup tables
- Submodel Links
 - Source term
 - UZ/SZ transport

IMARC Logic Tree (54 branches)



Net Infiltration

[Stuart Childs, Kennedy/Jenks]

- Based on three climate states [Austin Long, U. AZ]
- Infiltration assumed uniform over the entire repository footprint
 - Infiltration rates [mm/yr]:

	<u>Low</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>High</u>
Greenhouse:	1.9	11.3	19.2
Interglacial:	1.11	7.2	9.6
Full glacial maximum:	6.8	19.6	35.4


Focused Flow Factor

[Ben Ross, Disposal Safety]

- Based on March 2000 AMR: “Abstraction of Drift Seepage”
- Zero focusing: percolation rate = net infiltration rate repository-wide
- Focusing factor of 22: 4.5% of the repository gets 22 times the area-average infiltration rate


Drip Shield/Waste Package Combined Failure Distribution

[Dave Shoemith (UWO), John Massari (CNS)]



- Drip Shield degradation
 - General corrosion, HIC
 - 14 failed at emplacement
- Container degradation
 - Aqueous corrosion at $T < 120^{\circ}\text{C}$
 - Localized corrosion above 100°C
 - SCC only on outer lid weld


Fuel Rod Cladding Failure Distribution [Shoesmith and Massari]



- 2.44% initial cladding failures
- General corrosion (not specifically driven by F⁻)
- Localized corrosion considered unlikely

Source Term General Approach

[Wei Zhou; Mike Stenhouse, Monitor Scientific]



↕: diffusion

↓: advection


- Compartments are assumed well connected
- Advection directly into local flowing fracture
- 100% of waste form in failed cladding assumed exposed

UZ/SZ Flow and Transport Model

[Frank Schwartz, OSU; Ed Sudicky, U. Waterloo]

- UZ:
 - 1-D, dual K continuum
 - Simplified vertical columns
- SZ:
 - 3-D, dual porosity, dual permeability
 - SZ thickness: 200 meters
 - Vertical dispersion significant


Biosphere Dose Conversion Factors Conceptual Model [Smith et al., QuantiSci, Ltd.]



- Compartment model (AMBER)
 - Thin arrows: nuclide migration processes
 - Thick arrows: exposure pathways

ANNUAL DOSE VS. TIME


Dose from Highest Concentration at AE



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ANNUAL DOSE VS. TIME

Dose from Highest Concentration at AE



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Barrier Importance Analyses

- Purpose
 - Assign “value” to various components of Yucca Mountain System
 - Motivation: “Defense-in-depth”
 - Are all eggs in one (or two) basket(s)?
 - Provide insight on important Features, Events, and Processes (FEPs)
 - EPRI uses a “Hazard Index” approach
 - Variant of ‘full neutralization’

“Hazard Index” Approach to Identifying Potential Barriers

- Begin by eliminating ALL barriers
- Add potential barriers one-by-one
- Amount ‘Hazard Index’ (dose rate) is reduced indicates potential barrier importance

Starting Point - Highest “Imaginable” Dose

- All 70,000 MTU of spent fuel dissolved in 0.6 m³ water
- One individual drinks it in one year
- Starting total Hazard Index, $HI_{tot} \sim 10^{17}$ [mrem/yr]
- Why start so unrealistically?
 - **All** FEPs can be evaluated quantitatively
 - Basic engineering decisions (e.g. repository layout)


13 FEPs Added One-by-One

- 4% of Repository Wet
- 3,000 year Alteration Time
- Moderate Solubility
- Cladding Fails Over Time
- Containers Fail Over Time
- Drip Shield Fails Over Time
- Dilution in the UZ
- EBS Sorption
- Accessible Environment (AE) at 5 km
- UZ/SZ Moderate Retardation
- AE in Front of Alluvium
- AE at 20 km
- Dose from All Pathways

TOTAL HAZARD REDUCTION

Annual Dose from Water Only

Hazard index curve for all radionuclides



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
Hazard Reduction Factors

<u>Hazard Reduction</u>	<u>Time of Peak [yr]</u>	<u>Barrier</u>	<u>“Engineered” or “Natural”?</u>
10^{-1}	2000	4% of repository wet	both
10^3	3000	3,000 year alteration time	both
10^2	200,000	Moderate solubility	natural
$10^{0.1}$	200,000	Cladding fails over time	engineered
10^{-1}	600,000	Containers fail over time	engineered
10^{-0}	700,000	Drip shields fail over time	engineered
10^{-5}	700,000	Dilution in the UZ	both
10^3	700,000	EBS sorption	mostly engineered
10^2	500,000	AE at 5 km	natural
$10^{0.5}$	600,000	UZ/SZ moderate retardation	natural
$10^{-0.5}$	600,000	AE in front of alluvium	natural
10^{-0}	600,000	AE at 20 km	natural
10^{-18}		<i>Total Hazard Reduction</i>	
10^{5-14}		<i>Hazard reduction due to “engineered” features</i>	
10^{5-14}		<i>Hazard reduction due to “natural” features</i>	
10^{-1}		Hazard “reduction” (i.e., increase) due to all pathways	

EPRI Analysis of Conservatism and Optimisms in the DOE Models


- Conservatism
 - Source term diffusion model
 - Volcanism consequences
 - Unsaturated Zone transport (FEHM particle tracker needs correcting)
 - *Saturated Zone transport*
- Optimisms
 - 70% heat removal by ventilation (?)
 - Choice between temperature and RH conservatism/optimism
- EPRI satisfied overall DOE assessment is conservative

Concept of a SZ “Flowing Interval”




- “Flowing Interval” spacing: ~20m
- Typical fracture spacing within the flowing interval: <1m

Sensitivity of Np-237 Drinking Water Dose Rate to SZ Sorption



Impact of Eliminating Alluvium



Is it Necessary to Assess all Uncertainties?

- No
 - Many parameters we treat as fixed are truly unimportant to performance
 - Therefore, not worth the effort
 - Other, more important, fixed parameters could, during SR analyses, be investigated using expert judgment (non-Q OK)
 - ‘Conservative’ versus ‘best estimate’ to provide some insight on potential degree of conservatism
- EPRI encourages current M&O effort led by Coppersmith

Is TSPA an Appropriate Decision-Making Tool?

- **Yes**

- Comprehensive and quantitative measure of the degree of public health protection
- TSPA now based on many years of experience
- Multiple practitioners arrive at consistent results
- Most TSPA submodels are based on solid data
 - Years of R&D data incorporated directly or indirectly
- Multiple lines of evidence built-in to TSPA
 - Many submodels already employ natural analog information
- Performance confirmation will further bolster TSPA

Role of Performance Confirmation (and other Long-Term R&D) Activities

- Performance confirmation (and other long-term R&D) activity definition important for SR- not just for licensing
 - Helps provide clarity when managing many important uncertainties
 - Performance confirmation is an opportunity to improve understanding and bolster the safety case
 - SR decision makers can use long-term R&D plans, along with current knowledge

EPRI Two-Year Program to Clarify the Role of Performance Confirmation in SR/LA

- November 2000: 'Interim report' issued
 - Review of performance confirmation issues
 - What constitutes an appropriate performance confirmation activity
 - Has to be able to truly 'confirm' long-term performance
 - Has to have clearly defined goals and stopping criteria
 - Review of current DOE performance confirmation plan (May 2000)
 - Generally sound, but needs improvement
 - Other long-term R&D can provide bases for model improvements
 - Relaxing conservatism could lead to a more efficient repository design

EPRI Performance Confirmation Plans for 2001

- External review of and recommendations for appropriate performance confirmation and other important long-term R&D activities (to help establish consensus) .
- ‘Bottom out’ details of one or two performance confirmation activities
 - More detailed test plan
 - Supporting models to show how ~50-year data can be extrapolated to 10,000+ years
 - Definition of ‘error bar(s)’
 - Will choose container degradation
 - May also investigate larger-scale thermal testing
- Planned completion is mid 2001

Conclusions

- **DOE's TSPA is conservative**
- **Repository performance is bolstered by a diverse range of multiple barriers**
- **Efforts to quantify uncertainties should be risk-informed**
- **TSPA is an appropriate tool for repository decision-making**
- **Performance confirmation should play an important role in repository decision-making**