

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR WASTE TECHNICAL REVIEW BOARD

SUMMER 2000 BOARD MEETING

Piñon Plaza Resort
2171 Highway 50 East
Carson City, Nevada 89701

August 1, 2000

Scientific and Technical Issues and
Total System Performance Assessment

NWTRB BOARD MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. John W. Arendt
Dr. Daniel B. Bullen, Session Chair (TSPA/SR)
Dr. Norman L. Christensen
Dr. Jared L. Cohon, Chair, NWTRB
Dr. Paul P. Craig
Dr. Debra S. Knopman
Dr. Priscilla P. Nelson
Dr. Richard R. Parizek, Session Chair,
(Scientific and Technical Issues)
Dr. Donald Runnells
Dr. Alberto A. Sagüés
Dr. Jeffrey J. Wong

SENIOR PROFESSIONAL STAFF

Dr. Carl Di Bella
Dr. Daniel Fehringer
Dr. Daniel Metlay
Dr. Leon Reiter
Dr. David Diodato

NWTRB STAFF

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Karyn Severson, External Affairs
Ayako Kurihara, Editor
Paula Alford, External Affairs
Linda Hiatt, Management Analyst
Linda Coultry, Staff Assistant

CONSULTANTS

Dr. Rod Ewing, University of Michigan
Dr. William Melson, Smithsonian Institute
Dr. John Kessler, EPRI

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1 the nation's spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive
2 wastes from reprocessing. Five years later, in 1987,
3 Congress amended that law to focus OCRWM's activities on the
4 characterization of a single candidate site for final
5 disposal, Yucca Mountain, on the western edge of the Nevada
6 Test Site, about 100 miles north of Las Vegas.

7 In those same amendments in 1987, Congress created
8 the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, this Board, as an
9 independent federal agency for reviewing the technical and
10 scientific validity of OCRWM's activities. The Board is
11 required to periodically furnish its findings, as well as its
12 conclusions and recommendations, to Congress and to the
13 Secretary of DOE. We do this in Congressional testimony and
14 through our reports.

15 Now, this is a complicated project, as you know,
16 and in order to cover the many aspects of the project, the
17 Board created five panels, each focused on a set of issues.
18 The panels, which are comprised of four to six Board members,
19 meet from time to time in public settings like this.

20 As specified by the 1987 Act, the President of the
21 United States appoints our Board members from a list of
22 nominees submitted by the National Academy of Sciences. The
23 Act requires the Board to be a highly multi-disciplinary
24 group with areas of expertise covering all aspects of nuclear
25 waste management. I want to introduce to you now the members

1 of the Board, and in doing so, let me remind you that we are
2 all members who serve on the Board in a part-time capacity.
3 In my case, I am president of Carnegie-Mellon University in
4 Pittsburgh, my day job, as it were. My technical expertise
5 is in environmental and water resource systems analysis.

6 John Arendt--John, if you'd raise your hand--is a
7 chemical engineering by training. After retiring from a long
8 and distinguished career at Oak Ridge National laboratory,
9 John formed his own company. He specializes in many aspects
10 of the nuclear fuel cycle, including standards and
11 transportation. John chairs the Board's Panel on Waste
12 Management Systems.

13 Daniel Bullen is an associate professor of
14 Mechanical Engineering at Iowa State University, where he
15 also coordinates the nuclear engineering program. Dan's
16 areas of expertise include nuclear waste management,
17 performance assessment modeling, and materials science. Dan
18 chairs two of our panels, the Panel On Performance Assessment
19 and the Panel on the Repository.

20 Norman Christensen is Dean of the Nicholas School
21 of Environment at Duke University. His areas of expertise
22 include biology and ecology.

23 Paul Craig is professor emeritus at the University
24 of California at Davis. He is a physicist by training and
25 has special expertise in energy policy issues related to

1 global environmental change.

2 Debra Knopman is director of the Center for
3 Innovation and the Environment at the Progressive Policy
4 Institute in Washington, D.C. She's a former Deputy
5 Assistant Secretary in the Department of Interior, and before
6 that, she was a scientist at the U.S. Geological Survey. Her
7 area of expertise is groundwater hydrology, and she chairs
8 the Board's Panel on Site Characterization.

9 Priscilla Nelson is Director of the Division of
10 Civil and Mechanical Systems in the Directorate of
11 Engineering at the National Science Foundation. She's a
12 former professor at the University of Texas in Austin, and is
13 an expert in geotechnical engineering.

14 Richard Parizek is professor of hydrologic sciences
15 at Penn State University and an expert is hydrogeology and
16 environmental geology.

17 Donald Runnells is professor emeritus in the
18 Department of Geological Sciences at the University of
19 Colorado at Boulder. He's also now vice-president at
20 Shepherd Miller, Inc. His expertise is in geochemistry.

21 Alberto Sagüés, who's still working his way to
22 Carson City from Florida, just one of many airline
23 excitements that the Board experienced yesterday, should be
24 joining us in about an hour and a half. Alberto is
25 Distinguished Professor of materials engineering in the

1 Department of Civil Engineering at the University of South
2 Florida in Tampa. He's an expert in materials engineering
3 and corrosion, with particular emphasis on concrete and its
4 behavior under extreme conditions.

5 Jeffrey Wong is chief of the Human and Ecological Risk
6 Division of the Department of Toxic Substances Control in the
7 California Environmental Protection Agency in Sacramento. He
8 is a pharmacologist and toxicologist with extensive expertise
9 and experience in risk assessment and scientific team
10 management. Jeff chairs our Panel on Environment,
11 Regulations and Quality Assurance.

12 That's our Board. I'm delighted that almost all of
13 us could be here, and we'll look forward to Alberto joining
14 us momentarily.

15 Many of you know and have worked with our staff,
16 who are seated at the side of the room, impressively
17 displayed there along the wall. Bill Barnard--Bill, will you
18 raise your hand-- is the executive director of the Board, and
19 unlike the members who are part-time, the staff serve in a
20 full-time capacity, and I must add on behalf of the Board,
21 they are terrific.

22 We have asked several individuals to assist the
23 Board in its discussions at this particular meeting. William
24 Melson--Bill, if you'd raise your hand--has been the Board
25 consultant on volcanism since the Board's inception in 1989.

1 Bill has been a senior scientist in the Division of
2 Petrology and Volcanology at the Smithsonian Institution in
3 Washington since 1963. His principal areas of research
4 include the dynamics and petrology of explosive volcanic
5 eruptions and the impact of these eruptions on climate and on
6 the composition of oceans and atmospheres. He has extensive
7 field and consulting experience in issues related to volcanic
8 activity. We're very pleased he could be with us again.

9 Rod Ewing is a professor in the Department of
10 Nuclear Engineering and Radiological Sciences at the
11 University of Michigan. He is also responsible for the
12 university's program in nuclear waste management, and he
13 holds appointments there in the Departments of Geological
14 Sciences and Materials Sciences and Engineering. Rod is a
15 mineralogist by training and has conducted extensive research
16 on the effects of radiation on complex minerals, and the
17 application of natural analogs to the long-term durability of
18 radioactive waste forms. Rod has served on several National
19 Academy of Sciences Panels on the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
20 in New Mexico, and on nuclear facilities in Washington and
21 Idaho.

22 Of particular interest for us and for this meeting
23 is Rod's experience as a member of a DOE-commissioned panel
24 that reviewed the total system performance assessment of the
25 proposed Yucca Mountain repository, which was conducted for

1 the viability assessment.

2 John Kessler also has extensive experience in TSPA.
3 John is project manager for the Spent Fuel and High-Level
4 Waste Disposal Programs at the Electric Power Research
5 Institute. John has managed several iterations of EPRI's
6 performance assessment of the proposed Yucca Mountain
7 repository. His background and education are in nuclear
8 engineering, materials science, and hydrogeology. We're very
9 pleased that they could be with us today.

10 I'd also like to acknowledge the presence of Ivan
11 Itkin, who I will introduce more formally later on. Also, I
12 see George Dials in the audience. George, raise your hand.
13 Where did you go? You can't hide, George. And also Russ
14 Dyer we're very pleased could be with us. Thanks for coming.

15 Let me turn now to the significance of this meeting
16 for the Board. The DOE is preparing a recommendation on
17 whether to proceed with the development of Yucca Mountain as
18 the site of a radioactive waste repository. This is the
19 culmination of many years of work for the DOE.

20 The first iteration of this recommendation, which
21 will be called the Site Recommendation Consideration Report,
22 or SRCR, is due for release at the end of this calendar year.
23 The report will address many issues that bear on DOE's most
24 important decision. Of particular importance is the TSPA,
25 the technical core of the evaluation of whether this site is

1 suitable for further development.

2 In the past, this Board has expressed much
3 interest, and some concern, in the manner in which the DOE in
4 general, and the TSPA, in particular, address uncertainty.
5 Uncertainty is a critical consideration in any projection of
6 performance of anything over thousands of years. Most, but
7 not all, of the discussion over the next two days will be
8 about the proposed TSPA for the site recommendation, which is
9 identified by DOE by the acronym TSPA-SR, for site
10 recommendation.

11 Let me summarize very briefly the agenda for the
12 next two days. First, we are taking advantage of being here
13 in Carson City, and we'll be hearing a few remarks from
14 Senator Lawrence Jacobsen, who I'll also introduce more
15 formally in a moment, who's Chairman of the Committee on
16 High-Level Radioactive Waste of the Nevada State Legislature.
17 He will be followed by two overview presentations, one from
18 Ivan Itkin, who's Director of OCRWM, who will update us on
19 OCRWM's program and the Yucca Mountain project in general.
20 Bob Loux, Executive Director of the State of Nevada's Agency
21 for Nuclear Projects, will then comment on the Yucca Mountain
22 project from the perspective of his agency.

23 Following Bob's presentation, we'll move on to our
24 first technical session, which is devoted to scientific and
25 technical developments. Board member Richard Parizek will

1 chair this session. Aaron Barkatt and Jeff Gorman will brief
2 us on some ongoing research on Alloy 22, which has been
3 funded by the State of Nevada. Mark Peters will tell us
4 about the results of recent scientific studies carried out by
5 the Yucca Mountain project. Frank Perry and Kevin
6 Coppersmith will provide us with a recap on volcanism and
7 volcanic hazard estimates at Yucca Mountain.

8 We have asked for this recap because our
9 understanding is that TSPA-SR predicts that volcanism will be
10 the only contributor to dose during the first 10,000 years of
11 repository operation. Just before lunch, we will have a
12 public comment period, and I'll say more about public comment
13 later on. After lunch, we will hear from Bill Glassley about
14 an independent effort at Lawrence Livermore National
15 Laboratory to model coupled processes.

16 The rest of the day and most of tomorrow will be
17 devoted to TSPA-SR. Board member Dan Bullen will chair
18 today's session. We will start off with a tag team
19 presentation by Abe Van Luik and Bob Andrews describing the
20 structure, results and overall uncertainty associated with
21 the TSPA-SR. We will then begin a series of presentations on
22 the individual components that make up the TSPA-SR. The
23 series will continue into tomorrow's session. Today, we will
24 hear from Bo Bodvarsson on unsaturated zone flow and
25 transport, from Ernie Hardin on the engineered barrier system

1 environment, and from Pasu Pasupathi on the waste package and
2 drip shield.

3 Tomorrow morning, Board member Paul Craig will
4 chair the session on the TSPA-SR. And in a continuation of
5 presentations on TSPA components, we will hear from Christine
6 Stockman on the waste form, from Bruce Robinson on saturated
7 zone flow and transport, from John Schmitt on the biosphere,
8 and from Cathy Gaither on disruptive events. We will round
9 out tomorrow morning's session with a presentation by Abe Van
10 Luik on a recent DOE effort to better describe the
11 uncertainties associated with TSPA. And as I noted earlier,
12 the Board has placed a high priority on this issue.

13 Following lunch tomorrow, Board member Norm
14 Christensen will chair a session that will include a panel
15 discussion on TSPA. Dennis Richardson will provide us with
16 an update of the repository safety strategy, and Abe Van Luik
17 will summarize the presentations on the TSPA-SR. Then we'll
18 have our second opportunity for public comment at this Board
19 meeting.

20 Now let me say a few things about the opportunities
21 we've provided for public comment and interaction during the
22 meetings. This is something that's extremely important to
23 the Board. We try to give the public as many opportunities
24 as possible to participate in our meetings. For today's and
25 tomorrow's public comment periods, those wanting to comment

1 should sign the Public Comment Register at the check-in table
2 where Linda Hiatt and Linda Country are sitting. They'll be
3 glad to help you in signing up and being prepared to comment
4 publicly when the time arises. Let me point out, and I'll
5 remind you again later, that depending on the number of
6 people signing up, we may have to set a time limit on
7 individual remarks.

8 As an additional opportunity for questions and
9 continuing something we've tried out successfully before, you
10 can submit written questions to either Linda Hiatt or Linda
11 Country during the meeting. We'll make every effort to ask
12 these questions. That is, the chair of the meeting at the
13 time we ask the question during the meeting itself rather
14 than waiting for the public comment period. We'll do that,
15 however, only if time allows. We have a very tight agenda,
16 as is probably obvious from my recounting of the agenda. It
17 may very well be that time will not allow us to do this. If
18 that's the case, that is, if we don't have the time to ask
19 the question during the meeting itself, we will ask those
20 questions during the public comment period.

21 In addition to written questions to be asked by us,
22 we always welcome written comments for the record. Those of
23 you who prefer not to make oral comments or ask questions
24 during the meeting may choose this other written route at any
25 time. We especially encourage written comments when they're

1 more extensive than our meeting time allows. Please submit
2 the written comments to either Linda, who will be happy to
3 help you.

4 Finally, I need to offer our usual disclaimer so
5 that everybody is clear on the conduct of our meeting, what
6 you're hearing, and its significance. Our meetings are
7 spontaneous by design. Those of you of course who are
8 especially perceptive have noticed that I've been reading
9 from this script. Otherwise, though, this is not a scripted
10 meeting. It's completely spontaneous.

11 Those of you who have attended our meetings before,
12 and many of you have, know that the members of the Board do
13 not hesitate to speak their minds. Let me emphasize that
14 it's precisely what they're doing when they are speaking.
15 They're speaking their minds. They are not speaking on
16 behalf of the Board. They're speaking on behalf of
17 themselves. When we are articulating a Board position, we'll
18 let you know. We'll make that clear in our comments.
19 Otherwise, we're speaking as individuals.

20 And by the way, we will follow the usual pecking
21 order when it comes to questioning. That is, Board members,
22 then consultants, and other people who have joined us here at
23 the table, then staff. On occasion, we will also entertain
24 questions from the audience if there is sufficient time.

25 Before I introduce the first speaker, I would like,

1 on behalf of the Board, to say a few words about last month's
2 untimely death of Nick Stellavato of the Nye County Nuclear
3 Waste Repository Office. To many of us, Nick was the heart
4 and soul of the Nye County technical program. He was largely
5 responsible for bringing into being, and leading, the ongoing
6 Nye County Early Warning Drilling Project, which is providing
7 invaluable assistance in shaping our views on flow and
8 transport in the saturated zone.

9 His many interactions with the Board at meetings
10 and on field trips, he personified sound and responsible
11 science. His dedication to and love of his work were always
12 evident. He made the occasionally painstaking work
13 interesting and enjoyable, and through it all, demonstrated a
14 good sense of humor and great kindness. In short, Nick was a
15 wonderful person, and he will be deeply missed.

16 Please join me in a moment of silence for Nick
17 Stellavato.

18 (Pause for moment of silence.)

19 COHON: Thank you.

20 Now it's time to begin our program. Our first
21 speaker will be Senator Lawrence E. Jacobsen. As I mentioned
22 earlier, Senator Jacobsen is chair of the Committee on High-
23 Level Radioactive Waste of the Nevada State Legislature. I'd
24 like to point out that among his many distinguished
25 accomplishments, which are too numerous to mention, we are

1 particularly impressed that he's been an active member of the
2 Douglas County Engine Company for 52 years. That's civic
3 mindedness.

4 It's always been a pleasure to meet with Senator
5 Jacobsen, who has generously travelled to our meetings around
6 the state, and we welcome the opportunity to visit him in
7 Carson City on his own turf.

8 Senator Jacobsen, welcome.

9 JACOBSEN: Thank you for that introduction.

10 Good morning each and every one of you. What a joy
11 to see all of you here today. I'm impressed. It's the first
12 time you've been in Carson City, and everybody thinks that
13 Nevada consists of Las Vegas. There's a lot more to Nevada
14 than Las Vegas, and part of it is right here at the Capitol.
15 I'm sorry that we didn't have you in the legislative
16 building, because I think we're missing an opportunity to
17 kind of show off a little. But let me say what a joy it is
18 to be here this morning.

19 I live about 15 miles down the road. I'm a native
20 Nevadan, born and raised where I live. I see one of my
21 colleagues in the audience, Bob Price. Bob, stand up. He's
22 a former chairman, and led us a long way. You can't imagine
23 what it is to chair a committee like this when the state is
24 not too kindly in favor, and trying to keep the committee
25 together and be productive is somewhat of a chore.

1 But I want to indicate to each and every one of you
2 that our welcome is sincere. We're pleased to have you in
3 Carson City, and anything that I can do, we're ready, willing
4 and able.

5 As I look over the audience, I'm sorry to say I
6 know very few. Of course, I know Bob Loux, we deal with him
7 on a constant basis, usually budget-wise, and I serve on the
8 money committees. I'm the senior member of the Nevada
9 legislature, and that only means one thing. You're getting
10 too old to survive. But it's been a joy, and with 38 years
11 of service, I've really enjoyed it.

12 I want to indicate to each and every one of you
13 that our committee is very active, thanks to Bob Price as a
14 former committee chairman, and in Nevada, we change every
15 year, change chairmanships and change politics, too, try to
16 keep it non-political, and with the Republican Convention
17 starting, I think this is a good indication of the interest
18 that there is not only in something that's near and dear to
19 our hearts, but also politically, that it's part of the
20 process.

21 I indicated to you that I was a committee. We've
22 been everywhere and seen almost everything, thanks to DOE and
23 NCSL out of Denver, Sharon Runyon (phonetic), Linda Sekeema
24 (phonetic). We even went on the aircraft carrier, George
25 Washington, if you can believe that, off the coast of

1 Norfolk, to see what a nuclear powered machine, how it runs
2 and what makes it go. I'm an old Navy man, and so that was
3 kind of like going home for me, and I invite more trips like
4 that. But we've been to Hanford. We've been to Three-Mile
5 Island, Love Canal, I don't know how many power plants we've
6 been to, and I can't begin to tell you how many times we've
7 been x-rayed, and you can see I'm really not green or yellow,
8 I'm a little bit on the tan side. So it's really nothing to
9 be afraid of.

10 Let me indicate to you that we look at your board,
11 and I'm going to use Nevada terms, as kind of the "ace in the
12 hole" for us, to make sure that studies are proper and
13 productive and scientifically sound. It's very difficult for
14 us, and admittedly, I probably shouldn't tell you this, I've
15 been at Yucca Mountain 15 times, and some of my colleagues
16 have never been there. I think we're honored that our new
17 governor, Governor Gwynn, is one of the first governors to
18 visit the site. And I think, Ladies and Gentlemen, that's
19 one of the answers today, is for each and every one that has
20 some kind of an interest or something that's burning in your
21 craw, to go and take a look, and then draw your own
22 conclusions. I think that's what it's all about today.

23 Nevada is kind of a unique place, mostly because of
24 our public lands. 87 per cent of Nevada belongs to all of
25 you, and so we're really not directly in charge. I think one

1 of the features that I come from, and mostly that's in First
2 Response, I'm an EMT and been with the Fire Department for 55
3 years, ambulance driver and all those kind of things, and in
4 the rural areas, we survive by guess and by golly. I think
5 the 137 volunteer fire departments, my main concern is to
6 make sure that whatever happens, whether it happens or not, I
7 think transportation is probably the second issue, to make
8 sure that our responders are properly trained.

9 We have a fire marshal's office and we have a hard
10 time maintaining that, mostly because the large communities
11 like Las Vegas and Washoe have their in-house training
12 centers. In my county of Douglas, we have 14 fire
13 departments, 11 of them are volunteer, and that means about
14 30 members, Tom, Dick, Harrys and Marys, and we survive very
15 well, and let me indicate to you, and I probably shouldn't
16 say this, but we lit the fire for you this morning, and it's
17 burning all over Nevada. We don't like that. But mostly in
18 times like that, we're not in charge. The good Lord sends
19 the lightening and we become the survivors, you might say.

20 I'd indicate to you that legislative-wise, and I
21 started to tell you this, I was a little bit upset when one
22 of my colleagues told me one day in Las Vegas when we were
23 attending one of your meetings down there, that she said,
24 "Jake, I've never been to Yucca Mountain." I said, "Why not?
25 You live right here." She said, "Nobody ever invited me."

1 So we put out an invitation just to the legislators. Guess
2 how many takers we had? One. One taker that wanted to go.
3 The reason for that is is the political sideline comes in
4 there, and having to run for office, I found that Yucca
5 Mountain is a real detriment. It's safer not even to talk
6 about it, in fact. But as I said earlier, I think it
7 behooves everyone to take a look.

8 I think we have a responsibility, Ladies and
9 Gentlemen, not only to ourselves and the generations that
10 come, but especially to the military. Every ship at sea
11 today in the Navy is nuclear powered. And I couldn't get
12 over the USS George Washington, 5,000 people on there, and
13 just coming in from Boznia, this was about a couple months
14 ago, they had just completed their 1 millionth mile at sea on
15 a semi load of uranium pellets. And this room would probably
16 hold about five semi loads, which is 20 tons.

17 I don't know how many of you have seen uranium
18 pellets, but it looks like dog food. And I asked the sailors
19 on the ship, I said, "Are you afraid?" This thing is nuclear
20 powered, and I stood next to the reactor, and I didn't feel
21 anything or see anything. "They said, "Heck no, Senator,
22 we're not afraid. But if this sucker stops, we want to get
23 off." Of course I don't know whether that's safe or not. I
24 think I'd rather stay aboard as long as we're still afloat,
25 because I've had the experience of spending 12 hours in the

1 water at Bougainville when our cruiser was sunk.

2 I would certainly hope and pray that you have a
3 successful conference, and I think it behooves each and every
4 one of us to keep our ears open, learn what we can, ask the
5 questions that we have, and when you go back home, don't just
6 talk to yourself. If you're like me, I guess as soon as I
7 walk in the door, the Mrs. wants to know what happened, good,
8 bad and indifferent, and occasionally we don't agree. I
9 guess that's normal, but I think that's the process today, to
10 learn to agree and disagree, and not just stick your head in
11 the sand and say go away. That's not the issue, Ladies and
12 Gentlemen. It's not going to go away. It's a universal
13 problem and it's up to you and me and our colleagues, because
14 it's in everybody's interest, everybody's, whether you're
15 here as a native or whether you're here as a tourist, or
16 whether you just like the good old USA, we've got a problem
17 and it's up to us to solve it.

18 Ladies and Gentlemen, just let me say welcome to
19 Carson City. Anything that I can do for you, I'm ready,
20 willing and able. I'm pretty good at mouth to mouth. I'm a
21 little choosy, though. I noticed one other person, and I saw
22 her earlier, there's a representative from the Lieutenant
23 Governor's office here. Are you still here? Oh, yeah, she
24 is. Stand up so they can see you.

25 We have wonderful looking ladies in Nevada, and

1 especially in the legislative building. And years ago it
2 kind of tickled me. I was Speaker in the House for 16 years,
3 and I was amazed that a lot of times the staff people got in
4 on the conversation. They wanted to say something and make a
5 decision, and oh what a tough time we had. So we finally
6 had, and in those days, we had very few women, but now that
7 the women have come on, they're more vocal than the men are,
8 and so they insisted, and so we finally decided, well, we'd
9 kind of separate the men and the boys and the girls and try
10 to make some decisions on our own.

11 But today, we do it all together and the Lieutenant
12 Governor is president of the Senate, does an excellent job.
13 And I guess we missed the boat. We should have had her and
14 her husband here this morning to do a little entertainment
15 for us. But that's one reason for you to come back.

16 Welcome to Carson City. Nice to have you here.
17 Thanks.

18 COHON: Thank you very much, Senator. I was remiss in
19 not asking if there are other elected officials or
20 representatives of elected officials here with us today,
21 other than the Lieutenant Governor's representative. Are
22 there?

23 (No response.)

24 COHON: Okay. Well, Alberto Sagüés, in a display of
25 exquisite timing, arrived right after the end of my remarks.

1 And I think all Board members are going to try to figure out
2 how he did that so he could miss my opening remarks. But
3 we're very glad that Dr. Sagüés could be with us.

4 Thanks for getting here, Alberto, despite American
5 Airlines' and Delta Airlines' best efforts to keep you away.

6 It's now my pleasure to introduce the director of
7 OCRWM, Dr. Ivan Itkin. Ivan is a fellow Pittsburgher, which
8 makes me especially pleased to introduce him. He came to the
9 program last December after a long career of public service
10 in the state legislature in Pennsylvania. Before that, he
11 worked on the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program at Bettis
12 Atomic Power Laboratory in Pittsburgh.

13 Dr. Itkin has a doctoral degree in mathematics from
14 the University of Pittsburgh, a master's degree in Nuclear
15 Engineering from New York University, and a bachelor's degree
16 in Chemical Engineering from the Polytechnic Institute of
17 Brooklyn.

18 It's my pleasure to welcome back to the Board, Dr.
19 Ivan Itkin.

20 ITKIN: Thank you very much, Chairman Cohon. It's a
21 pleasure to meet again with the members of the Board. Also,
22 it's a pleasure for me, being a long-tenured state legislator
23 from Pennsylvania, to meet my fellow colleagues, Senator
24 Jacobsen and Representative Price, again. Wish them a good
25 day and a pleasant journey to be with you today.

1 I would, before I begin my prepared remarks, like
2 to just to follow up on Dr. Cohon's brief memorial of Nick
3 Stellavato. We knew him well in the program. I personally
4 had only met him a couple of times before his passing, but I
5 was very much impressed in my meetings with him about his
6 competency, his knowledge, his dedication, and I guess most
7 of all, being a straight talker. He was very down to earth.
8 He let you know what he thought, and he said it in very
9 succinct terms.

10 Also, he was a good scientist. He did his job
11 well. He was the driving force for the Nye County Drilling
12 Program, which was not only very helpful to providing
13 security to the residents of Nye County in terms of a
14 monitoring system, but also through the drilling program, we
15 in the Agency and the Department learned an awful lot about
16 the geologic and hydrologic properties in that particular
17 region of the test area.

18 So we very much appreciate his work. We sorely
19 miss him, and we'd like to extend my sympathies and our
20 sympathies to his friends, many friends, and family.

21 But I do very much welcome this opportunity to come
22 again and to update the Board on our recent progress and
23 near-term plans. I will use my time to discuss the broader
24 issues that affect the program, along with the issues raised
25 in the Board's recent reports and letter. After my talk,

1 there will be detailed discussions on the technical topics
2 you requested.

3 In June, the full House passed the Energy and Water
4 Development Appropriations Act, which included \$413 million
5 for our Program. This amount is a reduction of \$24.5 million
6 from our request of \$437.5 million. In recognition of the
7 importance of state oversight, the House included \$2.5
8 million for oversight activities. Although this amount is
9 \$2.1 million less than the Administration's request, it is
10 significantly larger than in the past several years. I
11 understand that the State will discuss its program later this
12 morning.

13 The House Committee on Appropriations requested
14 that we prepare two reports for Congress next year. The
15 first is an updated report on alternative means of financing
16 and managing the program. This report, completed in response
17 to a provision in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, included the
18 feasibility of evaluating various management structures.
19 Second, the Department must submit a plan for the timely
20 development and deployment of waste acceptance capabilities.
21 This requirement reflects the Committee's concern about the
22 limited funding for activities associated with waste
23 acceptance and transportation functions over the past several
24 years.

25 The Senate Appropriations Committee included just

1 \$351 million for the program, with a substantial share coming
2 from the defense contribution. Because of this, I remain
3 very concerned that if we do not receive adequate funding for
4 Fiscal Year 2001, we may be forced to delay critical program
5 milestones, such as the site recommendation and license
6 application. This is certainly the case should the Senate
7 Committee budget mark prevail in conference. On July 21, the
8 Administration expressed its strong objection to the mark in
9 a Statement of Administration Policy.

10 We, in OCRWM, appreciate the Board's timely and
11 constructive feedback. I believe the Board's recommendations
12 have led to substantial improvements in our program,
13 especially towards influencing the evolutionary design
14 process.

15 Our recent efforts to enhance our repository design
16 and better address the uncertainties in repository
17 performance analyses reflect the input of the Board.

18 Your April report and June letter raise several
19 issues that I would like to briefly address. I see the
20 Board's broad concerns as three-fold. First, understanding
21 uncertainties. Second, increasing the level of confidence in
22 performance assessment. And, third, describing the technical
23 decision-making process, including the ability to accommodate
24 new information into plans.

25 A central issue has been the notion of uncertainty

1 and its consequences for decisions on the suitability of the
2 site. Level of confidence has always been an important
3 factor in reaching a decision on a repository. As the Board,
4 the Department, EPA, NRC, and the National Academy of
5 Sciences have recognized, uncertainty about long-term
6 repository performance cannot be totally eliminated.

7 To address the quantification of uncertainty, the
8 Department is developing and documenting a consistent and
9 defensible method of treating uncertainty in our program. We
10 are examining how uncertainties are currently treated in the
11 process model reports, the analysis and model reports, the
12 total system performance assessment, and the Site
13 Recommendation Consideration Report. The goal is to describe
14 associated uncertainties and make the treatment of
15 uncertainty in performance assessment and other program areas
16 technically defensible and understandable to all interested
17 parties. Our intent is that this process will help to gain
18 the confidence of stakeholders and provide a better
19 scientific basis for decision making. We expect that this
20 will lead to continuous improvements in understanding
21 uncertainties as we proceed through the site recommendation
22 process and, if the site is recommended, to license
23 application.

24 There is recognition that unquantified
25 uncertainties will remain due to the limits of characterizing

1 any site, and to the present limits in our knowledge of
2 natural and engineering processes over thousands of years.
3 As the NRC's Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste recently
4 noted, the defense-in-depth philosophy is a strategy to
5 mitigate such unquantified uncertainties. Similarly, the
6 Department expects that the analysis of repository
7 performance, together with the safety margin and defense-in-
8 depth provided by the current repository design, will provide
9 a sufficient technical basis to judge whether the site should
10 be recommended as a repository.

11 A primary objective of the program's engineering
12 and scientific work continues to be to increase the level of
13 confidence in our analysis of repository performance. Our
14 repository design has evolved to better manage thermal loads
15 and reduce uncertainty. Our current design is both robust
16 and flexible. The design can be operated to manage thermal
17 loads by varying parameters, including the period of
18 ventilation, fuel staging, and waste package spacing. We are
19 continuing to evaluate other operational parameters that also
20 could be varied to manage temperature and reduce
21 uncertainties. A repository that is flexible to accommodate
22 technical advances or future changes in priority is one way
23 to address increasing the level of confidence. This approach
24 will permit future generations to learn from operations and
25 monitoring, and to close the facility when appropriate.

1 We are also evaluating additional technical work to
2 increase the level of confidence for licensing decisions.
3 The work will provide additional assurance that relevant
4 issues are evaluated in the context necessary for decision-
5 making on issues.

6 In addition to reducing uncertainty through
7 engineering design and scientific studies, we are increasing
8 our confidence in performance assessment by stressing
9 supplementary lines of evidence as suggested by the Board.
10 These other elements of the safety case, such as the analysis
11 of natural analogues and performance confirmation, are also
12 addressed in the repository safety strategy. This fall, we
13 are completing the fourth revision of this strategy, which
14 will support the site recommendation process.

15 We are committed to making our technical decision-
16 making process transparent. In many cases, relevant criteria
17 emerge and evolve during the course of investigation as the
18 significance of various parameters, processes and the
19 associated uncertainty are evaluated.

20 As a further means of increasing the level of
21 confidence in the understanding of long-term repository
22 behavior in support of an eventual decision on repository
23 closure, the NRC requires that a performance confirmation
24 program be put in place. It would evaluate whether new
25 information obtained during licensing, construction,

1 operation, and monitoring of the repository confirms the
2 assumptions and bases for the postclosure compliance
3 evaluation. The 50-year retrievability period was
4 established as a reasonable estimate of the time that might
5 be needed to permit repository closure. However, our design
6 would permit future generations to keep the repository open
7 significantly longer, and use their own evaluation about
8 repository closure. We have developed a preliminary
9 performance confirmation plan to support site recommendation,
10 and will refine it to support licensing.

11 The NRC, EPA, and the Department are working to
12 complete the site-specific regulatory framework for Yucca
13 Mountain. Finalizing this regulatory framework is central to
14 the site recommendation process. Since I addressed the Board
15 in May, both the NRC and the EPA have continued work to
16 finalize their respective regulations. On May 4, we
17 submitted our draft final regulation to NRC for its review
18 and concurrence. That concurrence process continues.

19 We continue to analyze and develop responses to the
20 public comments on our Draft EIS, and to prepare the Final
21 EIS. Our responses will be documented in a Comment Response
22 Document as part of the Final EIS. As the Nuclear Waste
23 Policy Act requires, the Final EIS will accompany a site
24 recommendation to the President if the Secretary decides to
25 recommend the site for development as a repository.

1 The emphasis of our work this year has been the
2 developing of the SRCR and supporting documentation.
3 Although the SRCR is not specifically required by the Nuclear
4 Waste Policy Act, it will help support the statutory site
5 recommendation process by assembling information in a format
6 more amenable to widespread public review. We are planning
7 to issue the SRCR late this year. Consistent with our open
8 and transparent policy, we have already begun the process of
9 providing the supporting documentation on the internet, which
10 will include the nine process model reports, the 121 analysis
11 and model reports, and other supporting documentation.

12 To date, more than 153,000 pages of information are
13 available. The SRCR will consist of two volumes, one
14 containing repository and waste package design, site data and
15 total system performance assessment, and the other containing
16 a preliminary site suitability evaluation. After the
17 issuance of the SRCR, we plan to hold public hearings in the
18 vicinity of Yucca Mountain to inform the public and receive
19 their comments.

20 As you may be aware, Secretary Bill Richardson
21 recently announced the signing of an agreement with PECO
22 Energy Company to address the Department's delay in accepting
23 spent fuel from utilities. The agreement, which applies only
24 to PECO's Peach Bottom Plant in Pennsylvania, allows PECO
25 Energy to reduce the projected charges paid into the Nuclear

1 Waste Fund. This would reflect costs reasonably incurred by
2 PECO Energy due to the Department's delay. It is intended to
3 be a framework that can be applied to other nuclear power
4 plants. Negotiations with other plant owners will be
5 conducted on a contract by contract basis.

6 For this agreement, we estimate that PECO's
7 adjustments could reach \$80 million through 2010. The
8 agreement demonstrates that the Department and the utilities
9 can reach a resolution regarding the delay without resorting
10 to costly and protracted litigation. During our
11 negotiations, we were careful to ensure that this agreement
12 would not have adverse impacts on the Nuclear Waste Fund and
13 jeopardize the viability of the repository program. In fact,
14 we believe that if all the other utilities entered into an
15 agreement of this type, there would be no impact on our
16 current activities at Yucca Mountain.

17 In addition to our work here in the United States,
18 the Department recently signed four agreements to conduct
19 collaborative work with the Russian Academy of Sciences. The
20 Department and the Russian Academy will collaborate on
21 studying geochemistry of actinides, modeling transport in
22 heterogeneous environments, and developing a Russian plan for
23 a repository. This work will increase the understanding of
24 radionuclide thermochemical properties and contribute to the
25 international database development effort, and may support

1 future use of more technically defensible models for
2 radionuclide behavior. The geologic repository plan calls
3 for the development of a coordinated approach between the
4 Russian Academy and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy
5 that will help prioritize future collaborative work between
6 the Department and Russia.

7 I would like to update the Board on the
8 recompetition for our Management and Operating contract,
9 which expires in February 2001. We are evaluating submittals
10 that we received in June from three teams. We expect to
11 award a follow-on performance-based contract in late summer
12 or early fall. Upon awarding the contract, we plan an
13 orderly transition to ensure that we continue to meet the
14 challenging tasks and milestones we have set for ourselves.
15 To that end, we have already established a federal transition
16 team both at Headquarters and at the Yucca Mountain Project.

17 In conclusion, we are nearing a point where we
18 expect that the scientific information will be adequate to
19 support a determination on whether the Yucca Mountain site
20 should be designated as a repository site, and to prepare a
21 license application if the site is found suitable, and
22 subsequent, to complete the process outlined in the Nuclear
23 Waste Policy Act.

24 We are now completing the documentation to present
25 the technical basis for a possible site recommendation. My

1 goal is to ensure that the technical basis is explained in
2 such a way that it provides the information necessary to
3 answer the key technical questions and provides a sound
4 scientific basis for decision-making.

5 Thank you for the opportunity to share my views
6 with you today, and I will be happy, within the time
7 remaining, to address your questions.

8 COHON: Thank you, Dr. Itkin. Questions from the Board?
9 Ban Bullen?

10 BULLEN: Bullen, Board. Dr. Itkin, you made your
11 comments about the repository design being robust and
12 flexible, with variations in periods of ventilation, fuel
13 staging and waste package spacing. Could you tell us what
14 the current repository design is? Is it the base case
15 design?

16 I mean, as we approach the SRCR stage, we really
17 need to know what the design is, and so could you comment on
18 that?

19 ITKIN: Well, I'm glad you asked that question, because
20 that's a question that we continually are asked to comment
21 on. We see this design as an evolving design. We see that
22 we are responsible to have to document the design that we
23 have established periodically. But you have to understand,
24 as most will, that by the time you see this in public print,
25 it's usually obsolete. The design has changed as we continue

1 to make use of more recent data and more recent decisions.

2 And so if we look at this design in a way that,
3 say, the Wright Brothers laid it out in 1903, and said is
4 this the design for the airplane, can you imagine a hundred
5 years from today what we'd be flying in. So I raise that as
6 an issue, that as we go through today's technical
7 discussions, some of our more technical staff will give you
8 more insight as to how that design is evolving. But I want
9 you to make it emphatic that this design is not stagnant,
10 that this design will continue to change as we have the
11 capacity to change within the time remaining, all the way
12 probably through licensing application, and perhaps even
13 beyond that.

14 BULLEN: Just one more quick question. With respect to
15 the PECO agreement and not having an impact on your funding,
16 I guess in the short-term, that's probably true because the
17 payments paid into the Nuclear Waste Fund are never
18 completely allocated each year to you. But as you move into
19 construction and license application and the resource
20 requirements increase, how could agreements with the
21 utilities not have an impact and not be detrimental?

22 ITKIN: Because we have examined what we believe to be
23 the total cost impact of these settlements will be in view of
24 using the PECO settlement as an example. We have measured it
25 in comparison to what our anticipations or expectation is in

1 terms of the revenues into the Nuclear Waste Fund, and we
2 believe we have sufficient monies to be able to carry out the
3 program as we intend to.

4 BULLEN: Do you think that Congress will ever allocate
5 more money than is paid in each year to the Nuclear Waste
6 Fund to you?

7 ITKIN: Do I think they will give us more money?

8 BULLEN: Well, when you get to the point where actually
9 you require more money to build the repository than comes in
10 each year, do you think Congress will allocate some of the
11 back funds?

12 ITKIN: Well, let me just say we're going to work with
13 the Congress to minimize the burden to them, and to maximize
14 our productivity.

15 BULLEN: Thank you.

16 ITKIN: Obviously, you know, there's a smoothing out.
17 We're working on modular designs as a way of not having peaks
18 and valleys in our revenue requirements as great as they
19 would be without that type of consideration. So we are
20 trying to plan a balanced request from the Congress in a way
21 that they can be able to tolerate it with their accounting
22 processes now in place.

23 COHON: Last question from Don Runnells.

24 RUNNELLS: Dan Bullen asked my question about
25 clarification of no impact from the PECO agreements.

1 ITKIN: Thank you very much.

2 COHON: Thank you, Dr. Itkin.

3 It's now my pleasure to introduce Bob Loux, the
4 Executive Director of the State of Nevada's Agency for
5 Nuclear Projects, Nuclear Waste Project Office. Bob has been
6 Director since the inception of the office in 1983, and has
7 worked under six governors on high-level radioactive waste
8 management, and other related issues.

9 Bob holds a master's degree from the University of
10 Nevada at Reno, which he received in 1972, and has been a
11 State employee since 1976. He has appeared before the Board
12 many times in the past. We're pleased to welcome him back.

13 Bob?

14 LOUX: Good morning. On behalf of the Governor Gwynn,
15 I'd like to also add my welcome to you to Carson City for
16 your meeting. If there's any way that we or any of our staff
17 can make your visit here more enjoyable in any way, please
18 let us know. We certainly appreciate the opportunity to make
19 a few remarks to you this morning. I note that we're now
20 into the program and slightly off schedule. I'll try to be
21 brief and make this up for you.

22 Also, in a few moments, you'll hear from Drs.
23 Barkatt and Gorman on a presentation that we sponsored a
24 couple years ago regarding C-22 that's being proposed by the
25 Department relative to containers for disposal. And, of

1 course, the basis for this research really is rooted in the
2 DOE's allocation and performance at the Yucca Mountain,
3 probably captured in the viability assessment with the bulk,
4 if not the majority, of performance attributable to
5 container, we felt it was pretty critical that we began
6 looking at that issue, and I hope that you'll find this
7 presentation informative and helpful to you.

8 We appreciate the Board's ongoing willingness to
9 hear our views and the high-level waste program, and on the
10 Yucca Mountain site characterization project. We applaud the
11 Board's availability to hear comments from the interested
12 public, especially during its meetings here in Nevada where
13 the Yucca Mountain project, both from a policy and a
14 programmatic standpoint, has been at the forefront of public
15 concern for better than two decades now.

16 Now that the national high-level waste program is
17 nearing the point where the Secretary will be making a
18 decision about the suitability of the Yucca Mountain site for
19 the development of a repository, the Board's role is even of
20 greater importance to Nevadans. We at the Agency, and I know
21 all Nevadans really have come to depend on the Board's rigor,
22 objectivity and openness in these evaluations.

23 With a growing institutional momentum towards the
24 Secretary's suitability decision, the Board really may be the
25 only entity in our opinion left that is not driven by the

1 political pressures on Capitol Hill to move this program
2 along, and may be the only one who is somewhat insulated from
3 the political process. We're depending even more now on the
4 Board's continuing to be the ear and the voice of reason in
5 this otherwise politically charged climate.

6 Over the years, the growing body of technical
7 evidence from the site characterization has only served to
8 reinforce our view that the site is not suitable for
9 development as a repository. The current eleventh hour
10 flurry to change all of the regulations that affect site
11 suitability and licenseability decisions cannot change the
12 natural inability of the site to isolate waste for long
13 periods of time. It would only serve I guess to reinforce
14 our view about site suitability.

15 I guess I would note parenthetically one of the
16 major concerns that we've got with the regulatory process is
17 that TSPA in the proposed rule would be the only measure of
18 site suitability, and that causes us a great deal of concern,
19 especially with the large uncertainties associated with those
20 calculations.

21 The current efforts to try and make the site work
22 through the application of multiple engineered barriers does
23 nothing to improve the safety of the site. The barriers
24 possibly delay releases of radionuclides into the
25 environment, but their projected contribution to long-term

1 repository performance is highly uncertain. At some
2 uncertain time in the future, the repository will perform as
3 if there were no engineered barriers, and that performance,
4 based on available DOE calculations, will not be acceptable
5 compared to any reasonable regulatory standard.

6 The current goal of making a Yucca Mountain
7 repository work appears to be rooted in adding more
8 engineered barriers. The hope, of course, is to improve the
9 probability solely for regulatory purposes that significant
10 releases will not occur during the first 10,000 years after
11 closure, notwithstanding the scientific knowledge gained
12 through site characterization that at some point after the
13 engineered barriers, there likely will be significant
14 releases of radionuclides to the environment. The scientific
15 and technical validity of this conclusion is reasonably well
16 understood and established.

17 The critical uncertainty then is much less a
18 question if repository performance is unacceptable than it is
19 one of when that condition will actually occur. Attempts to
20 reduce the uncertainty we believe are imprudent and
21 fruitless, especially if the ultimate goal is to achieve the
22 permanent safe isolation of wastes.

23 Let me turn briefly, if I can, in closing to the
24 site recommendation process, as Dr. Itkin alluded to a moment
25 ago. The first step towards the Secretary's suitability

1 determination is the site characterization considerations
2 report, as you heard, expected to be released later this
3 year. DOE intends this report, which is not required by law,
4 to be the subject of required public hearings in the vicinity
5 of the Yucca Mountain site. It's also been announced that
6 the information contained in the report will be changed and
7 updated in the Secretary's required site recommendation
8 report, which is currently scheduled for release in mid 2001.

9 It's been announced also that the final
10 environmental impact statement for the Yucca Mountain
11 repository won't be issued until the time the Secretary makes
12 the site recommendation.

13 Because of these schedule pressures that you heard
14 of earlier, DOE expects the incomplete and outdated
15 considerations report to be the technical basis of the public
16 comment on the Secretary's consideration to recommend the
17 Yucca Mountain site.

18 Furthermore, DOE expects that the considerations
19 report, without the benefit of a final environmental impact
20 statement, or the actual decision, will be the basis of the
21 governor and the legislature's comments on the Secretary's
22 site recommendation decision, which the Secretary must by law
23 respond in his report to the President.

24 In this process, commenters, including the Board,
25 if it so chooses, will not have the ability to review and

1 comment on the same material that the Secretary will use as
2 the basis for the site recommendation decision. Obviously,
3 this process will limit the potential of effectiveness of any
4 comments which will be on a report that's essentially
5 outdated, including those of the Board, on the most important
6 decision made in the program to date.

7 Just yesterday, the Attorney General for the state,
8 Frankie Sue Del Papa, met with Dr. Itkin and we exchanged
9 letters again relative to this issue. It's certainly the
10 Attorney General's view that this process as described by the
11 Department of Energy is not in conformance with the Act, is
12 unreasonable, and really subverts the purpose of the
13 gubernatorial and legislative input into the site
14 recommendation process. It's an issue that we hope to
15 continue to work with the Department of Energy on. I expect
16 that the governor will be talking to the Secretary about this
17 matter in the near term, and hopefully we can get this
18 resolved so that people's comments on the site recommendation
19 report will actually have some meaning and weight.

20 With that, I'd just like to thank you again for the
21 opportunity to be here and sharing some of our concerns. I
22 again hope that the presentation that is going to be coming
23 up on the C-22, you'll find informative and helpful in your
24 deliberations. And with that, Mr. Chairman, if I can answer
25 any questions, I'd be happy to. Thank you.

1 COHON: Thank you, Bob. I'd actually like to pursue
2 this latter matter a bit more that you just raised about
3 SRCR. The Board received a copy of your letter and Dr.
4 Itkin's reply. Now, is there another pair of letters, or was
5 that--

6 LOUX: There's my letter and Dr. Itkin's letter. Now
7 there's another letter from the Attorney General to Dr.
8 Itkin.

9 COHON: So that suggests that Dr. Itkin's response
10 didn't resolve the matter in the views of the state.

11 LOUX: From our view, that's correct.

12 COHON: And just to make sure that I understand, is the
13 concern that by commenting on SRCR, that somehow the State's
14 impact, or rights, under the site recommendation process have
15 been preempted or affected somehow?

16 LOUX: Not by merely commenting on the considerations
17 report, but the inability to have comments on the final
18 recommendation report with the final environmental impact
19 statement attached to it, and having the Secretary's views on
20 those comments is the process that we believe the law
21 requires, and one that allows for the legislature and the
22 governor to have some substantive input into the actual
23 recommendation decision, not the considerations report.

24 COHON: So your concern is that the SRCR might have the
25 effect of replacing part of what the process would have been

1 had there not been an SRCR, if I said that correctly?

2 LOUX: My reading of Dr. Itkin's letter is that they
3 only intend that the SRCR will be available for review and
4 comment prior to the recommendation going to the president,
5 not the actual recommendation report itself.

6 COHON: Let me see if Dr. Itkin or anybody else wants to
7 comment. Ivan, do you want to comment on this?

8 ITKIN: It's our belief that we will follow the law. We
9 will follow the law as Congress intended us to do. The SRCR,
10 which is non-statutorily required, is being produced by us.
11 The law makes it very clear that prior to a site
12 recommendation report, that we hold public hearings, and we
13 will do that in the wake of the SRCR report.

14 The law is also very clear, it says that the
15 Secretary of Energy, if he makes a recommendation that the
16 Yucca Mountain is suitable as a repository site, he must
17 notify the State of Nevada and its legislature within 30 days
18 of informing the President, and that we will do. If the
19 Secretary decides to recommend this report, we'll follow the
20 law, and the Secretary will advise the State that he intends
21 to recommend to the President.

22 At the end of 30 days, it's our understanding,
23 following the law, within that 30 days, after 30 days, the
24 Secretary will send the SR and the FEIS, as required by law,
25 to the President. The President will make a judgment on all

1 available information, the NRC sufficiency comments, by law,
2 any comments that the State of Nevada chooses to provide at
3 that time to the Secretary will be done.

4 We are in a position at this point in time to move
5 forward and to get to the point where the Secretary of Energy
6 can make that decision.

7 If the President should make a decision to go
8 forward, obviously there is a Congressional action that needs
9 to be taken, and the State of Nevada can take such action.
10 If the State of Nevada chooses to object to the program, it
11 may do so after the Presidential decision. They also may
12 make their views, if they feel compelled to do so, to the
13 Congress, and the State's position will hold, that is, the
14 State of Nevada has the right to veto, and if the State
15 vetoes it and Congress does not override that veto, it holds.
16 It will not go forward.

17 On the other hand, if the State is not able to
18 convince the Congress of their position, and the Congress
19 chooses to override, then of course the program will go
20 forward.

21 And so there is redress. I just want to say this
22 very clearly, that it is our intention to explicitly follow
23 the Nuclear Waste Policy Act and everything that it requires
24 us to do.

25 COHON: Thanks. Other questions for Bob? Dan?

1 BULLEN: Bullen, Board. We heard about the House
2 Appropriation of 2.5 million for oversight, and I don't know
3 what the Senate gave. But do you have sufficient resources
4 at this critical point in your review from the legislature to
5 do that? I know there's never enough money, but is it an
6 improvement? Can you bring us up to date on what your budget
7 fund is?

8 LOUX: Well, I think the situation is improving. The
9 Senate did agree with the House number, so it's not a
10 conference issue at this point, at least my understanding.
11 That would certainly help us to go a long way in continuing
12 some of the work, for example, that you're going to hear
13 about earlier today.

14 We're able to keep things going and focus very
15 sharply on those key issues. We're obviously not able to do
16 the kinds of things that it would be nice to do, but really
17 not critical, so it's really caused us to have to focus
18 dramatically. In some sense, DOE's performance assessment
19 and allocation of performance has in some ways helped that
20 situation a lot with their view that the site provides
21 essentially very little in the way of performance. It
22 doesn't seem to us that that's an area that we're probably
23 going to spend a heck of a lot more resources, especially if
24 according to at least one calculation, 95 per cent of the
25 performance is going to be attributable to the container, it

1 seems to us that's the place to put money. And I think we'll
2 have sufficient resources in that regard.

3 COHON: Thank you very much, Bob.

4 LOUX: Thank you.

5 COHON: Richard Parizek, a member of the Board, will now
6 serve as Chair of our first technical session.

7 PARIZEK: Good morning. My name is Richard Parizek, and
8 I will be chairing the session on scientific and technical
9 issues. Because of the time constraints we're under, I'm
10 going to kind of cut my remarks brief in terms of the
11 introduction I was going to give you. But first, I wanted to
12 add my remarks with those of others on Nick's passing. It
13 was a great sadness and shock that the Board learned of his
14 passing. His wife, Sandra, as I understand it, has lost not
15 only her husband, but mother and father, all within the last
16 few months, and she has a very heavy burden to bear.

17 Those of you who had the pleasure to know and work
18 with Nick will remember him as a doer, an up-front production
19 man. He had a passion for his work in Nye County on the
20 early warning drilling program, and he had a passion for Nye
21 County. The early warning drilling program would provide
22 valuable information on available water resources in the
23 Amargosa Desert region that might be put to use by local
24 residents. It would provide important data on the water
25 quality related issues concerning the Nevada Test Site

1 activities, and the Yucca Mountain project. He knew his
2 work, and that of his associates would add confidence to site
3 scale and regional groundwater flow models of importance to
4 the DOE systems performance and biosphere issues. 23 new
5 groundwater geochemical and geological control points would
6 add significantly to the understanding of the regional
7 groundwater flow at the interface between fractured volcanic
8 rocks and alluvium.

9 I've said publicly Nick's program was the best show
10 in town in providing important new geological, hydrological
11 and geochemical data at a critical time in the Yucca Mountain
12 project. A lot of people associated with the Yucca Mountain
13 project continue to stretch the envelope as highly dedicated
14 public officials, responsible, concerned individuals in the
15 face of criticism. Nick was such a person.

16 Thank you, Nick, for your warmth, respect and
17 friendship. Your shoes will be hard to fill.

18 Now, we all know that DOE is working very hard to
19 formulate a site recommendation. Following this session,
20 we'll hear a great deal about the total system performance
21 assessment. It will constitute a very important element of
22 that site recommendation.

23 However, we should not forget the important ongoing
24 and plan scientific and technical work. These studies have a
25 bearing on many of the technical conclusions lying at the

1 heart of determining whether Yucca Mountain is a suitable
2 site for a repository. At the heart of determining the
3 engineered aspects of the repository and the behavior under
4 repository conditions for thousands of years, past experience
5 indicates that we would indeed be foolish if we assume that
6 we know everything that needs to be known about the site and
7 the proposed engineering system. The Board looks with great
8 interest at ongoing and planned investigations.

9 We should then begin, I think, with the first
10 presentation from the State of Nevada, Aaron Barkatt and Jeff
11 Gorman, concerning their research on Alloy 22. I will not
12 delay the beginning of their presentations any further with
13 my remarks.

14 BARKATT: Good morning. The next presentation on Alloy
15 22 will be given by Dr. Jeff Gorman from Dominion
16 Engineering.

17 COHON: I'm sorry to interrupt. If you'd just tell us
18 your name, because there are two people, and our reporter
19 needs to know who is who.

20 BARKATT: I was going to say Dr. Jeff Gorman of Dominion
21 Engineering and myself. My name is Aaron Barkatt, and I'm
22 from the board of the oxide chemistry group at the Catholic
23 University of America in Washington, D.C.

24 However, we have a third member of our team, who we
25 are fortunate to have her with us, Dr. Staehle who is Dean of

1 Sciences and Engineering at the University of Minnesota, and
2 is a leading member of the corrosion science and engineering
3 community.

4 GORMAN: Excuse me just a minute. Is it possible for us
5 to use this as a hand held mike and both of us to be here?

6 BARKATT: We started working for the program of the
7 State of Nevada several years ago in the area of glass
8 durability, and we were the first to come up with a
9 comprehensive model for the effects of solutes in aqueous
10 media on glass dissolution, and we came up with an extensive
11 database, as well as a model. And at the same time, for the
12 past twelve years or so, we have worked in the nuclear
13 industry on corrosion issues. And during that work, we came
14 to form a close cooperation with Dominion Engineering.
15 That's a firm based in Virginia, that for the past 20 years,
16 had a key role in addressing corrosion issues in the nuclear
17 power industry.

18 So when a few months ago we were asked by the State
19 to refocus our efforts from glass to C-22, we of course
20 immediately invoked this cooperation with Dominion
21 Engineering, with Dr. Gorman and his colleagues in trying to
22 address these issues, and to plan a series of initial
23 studies, both literature surveys and experimental studies,
24 which have been going on now for only a few months.

25 The studies which we are planning are based on the

1 experience of both our groups with materials issues in the
2 nuclear industry. For instance, and this is an example which
3 we are going to talk about today, and to exhibit the results,
4 we have started looking into an issue which has been
5 bothering the industry for the past few years, and that is
6 the role of potentially corrosive trace species such as lead,
7 mercury, arsenic, and so on, the interaction with those high
8 nickel alloys used in nuclear components. And we started
9 looking again at lead and some of the others.

10 The experiments which we have been doing so far
11 have been preliminary in nature. The intent of this program
12 is not to compete with the extensive and high quality
13 experiments carried out by the national labs and universities
14 for the DOE. The intent is strictly to try to point out
15 issues which have not been completely covered, and try to
16 suggest these for future studies whenever necessary.

17 So based on this concept, we have not started the
18 experiments which we are going to talk about now, are not in
19 any way meant to describe the interaction of lead or mercury
20 with C-22 under service conditions. They are meant, rather,
21 to ask the preliminary question, does that interaction occur
22 and does it merit future attention. Again, what we are
23 describing right is not meant to answer the question how is
24 lead going to affect C-22 under service conditions. We are
25 still far from being able to answer that question.

1 But, again, preliminary to talking about service
2 conditions, there are two questions which come to mind. Is
3 it possible that we will have lead, for instance, or mercury,
4 or other potentially active ingredients, in the repository
5 environment? And the second preliminary question is under
6 any condition, accelerated, if you wish, to a great extent,
7 is it possible that C-22 interacts with such species?

8 Now, with respect to the first question, it is not
9 possible I think at the present time to exclude the
10 possibility that lead may be in the repository environment,
11 both as a result of natural causes, the fact that there is
12 lead in the rock, and some of it may solubilize, and as a
13 result of man-made operations at Yucca Mountain, the presence
14 of components such as shielding or solder which contain lead,
15 or as impurities in other materials which may go into the
16 repository. So because this cannot be a priori excluded,
17 comes the question can lead at all interact with C-22.

18 So, again, the tests which have been carried out
19 over the past two or three months, which is all we had so
20 far, was to try to take a look at possible interaction. We
21 used two types of samples. We used U-bends, stress U-bends,
22 both welded and non-welded, and we used static disks. The U-
23 bends were explored to a temperature of 250 degrees
24 centigrade, the disks at 160 degrees centigrade. We used J-
25 13 water concentrated by a factor of 1000. Both of these

1 were of type alkaline, pH of 12, 13, and certified to a low
2 pH, and we tried to look at the results of introducing lead
3 to the system. Again, the J-13 concentrate which we used,
4 based on studies by Rosenberg and co-workers at Lawrence
5 Livermore, and based on the water composition, the
6 temperatures and the samples which we mentioned, we built up
7 to a preliminary matrix of experiments, and Dr. Gorman will
8 go into the detailed results of these tests.

9 GORMAN: I'm Jeff Gorman, principal engineer at Dominion
10 Engineering. This is the matrix of these U-bend tests that
11 have been rather short tests, maximum time of 32 days, and
12 most done at 250, one at room temperature and a couple at
13 200, or a couple at room temperature. And with the range of
14 pHs, as Dr. Barkatt was saying, and here's the room
15 temperature pH, and here's the calculated high temperature
16 pH. And the matrix indicates what additives were added. The
17 most important ones to note are for the lead case where we
18 had, as we'll show in some examples in just a minute, some
19 cracking starting after about a week of testing, had about a
20 half a percent of lead in this case here. So we think
21 there's actually very little additional sulfide actually
22 added. So this is sort of a base case without any
23 significant additives.

24 The main results of these tests were one was lead
25 cracked. We got some significant pitting, and this we'll

1 show you, in a couple of other cases. All of these three
2 cases are cases using hydrochloric acid, which seemed to have
3 more severe effects than sulfuric acid. We also got some
4 effects on the surfaces, and we'll show some weight loss and
5 chemical results in just a minute.

6 This is the same matrix of tests now with the
7 measured main elements in the post test solution and the
8 percent weight loss. You see these three here are the same
9 that had the crack and the pitting, had the most weight loss,
10 but there was some weight loss in other cases, and some
11 dissolution of the base alloys in these other solutions also.

12 BULLEN: Bullen, Board. Just excuse me for a second on
13 that figure. The NM's are?

14 GORMAN: Not measured.

15 BULLEN: Not measured or not measurable?

16 GORMAN: Not measured.

17 BULLEN: Okay.

18 GORMAN: And we started with a half a percent lead, and
19 the engineer who was doing it just thought it wasn't worth
20 testing.

21 These specimens, I forgot to say the size were
22 about 3/4 inch wide, 1/8 inch thick, and about two inches
23 long to start with, bent around a 1/4 inch rod, and then held
24 with a C-276, and not with Teflon washers isolating it from
25 the U-bend, with calculated 25 per cent strain at the outer

1 surface. This is after two weeks of testing. The crack was
2 detectable after one week of testing, but we kept it in to
3 see whether it would continue to grow, which it did.

4 This is more detail of it. This is the ID, this is
5 the OD. This is the crack. And as we'll show on another
6 figure, starting transgranular on the first half, and then
7 apparently as stresses decreased, it started following an
8 intergranular path.

9 This is just an overview showing the width of the
10 U-bend. This is about 3/4 inch, and as you can see, that's
11 the crack. This is that same specimen now with the teflon
12 washer removed, and you see some pitting kind of attack also
13 occurred on this specimen, as well as the cracking.

14 This is the detail. This is a cross-section. I
15 think this is the OD, with the more transgranular
16 propagation, turning to intergranular, sort of typical
17 intergranular branch, showing a pretty strong corrosive
18 attack as opposed to just a straight break cracking kind of
19 attack. And transgranular, this is the SEM view showing
20 transgranular, and then intergranular attack.

21 In looking at another part, on the OD surface, high
22 stress surface, you can see that there are many other
23 incipient cracks starting, so it wasn't just one single
24 place.

25 Switching to the sample with mercury, mercury also

1 seemed to cause pretty severe pitting kind of attack, as you
2 can see here, and as shown by the dissolution of elements and
3 the weight loss also. This is the sulfur added to the acid,
4 and as we note, a lot of the sulfur was not present in the
5 actual test. It's sort of removed during the heat-up
6 process.

7 Okay, these are the disk tests here.

8 BARKATT: The tests on the U-bends, the U-bends were
9 stressed, they were studied at a temperature of 250 degrees
10 Centigrade, and with pHs as low as about .6. The tests on
11 the disks, on the other hand, were carried out in unstressed
12 samples at a pH of, again, either 12, 13 or mildly acidic to
13 .5 to .6. The most important thing, 160 degrees Centigrade
14 instead of 250 degrees Centigrade. And as you can see, we
15 tried, this is with a very scoping type of experiment with
16 the disks. We had no additives with the base case. And as
17 you can see, you need to compare these results against the
18 base case. At the same pH, you can see that chromium is
19 about 50 per cent higher in terms of dissolution, and
20 molybdenum is about double.

21 But when we go to mercury, we can see a very
22 pronounced rise in the extent of dissolution of both chromium
23 and molybdenum, and in addition, in a mildly acidic
24 environment. Of course, you have much more dissolution of
25 all the C-22 components. And in agreement with the wet

1 analysis results, there was one sample that stood out, the
2 sample which was present, again at 160 degrees, mildly acid
3 conditions after two weeks, showed no cracking, but
4 extensive, extensive pitting, and in some cases, the pitting
5 was overgrown by a deposition of corrosion products.

6 So as you can see, we already started reducing the
7 acceleration factors, and we were still able to see in the
8 presence of lead a very significant amount of attack.

9 The main findings first for U-bend.

10 GORMAN: Okay. The main findings of the U-bend tests
11 were that we saw corrosive attack where those exposed to
12 acidic environment. Without additives the corrosion is mild,
13 and some shallow general corrosion and mild pitting, but
14 possibly with some deposition. When you add mercury, you get
15 strong general corrosion, some pitting, and some deposition
16 of corrosion products. We didn't see any accumulation of
17 mercury on the corroded surface.

18 When you use lead as the additive to the acid,
19 cracking occurs first in a transgranular mode. When the
20 stress gets relieved at about the halfway point, the crack
21 grows in an intergranular mode. There's a lot of secondary
22 cracks, mostly intergranular.

23 There was corrosion product deposition observed,
24 and enriched in silicon and depleted with respect to nickel
25 and tungsten. There may have been some pitting preceding the

1 cracking, and a lot of lead concentrates on the crack
2 surface. This is contrast to mercury, where mercury doesn't
3 seem to attach to the metal surfaces, lead does. So it seems
4 to be a different mechanism than the effect of mercury.

5 BARKATT: With regard to the unstressed disks, again,
6 these were done under milder conditions, and we still
7 observed a corrosive attack, extensive pitting. We observed
8 some deposition, and we observed by EDX about 11 per cent of
9 lead on the surface, the pitted surface. It appears as if a
10 very large fraction of the lead available in the environment
11 ends up on the surface of the C-22 samples.

12 With regard to the chemical analysis of the
13 dissolved species, what we can see here is that in the
14 presence of both lead and mercury, we have extensive
15 dissolution of these ingredients, in particular nickel. And
16 it appears the severity of the attack as measured by wet
17 analysis as well as by observations of the sample agree
18 pretty well.

19 In the basic concentrated J-13, J-13 without
20 acidification, mercury still gives significant enhancement of
21 the dissolution of chromium and molybdenum from the C-22. So
22 we were able to point out both mercury and lead as candidates
23 for further studies on these interactions.

24 GORMAN: So our main conclusions from these preliminary
25 tests are that in some environments, small amounts of

1 aggressive species that could be present in the repository
2 water, lead, mercury, arsenic, species such as that, can
3 strongly aggravate pitting, crevice corrosion and SCC. And
4 we conclude that any qualification program for the alloy
5 needs to consider the possible presence of these species, any
6 that are in the environment that could be transported to the
7 metal surface.

8 BARKATT: Let's return for a moment to the initial
9 question of can you have lead and/or mercury in the
10 repository environment? And here with support from Dr.
11 Morganstein and Shettle, Geoscientist Management, they were
12 able to go through the literature, and to go through studies
13 by the USGS, and under the sponsorship of the Department of
14 Energy for the hydrology and geology of these sites. And
15 what we can see when we look at the water itself, the water
16 itself in these environments contains between a few tenths of
17 ppm and a few ppms of lead, and mercury values are not
18 available.

19 But, again, it's important to point out that it's
20 not only the concentrations that are important, but also the
21 total amounts of lead, if so much lead ends up on the C-22
22 surface itself. So since the total availability of lead is
23 important, we should look at the rocks surrounding the
24 repository site, and when we do that, we end up with values
25 ranging from a few ppm to 100 to 200 ppm of lead in the whole

1 rock formations around. And with respect to mercury,
2 somewhere between values of sub ppms to a few ppms of
3 mercury, which are available and could be solubilized during
4 repository operations.

5 GORMAN: We're now switching to another aspect of this
6 preliminary work, which is sort of looking at what has the
7 experience been with similar kinds of alloys in the nuclear
8 power plant industry, and saying from that experience, what
9 do we learn as to how a qualification program for new
10 material for a new application ought to be qualified.

11 There have been, unfortunately, lots of--well,
12 unfortunately for the industry, lots of failures of
13 materials, fortunate for those of us who have made a living
14 trying to understand them and try and fix things based on
15 them. The ones that seem to have the biggest impacts that
16 we've listed here are the austenitic stainless steel for BWR
17 structural materials, piping and core shrouds; inconel 600
18 for PWR steam generator tubes and for nozzles like control
19 rock drive mechanism nozzles and instrument nozzles and
20 pressurizers and the like; X750, which is a high strength
21 precipitation hardened nickel alloy used for bolting and
22 similar kinds of applications, which has had extensive
23 failures in both BWRs and PWRs; A286, which is a
24 precipitation hardened stainless steel used in one class of
25 PWRs and experienced extensive failures; 17-4 PH, a

1 Martensitic precipitation hardening stainless steel, which
2 has been used, was widely used and still is widely used for
3 valve parts and bolting, and has had many failures;
4 Martensitic stainless steel, similar kind of applications and
5 similar types of failures; zircaloy fuel rod cladding, which
6 was selected for its good corrosion resistance and low
7 neutron cross-section, but then was found to be susceptible
8 in both BWR and PWR to stress corrosion and cracking from the
9 ID of the pipe.

10 We went through and looked at each of these in some
11 depth trying to decide what sort of reason, why did we get
12 into the problem and what lessons to learn. In the interest
13 of time, I would like to leave those and go to the summary of
14 lessons learned. What it seems that the--how we got into all
15 those problems which have cost hundreds of millions of
16 dollars and long delays at many plants for repairs and
17 changes of materials, the reasons seem to be there wasn't a
18 full range of realistic service environments considered,
19 potential pH, aggressive species. And potential, for
20 example, apparently the effective small amounts of oxygen and
21 BWR, coolant wasn't adequate, its effect on sensitized
22 stainless steel was not adequately investigated back at the
23 time of the selection of the stainless steel, and so we've
24 had this long continuing problem with cracking of the weld
25 zones in austenitic stainless steels and BWRs.

1 With regard to pH, an aggressive species, the best
2 examples of those are in BWR steam generators, alloy-600
3 steam generators where the pH can go either very low or very
4 high due to concentration occurring in boiling zones,
5 compounded by effects of small aggressive species, such as
6 lead, which is in the feed water typically in the 20 ppt
7 range seems to have an ability to collect on cracked
8 surfaces, and under oxides, we measured them sometimes in
9 some recent failure examinations on some steam generator
10 tubes in the 3 or 4 per cent on crack surfaces, despite it
11 being in the 20 ppt in the water. So nickel alloys have an
12 ability to sort of concentrate some aggressive species.

13 So that's the first category of how we seem to have
14 gotten into these problems. Another aspect is the realistic
15 range of material conditions and compositions wasn't
16 evaluated. The effects of centralization from long range is
17 an obvious one. The possibility of trace boron in alloy-600,
18 Inconel 600, leading to increased susceptibility to caustic
19 attack is another, where it's not a controlled measured
20 interstitial species, but it's there and it can effect its
21 performance.

22 Another aspect is the range of total stresses, and
23 in particular, including residual stresses and applied
24 strains not adequately considered. The residual stresses
25 often resulting from things such as insertion gouges, parts

1 falling on things, surface effects. In many cases, the
2 testing didn't adequately use a staged planned program of
3 accelerated testing so that you could extrapolate for the
4 full life, 40, 60 year life. The tests were shorter term and
5 really only focusing on the expected behavior in the first
6 couple years of service.

7 I've already mentioned the aggravating effects of
8 surface damage, not only residual stress, but local cold work
9 often accelerates the cracking process, from polishing of the
10 OD of Inconel, the grinding of stainless steel in BWRs is
11 found to be a big accelerator, for example.

12 Last one on the list is long term material aging
13 effects were not adequately addressed in some cases, 17-5 pH
14 being probably the best example of where if it's up at high
15 temperature for a long time, it embrittles and becomes more
16 susceptible to stress corrosion.

17 The main lesson is you've got to consider all those
18 factors when qualifying a material, and from our reviews of
19 the literature that we've been able to get ahold of, it seems
20 that all of them have not been adequately reviewed for C-22
21 at this stage.

22 Lots of tests have been and are being performed on
23 C-22. Some aspects that seem to us warrant some more
24 attention, they haven't addressed the possible effects of
25 trace aggressive impurities such as the ones we list, and

1 several others that are in the environment that could
2 possibly get to the metal surfaces.

3 We haven't seen that they've addressed the full
4 range of water chemistries and concentrations that could
5 occur, such as with boiling on a super-heated surface where
6 in the PWR steam generator world, we find that the
7 concentrations that you can develop with some super-heat, 10,
8 20 degrees super-heat can cause very rapid corrosion of
9 similar nickel alloys.

10 We haven't seen tests that address the full range
11 of base material compositions, including trace deleterious
12 impurities. Now, that's trace deleterious impurities in the
13 metal, not in the environment. And then the conditions,
14 welding and cold work, we know that some work has started on
15 the welding aspect.

16 So the intention is to cover those insufficiently
17 addressed aspects, and with the assistance of Dr. Staehle and
18 Dr. Barkatt and ourselves and Dr. Morgenstein and Shettle,
19 they're going to try and develop a test program that
20 addresses those aspects that haven't had sufficient attention
21 so far.

22 PARIZEK: Thank you for your presentation. We are on a
23 tight time schedule, but I think it's a very important
24 presentation that we ought to allow time, and the coffee
25 break can suffer, and those that need to go out for a moment

1 can do so, but I think questions generally are very important
2 because Alloy-22 is critical to the performance of the
3 repository, and if there's some inconsistencies with what the
4 program and what you folks are finding, it's important.
5 Obviously, your results are not published. You've gone
6 through the peer review process, I believe. I assume you
7 intend to make those kind of publications somewhere in the
8 future.

9 But I would be wanting to know more about the study
10 plan, your last page, as to how you would lay this out and
11 what time frame would be required to adequately address these
12 concerns, what kind of dollars are required, and does the
13 State of Nevada have that kind of money to support your
14 program available to you at this time?

15 GORMAN: This is a subject that's under discussion with
16 them at this time, and I guess it depends parts on the
17 political process here over the next few months. So I think
18 I'm not in a position to address that question. We've done
19 some preliminary thinking of what sort of resources would be
20 required. We've had some preliminary discussions with the
21 geosciences management and with the state, but these are very
22 preliminary, and so I don't think I can answer your question
23 at this time.

24 BARKATT: I think in retrospect, one very important
25 aspect and a lesson that I think was learned in other stages

1 of our programs is that a contingent fee is made for longer
2 term tests so that the validation of predictions made from
3 short-term tests can take place over longer periods of time
4 that will allow us to gain more confidence in extrapolating
5 from accelerated tests to service conditions.

6 PARIZEK: Alberto Sagüés?

7 SAGÜÉS: Were these tests performed like in autoclaves?

8 GORMAN: Yes, they were performed in small stainless
9 steel autoclaves.

10 SAGÜÉS: I see.

11 GORMAN: With teflon liners.

12 SAGÜÉS: With teflon liners. What kind of pressures
13 would you build in?

14 GORMAN: It would be the saturation pressure for 250,
15 and at 288, it's 1000 psi, so it's probably 600 psi,
16 something in that order.

17 SAGÜÉS: Right. And how much of the volume of liquid,
18 about 100 cc, something like that?

19 GORMAN: About 150 cc.

20 SAGÜÉS: 150 cc. So when one looks at the
21 concentrations at the end, one can get an idea of the total
22 amount of that.

23 GORMAN: Yes.

24 SAGÜÉS: And those were single tests, like for example,
25 the specimen that showed the crack, is that one test?

1 GORMAN: That was one specimen. And in some cases, we
2 had two specimens, but I think in that case, it was only the
3 one specimen. These are not duplicated, and of course in a
4 full scale program, we would intend to go to statistically
5 significant numbers to be able to get some statistics, 10,
6 100, or something in that order, under each environment, and
7 then staged at different temperatures and staged with
8 stresses to try and get ability to predict to service
9 conditions, or a variety of service conditions.

10 SAGÜÉS: And lead was in the form of lead acetate or
11 some such sort?

12 BARKATT: Lead was lead acetate.

13 SAGÜÉS: Acetate. And that was all soluble, in other
14 words, you ended up with salts at the bottom of the
15 autoclave?

16 BARKATT: This is again, I apologize for reporting very
17 preliminary data, we put in half a per cent, and in one of
18 these test what we ended up with was .14 per cent of lead in
19 the solution. Now, some of it may--we didn't notice a
20 voluminous precipitate, but our feeling is that a lot of the
21 lead ended up on the surface of the corroded metal.

22 PARIZEK: Okay, thank you. Dan Bullen?

23 BULLEN: Bullen, Board. You may know that the Board is
24 interested in cooler repositories for reduction of
25 uncertainty, but the question that now arises is I saw that

1 the room temperature data had very limited impact on it. And
2 as we go to cooler repository designs, and perhaps not
3 boiling surfaces on the waste package, would you expect there
4 to be an acceleration or a deceleration in the impact of the
5 trace impurities on the corrosion?

6 GORMAN: Oh, I think most of the corrosion processes are
7 thermally activated so that the lower the temperature, the
8 better. There are a few hydrogen cracking mechanisms that
9 are worse at lower temperatures in these high nickel alloys,
10 but almost all of them, most of the ones that we would be
11 worried about are thermally driven, so the lower the
12 temperatures, the better.

13 BULLEN: Do you think your data would be able to
14 identify a threshold temperature that would be of critical
15 importance for the trace elements, or is that going to be
16 sort of beyond the scope of what you have planned?

17 GORMAN: If the program is funded and carried out the
18 way we envision and we get the kind of results we expect, the
19 intent would be to allow--there's no threshold where it
20 actually stops, but you get--the time scale gets stretched
21 out the lower the temperature. And so you get results at
22 different temperatures, and then extrapolate to service
23 conditions. So the answer is is you try and get results at a
24 sufficient number of temperatures, and at sufficiently low
25 temperatures, so you have pretty high assurance of predicting

1 to service conditions.

2 BULLEN: Right. But the key there for service
3 conditions was already identified by Dr. Sagüés, in that if
4 your atmospheric conditions, you're kind of limited to how
5 high you can go in temperature because of the fact that
6 you're at saturation and you can't get beyond that.

7 GORMAN: Well, if you get deposits on surfaces and you
8 have a heat source that can get above 100 C., it depends on
9 what sort of deposits you get on it, how much insulation that
10 is, you can then, in that deposit, get temperatures above 100
11 C. and you can also get boiling point elevations and
12 concentrations up to the 10, 20, 30 per cent of dissolved
13 solids in those deposits. So there may be some possibility
14 of that kind of environment developing.

15 BULLEN: But the critical part there is trying to figure
16 out where that is and how to do the extrapolation then?

17 GORMAN: Yes. Well, there's two parts of it. There's
18 doing the tests for the extrapolation of the data, but
19 there's also the definition of the environment from a
20 realistic set of scenarios, as to can you get deposits on the
21 surface and can the temperatures be raised by those deposits.

22 BULLEN: Thank you.

23 PARIZEK: Debra Knopman?

24 KNOPMAN: Knopman, Board. Just a real quick followup to
25 Dan Bullen's question. Would there be any particular

1 significance based on your preliminary work with temperatures
2 between 96 degrees C. and 100 degrees C., for example, at
3 boiling, is there anything in particular that changes in that
4 range? Would you expect some change in the
5 temperature/corrosion curve, corrosion rate curve?

6 GORMAN: For the kind of mechanisms we were looking at
7 in these very preliminary tests, no. There are some
8 degradation modes that affect high nickel alloys that are
9 worse at the lower temperatures, and they seem to be hydrogen
10 driven processes, so the hydrogen doesn't diffuse out of the
11 metal so fast, and you get faster cracking at sort of the
12 just below boiling point conditions.

13 So, in general, the answer is that there's no
14 particular threshold, and it gets better the lower
15 temperature you get, but there are a few low temperature
16 processes that possibly need to be considered.

17 PARIZEK: Chairman Cohon?

18 COHON: I know that you're very early in the process of
19 your studies, which are very interesting, so my question is
20 probably unfair, but it's a very key question. And that's
21 extending the results, and even later results after you
22 continue to do your work, to the very long times that these
23 waste packages have to perform, you mentioned in your review
24 of some of the instances of failures in nuclear power plants,
25 that one of the failings in terms of design was not thinking

1 through or not designing for the full lifetime. And you
2 mentioned 40 to 60 years. In this case, though, we have to
3 extrapolate to hundreds of thousands of years. Thoughts
4 about this and, you know, what should one do in order to get
5 from where we are to where we need to be in terms of making
6 reasonable predictions over such long periods of time?

7 GORMAN: The standard approach for addressing that
8 question is to do a series of tests at different
9 temperatures, with longer times required at lower
10 temperature, and then extrapolate to the times, to the
11 service conditions. We, of course, looked at that on an
12 exploratory basis, if it cracks in one week, in 250, what
13 does that mean in terms of service condition. That all
14 hinges on a parameter called the activation energy.

15 If the activation energy is in the low range for
16 this kind of process, 25 kilocalories per mole, then the one
17 week occurs within the design lifetime of these parts. If
18 it's at the high end, 50 kilocalories per mole, then the one
19 week, 250 C., it doesn't indicate a problem in 10,000 years.
20 But the activation energies that you get for these cracking
21 and crack processes range sort of from 25 to 50 kilocalories
22 per mole. So at the lower end, the cracking in one week
23 would indicate a problem in the design lifetime of these
24 barriers.

25 Does that address your question?

1 COHON: Yes.

2 GORMAN: Could we let Roger Staehle add a comment on
3 this?

4 PARIZEK: Yes, and let him introduce himself for the
5 record.

6 STAEHLE: I'm Roger Staehle. I'm an independent
7 consultant. I'm also an adjunct professor at the University
8 of Minnesota.

9 There are sort of two main ideas here in responding
10 to this question. First is C-22 is basically an acid alloy.
11 It has a molybdenum concentration, chromium concentration
12 which are basically acid oriented. You probably understand
13 the thermodynamics of the problem. C-22 is not basically a
14 neutral or an alkaline alloy because the high solubility of
15 molybdenum and tungsten and chromium as you move up in pH
16 suggest that it should begin to dissolve and corrode in those
17 cases. So you have to kind of think about that general
18 pattern.

19 The second general pattern about prediction is Jeff
20 made a very important point that I assume all of you picked
21 up, and that is that the lessons learned from the nuclear
22 industry pertain directly here. And some of you know that
23 the Alloy 600 was picked by somebody who would sit at the
24 right hand of God, some of you know the story here and some
25 of you don't, but Admiral Richover sort of unilaterally

1 decided that Alloy 600 was the right material no matter what.
2 That alloy turned out to be among the most corrosion prone
3 alloys that ever existed. And that alloy is in the same
4 family as your C-22. It's not exactly the same, but it's
5 very close. And the reason that the problems of failure
6 occurred, as Jeff pointed out, were basically people wanting
7 to define the environments very well, and second, didn't
8 define the limits.

9 And so what Jeff has done is very nice work, is
10 actually begin to define some of the limits of the
11 performance of this material. So if you would have asked in
12 1960 what is the expected life of Alloy 600, he would have
13 said, well, something semi-infinite. Today, actually through
14 a lot of Jeff's work, the life is not zero, but it's not all
15 that very good either, and to have a one year experience base
16 for the application of C-22 of this application in that
17 framework is an almost laughable kind of a basis for making a
18 prediction.

19 So I think that it needs a very serious thoughtful
20 consideration of the site chemistry, the reality of the site
21 chemistry, and the reality of the boundaries, and then you
22 can begin to make some predictions.

23 COHON: If I could just follow up real quickly, Richard,
24 because it would get to a key point? Suppose the environment
25 in which the material would have to operate were specified,

1 though that's a big issue, I have a specific question with
2 regard to the kinds of experiments you would conduct if you
3 had to answer the question how long will C-22 likely perform.
4 It sounded from your answer like if you had a year and
5 enough money, you could come up with--whatever answer you
6 could produce in that year would probably be as good as you
7 could produce in two years, or three. Of course, you'd love
8 to have 9,000 years probably, or 9,999, but given like one,
9 two, three years, am I coming to the right conclusion, based
10 on what you said?

11 GORMAN: I think a little optimistic. To get
12 sufficiently long tests to get--use a low enough temperature
13 so that you have higher assurance in your extrapolation to
14 service temperatures, we've estimated that you need about
15 three years to get the length of tests that you need to do
16 it. So you'd get some useful information in one year, but
17 your uncertainty would be quite high trying to extrapolate
18 down to service temperatures.

19 COHON: But five years would not provide a very large
20 gain over three years?

21 GORMAN: That's my preliminary assessment. Long tests
22 always take longer and are more difficult than you
23 anticipate.

24 STAEHLE: But that's not really the total answer to that
25 problem. It's not that you can run a test in a week, and

1 Jeff's done this, or two weeks, whatever. The activation
2 energies for the systems are well known. I mean, you can
3 just say it's either between this or this, and make an
4 extrapolation, and so why do the experiments at lower
5 temperatures. The bigger issue I think is not the question
6 of how they extrapolate. The bigger issue is what is the set
7 of chemical species that is of concern. And the Alloy-22 I
8 don't think is sufficiently well understood from the point of
9 how it interacts with the environmental species, nor how the
10 environmental species would build up in time, and I think it
11 would take some time to not do the experiment in a sense, but
12 to figure out the right set of things, that is, the
13 respectable engineering, and that's what would actually take
14 more time. And, of course, you need some extrapolation base
15 to be legitimate, but as a first cut, I think you can kind of
16 almost assume the extrapolation.

17 PARIZEK: Can you identify yourself at the end?

18 STAEHLE: I'm sorry, excuse me. Roger Staehle,
19 consultant.

20 PARIZEK: Priscilla Nelson, Board.

21 BARKATT: May I just add a quick comment to that? We
22 have to be careful when we use the term extrapolation. When
23 one thinks about extrapolation, first cut is it's a linear
24 extension of observed results to service conditions, assuming
25 that you can linearly plot something and continue in a

1 straight line, which we know from metal corrosion that has
2 been first discovered in the 1920s, as well as in the
3 corrosion of ceramics, composites, glasses, is that in many
4 cases, you may have non-linear effects where your initial
5 degradation or corrosion life is low, and then due to some
6 effects, physical, chemical or mechanical effects, all of a
7 sudden, your corrosion will take off.

8 Now, that means that linear extrapolation by itself
9 is insufficient to come up with confident prediction of
10 what's going to happen in the long term. You must good
11 understanding of the total mechanism, of all the mechanisms
12 that can lead to such an effect, and this is one very
13 important reason why long-term studies are very, very
14 important.

15 NELSON: Nelson, Board. I realize that it's possible--
16 we have been thinking, at least I have been thinking that,
17 you know, Alloy 22 is the super metal, and we're making it
18 seems more mortal, but I'm struck by Slide 31 when you talk
19 about the reasons for unexpected failures, including most of
20 your points really require some knowledge of realistic
21 environments, or realistic material conditions, realistic
22 ranges of stresses. And I'm wondering, in hindsight,
23 thinking about the nuclear power plant experience that you
24 talk about here, it's possible to understand what those
25 realistic stresses environments are. But evidently it wasn't

1 possible to anticipate what those realistic conditions were
2 before.

3 I'm wondering how good we're going to be at
4 understanding what realistic means when you try from here to
5 do forecasting. Do you have any comments on that?

6 GORMAN: My comment is that we ought to do a very
7 serious job of looking at all those factors that have caused
8 us problems in the nuclear power industry, and learn from
9 that experience as best as we possibly can. And that's what
10 we recommend be done to try and define both the environmental
11 conditions to which the barrier will be exposed, and then
12 also the range of material conditions itself, and then all
13 these untoward sort of things that happen to real materials
14 that induce increased stresses and susceptibility to
15 cracking, the scratches, the grinding, all of these kind of
16 things, and address those either in the predictions of life
17 or by design processes that control them.

18 STAEHLE: Roger Staehle. I'm also working with the
19 Nevada people. Actually, the approach, and you're really
20 right on in terms of saying you can't define all this all
21 that precisely, and there's no question about that. You
22 can't. But what you can do, you can bound the system, and
23 there are certain ways of bounding systems thermally,
24 chemically, from a stress point of view, without making the
25 boundary so broad you can't build anything. And that's a

1 problem with bounding.

2 And so it's quite within present technology to
3 bound a system like this and work within it and demonstrate
4 whether it works or doesn't work within that bounding system.

5 NELSON: Nelson, Board. Presumably, that would have
6 been possible in the nuclear power plant industry in the past
7 as well. I guess based on what you understand about the
8 testing that's going on on the project right now, are what
9 you would think as being realistic conditions, realist
10 environments being tested and evaluated in the existing
11 program? And it's fair to say that you don't know, if you
12 don't know.

13 GORMAN: The answer is that from what I do know, they're
14 not being completely covered, but I don't know the whole
15 program, and I expect to be better educated by the end of
16 these two days.

17 PARIZEK: Parizek, Board. You spoke about the non-
18 linear nature. You have accelerated rates. You can also
19 have decelerating rates as a result of passification of pits,
20 as an example, you didn't count on them?

21 BARKATT: Certainly. That is why a complete mechanistic
22 understanding is so important. I think I would not be very
23 wrong in saying that cases where you have perfect linear
24 behavior, super linear or sublinear behavior appears to be
25 the rule.

1 PARIZEK: Questions from the advisors for the Board?
2 Kessler or Ewing?

3 EWING: Rod Ewing, an advisor to the Board. Did you
4 identify any of the corrosion products that formed in your
5 experiments?

6 BARKATT: No, not yet, except for EDS, which Jeff
7 identified on the surface, we haven't come to that yet.

8 EWING: And did you try to calculate the species that
9 would be in solution, say if it's a lead, mercury and
10 arsenic?

11 BARKATT: To calculate the speciation? These
12 experiments that we're talking about started two or three
13 months ago, and we are planning to do that in the near
14 future.

15 EWING: And then finally, the very low pH values, do you
16 envision them as part of the accelerated experiment, or are
17 they relevant to the repository condition?

18 BARKATT: Well, there are several answers to that.
19 Again, we tried to answer the question of are these
20 interactions possible at all, so we went to highly
21 accelerated conditions. But as you could see, we already
22 went to much milder pH, to .6 only, and we still observed
23 extensive pitting.

24 In addition to that, the temperatures with the pHs
25 that we are talking about are room temperature pHs, and when

1 you look at a pH at temperature, they're not so much out of
2 realistic range as might appear from looking at the room
3 temperature values.

4 PARIZEK: John Kessler, Dr. Kessler?

5 KESSLER: John Kessler, EPRI. Can you give us some kind
6 of idea what you've been funded for in terms of the next
7 round of tests, lower temperatures, whatever, longer time
8 periods; what's next?

9 BARKATT: Again, this meeting, and the meeting with the
10 State of Nevada people, will already be taking place here,
11 are about priorities. We believe that the most important
12 next stage is, again, what Dr. Staehle referred to, a
13 definition of the expected environments, so we will know what
14 we are supposed to extrapolate to.

15 Following this definition of expected conditions
16 that we hope to do based on review of DOE documents and other
17 literatures available, we will then be in a position to plan
18 a detailed matrix of experiments which will allow us to do
19 this extrapolated work.

20 PARIZEK: Questions from staff?

21 DIODATO: Dave Diodato, staff. I was just wondering, I
22 know that you still have many more experiments you'd like to
23 do, but you presented quite a range of experiments here this
24 morning, both under stressed and unstressed conditions in a
25 variety of environments, and with a variety of accelerants

1 and different concentrations. Would it be appropriate, even
2 now in a preliminary way, to think about a multivariable
3 regression to identify the relative impacts of the different
4 factors, and separate those out in kind of a quantitative
5 fashion, at least in a preliminary way? Or is that not done?

6 BARKATT: Certainly it would be appropriate. But since
7 we have talked so far about scoping studies, we are still
8 trying to isolate parameters and study them one at a time.

9 STAEHLE: Maybe I could respond a little bit. Roger
10 Staehle from the Nevada program.

11 That's a perfectly rational approach to doing this
12 kind of work. The problem here is is a matter of figuring
13 out what the problem actually is. And as an example, Jeff
14 and Ron in their program, have looked at the question of
15 lead. It would be a little bit difficult to explain how
16 undefined the system actually is from the point of view of
17 cracks. And before you do some kind of a serious
18 multivariable kind of experiment, you've got to in fact
19 figure out what the multivariables are, and that's sort of
20 step one. That's a big step.

21 And the other part of the multivariable is the
22 question of what the environments actually are, or can be, or
23 can be bounded to be. And so then another part of this thing
24 has to do with the fact that you not only have to deal with
25 the multivariable effect, but you've got to deal with the

1 dispersion effect, and you're interested in the first failure
2 and the second failure and the third failure, and that's also
3 something that needs to be thought about. And I'm not so
4 sure it's part of the Nevada program to figure out the
5 dispersion problem, and maybe even the multivariable problem.

6 I sort of see the effect of the work here as being
7 identifying the bounding conditions, and what it looks like,
8 and maybe someone with more money can do a bigger study.

9 DIODATO: With one thing being possibly maybe total loss
10 of mass in the system looked at and another time to incipient
11 formation of these first cracks; are these the kind of
12 variables that you look at for response variables?

13 STAEHLE: Sort of. The problem here is not a mass loss
14 problem. With C-22 and this kind of a system, it's not a
15 matter of losing mass. Like, for example, if you use iron or
16 an iron base material, you're looking at mass loss because
17 you've got this general problem of instability. Whereas, in
18 the C-22 with the alloys you've got, you're really looking at
19 cracking processes, local processes, and so it's not a mass
20 loss problem.

21 PARIZEK: Paul Craig, Board?

22 CRAIG: Craig, Board. You mentioned, Dr. Gorman I
23 believe mentioned the importance of scratches and gouges and
24 how these can sometimes accelerate deterioration, and also
25 small impurities in the materials. And, of course, many of

1 these for the DOE design, these materials will have to be
2 manufactured in large quantities over quite a period of time,
3 so quality control will matter. I wonder if you could give
4 us some insight as to how to think about that kind of problem
5 from the perspective of a scoping study.

6 GORMAN: First, let me refresh myself and you as to why
7 I was saying this. For example, in Inconel 600 tubes, we
8 find that the tubes in some cases when they were inserted had
9 lines and abrasion or scratches along the surfaces. The
10 failure analysis I happen to be working on right now, we find
11 that the cracks tend to occur preferentially along that line
12 of disturbed material, and while the rest of the material
13 that have an attack of only a grain or so, saying 1 mill deep
14 in the regular surface, it will be 15 to 20 mills deep, half
15 the tube wall, along a line of scratching. So the scratch
16 seems to have residual stresses and cold work, both of which
17 seem to aggravate many of these degradation processes.

18 Grinding on stainless steel puts in residual
19 stresses and also phase change, and both of those processes
20 accelerate cracking of stainless steels. And then in the
21 trace impurities--

22 CRAIG: Well, we're concerned here about, one, will be
23 the welds, and the second aspect will be rocks that might
24 fall on the canisters.

25 GORMAN: Right, or other installation damage. And so I

1 think the testing ought to include tests of material with
2 representative surface damage. And so you try and isolate to
3 determine how much effect it has on either pitting or most
4 likely cracking, and the welding, you ought to have welds in
5 this test qualification program.

6 The trace impurities in the material is a harder
7 one actually to address, because these impurities such as
8 boron and other interstitials are not normally measured in
9 the material, and they're not quantified, yet we have found
10 in Inconel 600, for example, that boron in the material
11 greatly accelerates susceptibility to caustic cracking. And
12 so there has to be some systematic testing done to try and
13 identify what are the trace impurities and what effect do
14 they have, and you have to use an accelerated environment to
15 do that test, and then hope that that tells you it can be
16 safely extrapolated to lower temperatures.

17 So it would be part of a spring test either done
18 with electrochemical methods or with methods such as constant
19 ascension rate tests to get results in a six month or one
20 year time frame.

21 PARIZEK: I want to thank you for your contributions
22 this morning, and hope that you'll be available throughout
23 the day, and perhaps in the public comment period. And it's
24 been an important topic, so we've let it run beyond the
25 coffee break time, so can we assemble here at 11:00 sharp?

1 Okay, so those of you who must leave for a few
2 minutes, do so, because we really have volcanism and we have
3 the whole scientific program update. Mark Peters is our next
4 presenter from the DOE program, a review of all the
5 scientific studies ongoing, which is also a very important
6 topic, and then we'll follow that with the volcanism
7 discussion.

8 The next presentation is our scientific and
9 engineering testing update, an important presentation,
10 followed by another one on volcanism, so we must get started.

11 Mark?

12 PETERS: Thanks very much. Can you hear me okay?

13 I guess I'll start off with half the room, and then
14 it will fill up as we go.

15 Thank you very much for having me again today.
16 It's nice to have the opportunity to talk to you all again.

17 Again, just following through on previous
18 presentations that I've given to the Board, this is just
19 another volume of the scientific and engineering testing
20 update to give you a feel for where we're at in the testing
21 program across the project, cover a lot of ground, as I
22 normally do, try to give you a feel for what we're doing in
23 all the areas, and then hopefully prompt questions. We'll
24 hear a lot more about the details of the modeling in later
25 presentations in the TSPA.

1 I've already given you the objective, provide the
2 status of the testing program in support of the process
3 models and design. I'll start with update of some of the ESF
4 studies, the drift scale tests, as well as an update on where
5 we're at with Chlorine 36 validation work. You've heard an
6 extensive presentation on that at the June meeting. I'll
7 just give you an update on where we're at with that.

8 Moving into the cross drift, I'll talk about
9 results from the seepage studies at Niche 5 in the lower
10 lithophysal, the Topopah Spring, and then some additional
11 work that Lawrence Berkeley is conducting in the lower
12 lithophysal, looking at systematic hydrologic properties, a
13 brief update on where we're at with the bulkhead
14 investigations, an update on where we're at with the Phase II
15 testing at Busted Butte, unsaturate zone transport test, some
16 new discussion of where we're at with the alluvial testing
17 complex work in cooperation with Nye County, and then switch
18 gears into the engineered barrier system, an overview of the
19 pilot-scale testing at Atlas in North Las Vegas, where we're
20 headed with ventilation testing also at the Atlas facility,
21 and then a very high level overview of the materials testing,
22 waste package materials testing, and then wrap up with a
23 brief summary.

24 Starting with the ESF and the cross-drift studies.
25 You've seen this many times before. The ESF here, north

1 ramp, main drift, and south ramp, the potential repository
2 block to the west. This is north in this direction on this
3 diagram. So the potential repository block with the cross-
4 drift in red going out over top of the block.

5 Today in the ESF section of the discussion, I'll
6 focus on some results from the drift scale test, and also a
7 little bit about Chlorine 36 validation from samples up here
8 near the Drillhole Wash Fault, and also taken down here near
9 the Sundance Fault.

10 Starting with the drift scale test, I'm sure you're
11 all familiar now with this diagram and layout of the test,
12 the observation drift with the connection drift, and then the
13 heated drift with the boreholes drilled from the observative
14 drift, both above and below the heated drift, as well as
15 boreholes drilled within the heated drift itself, primarily
16 to get temperature and mechanical changes in the rock.

17 In terms of an update of where we're at with power
18 and temperature, I mentioned at the last meeting that we had
19 gone through one power ramp-down. We were approaching 200
20 degrees C. at the drift wall, which was our target. So we've
21 ramped down the power now once again, so you can see the
22 changes in power here, time and days versus power in
23 kilowatts on this axis, temperature and degrees C. on the
24 right-hand axis. The temperature of the drift wall, both at
25 the crown on the left rib and the right rib are also plotted

1 here, and show how we've converged on 200 degrees C., and
2 we're not flattening off and we're going to maintain. We're
3 in about two and a half years into the heating phase, plan to
4 heat for the full four years.

5 I'd like to talk a little bit about some of the gas
6 chemistry and water chemistry work that we've been doing,
7 analyzing gas, collecting gas and water from some of the
8 holes drilled off the observative drift, and also compare
9 that to some of our modeling that we've done with active
10 transport modeling, pretest predictions, and then evolving
11 predictions through the test.

12 First gas chemistry. What I've got plotted here is
13 time from heating versus CO₂ in parts per million by volume.
14 The solid are measurements of CO₂ concentration for the
15 borehole, Borehole 75, which is a borehole drilled up from
16 the axis drift above the heated drift. So we've got CO₂
17 measurements versus a model calculation for CO₂ concentration
18 in the fractures as a function of time. It's a dual
19 permeability simulation, and again, since it's due to
20 permeability, you have predictions for matrix CO₂ contents
21 and fracture CO₂ contents.

22 But you can see we expected to see a rise, and
23 we've talked before about the CO₂, I'll call it a halo, the
24 increased CO₂ concentrations in advance of the boiling front.
25 And then once the boiling front passes, we would tend to see

1 the CO2 concentrations reduce. That's predicted by the
2 models, and we're starting to see that behavior in the
3 measurements as well.

4 CO2 concentration ties, of course, heavily to water
5 chemistry, particularly controls of pH. This is data on pH
6 measurements on water sampled from three different intervals.
7 Borehole 60 is a down borehole, so this was sampled below
8 the heated drift, or to the side and below the heated drift.
9 And 186, Borehole 186, is also a down borehole, so to the
10 side of the heated drift, below and to the side.

11 Again, a series of pH measurements. The pH, this
12 is a model prediction for that region of the heated area,
13 showing a decrease in pH, and then a subsequent rise in pH,
14 and we're in fact seeing that kind of systematic behavior in
15 the pH measurements that we're getting from the water sample.

16 Chlorine 36 validation, I mentioned at the
17 beginning that you heard a lot about that at the June
18 meeting. Mark Caffee from Lawrence Livermore gave a
19 presentation on that, and June Fabryka-Martin was also there,
20 added some during the discussion.

21 We're all familiar with what we're doing there, but
22 what we're after is validating the occurrence of bomb-pulse
23 Chlorine 36. From the original work that was done by June,
24 she identified bomb-pulse locations in several places in the
25 ESF. We chose two of those, the Sundance Fault and the

1 Drillhole Wash Fault, and the USGS, in cooperation with
2 Livermore and Los Alamos, has led a study to try to validate
3 those occurrences.

4 In terms of the path forward on that, you heard a
5 lot about discussion of the data, and there's some
6 interesting differences in the previous data collected versus
7 what Livermore is now collecting. So we've developed a path
8 forward to try to get at understanding why there's those
9 differences. So the USGS has prepared a reference sample.
10 We took some rock from the tunnel. We've crushed it,
11 homogenized it, and we're distributing aliquots to Livermore
12 and Los Alamos. That has been done.

13 Livermore and Los Alamos are now in the process of
14 documenting how they plan to test the effective different
15 leaching procedures. We don't think it has to do with the
16 sampling. It's more of the laboratory, how they're leaching
17 the chloride from the rock for subsequent analysis. So we're
18 going to go through a process of comparing leaching
19 procedures, doing different leaching techniques, and then
20 swapping samples basically to try to get an inter-laboratory
21 comparison to try to address the differences. So these two
22 steps are really ongoing as we speak.

23 Once we've agreed as a team on the standard
24 processing method, we'll apply that to a separate aliquot of
25 the reference sample, and then to the additional validation

1 samples. I should also mention the USGS continues to extract
2 water and conduct tritium analyses, and they've got close to
3 38 analyses right now of tritium from the Sundance fault, and
4 all of them, except for one, have shown no evidence of any
5 tritium, and that one is in the order of 2 1/2 to 3 tritium
6 units. So it's still below bomb-pulse levels. So we still
7 see no evidence of bomb-pulse tritium at the Sundance.

8 And then at any rate, that's the results. The last
9 bullet here just reminds everybody that once we're done
10 analyzing the validation samples, we'll synthesize the
11 results and prepare a report.

12 Switching gears to the cross-drift, this is a
13 diagram you've seen before, the cross-drift here cutting
14 across over the top of the potential repository block.
15 Different units within the Topopah Spring are marked, as I've
16 done in previous meetings. The upper lithophysal exposed up
17 to here. The middle non-lithophysal in this section of
18 tunnel. The lower lithophysal through here, and the lower
19 non-lith exposed from this part of the tunnel all the way to
20 the Solitario Canyon Fault.

21 Color coding again, the stuff in black is existing
22 excavations that I would have tests ongoing, or we're in the
23 process of finishing up test construction. And those in
24 Italics and blue are things that are in the baseline plan for
25 out years.

1 I'll talk today about work Berkeley has been
2 conducting at Niche 5, seepage testing in the lower
3 lithophysal. I'll also talk about some systematic work that
4 Berkeley is doing within the lower lith in this section of
5 the cross-drift, and then a brief update on the bulkheads,
6 remind you that we have bulkheads constructed at about 1750
7 meters from the entrance to the cross-drift, another one just
8 before the Solitario Canyon Fault, and as of today, we should
9 be getting ready to close up a third bulkhead that we've
10 stuck down right at the back of the tunnel boring machine to
11 try to minimize the effects of the tunnel boring machine, the
12 heat produced from the tunnel boring machine.

13 First, Niche 5, again, after drift-scale seepage
14 processes, Niches 1 through 4 in the ESF were in the middle
15 non-lithophysal, the upper part of the repository. Here,
16 we're in the lower lithophysal. In terms of status,
17 excavation of the niche is complete. They've characterized
18 the flow paths using dye released prior to niche excavation,
19 and then looking for the dye as excavation proceeded.

20 Air permeability tests for the post-excitation
21 boreholes are in progress, very close to finished. We've got
22 a bulkhead installed so that when the seepage tests begin,
23 we'll be at ambient humidity conditions as we're dripping
24 into the opening.

25 Reminder of what Niche 5 looks like. There's an

1 access drift that was excavated, then a series of boreholes,
2 pre-niche excavation boreholes were drilled. This is where
3 liquid dye was released, and then while we were excavating
4 the niche itself, we looked for where the dye travelled along
5 pathways within the lower lithophysal. And then we've also
6 drilled post-excavation boreholes, and that's where some of
7 the additional air permeability testing is taking place.

8 The liquid release seepage testing will take place
9 from some of these same boreholes here that are drilled above
10 the niche itself.

11 I'll talk about comparison, what we've seen
12 preliminarily in Niche 5. Again, we're in the lower
13 lithophysal and we're comparing what we've seen in Niches 1
14 through 4 in the ESF in the middle non-lithophysal. Pictures
15 on the right are meant to illustrate some of the points that
16 I'm going to be making here in the bullets. The picture on
17 the left, you can see purple dye gathered around the
18 borehole. This is from Niche 5 within the lower lithophysal.
19 The picture on the right, you can see a trace of blue dye.
20 You should be able to pick up a trace of blue dye that
21 travelled along through-going fracture, with the scale here.
22 This is on the order of a meter. This is in the middle non-
23 lithophysal.

24 So there is a contrast in the behavior of the
25 liquid dye travel in the two units. Evidence in the lower

1 lithophysal of stronger capillarity. Also, the air
2 permeability tests that we've done at Niche 5 suggest higher
3 permeability. When you put those two things together and
4 compare them to what we saw in the middle non-lith, it's
5 potentially a higher seepage threshold in the lower
6 lithophysal than in the middle non-lithophysal. That's
7 positive for performance. Remember, the lower lithophysal is
8 on the order of 70 or greater per cent of the potential
9 repository horizon, so it equals less seepage into drifts in
10 the lower lith, based on these preliminary results.

11 I believe it was two meetings ago, there was also
12 discussion about the evidence that calcite lithophysal
13 cavities, and what that might say about seepage. One of the
14 things that was seen by Lawrence Berkeley as we were
15 excavating the niche after release of the liquid dye, this
16 was a borehole where there was dye released, and you can see
17 that the dye actually by capillary forces actually flowed up
18 and coated the bottom of a lithophysal cavity.

19 So the strong capillary forces in the lower
20 lithophysal could be possible alternative explanation for
21 calcite in the bottom of lithophysal cavities, at least in
22 the lower lithophysal.

23 And I should also mention that as we were looking
24 at the lithophysal cavities during excavation, we didn't see
25 spots. We could see just dripping into those cavities. We

1 saw evidence of coating along the bottom of the lithophysal.

2 Switching gears, Berkeley is also conducting, we're
3 drilling a series of boreholes in the lower lithophysal to
4 look at Niche 5 as one location in the lower lith. We're
5 interested in heterogeneity and the variability of rock
6 properties, fracture properties, throughout the lower
7 lithophysal. It is a heterogeneous unit, so we're drilling a
8 series of boreholes, both off to the side of the drift, as
9 well as up and at low angles in the crown of the drift.

10 This is just a schematic to kind of show you that
11 systematically, we're drilling these boreholes. We're doing
12 it from the top of the lower lith, all the way down to the
13 first bulkhead right now, and we've conducted some
14 preliminary testing in some of those boreholes, and I'll talk
15 about those in the next slide.

16 One borehole in particular is a low angle borehole
17 drilled from the crown of the drift, and then it's packed off
18 at different zones, and the second area picked up the
19 distance from those packed zones to the crown of the drift,
20 so on the order of 1 1/2 to a little bit more than 4 meters.
21 We then do liquid release tests. We do air K tests in those
22 holes, and also do liquid release tests, so borehole seepage
23 measurements, both high rate tests as well as low rate tests.

24 Yvonne Tsang, the principal investigator from
25 Lawrence Berkeley for these tests, shows the set-up in the

1 cross-drift, the gas cylinders for air injection, and the
2 data collection system. And, again, she's working here on a
3 set-up that's set up in a borehole that's drilled from the
4 crown at an angle off in that direction.

5 I showed part of this diagram at the last meeting.
6 This is an update on the air permeability measurements that
7 we've been getting in Niche 5, and also some preliminary
8 stuff from the systematic work that I'm discussing right now.
9 This is a plot log of permeability, air permeability versus
10 basically location. For Niches 1 through 4 in the ESF, you
11 saw a mean air K for three different boreholes on the order
12 of a little less than 10^{-13} in meters squared,
13 and a range over about two orders of magnitude. The results
14 from Niche 5 in the cross-drift suggest that the air
15 permeabilities are greater by as much as an order of
16 magnitude, which still show a significant range.

17 Very preliminary results from one of the boreholes
18 in the systematic work suggests again the lower lith seems to
19 exhibit relatively high air permeabilities, relative to what
20 we saw in the middle non-lithophysal in the ESF, a much
21 smaller range, but that's a very limited dataset at this
22 point, bearing out these higher permeabilities that were seen
23 in the lower lith versus the middle non-lith.

24 Bulkhead. Again, we bulkheaded off the back half
25 of the cross-drift, no ventilation, looking for drips

1 basically, looking for seepage, looking for return of the
2 rock to ambient conditions, rewetting.

3 If you remember, there was condensation observed
4 back earlier this calendar year, and we attributed a lot of
5 that to the influence of the tunnel boring machine still
6 being under power, and it was producing a thermal gradient.
7 So we've gone in and put a third bulkhead with insulation
8 just behind the tunnel boring machine to try to minimize
9 those impacts. We've also rewired the lights so that we can
10 turn the lights off while we're not in there, which was
11 another contribution of heat. And we've also installed
12 additional instrumentation. The USGS has put in additional
13 temperature sensors. We're looking at wind speed. And also
14 we've got drip cloths installed at certain locations where we
15 think we might see drips. But as of right now, there's still
16 no apparent evidence of any seepage into the back half of the
17 cross-drift.

18 Moving out of the cross-drift in the repository
19 horizon to the bottom of the Topopah, the Calico Hills,
20 transport in the unsaturated zone below the potential
21 repository. As you recall, we're doing an unsaturated zone
22 transport test at the Busted Butte facility, which is
23 actually southeast of Yucca Mountain, exposed at Busted
24 Butte. We have a shallow excavation portal where we've
25 exposed the bottom of the Topopah Springs and the top of the

1 Calico Hills formation, and we're doing unsaturated transport
2 tests.

3 Purpose is to evaluate the influence of
4 heterogeneities, look at fracture/matrix interactions, and
5 interactions, permeability contrasts across lithologic
6 contacts, consider colloid migration in the unsaturated zone.
7 Scale or laboratory sorption measurements to field scale,
8 calibrate and validate the UZ flow and transport model, and
9 again, get at scaling issues.

10 I'll show another diagram that gives more detail of
11 the test block, so I won't dwell on it in this particular
12 diagram.

13 Reminder, the test was broken up into two phases.
14 I'll focus today on Phase II. But this just gives you an
15 idea of the suite of tracers that we're using in the
16 transport tests. Phase I, we used a whole series of
17 conservative tracers, included fluorescent dye, also
18 microspheres for colloid analogs, and as well as lithium
19 bromide as a reactive tracer.

20 For Phase II, we added these tracers as well, some
21 of the transition metals meant to be analoged for some of the
22 radionuclides from our perspective.

23 I'm going to talk again about Phase II today. This
24 is a more detailed diagram of the test block. The main adit
25 comes down here. The test alcove breaks off to the right-

1 hand side. You're looking at three units, the upper
2 fractured vitrophere, which is the basal part of the Topopah
3 Springs, an unfractured vitrophere at the bottom of the
4 lithologic Topopah Springs, which is part of the hydrologic
5 Calico Hills, and then the true bedded Calico Hills. So
6 we're looking at hydrologic Calico Hills in these two units,
7 and hydrologic Topopah Springs in the upper unit, this being
8 fractured, this being relatively unfractured, and this being
9 a bedded tuff, bedded Calico Hills.

10 Phase I, you've heard about in previous meetings,
11 so I won't dwell on Phase I. I'm going to give you an update
12 on where we're at with Phase II. Phase II is this larger
13 test block here. We have a series, two planes of injection
14 holes, one upper plane and one lower plane, and some of the
15 basic statistics on the injection rates in the different
16 holes are shown here in this box. Then we also have a plane
17 coming off the main adit of collection boreholes, two planes
18 of those as well, one for the upper injection and one for the
19 lower injection.

20 We're doing geophysics, so some of the symbols show
21 where some of the--all these collection holes have liner
22 systems where we can pull the liners periodically, collect
23 collection pads and analyze those in the laboratory. Those
24 holes are also used for running radar and neutron logging for
25 looking at movement of the moisture front. Each of the

1 injection holes has on the order of ten injection points per
2 borehole.

3 What I'm going to do is I'm going to get fancy and
4 go multi-media on you here. Just as I'm going through some
5 of the results, it's hopefully clear, I'll leave this diagram
6 up so that you can refer to the borehole numbers as I'm going
7 through.

8 Phase II is ongoing. It's been running for almost
9 two years, and we'll run through the fiscal year. So far,
10 we've collected nearly 15,000 pads, well over that by now.
11 Each borehole is harvested for its pads every other week, on
12 the order of every other week. So we're collecting a huge
13 amount of pads. Of those pads we collect, we take a subset
14 of those and do analyses of the conservative tracers, as well
15 as looking for reactive tracers. And then as I mentioned,
16 we're doing multiple geophysical logging runs, and that's to
17 get at the movement of the moisture front, and also helps
18 guide us is where we're pulling pads at different times
19 during the test.

20 We've seen breakthrough of non-reactive tracers at
21 all of the boreholes except for 10, 11 and 47. So all the
22 boreholes have really seen breakthrough of non-reactive
23 tracers, conservative tracers. Lithium is one of our key
24 reactive tracers. We've seen breakthrough of lithium at
25 several boreholes. But as of right now, we've seen no

1 breakthrough of any of the transition metals.

2 We're collecting a lot of data on pads, looking for
3 travel of the tracers, and we're also doing some test scale
4 modeling that's used in conjunction with the site scale
5 modeling for confidence building validation exercises.

6 The test scale modeling that's been done to date
7 for Phase II involves three hydrologic layers, with no
8 faults, and right now, they're really concentrating on trying
9 to match the conservative tracer results, ongoing modeling,
10 which I won't talk about today, but we're starting to look at
11 the reactive tracer results. But, again, we've really only
12 seen lithium breakthrough. We haven't seen breakthrough of
13 the other reactive tracers. In general, the model shows a
14 good match of characteristics, and in some, it's actually a
15 very excellent quantitative match.

16 We could probably do a better job of having the
17 model match the measurements by simply incorporating even
18 more accurate geology and accounting for dispersion and
19 heterogeneity in the system, more than we have in this
20 relatively simpler modeling that we're doing today.

21 This is just an example of what we've done in terms
22 of predictions. What you're looking at here is concentration
23 normalized, initial concentration versus measured
24 concentration versus distance along a given borehole. This
25 is for Borehole 16, which is this borehole up here. And what

1 you're seeing is a function of time. These are four
2 different time slices, earliest, progressing to most recent.
3 And you can see in the solid, is the actual measurements,
4 and I believe in--no, excuse me, the solid is actually the
5 simulation, and the dotted line are the actual measurements.

6 So in terms of accounting for conservative tracer
7 porous flow, we do a nice job of matching the observations
8 for the conservative tracers.

9 Switching now to Nye County, work we're doing
10 cooperatively with Nye County. Nye County's Early Warning
11 Drilling Program, we've heard that discussed a lot this
12 morning in the context of Nick's passing. This is just a
13 reminder that the project is working cooperatively with Nye
14 County. We are collecting data from the boreholes that Nye
15 County is drilling, and trying to get as much information as
16 we can as well out of this program.

17 Some of the data that we're using that we're
18 collecting, and also using that Nye County is collecting for
19 the SZ flow and transport model is listed here in bullets.
20 I'm going to focus today on where we're headed with the
21 alluvial testing complex, where Nye County has drilled a well
22 and plans to drill additional wells, where the project will
23 conduct tracer testing in the alluvium in the saturated zones
24 downgradient of Yucca Mountain.

25 The borehole I'll be referring to is right here,

1 19D. It sits just off the edge, just southwest of the Nevada
2 Test Site, and that well is completed and there's some single
3 hole testing ongoing that I'll present some preliminary
4 results from.

5 Again, Nye County has completed drilling 19D/D1.
6 There was alluvium from the ground surface down to just over
7 800 feet. Static water level was at about 360 feet. The
8 borehole also penetrated volcanic tuffs over about 400 feet,
9 and then was terminated in a section of tertiary sedimentary
10 rocks. That was one of the criteria that we had for this
11 borehole to be the likely borehole to be the start of the
12 multi-hole complex that we call the alluvial tracer complex.

13 Nye County has done some flow surveys, and also a
14 48-hour open-hole hydraulic test of the entire borehole. So
15 all three sections. It's not my place to talk about Nye
16 County's results, only in the context of what we found in our
17 pump tests, and I'll get to that.

18 We've conducted also an open-hole hydraulic test,
19 but here we only isolated the alluvium. So Nye County was
20 looking at the entire borehole. We looked at just the
21 alluvial aquifer. It was seven days of pumping, seven days
22 recovery. It just finished really a couple of weeks ago.

23 We were monitoring distant and nearby wells. It
24 pumped at 150 gallons per minute. There was 100 feet of
25 drawdown. I made a mistake in the parentheses here. That

1 "less" should be a "more." That's a big mistake. Our tests,
2 there was more drawdown than the Nye County open-hole test.
3 So when we isolated just the alluvial aquifer, this shouldn't
4 be a surprise, because they were seeing contribution from the
5 other sections. But there was more drawdown in our test by
6 almost an order of magnitude.

7 The plans from here, we have four intervals
8 identified in 19D where we're going to do isolated interval
9 hydraulic testing. That's in the process of being fielded.
10 That's going to take place in this late fiscal year. And
11 current plans for next year would be to take those isolated
12 intervals and also do tracer testing where we would inject
13 push-pull. We would inject the tracer suite, and then
14 immediately pump it back out to look for transport properties
15 of those same alluvial intervals. And this would be with
16 that single hole, and then the Phase III of Nye County has,
17 at least the current plans would have additional holes
18 drilled that would make up the multi-well complex. But
19 that's all planned. I should emphasize that's planned work.

20 Switching from the natural system to the
21 engineered, the pilot scale testing focusing on the work
22 that's being done at the Atlas facility in North Las Vegas,
23 here you've heard about this before, but we're evaluating
24 various EBS configurations and providing data in support of
25 the EBS process models.

1 I won't dwell on this slide in the interest of
2 time, but you've heard a lot about the test canisters testing
3 that we've done at the Atlas facility, pilot scale testing,
4 quarter scale testing. Canisters 1 through 3, you've heard
5 results of before. I'd remind you that the first canister
6 was a Richard's Barrier type setup. Second canister was a
7 backfill setup, straight sand backfill, with Canister 3 being
8 a drip shield with a mock waste package heated, with no
9 backfill. Results are kind of summarized in the bottom of
10 each of the slides.

11 I should say that Canister 3 with the drip shield,
12 the results of that, the drip shield effectively protected
13 the mock waste package from drips. We didn't see any
14 condensation underneath the drip shield.

15 Now, on to Canister 4. Canister 4 was a drip
16 shield with backfill. Again, similar conditions in terms of
17 the waste package surface, the mock waste package surface was
18 at 80 degree C. The surface of the test cell was maintained
19 at 60 degrees C., same as Canister 3. But here, we added
20 backfill, Overton sand. Similar results in the sense that
21 the drip shield still effectively shields the waste package
22 from drips, the mock waste package from drips, and it creates
23 an environment that is warmer. So we actually saw gradients
24 in relative humidity, and also we saw no drips again, no
25 condensation on the inner surface of the drip shield. That

1 test was completed in early May, and they're in the process
2 of comparing that to model results and preparing a report on
3 that.

4 Now moving into the planned arena, the ventilation
5 test. This is a test that's being planned for next year.
6 Again, it's being planned to provide data for validating our
7 preclosure ventilation model. As we talk a lot about design
8 and evolution of our design, our design is currently relying
9 on ventilation during preclosure. We have codes, models, and
10 models associated with that that we use to do that
11 ventilation modeling. This test is planned to validate that
12 model.

13 This is again over at North Las Vegas in the Atlas
14 facility. You'd have a simulated emplacement drift with
15 simulated waste packages, about 25. This would be about .35
16 kilowatts per meter of power output, and the surface of the
17 mock waste packages would be 200 degrees C. So what you're
18 looking at is a long pipe where we would have mock waste
19 packages, and we would ventilate that, and then compare that
20 to model predictions. This is the intake air velocity, and
21 we would maintain the maximum temperature of the crown at
22 boiling.

23 This is, again, planned work. The first phase,
24 which is in the process of being fielded, should start, if it
25 hasn't started today, it will start likely this week, would

1 be where we would heat the waste packages and intake ambient
2 air, and ventilate that long pipe with ambient air.

3 The next phase would be to use conditioned air. We
4 would recirculate the air and continually suck the air into
5 the intake. We would recirculate the air. These other two
6 phases are in the planning stages and may or may not happen
7 next year, depending upon budget constraints. But we would
8 wrap up whatever work we do do this year, and next year would
9 be wrapped up in fiscal year '01 into a nice package. But,
10 again, this is all planned. The next meeting, we should have
11 some preliminary results from Phase I.

12 Moving to waste package materials, this is going to
13 be very high level. This is just a reminder we have the
14 corrosion testing facility at Lawrence Livermore. There's
15 been long-term tests underway there for longer than two
16 years. We have a range of conditions, immersed G ponds,
17 water line, vapor corrosion. We're looking at general and
18 localized corrosion mechanisms over a wide range of
19 conditions.

20 We're looking at a lot of different materials,
21 corrosion allowance materials, corrosion resistant materials,
22 different geometries. You heard some discussion of
23 geometries in the previous presentation, U-bend specimens,
24 crevice specimens.

25 Our test conditions over a wide range of

1 temperature, ionic strength of the water, as well as pH, a
2 very wide range. We feel like we've bounded the conditions
3 that we would expect to see.

4 The long-term tests are evaluated for weight loss
5 as well as the presence of crevice or any other localized
6 corrosion. For things such as Alloy 22 and the titanium
7 alloys where we're looking at following corrosion processes
8 that tend to occur more slowly, or look for passive film
9 stability, we're using standard microscopic techniques and
10 also using some more detailed microscopy, Atomic Force
11 Microscopy to look at, in particular, passive film stability.
12 This is a program that you've heard about before. It's
13 ongoing and will continue.

14 So to wrap up, I gave you hopefully a pretty
15 comprehensive but very quick overview of where we're at with
16 the testing program in the ESF, the cross-drift, Busted
17 Butte, and then also in the engineered area at Atlas and also
18 in the corrosion test facility at Lawrence Livermore.

19 We continue to try to address the key processes in
20 the natural and engineered systems. And the data collected
21 and analyzed that results from the investigations that I'm
22 discussing will be reported in technical update documents.
23 So there was a lot of discussion about how these results will
24 be incorporated in SR. These results will be incorporated
25 into technical update documents that will be made available

1 as the different entities are reviewing the site
2 recommendation consideration report. And if we see things
3 that are considered impactful to what we've assumed in the
4 SRCR, we will do impact analyses and incorporate those
5 results into the SR as appropriate, all those results being
6 made available to the public.

7 PARIZEK: Thank you, Mark, for very concise information
8 as always. Questions from the Board? Debra Knopman?

9 KNOPMAN: Knopman, Board. Mark, would you comment on
10 one of the conclusions of the previous presentation about the
11 inadequacy or the incompleteness of the range of conditions
12 that you're looking at for the corrosion resistant waste
13 package material for the C-22?

14 PETERS: In terms of the water chemistry, et cetera?

15 KNOPMAN: Yes.

16 PETERS: Well, we feel constraining the environment, as
17 you well know, that's an area of large uncertainty, and I
18 won't sit here and say it's not. We feel like we were doing
19 experiments over a wide range of temperatures. There's
20 people who can elaborate in the audience, but 10, 100, 1000
21 times concentration of J-13, concentrated solutions. The
22 range of pH is--I mean, it's a very large range. We feel
23 like we've bounded the conditions.

24 KNOPMAN: What about the trace metal issue?

25 PETERS: I have some experience in analysis of lead.

1 You want to be real careful about looking at lead. Lead
2 analysis is highly subject to contamination. So we would
3 need to look very carefully at those analyses, particularly
4 the hole lock analyses, before we can really say much about
5 how much lead, for example, you might get in a drip that
6 would come into the drift. The project needs to address
7 those results, I don't deny that. But one needs to be very
8 careful. We need to really take a careful look at what the
9 trace metal concentration will be in the incoming water.

10 PARIZEK: Don Runnells?

11 LINGENFELTER: Al Lingenfelter at Lawrence Livermore.
12 The test water in the long-term corrosion facility was
13 prepared with de-ionized water. It's to mock the J-13. It
14 is not J-13 water. So it may or may not have lead
15 contamination in it. At a couple parts per billion, which is
16 what J-13 has, it could be that high, but we've never
17 analyzed it. We will after the question was raised, and we
18 do, I believe, have some drip tests of J-13 on the hot
19 surface which I will try to find those results today. But we
20 will also have some way of arguing what concentration we're
21 getting in build-up of the salts. So there are some tests
22 going that could answer some of these issues in the fairly
23 short-term.

24 PARIZEK: Don Runnells?

25 RUNNELLS: That answer and yours also, Mark, pretty well

1 covered what I wanted to ask. But let me just finish it off
2 by asking if you're analyzing the water from the drift scale
3 heater test for any of these trace metals that we heard about
4 earlier.

5 PETERS: Actually, Zell Peterman and I just talked about
6 that in the back of the room actually. We're going to go out
7 and thinking about trying to analyze for lead. We are not as
8 of yet. Because of the contamination problems, that's a hard
9 sample to collect, but we're going to look into trying to
10 analyze for lead, for example. We're looking at strontium
11 and uranium, because we're also doing isotopic analyses in
12 those systems. But we're going to think about analyzing for
13 some trace metals in the drift scale test waters to try to
14 hopefully address that.

15 PARIZEK: Priscilla Nelson?

16 NELSON: Nelson, Board. Mark, a couple of questions.
17 First, when do you think that Chlorine 36 test series will be
18 concluded?

19 PETERS: It will be next year.

20 NELSON: Next fiscal year?

21 PETERS: Yes.

22 NELSON: Next calendar year or this calendar year?

23 PETERS: I don't know exactly, to be honest with you.
24 It will certainly be next fiscal year. We should get a lot
25 of information by the end of the calendar year, but I

1 wouldn't want to commit that we'd have a report wrapped up
2 with a bow around it.

3 NELSON: Okay. And a separate question, when you showed
4 the contrast between the lith and the non-lith and the dye
5 test, was that expected, predicted by the models that you
6 have for those materials' performance?

7 PETERS: Well, let me answer it, I'll come at it maybe
8 not from the model perspective, but as people from the
9 geologic perspective are looking at the rock, the lower lith
10 has a lot of fractures that terminate in the lithophysae.
11 There were those who were surprised that the capillary to the
12 matrix was so strong in the lower lith. So I would say that
13 it was probably a surprise to some extent, the strength of
14 the capillary forces in the lower lith. But the nature of
15 the fracturing would suggest that you would get--the middle
16 non-lith has longer throughgoing fractures, so you'd expect
17 there to be longer pathways than you'd see in the lower
18 lithophysal.

19 NELSON: Okay. Let me just follow up on that because my
20 understanding of the idea of a capillary barrier would be
21 that the capillary barrier would actually act against such
22 strong forces that bring water in the capillaries to an
23 opening such as the lithophysae. It would deflect water from
24 moving towards an opening such as the tunnel on a larger
25 scale. So I'm wondering about the water moving through the

1 pores capillarity going to the lithophysae. Is that
2 inconsistent in your mind relative to the fact that you
3 expect that capillary area to shed water or deflect water on
4 the openings?

5 PETERS: I'm probably not the right guy to answer that,
6 to be honest with you.

7 NELSON: Okay. Talk to me about that.

8 PARIZEK: Paul Craig? We'll probably get ahold of Bo
9 Bodvarsson to understand the physics of this. Paul Craig?

10 CRAIG: Craig, Board. Chlorine 36, at the last Board
11 meeting, it was clear that the two groups were not talking to
12 each other very much. Are they now talking to each other?
13 If so, are there any new ideas as to what's going on? And if
14 they're not talking to each other, why not?

15 PETERS: They're talking to each other. The answer to
16 your first question is yes, they are. We're making sure
17 that's happening.

18 Like I said, they're going to do a series of
19 experiments on that reference sample to get at leaching
20 techniques. We think it's in the preparation in the
21 laboratory, the leaching, so Livermore and Los Alamos are
22 working with the Survey to come together on how to go about
23 doing those leaching experiments. Once we do that, then
24 we'll be able to say a lot more. But we're honing in on the
25 laboratory preparation of the samples as opposed to how they

1 were taken in the field. There's no additional data really
2 that sheds any new light than what you saw in June. There's
3 still a difference.

4 CRAIG: And no new ideas?

5 PETERS: Well, again, we're focusing in on the leaching.
6 I mean, it probably has to do with how much rock chloride--
7 it might have to do with how much rock chloride you're
8 releasing that will tend to dilute the Chlorine 36.

9 PARIZEK: Alberto?

10 SAGÜÉS: Yes, thank you. I'm looking at the last couple
11 of experiments, I guess, and I'm looking at the engineered
12 barrier system testing of waste package materials. Do I
13 understand that most of the testing or research is now
14 limited to what has been done with the immersion, like for
15 example, are there additional experiments being conducted on
16 the stress corrosion cracking?

17 PETERS: Yes, there are. There are additional
18 experiments on stress corrosion cracking and other areas. I
19 probably should have added bullets to that effect. But
20 you'll here, I think, even more about that. Pasu will talk
21 quite a bit about the basis for the waste package drip shield
22 degradation models this afternoon, and you'll hear probably
23 more about that data in his presentation. That is ongoing as
24 well.

25 SAGÜÉS: I see. Is any work planned on investigating

1 fundamental issues of stability of passivity on the alloys
2 considered for the waste package?

3 PETERS: Yes, that gets at I believe the Atomic Force
4 Microscopy work where they're looking at passive film.

5 SAGÜÉS: That's examination of the cupons from
6 passivity. But what I'm saying is is there any investigation
7 aimed to address fundamental issues? Because that's simply
8 characterization of microstructure.

9 PETERS: Al can speak to it.

10 LINGENFELTER: Al Lingenfelter, Lawrence Livermore.
11 There's, let's say, a proposal dependent on funding to look
12 at the passive film stability. We have Larry Kaufman from
13 MIT lined up to put together a theoretical diagram based on
14 thermodynamic calculations, and we also would hope to be able
15 to analyze the films at different points in the voltrometry
16 curve, and in that way, see if we can get experimental data
17 that has any agreement with the theoretical.

18 We also have the Josephson on the list, and it,
19 again, all of this is dependent on where the funding ends up.
20 There are a whole suite of activities to look at phase
21 stability and stress corrosion cracking, as Mark has said.

22 SAGÜÉS: But those are planned or proposed, but not
23 necessarily supported?

24 LINGENFELTER: That's currently correct, yes. But this
25 process is ongoing. We're in the middle of the budget

1 process. So for me to argue one way or the other would be
2 silly.

3 SAGÜÉS: I see. But activities which are budgeted are
4 the continuation of the long-term, the coupon tests; is that
5 correct?

6 LINGENFELTER: We have no plans to discontinue the long-
7 term facility tests; that's correct. They will continue.

8 SAGÜÉS: Those are supported? Those are funded?

9 LINGENFELTER: Yes.

10 SAGÜÉS: Okay. All right.

11 PARIZEK: Debra Knopman, Board.

12 KNOPMAN: Mark, based on the results so far with the
13 tests in the ECRB, Busted Butte, the drift scale heater test,
14 how would you order your priorities if for some reason you
15 had to cut back on some of this testing? What seems to you
16 the most promising? What has the biggest bang for the buck
17 in terms of additional scientific insight that will
18 measurably affect performance among all the seepage tests,
19 all of these activities that are currently going on?

20 PETERS: This is Mark Peters. I would say that the
21 hydrologic characterization work in the lower lith and the
22 cross-drift, in my opinion, is the most important. The work
23 that's ongoing in there that we're just finishing up
24 construction on, that would be where I would say the bang for
25 the buck is.

1 COHON: It sure is lucky that they have a cross-drift.

2 PETERS: That's just for the natural system, Debra.

3 KNOPMAN: Right. Do you feel like you're into
4 diminishing returns in terms of the Busted Butte results at
5 this point?

6 PETERS: I think, yeah, we've learned, we've really
7 validated a lot of assumptions that we had already made about
8 flow in the Calico Hills. So, I mean, we're really looking
9 to wrap that test up. We've done some good model validation
10 there, but that test I think needs to be wrapped up, and we
11 need to focus more on the cross-drift.

12 PARIZEK: That side-bar remark was from Chairman Cohon.

13 Mark, this is Parizek, Board, there were no drips
14 observed when you were putting in the third bulkhead;
15 correct?

16 PETERS: We haven't seen any evidence of any drips
17 since, really since I talked to you all in May, and you went
18 in there in May. We had them closed back up for on the order
19 of close to two months, and we still haven't seen any
20 evidence of drips.

21 PARIZEK: And Bo Bodvarsson will explain this wicking
22 effect, how water goes from small openings to big openings,
23 we hope, the physics of it, sometime in the day?

24 PETERS: He's definitely the right guy.

25 PARIZEK: Now, in terms of Busted Butte colloid

1 experiments, you have 15,000 pads collected.

2 PETERS: Yes.

3 PARIZEK: Part of that was to look for colloids that you
4 put in in terms of microspheres to see if they in fact move
5 through the Calico Hills. How is that coming along? Because
6 obviously colloid migration is critical in your modeling,
7 it's been mentioned a number of places.

8 PETERS: Right.

9 PARIZEK: And have you found microspheres?

10 PETERS: We were having some problems with actually
11 convincing ourselves that we were really analyzing colloids
12 or not on the pads. So the Los Alamos folks are in the
13 process of doing a series of calibration experiments.
14 They've done some saturated column experiments with pads, and
15 they've convinced themselves that they can collect colloids
16 and analyze them there, and they're finishing up on saturate
17 column experiments. Those, if successful, and they look
18 good, we think we can then go take some of those pads and
19 then start to analyze the colloids.

20 PARIZEK: That's an important part of the Busted Butte
21 experiment still ongoing and needs critical analysis?

22 PETERS: That continues to be the one performance
23 assessment, one of the first things they'll always say to us,
24 is get at the colloids if you can. So we've spent a lot of
25 effort on trying to get that protocol in place.

1 PARIZEK: Questions from Board advisors?

2 KESSLER: John Kessler, EPRI. On the tritium
3 breakthrough tests, you didn't mention whether that was an
4 expected result. Given that there may be Chlorine 36 coming
5 through, but not tritium, is that something that was
6 expected? What's the mechanism?

7 PETERS: Well, remember the way tritium is analyzed.
8 Let's start with Chlorine 36. Chlorine 36, you're leaching
9 the rock and really dissolving stuff, evaporated chloride
10 from past water flow. Tritium, they're actually using a
11 centrifuge and extracting water. It's probably mainly matrix
12 water. So there could be disequilibrium between the
13 fractures and the matrix and you're just not seeing it. So
14 it's still early to be able to tell really what that means,
15 but we were intending to look for other evidence of bomb-
16 pulse to try to validate again the occurrence of bomb-pulse.
17 And taken at face value, you don't see any evidence.

18 PARIZEK: Questions from staff?

19 (No response.)

20 PARIZEK: Okay, that's it, Mark, thank you so much.
21 We've run deep into the next topic, volcanism and volcanic
22 hazards by Frank Perry and Kevin Coppersmith. I won't
23 introduce them because I think we really are tight. We'll
24 run late for lunch, and we'll nevertheless cover their
25 presentation before lunch.

1 PERRY: Good morning. I'm assuming you can hear okay.

2 I'm going to give a broad overview of the volcanics
3 around Yucca Mountain, and also the history of volcanism
4 studies which have gone on for 15 or 20 plus years, depending
5 exactly on how you count.

6 It's interesting to be here. The last time I
7 presented to the Board was early 1994, so it's been a long
8 time, and the only familiar faces are Bill Nelson, Leon
9 Reiter. And as an aside, about the time volcanism studies
10 were beginning, Rod Ewing was my mineralogy professor.

11 So the purpose is, again, to provide an overview of
12 the history and the history of the studies, and also to
13 provide a sense of the type of site characterization
14 information and data that was considered by an expert
15 elicitation during the PVHA. And this talk will be against
16 the background of the PVHA, the probabilistic volcanic hazard
17 analysis, which is held in 1996 in an effort to quantify the
18 probability of volcanoes respecting the site and what the
19 uncertainty was. So I'll be talking against that background.

20 Studying of volcanism in the immediate repository
21 site, there's been a history of about 4 million years of
22 volcanism within about 20 kilometers of the site. And the
23 quaternary, the last million years or so, there's been six
24 volcanoes shown here in red. The recurrence interval of
25 volcanic episodes, volcanoes of similar age, is about 300,000

1 years. So volcanism as an event doesn't occur that
2 frequently, but it does occur.

3 The youngest volcano we've been able to establish
4 in the last few years is dated at about 75,000 years pretty
5 reliably.

6 The gist of the problem comes down to two things.
7 One, what's the probability of disruption. And so really we
8 want to know, given that somewhere in this area other
9 repository, a future volcano will form, what's the
10 probability that the volcano, where the associated dike
11 system that feeds the volcano and has a larger area extent
12 will actually impact the repository.

13 The second aspect is given that that happens, what
14 are the consequences. So I'll talk about this framework.
15 Kevin Coppersmith after me will talk about the process of
16 PVHA, how the probability was actually determined. And then
17 tomorrow, Kathy Gaither will talk about some of the aspects
18 of consequences and why some of these volcanism issues have
19 re-emerged through performance assessment.

20 The timeline, very briefly, volcanism studies began
21 in 1978 as a joint study between Los Alamos and the USGS. It
22 concentrated at that time on regional characterization of
23 basaltic volcanism, looking very broadly several hundred
24 kilometers out to get a picture of the broad patterns of
25 volcanism, the time of volcanism. And then during that time,

1 early on, Bruce Kerr of Los Alamos began developing a
2 probabilistic approach to hazard analysis. Given that these
3 are infrequent, somewhat random events, he felt that that was
4 the best approach to look at this problem.

5 Phase 2 began in about 1987. At that time, we
6 began focusing down to the immediate Yucca Mountain area, and
7 on the last 5 million years of volcanism, the post-Miocene.
8 Consequence studies began at Los Alamos during that time to
9 look at the effects of volcanism should the repository be
10 impacted. We began to look at how we could reduce
11 uncertainty, particularly in the age of the youngest volcanic
12 center, because there's a lot of interest. There was some
13 hypotheses that this volcano could be as young as Holocene,
14 which had sort of a political impact on looking at volcanism
15 as an issue. And we applied multiple geochronology methods.

16 And in the probability arena, Bruce Kerr continued
17 to develop alternative probability models and to look at the
18 sensitivity of the results as a function of different
19 approaches to probability. And then in 1996, the program
20 kind of culminated with the year and a half process of the
21 PVHA expert elicitation.

22 Post-PVHA, in the last two or three years, DOE has
23 carried out some sensitivity analyses of PVHA results in
24 light of new data that's come in, and I'll allude to that in
25 a few minutes, and new interpretations. And in the last

1 year, we've been supporting analysis and model reports which
2 feed into the disruptive events PMR, which Kathy will talk
3 about tomorrow.

4 Sort of stepping back to a little bit more regional
5 view, this is really the volcanic system that the PVHA
6 experts considered when they were estimating the probability
7 of disruption. Basically, it goes out from the repository
8 about 50 kilometers and it includes all the volcanism known,
9 which has occurred in the last 5 million years. These
10 numbers are the age of particular volcanic centers. The
11 quaternary, the youngest centers, are shown in red, which is
12 in alignment southwest and north of the repository.

13 Silicic volcanism hasn't been an issue. It hasn't
14 occurred since 7 or 8 million years ago. And in all of these
15 probability models, we really rely on the past patterns of
16 basaltic volcanism as the basis for estimating the future
17 probability of disruption.

18 The volcanic record includes the presence shown
19 here in blue of inferred and known buried basalt centers.
20 These were first detected by aeromagnetic techniques and
21 believed to be buried basalts. One of these was drilled
22 several years ago and dated at about 3.8 million years ago,
23 which is very similar to this other episode, maybe the same
24 age and just an extension of that episode. But several of
25 these anomalies were known at the time of PVHA, including one

1 up here, and were considered by the experts. They were
2 counted as events using alternative interpretations. Some
3 counted them, weighed them more than others. But they were
4 considered.

5 There was also a hidden event factor in the PVHA
6 that beyond the known buried events, a factor generally of 20
7 to 50 per cent was put in to account for events that we
8 didn't know about yet. Since the PVHA, the NRC has done some
9 work with ground magnetic surveys based on aeromag regional
10 surveys, but has focused down on a few that look most likely
11 to be basalt, and these three points here in black are sites
12 where it's a pretty good interpretation that these are
13 additional buried basalts, and these are published in Connard
14 2000 just recently.

15 Sort of our feeling is that this adds some new
16 information. It doesn't really change the location of where
17 the most recent volcanism has occurred, and the addition of a
18 few buried anomalies in this area, was taken into account in
19 PVHA because of this hidden event factor of 20 to 50 per
20 cent.

21 Real briefly, this is just a quick look at the
22 whole history of volcanism in the region, and the only point
23 is that back in the middle Miocene from about 10 to 15
24 million years ago, there were enormous volumes of silicit
25 eruptions, and this of course is the source of the tuff that

1 the site sits in. But by about 7 or 8 million years ago, in
2 a regional sense, this had all ended. Generally, there's a
3 fundamental shift about that time to much lower volumes of
4 basaltic volcanism. I should explain that these spheroids
5 are--the radius is proportional to the volume. So it's just
6 another way of getting at volume scale, and this is a log
7 scale. So you had hundreds to thousands of cubic kilometer
8 eruptions early, and then once the transition to the south,
9 you're on the order of a tenth of a cubic kilometer, up to a
10 maximum of about 10 cubic kilometers.

11 And in the last 5 million years, the period of real
12 concern for hazard analysis, the Pliocene volumes were
13 systematically larger, 1 to 3 cubic kilometers, and in the
14 quaternary, the volumes have become very small, on the order
15 of a tenth of a cubic kilometer. So volume has decreased
16 through time, but the recurrence rate has probably increased
17 in the last million years with more frequent episodes. But
18 these are very small volcanoes.

19 I don't have a photo of these type of volcanoes. I
20 assume most of you have seen these from the top of Yucca
21 Mountain. But they're small volumes. In terms of volcanoes
22 on the earth, these are the smallest type of volcano really.
23 They generally erupt one time, and then never erupt again.
24 They're monogenetic.

25 Two basic types of data that have to be considered

1 to do a hazard analysis are the timing of volcanism and the
2 spatial location, spatial controls. Timing was done through
3 sort of standard argon techniques. Looking at the past 5
4 million years, the thing that really came out of that is
5 there's probably six discrete episodes of volcanism during
6 the last 5 million years, with some noise and some
7 uncertainty.

8 The next slide will be just these points, which are
9 the million year centers in Crater Flat to the west of Yucca
10 Mountain. And in detail, if we look at those points, given
11 the uncertainty of the data, it could be interpreted
12 different ways, and the experts did look at alternative
13 interpretations. The central of this model is that they're
14 all a million years old, and it was basically a single event.
15 But the data allows--these are also arranged from north to
16 south, the northern most center to the southern most center
17 of the four centers. There may be a systematic decrease in
18 age as you go south. So this may be one event, or it may be
19 several events, and this is the type of uncertainty that ran
20 all through the PVHA. Almost any parameter was uncertain and
21 had to be addressed by alternative interpretations.

22 This is one example of being able to reduce
23 uncertainty. This is dating the youngest volcano. When the
24 program started in the late Seventies, it was believed to be
25 about 300,000 years old, the potassium argon days. By the

1 early 1990s, using argon to argon, the interpretation was
2 that it was about 140,000 years old, but the uncertainty was
3 fairly large. By the mid Nineties, sort of a wrap-up of
4 these studies, we were able to, using multiple techniques and
5 just advancements in techniques, able to reduce the
6 uncertainty quite a bit, and pretty confidently say that the
7 youngest volcano was 70 to 80,000 years old.

8 The other is the spatial issue, what does the past
9 location of volcanoes look like and how does that influence
10 the understanding of probability of where future volcanism
11 would occur. Most of these models have some aspect of
12 structural thinking built in. The experts and other people
13 have done this, have considered what type of spatial controls
14 and tectonic controls exist, either implicitly or explicitly.

15 This is an example of kind of the current
16 understanding of the tectonic setting of Yucca Mountain. It
17 lies within this structural domain, the Crater Flat
18 structural domain. And Yucca Mountain lies within the same
19 domain as most of the volcanoes of interest, but it appears,
20 and there's a consensus among people, structural geologists
21 who have been looking at this domain, that different portions
22 of the domain have different extension histories. The most
23 significant thing being that the western and northern part of
24 the domain, the Highlands where Yucca Mountain is a part of,
25 is less extended, and the basin part of the domain, the

1 Crater Flat topographic basin where the basalts occur appears
2 to have a history of greater extension. And this is shown by
3 things such as fault offset, basin subsidence, cumulative
4 fault throw, those type of things, topography.

5 Geophysical studies, also we enforce this. This is
6 from Brocher, 1998, the seismic reflection survey across
7 Crater Flat. And the western part of the basin where the
8 volcanoes occur is deeper and, hence, more extended.

9 The way a lot of the experts addressed the spatial
10 issue of volcanism was to draw source zones, and these are an
11 example of different source zones by four different experts
12 of the ten experts. The primary method that they employed to
13 draw these source zones is really to look at the pattern of
14 past volcanism. But also in their thinking was is there any
15 conflict with the structural understanding of the basin. So
16 kind of the position we have now four years after the PVHA is
17 that these zones are certainly consistent with the patterns
18 of past volcanism, and they're also consistent with our
19 current understanding of the Crater Flat domain tectonics.

20 So one question is why do we have, in '96, why do
21 we have an expert elicitation after 15 plus years of intense
22 data collection and analysis. Previous to this, going back
23 to 1980, the DOE approach had been to emphasize a suite of
24 permissible alternative probability models, but all equally
25 weighted with no attempt at discriminating between models.

1 We just really wanted to look at the range of possible
2 models.

3 Over the years, there was disagreement among
4 scientists over the specific modeling methods to model the
5 probability, and the parameters that went into these models,
6 which created difficulty in reaching resolution on these
7 issues.

8 The reasons for this, what contributed I think is,
9 one, a sparse record of volcanism. There's not a lot of data
10 to base these estimates on. And an incomplete understanding
11 of both the magmatic and tectonic process which control
12 volcanism, and both of these things tended to fuel
13 disagreements over the years.

14 So one of the reasons the PVHA was convened was to
15 provide an independent assessment of the probability of
16 volcanic disruption. And it was also important that the
17 process gave us a good handle on the uncertainty of the
18 probability models, and the uncertainty in the parameter
19 values that were used in these models.

20 Just one example of parameter uncertainty is dike
21 length. Dike length, as it increases, generally increases
22 the probability of an intersection, because there's more
23 likelihood of hitting the repository. But if you looked,
24 each expert had an estimate of what the most likely dike
25 length was, the 90th percentile dike length. If you

1 aggregated that across the whole panel, the mean dike length
2 was about 4 kilometers, and the 95th percentile dike length
3 about 10 kilometers. So these are the type of inputs that
4 went into the probability models

5 The last slide, which will lead into Kevin's talk
6 on the process of the PVHA, the bottom panel is the results
7 of the PVHA. This is the probability distribution for the
8 annual probability of intersection, and it centers around 10
9 to the minus 8 as a mean value, and the 95th percentile span
10 about two orders of magnitude.

11 And a point I really want to make is that the '96
12 PVHA was not done in isolation. There were many estimates
13 before that, and there's been estimates since. The very
14 earliest estimates were done in 1980. A series of estimates
15 done, several since then, both by the state shown here in
16 blue, but they had other publications before 1998, and the
17 NRC shown here in pink, and over this 20 years of different
18 probability estimates, the range is about two orders of
19 magnitude. My sense is that there's pretty remarkable
20 agreement over this 20 year period, and that the PVHA
21 elicitation, incorporating the uncertainty, did a good job of
22 capturing this uncertainty and gave us something to really
23 work with in terms of consequent studies.

24 But I think, you know, these other studies have
25 kind of shown the robustness of the number and the PVHA

1 really confirmed that, that these estimates are fairly
2 robust.

3 PARIZEK: I think we'll perhaps take questions after
4 Kevin's presentation as well, combine the two. Does that
5 make sense? And I'll remind you that there will be a public
6 comment period presided over by Chairman Cohon after this
7 presentation. So any of the concerns probably should stay
8 put.

9 COPPERSMITH: Thank you very much. I appreciate the
10 opportunity to talk about the probabilistic volcanic hazard
11 analysis again. The last time I talked about it I think was
12 give years ago, maybe four years ago. We had an opportunity
13 to go into a lot of detail at that time of the nature of the
14 study, the experts that were involved and interpretations
15 that were made. This will be an opportunity to give more of
16 an overview of the project itself, and I want to focus on
17 some of the details of the process that were followed as we
18 go through.

19 Again, I want to provide an overview. I want to
20 talk about the process and the rationale, some of the key
21 steps, example evaluations and the results and uncertainties,
22 and will end with the probability distribution that Frank
23 showed at the end, but I wanted to dissect it a little bit
24 differently and talk about some of the components of
25 uncertainties.

1 The purpose of the study at that time was to
2 develop a defensible assessment of the hazard at Yucca
3 Mountain, with particular emphasis on the quantification of
4 uncertainty. The environment, in terms of contention, and
5 Frank talked a little bit about volcanologists, I guess there
6 are a few in the room, tend to be a contentious bunch, and
7 the process of making interpretations and discussing those
8 interpretations is a wonder to facilitate. But it also means
9 that data related to volcanism or volcanic hazard in
10 particular is not unique. It's subject to interpretation,
11 and this was an opportunity to put together the data that had
12 been collected over a long period of time, to put that in
13 front of hazard analysts and give them an opportunity to
14 develop their interpretations. That data and that
15 information provided a strong basis for uncertainty
16 quantification.

17 One thing that Frank alluded to that's kind of
18 ironic is the fact that there's relatively low levels of
19 volcanism in the area. If we're in the middle of a large
20 volcanic field with a lot of volcanoes, the hazard analysis
21 would probably be a little bit easier to do. There may be
22 other problems associated with that, but the hazard analysis
23 would be easier to do.

24 The expert elicitation allows for a quantitative
25 assessment and incorporation of alternative models and

1 parameter values. I would contend that all interpretations
2 that we'll hear about today and tomorrow involve expert
3 judgment. This expert elicitation process allows us to
4 formalize the eliciting of the information and quantify the
5 uncertainties associated with it. And as we'll see, there's
6 alternative models as well as parameter values that go into
7 those interpretations.

8 At the time the elicitation was done, we were
9 following all the applicable guidance for explicitly
10 incorporating expert judgment, the NRC Branch Technical
11 Position. At the same time, a large study sponsored by DOE,
12 NRC and EPRI had come out on the use of expert judgment, and
13 formal expert elicitation process, the so-called Shack Study,
14 and all of those procedures and processes were followed
15 during the course of the PVHA.

16 The product of the PVHA is a probability
17 distribution of the annual frequency of intersection of a
18 basaltic dike with the repository footprint. The probability
19 distribution, I'll get back to that in a minute. Its
20 application goes on from there. The application then becomes
21 conditional that you have some part of the dike intersect the
22 repository footprint, and you look at the consequences of
23 that, consequences in terms of intrusive consequences or
24 extrusive consequences, and so on. And those will be
25 discussed by Kathy Gaither in the context of the process

1 model report tomorrow.

2 So the steps in the probabilistic volcanic hazard
3 analysis are typical of formal expert elicitations or process
4 for selecting the experts on the basis of their expertise and
5 applicability to this particular problem. There is a
6 candidate, a pool of candidates, over 70, and a process of
7 winnowing those down occurred.

8 Identifying the technical issues is key to this
9 type of elicitation. Here, we needed to focus on the issues
10 that need to be developed, need to be actually discussed, the
11 applicable datasets, the uncertainties in those datasets.
12 These discussions of issues and alternative interpretations
13 occurred in a series of workshops. These are interactive
14 workshops that allow for discussion. All of the project
15 scientists and scientists from the state, the center, NRC
16 sponsored research, and so on, were presented to the expert
17 panel, as well as in a series of field trips. So they had an
18 opportunity to basically climb the learning curve in terms of
19 the information that was available.

20 Also, part of this process is one of interaction,
21 of people when we get into the later parts of the study,
22 preliminary interpretations by the panel members themselves
23 were presented, and they had an opportunity for their peers
24 to challenge their interpretation, to offer defense in their
25 uncertainty characterizations, and so on.

1 That interactive process is much preferable to an
2 independent expert analysis where you don't have the
3 interaction among the expert panel.

4 Field trips were held, as I said, to give an
5 opportunity to the recently gathered data, as well as the
6 history of investigations. The actual elicitations occurred
7 in a series of individual interviews, two day interviews with
8 each expert, followed by feedback. There were calculations
9 done to show the implications of their assessments, and they
10 had an opportunity to look at those implications and to make
11 changes.

12 We also had a feedback workshop that gave an
13 opportunity to see the implications and to challenge and
14 defend interpretations made by all members of the panel.

15 And, finally, documentation of the process and the
16 evaluations themselves.

17 This is the expert panel. I won't go through the
18 resumes of them all. But basically, it's a diverse set of
19 individuals who range from geochemists, geophysicists,
20 volcanologists, some with a lot of hazard experience, for
21 example. Alex McBirney has developed some of the procedures
22 for developing probabilistic hazard analysis for the IAEA,
23 and so on. Others, George Thompson, a geophysicist who would
24 focus on a lot of the potential field data, and so on.

25 All of these geologists tended to be well known in

1 their field, and focus on and were able to bring to bear a
2 lot of experience, and that experience from other locations
3 is key in making interpretations for the data that exists in
4 the Yucca Mountain area.

5 I should say this included people from within the
6 project, like Bruce Crowe, as well as those who had not
7 worked on Yucca Mountain at all beforehand.

8 The problem of hazard analysis or volcanic hazard
9 analysis is very typical for those that are familiar with
10 other types of analyses, like seismic hazard analysis.
11 There's two parts to the problem, a temporal part that deals
12 with the frequency of occurrence of volcanism in this case,
13 and a spatial part that deals with where volcanoes are likely
14 to occur in the future.

15 Some of the models that were considered in terms of
16 temporal models are simple homogeneous type models that deal
17 with essentially a memoryless type of system, to those that
18 are more complicated and non-homogeneous, those that deal
19 with a changing system, either a waxing or a waning system,
20 or one whose timing is controlled by the volume of past
21 eruptions. These types of temporal models were all
22 considered and in some cases incorporated.

23 The spatial aspect is very important in volcanic
24 hazard analysis, unlike for those who are familiar with other
25 types of hazard analyses, this is a very important component.

1 Homogeneous models and non-homogeneous models were
2 considered. The homogeneous models are ones, we've heard the
3 term source zone that Frank talked about. Basically, you
4 divide regions into areas that would have a different rate
5 density of occurrence of volcanism, and those areas, with
6 their own rate density, or locally homogeneous rates, are
7 called source zones.

8 The boundaries of those zones are defined in a
9 variety of ways based on tectonic information, or regions
10 that surround volcanism that has a certain geochemical
11 affinity or a certain age. The boundaries to those source
12 zones are uncertain in many cases, and the uncertainty was
13 handled through either alternative source configurations,
14 just different maps, those source zones, or through
15 uncertainty, explicit uncertainty in the source boundary that
16 could occur over a certain area or certain region. But it
17 was important and known that since we have local volcanoes in
18 the Crater Flat area that the nature of the spatial
19 configuration of Crater Flat versus Yucca Mountain would be
20 important and was focused on quite a bit in the study.

21 Non-homogeneous models, in terms of spatial models,
22 are also quite interesting. There's some of the parametric,
23 actually certain field shapes that have been invoked based on
24 experience at other volcanic fields, or nonparametric
25 approaches, smoothing, if you will, that invoke the spatial

1 stationarity concept that says that where you've had volcanic
2 centers is where you expect them to occur with some
3 uncertainty. And the smoothing of the spatial distribution
4 of past events--on the future distribution of events, and
5 naturally different functions are used and different
6 smoothing operators for that type of procedure.

7 These are some examples that Frank showed before of
8 different spatial configurations of source zones. I just
9 want to make the point that the uncertainties associated with
10 these was very important, whether or not, for example,
11 there's a hard boundary that separates the Crater Flat area
12 or source zones in the Crater Flat area from Yucca Mountain
13 is obviously an important issue from the standpoint of
14 volcanic hazard and the repository footprints as shown here.
15 That uncertainty was something that we tried hard to have
16 explicitly quantified in dealing with the experts.

17 But the issue here is also one there's larger
18 source zones around here, so the real difference is the rate
19 density, the number of expected events per year that would
20 occur within the source zone versus the rate density
21 elsewhere. There is a rate density. There's a finite
22 probability of occurrence per year of volcanic features of
23 volcanoes everywhere in these zones. It's simply a function
24 of where there are differences in rate. And for those that
25 are familiar with the seismic hazard issue, this obviously is

1 the most important component, that recurrence component.

2 Just some other examples of interpretations of
3 source zones.

4 I want to show, this is just a logic tree. In
5 fact, it's virtually impossible to read. Hopefully the hard
6 copy is a little bit better. The point here is that there is
7 uncertainty in the temporal models and the nature of source
8 zones, the spatial models that are used, which source zones
9 are actually used, and whether or not there are alternatives.
10 All of these components have incorporated quantified
11 uncertainties. The temporal model, for example, whether or
12 not we're going to use the homogeneous Poissonian type model
13 or one that takes into account waxing or waning, changing
14 processes as a function of time, both of those models could
15 be used by an individual expert and incorporated with
16 alternatives ways to express the degree of credibility of
17 those models.

18 And likewise, multiple interpretations of source
19 zone configurations like we talked about before could be
20 taken into account.

21 And important aspect over here has to do with the
22 nature of the event itself. Most of these processes,
23 volcanic hazard, exactly like seismic hazard, deals with
24 events first as a point in space, and then the issue is here
25 we actually have a process that is spatially distributed. A

1 dike itself has an orientation and a length that needs to be
2 taken into account, and that dike, orientation and dike
3 distribution were things that were independently elicited and
4 are incorporated into this. So that event definition itself
5 becomes important.

6 As an example, if an individual event starts out as
7 a point, or is treated as a point, it might look like this.
8 Variation or uncertainty in the dike orientation and its
9 length can allow for a finite probability of intersection of
10 these dikes with the repository footprint. So that
11 uncertainty was incorporated as well.

12 In fact, much of the contribution of volcanic
13 hazard to the site comes from the distribution of events in
14 the Crater Flat area and the potential for longer dikes to
15 intersect the repository.

16 So the outputs are the unconditional probability
17 distribution of the annual frequency of intersection. We'll
18 look at that in a minute. Also some conditional probability
19 distributions on the length and azimuth of an intersection
20 dike, and on the number of eruptive centers that might have
21 occurred along those dikes as a function of dike length
22 itself. There's also a marginal distribution on the length
23 of dike that would intersect the repository. These outputs
24 are outputs that are required for consequence analysis. You
25 need to know how much of a dike, if it does hit the

1 repository, how much would it hit and what would be the
2 orientation, given that it did. And this would then be
3 propagated into considerations of intrusive effects, eruptive
4 effects, and so on.

5 And finally, the probability distribution on the
6 annual frequency of intersection across all of the experts.
7 I can get into a lot of--we did a lot of dissection of
8 individual expert means and medians to see whether or not in
9 fact there was a broader distribution. It's interesting for
10 those who have looked at this before, the actual distribution
11 of medians and means is pretty comparable.

12 When we looked at the intra-expert versus expert
13 uncertainty, the contributions, in fact most of the
14 contribution comes from the within expert uncertainty, not
15 the so-called diversity component, which was also in
16 agreement with some previous studies that have been done, and
17 this type of thing.

18 But, again, we're looking at a range here, the mean
19 distribution is about 1.5 times 10 to the minus 8, a broad
20 range of interpretations. The chart, I have it as a chart in
21 here, and the diagram that Frank showed, some of the other
22 assessments that have been made. One example is the NRC has
23 suggested that a range of 10 to the minus 8 to 10 to the
24 minus 7 might be a reasonable range, and I think will have
25 some sensitivity analyses that show the results out at 10 to

1 the minus 7, but the mean estimate is just over 10 to the
2 minus 8, using this distribution.

3 And I'll stop there and take any questions.

4 PARIZEK: Thank you again for a clear presentation, as
5 always, Kevin.

6 Questions from the Board? This will be important
7 input for what's coming later in the program about doses.
8 Priscilla Nelson?

9 NELSON: Nelson, Board. Just what's probably a point of
10 clarification. There was a small pink area immediately west
11 of the repository footprint on your maps, and I'm not
12 familiar with what that might be. Can you tell me what that
13 might be?

14 COPPERSMITH: Do you want to talk about that? That's
15 the Solitario Canyon Dike.

16 PERRY: Yes, Frank Perry. That's the Solitario Canyon
17 Dike, which is about 11 million years old, and it's the, as
18 far as I know, the only basaltic volcanism that's occurred in
19 the block.

20 PARIZEK: Advisors to the Board?

21 MELSON: Kevin, I'm wondering, given the young
22 volcanism, how you feel about following geophysical
23 measurements in the future. Is this something that's going
24 to be buried with time or, for example, the EDM measurements,
25 the GPS deformation measurements. Do you feel this is worth

1 doing? I'll also address that to Frank.

2 COPPERSMITH: Well, let me first make it, as a hazard
3 analyst, an uncertainty person, the types of things that move
4 the needle here are few. For example, the issue of, let's
5 say, GPS measurements or other types of crustal geodetics
6 that show that in fact the rates of extension into this area
7 are a certain level. Those measurements are important. I
8 think they help serve to calibrate a lot of the information
9 related, for example, to longer term estimates of
10 deformation, like the fault slip rates, which are fairly well
11 determined throughout the Yucca Mountain area. Those
12 comparisons, though, if they don't agree, it isn't clear how
13 hazard analyses would be affected.

14 For example, in the probabilistic seismic hazard
15 analysis, those geodetic results were presented. Warneke,
16 for example, made presentations. Others have looked at
17 geodetic information. But it doesn't tend to be a
18 controlling dataset in assessments of the rate of occurrence
19 of earthquakes.

20 And likewise here, the geologic observations tend
21 to be more of a control in terms of actual hazard analysis.
22 If those observations said, for example, that we would add
23 orders of magnitude in the number of events, or in fact the
24 past occurrence of volcanism had been in a different place
25 than it is now, then they would have hazard implications.

1 But otherwise, they don't tend to affect the two things that
2 matter most, which is the overall rate density, which needs
3 to change a lot.

4 MELSON: A different question. Specifically, suppose
5 new dikes form, or something happens, how well are you set
6 up, or is the DOE set up to even spot such an event in the
7 future? The whole extrapolation of probability into the
8 future, as you've pointed out repeatedly, and everyone else,
9 is full of vast uncertainties. So I'm going to--

10 COPPERSMITH: One thing, we did ask the experts at the
11 end of this what would change your assessment, and in many
12 cases, precursory information related to an impending
13 eruption was something they said they would take a lot of
14 interest in. It wouldn't necessarily change their hazard
15 estimate. Go ahead, Frank.

16 PERRY: Yes, Frank Perry. My thought is that these
17 types of volcanoes represent extremely transient events. And
18 from the time you might first detect it to the time an
19 eruption stops might be a few years at most, as opposed to
20 some other types of volcanoes. So if you set up a 200 year
21 experiment to monitor for signs of some type of magmatic
22 activity, given these recurrence rates of a few hundred
23 thousand years, the chance is nil that you would ever see
24 anything. You can't run an experiment that long.

25 COPPERSMITH: We can say there is, in terms of the

1 seismicity, this is a well instrumented area. So inasmuch as
2 they would be represented by small magnitude earthquakes,
3 that would be captured in the ongoing--

4 PERRY: Right. If we saw dike swarms with associated
5 seismicity coming out, they would be captured, just from the
6 seismic net.

7 PARIZEK: Rod Ewing?

8 EWING: I'm out of my field, but I'm trying to think
9 about how to characterize the uncertainty from the process of
10 expert elicitation. I'm wondering if you limit the
11 interaction between your ten experts, say divide them into
12 three groups and then go through the process, do you think
13 the distribution would be essentially the same, or very
14 different?

15 COPPERSMITH: Well, we haven't done that test and we
16 haven't convinced DOE that it's worth doing. But I think I
17 would say no, primarily because the distribution, as we saw
18 the dominant contribution is actually within expert
19 uncertainty.

20 EWING: That's with the interaction.

21 COPPERSMITH: That's with the interaction. It could be
22 argued that in fact if we didn't have it, it might be
23 broader. These studies, once Livermore did a series of
24 seismic hazard analyses, expert elicitations, without any
25 interaction. EPRI did exactly the same area, and had much

1 more interaction. We looked at the distributions in those
2 cases, and in fact they were fairly comparable. It's an
3 experiment that really hasn't been done. My guess is that
4 there really wouldn't be too much of a difference.

5 EWING: Because in my own mind, I think we have to
6 distinguish between the uncertainty associated with the
7 expert elicitation process and the uncertainty in what we're
8 trying to describe, in this case, volcanic activity. So a
9 followup question would be in other areas where expert
10 elicitation is used, where later you can actually make a
11 measurement and determine what the actual value is, what is
12 the kind of general quality of success?

13 I mean, here, we have a case where we'll never know
14 what the answer is, but we're going to go ahead and use the
15 results of the expert elicitation. But there must be other
16 areas, say estimating the cost of large construction projects
17 where a group of experts get together, go through a process,
18 and they have a number, and then the structure is built. Has
19 anyone looked at the success rate for such efforts?

20 COPPERSMITH: Yes. And this is a whole field of work,
21 and I won't begin to get into it. But yes, the information
22 we have, almanac type information, ability to post facto see
23 how close you are, this gets into whole areas of cognitive
24 biases beforehand, the training that's required to avoid
25 those biases. All of that occurred prior to this

1 elicitation.

2 EWING: Okay.

3 COPPERSMITH: I won't go into all the details.

4 PARIZEK: Questions from staff? I want to thank all the
5 speakers--oh, sorry, John Kessler?

6 KESSLER: This may be a premature question, since to
7 wrap this into risk, obviously we need to work on the
8 consequence side as well, which we haven't heard yet. I
9 assume we're hearing that tomorrow. I just want to make sure
10 I understand when these probabilities were developed, they're
11 based on the volcanoes that are there, which is mostly an
12 extensional environment. So it's the kind of volcanism you'd
13 expect in an extensional environment?

14 COPPERSMITH: That's right.

15 KESSLER: And so generally they're not associated with
16 really highly energetic types of volcanoes?

17 COPPERSMITH: Right.

18 KESSLER: Okay. My understanding is, leading into the
19 consequence side, I understand that the consequences may be
20 on a different kind of volcanism, which will be something
21 that we should look for.

22 COPPERSMITH: Yes, there will be more discussion of
23 that. You saw on Frank's chart, for example, the volume of
24 eruptions from thousands of cubic kilometers now to less than
25 a cubic kilometer.

1 PARIZEK: You both will be present for the later
2 presentations?

3 COPPERSMITH: Yes.

4 PARIZEK: Good. So if we have questions, we can go
5 further into that. Thank you.

6 I want to thank again the speakers of the morning,
7 a very full program, as we knew it would be, and Chairman
8 Cohon.

9 COHON: Thank you, Richard, and thank you for chairing
10 this session. I think it was excellent.

11 I believe we have two people who would like to
12 speak during this public comment period. I just need to
13 confirm that, because four people signed up. My
14 understanding is that John Hatter and Judy Treichel, although
15 they signed up, are yielding their time to Kevin Camps. Is
16 that right?

17 Okay, so we have Kevin Camps and Chuck Connor.
18 I'll call on Kevin Camps first. And though they've yielded
19 your time, they had less time to yield because we ran over
20 here. If you could keep your remarks to ten minutes, that
21 would be greatly appreciated. But we understand if you run
22 over. And if you'll state your name again and give your
23 affiliation, that would be appreciated.

24 CAMPS: Yes, my name is Kevin Camps, and I am Nuclear
25 Waste Specialist at Nuclear Information and Resource Service.

1 COHON: And, Kevin, if you've got notes, you might find
2 it more convenient to come up here. Would you like to come
3 up here?

4 CAMPS: Sure. Thank you.

5 Chairman, members of the Board, thank you for this
6 opportunity to speak. My name is Kevin Camps. I am Nuclear
7 Waste Specialist at Nuclear Information and Resource Service.
8 NIRS is based in Washington, D.C. and is an information
9 clearing house for concerned citizens and grassroots
10 organizations about nuclear power issues and radioactive
11 waste issues.

12 For the past month, I have hauled a replicate of a
13 nuclear waste truck cask container across the country along
14 the actual projected transportation routes to Yucca Mountain.
15 Our tour began at the Cook Nuclear Reactors in Michigan. We
16 then travelled through Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, Nebraska,
17 Wyoming and Utah. We are culminating our tour here in Carson
18 City, and in a few days, in Las Vegas.

19 I've spoken with hundreds, if not thousands, of
20 individuals across the United States on this tour. These
21 have included residents along the roads and rails, emergency
22 responders, landowners, real estate agents, elected public
23 officials, teachers and school children, Native American
24 tribal councils and members, truck drivers at rest areas, and
25 many others.

1 When people learn that I'd be attending this
2 meeting of the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, they
3 asked me to communicate to you their concerns. I've spoken
4 with many of these people and they've expressed concern that
5 the corridor states have been overlooked in the Yucca
6 Mountain site characterization process.

7 Persons living and working along the transportation
8 routes were upset to learn that the dose receptors referred
9 to in the Yucca Mountain Environmental Impact Statement refer
10 to themselves and their families. Many people were surprised
11 and even shocked to learn that both the truck and train
12 transportation containers bound for Yucca Mountain would
13 release radiation even during routine incident-free
14 transports. Many of these communities were not consulted
15 with public hearings, and did not even know about the
16 environmental impact statement process which they could
17 comment on, which is now closed to public comment.

18 One of the more interesting experiences on this
19 tour was being stuck in a three-hour long traffic jam near
20 Chicago on the toll road. People actually got out of their
21 vehicles to ask me questions about the mock nuclear waste
22 cask that I was hauling. Neighboring motorists were very
23 concerned to learn that had this been an actual shipment of
24 high-level radioactive waste, they could have received the
25 equivalent of three chest x-rays during that three-hour

1 traffic stoppage.

2 One person that was especially upset was a pregnant
3 woman who had small children with her, and she said that as
4 soon as she got home, she'd contact her elected officials and
5 ask them why she did not even know about the environmental
6 impact statement process, even though there was a hearing
7 held in Chicago.

8 Toll both attendants were similarly concerned about
9 their repeated exposures to thousands of such shipments,
10 especially when traffic jams like this one would slow traffic
11 to a crawl, or even a full stop at their toll booths.

12 State Highway Patrol officers that I met across the
13 country had interesting perspectives on this. They were
14 concerned about their current exposure to other hazardous
15 materials on the roads, even to the radar transmissions in
16 their own vehicles, and they were concerned about the
17 cumulative effect of now being exposed to low level exposures
18 to these shipments. They were also concerned about their
19 current lack of training for emergency response, and their
20 potential exposure to acute doses in the event of an
21 accident.

22 In addition to the highway routes, many of the rail
23 routes across the country paralleled the path that we
24 travelled. In Chicago, Illinois and in Lincoln, Nebraska and
25 in Cheyenne and Laramie and smaller towns across Wyoming, the

1 projected rail transport routes actually pass directly
2 through neighborhoods and near businesses. Numerous
3 residents' homes were right next to the tracks, and parents
4 were especially concerned about the radiation doses their
5 young children would receive from the thousands or even tens
6 of thousands of rail shipments that would pass by under this
7 program.

8 In addition, homeowners and business owners worried
9 about the negative implications for their property values.
10 All felt that the DOE's Yucca Mountain DEIS treatment of
11 incident-free exposures was inadequate, especially for their
12 specific neighborhoods located right on the tracks.
13 Concerned citizens that I met in Chicago, in St. Louis, in
14 Lincoln, Nebraska, all who had attended the Department of
15 Energy DEIS hearings in their communities expressed deep
16 concerns that the incident-free exposures and even the
17 accidental releases from transportation accidents were
18 inadequately addressed in the EIS.

19 For instance, DOE assumed 25 year old fuel in its
20 analyses, and people asked about how old the fuel would be in
21 these transportation containers, and were concerned that the
22 exposures that were calculated were not accurate for what
23 they could be exposed to with younger fuel. They were also
24 concerned about the dollar value impacts of a severe
25 accident, and were puzzled why such dollar values were never

1 mentioned at the EIS hearings, or in the EIS document itself.

2 People were confused why the dollar values hadn't
3 been published, and they were puzzled why the only measure of
4 protection was against latent cancer fatalities. They asked
5 me questions about the broad range of other health impacts
6 that could result from incident-free or accidental
7 transportation scenarios.

8 People we met with were also very concerned to
9 learn that transportation casks are not subjected to full-
10 scale physical testing under the NRC's certification process.
11 Many expressed their desire that tests to destruction be
12 conducted. They requested me to ask the Nuclear Waste
13 Technical Review Board to urge the Department of Energy to
14 conduct full-scale physical tests to the point of
15 destruction, especially since NRC does not require such
16 tests.

17 In conclusion, many hundreds of people who I spoke
18 with who live and work along the transportation routes are
19 concerned about the risks to their communities from the
20 transportation shipments, and are feeling very forgotten and
21 overlooked in the Yucca Mountain characterization process,
22 and they urge the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board to
23 hold the Department of Energy to the highest level of
24 technical standards.

25 Thank you.

1 COHON: Thank you very much. Now we'll hear from Chuck
2 Connor, who is from CNWRA.

3 CONNOR: Okay, I'll try to be brief. I have a few
4 technical and scientific comments about the volcanism studies
5 which have been presented. And, again, my name is Chuck
6 Connor of the CNWRA. I work under contract to the U.S.
7 Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

8 There's several concerns we have about the PVHA and
9 the volcanic hazards assessment that were presented earlier
10 today. Our probability models for volcanic disruption of the
11 site vary from those presented by Frank and Kevin.
12 Basically, we have a higher range of probability of volcanic
13 disruption.

14 Frank presented a slide which showed that there's
15 considerable overlap. That's certainly true. But we have to
16 be careful that we first define the event that we're talking
17 about. I believe it's fair to say that Frank and Kevin
18 presented results of igneous dike intersection of the
19 repository which lead to either intrusive effects or
20 extrusion of volcanic products at the surface of the earth.

21 Our analyses only consider extrusive products.
22 Those are volcanic eruptions which occur which might
23 transport ash and presumably contaminants into the atmosphere
24 to elevations of, say, two to seven kilometers above the
25 site, and disperse those materials down range on the order of

1 tens of kilometers. So our analyses are only dealing with
2 the extrusive events.

3 We also take a different view of tectonic models.
4 This is a probability map which shows one realization of
5 analyses for the probability of volcanic disruption of the
6 area based on the distribution of past events and tectonic
7 models, and that's basically contoured at events per square
8 kilometer per 10,000 years.

9 Basically, we agree, of course, that the highest
10 probability of volcanic activity is in the central part of
11 Crater Flat where volcanism has been prevalent in the past.
12 And that probability decreases to the east, but we don't put
13 a--draw a line on that map or consider a barrier to be there.

14 I'd talk more to any of you individually if you
15 wish. As Frank mentioned, these results are published in the
16 Journal of Geophysical Research in last January's issue. We
17 also recently released documents to the public document room
18 in the NRC in February summarizing about ten peer review
19 publications we have on this topic.

20 If we look at the probability of volcanic
21 disruption of the repository, this is times ten to the
22 eighth, so these numbers vary from one times ten to the minus
23 eight, to one times ten to the minus seven per year, and vary
24 the maximum length of a volcanic alignment that might be
25 associated with that. You can see that our values for

1 different recurrence rates vary from one to five volcanic
2 events in the system in the next million years, vary between
3 over about an order of magnitude and are all greater than one
4 times ten to the minus eight. So these are for extrusive
5 volcanic eruptions leading to the dispersion of wastes in the
6 atmosphere and down range from the site.

7 So we can conclude from a lot of these analyses,
8 and I don't think people disagree with this too much, that
9 Yucca Mountain is located within an active basaltic volcanic
10 field, active in a geologic sense. I think everybody expects
11 that that volcanic system is likely to experience volcanic
12 activity again in the future.

13 A lot of detailed geophysical studies, geologic
14 analyses reveal that structure controls the location of
15 basaltic events on several scales. Most importantly,
16 recognition of control of the Bear Mountain Fall located west
17 of the Crate Flat and the Yucca Mountain site basically
18 doubles our hazard assessment. So rather than decreasing
19 hazard assessment, which has been a primary result of the
20 PVHA, we believe that recognition of the structure actually
21 leads to an increase in the probability of volcanic
22 disruption of the site.

23 Based on that, the probability of volcanic
24 eruptions, that is, the dispersion of volcanic products into
25 the atmosphere, is on the order of ten to the minus four to

1 ten to the minus three in a 10,000 year period. And getting
2 back to Bill Nelson's question earlier, that means we can
3 also say that based on these analyses, there's about a 5 per
4 cent chance of a volcanic event within the entire system in
5 the next 10,000 years, and about a 25 per cent chance of a
6 volcanic crisis, that is, that sort of dike injection which
7 may or may not intersect the repository.

8 That means that people monitoring that site in the
9 future might have to deal with a volcanic crisis in the
10 system. That's something that people generally try to
11 respond to in some way. It's quite different from simply the
12 probability of volcanic intersection of the site.

13 So thanks for the time. I just want to point that
14 out. One path toward resolution on this particular issue
15 might be to go forward in the license application with some
16 of these higher values for probability, and make sure the
17 consequence analyses take place and risk is calculated
18 recognizing that there's some probably natural divergence in
19 scientific opinion on this topic.

20 Thanks.

21 COHON: Thank you. Do we have a copy of his overheads?
22 Can we get hard copies? Thank you.

23 Any reactions, comments or questions for Chuck
24 Connor? David?

25 PARIZEK: I was just going to ask whether those

1 overheads are in that January publication in '99, JGR?

2 CONNOR: Yes, they come straight out of that
3 publication, yes.

4 PARIZEK: Okay. Then we're okay.

5 COHON: Let's get it anyhow, because the recorder would
6 like a copy of it I'm sure.

7 DIODATO: Diodato, staff. One question. With your
8 hazard curves that you had for the different one event, five
9 events, versus length, and then there's a positive slope to
10 those curves. So that slope suggests that the probability of
11 the longer lengths was also increasing? But, no, not really,
12 that was just assuming the longer length?

13 CONNOR: No, that shows one range, one ensemble of
14 analyses essentially. And, you know, there are a host of
15 parameters that go into these models. That's one
16 realization, one set of parameters that we think reasonable
17 bound the problem. I think, I don't want to put words in his
18 mouth, but Gene Smith from the State might argue that we'd
19 want to use longer alignment lengths based on some of the
20 work that he's done, that kind of thing. So there is
21 reasonable room to move on some of these kinds of parameter
22 analyses.

23 DIODATO: But then clearly, that does not suggest an
24 increased probability of longer lengths.

25 CONNOR: Absolutely not.

1 DIODATO: Okay, thanks.

2 COHON: Thank you very much, Mr. Connor. And our thanks
3 again to all the speakers today. I think all presentations,
4 both from scheduled speakers and from the public, were of
5 very high quality. We appreciate that very much.

6 We'll now take a lunch break for one hour, until 10
7 minutes to 2:00, 1:50.

8 (Whereupon, the lunch recess was taken.)

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A F T E R N O O N S E S S I O N

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Dr. Glassley?

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PARIZEK: Dr. William Glassley from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and he's going to be addressing coupled thermal-hydrological-chemical processes in using high-performance, massively coupled computers. And, again, this is the last of the session that I will chair this afternoon.

GLASSLEY: Thank you very much. I appreciate the

opportunity to address you on a subject that's something that is near and dear to my heart and we've--

PARIZEK: Quiet in the room, please.

GLASSLEY: What I will do is provide you with a

description of what the capabilities are that we've been developing over the last few years. I'm the team leader of a project at Lawrence Livermore that has been going now since 1998. The outline of the presentation will first cover briefly why the laboratory invested in this effort and what the goal is. I'll then discuss a little bit of what the current capabilities are today and where we expect to be going in the future and some of the activities we're pursuing. I'll then provide an example of an application we have been interested in with some preliminary results,

1 particularly as they pertain to a generic kind of performance
2 confirmation activity and then I'll conclude.

3 I want to point out the team members who have been
4 participating in this. John Nitao is probably one of the--is
5 the preeminent member of the team. He has responsibility
6 both for code design and implementation. Olivier Bildstein,
7 Tom Boulos, Mary Gokoffski, Charles Grant are all involved
8 either in computer science or geochemistry. Olivier is a
9 post doc. If anyone out there is interested in getting a
10 good post doc, he's the person to get. His contract ends in
11 October. Jim Johnson, many of you know as the guru for the
12 EQ-36 gembox database. Jim Kercher is an environmental
13 geoscientist biologist, but with a lot of experience in
14 parallel processing. JoAnne Levatin, computer scientist with
15 some experience with parallel processing, and Carl Steefel,
16 world-renowned geochemist in the area of reactive transport.

17 Why would the lab invest in this effort? What is
18 their interest? It comes from a long history, literally
19 decades long, of activities in two key areas; one, the area
20 of subsurface flow and transport and the other in the area of
21 application, development, and design of code for state-of-
22 the-art computational platforms. The expertise in the area
23 of subsurface flow and transport made it clear a long time
24 ago that to really do simulations of high-resolution with
25 complex chemistry in natural systems required computation

1 platforms that simply didn't exist until very recently.
2 That, along with the interest the laboratory is having in
3 computation capability, made a very interesting marriage a
4 couple of years ago. People began to realize the laboratory
5 was in a position, with the acquisition of the Blue Pacific
6 machine and IBM SP-2 with 1200 processors, it might be
7 possible to actually put together a simulation tool that
8 would allow us to work at subsurface flow and transport in a
9 way that was different from anything that had been done
10 before.

11 Briefly, the reason why massively parallel
12 platforms are so important in this arena is represented here.
13 On the right hand side of the figure is something we've
14 modified from a publication Dennis Norton did in 1984 which
15 is an attempt to show the way fluid rock interacts in the
16 subsurface. It's something that's been recognized for
17 decades in the geological community. Dennis made it
18 graphical and we made it colorful. The key thing is that
19 there are three domains that one has to be concerned with.
20 One is the thermal-hydrological, one is the geochemical, and
21 the third is the thermal-mechanical. All of these are linked
22 in a very strong way to the modification of the porosity
23 permeability field that can result either through chemical
24 interactions or through thermal-mechanical effects and how
25 those then feed back to the thermal-hydrological domain.

1 To represent this system at high-resolution and
2 with fidelity to the natural complexity of most geological
3 systems requires that one deal with something on the order of
4 50 to 100 independent components in a computational cell for
5 the calculation. The number of cells necessary to represent
6 complex domains varies tremendously, but in three dimensions
7 you're talking of something on the order of 10^6 to 10^{12} cells
8 and representing spacial regions on the order of millimeters
9 to 10s or 1000s or more of meters. Clearly, that kind of
10 complexity requires computational capability that is not work
11 station size or laptop size. It requires something more than
12 that. With the advent of the massively parallel computers a
13 few years ago and access to those, it became possible to
14 seriously couple this stuff being true to the complex
15 chemistry.

16 Quickly, I just want to show you what's happening
17 in terms of computational power. Vertical axis represents
18 the memory that's available for a calculation. Horizontal
19 axis in years from '96 to 2001. Work stations far within the
20 range of about a gigabyte, a billion bytes of memory
21 available, more or less. This is all approximate. With the
22 terrabyte machines or the massively parallel machines, we're
23 up into the terrabyte range. The green dots represent the
24 trend of memory available for computation that the Department
25 of Energy is investing in in what is called its Accelerated

1 Scientific Computative Initiative.

2 As that memory expands, more and more complexity
3 and fidelity to three dimensional simulations is possible.
4 We're currently at the point of being able to represent
5 hundreds of waste packages and many drifts with the complex
6 chemistry fully represented. Now, I'll show you an example
7 of that kind of simulation in a moment.

8 The code that we have been using on the ASCI Blue
9 Pacific machine is a code that represents full equilibrium
10 and kinetic reactions in a saturated or unsaturated
11 environment for multi-phase flow under isothermal or non-
12 isothermal conditions. Chemical changes are through porosity
13 and chemical changes as a result of dissolution and
14 precipitation processes, modify the porosity, and hence, the
15 permeability. And then, through that, modify the flow
16 regime.

17 The code is capable of dealing with an unlimited
18 number of chemical reactions, both for individual mineral
19 phases and speciation reactions, but the current limitation
20 is expressed primarily in the database that we have available
21 to us in terms of properties of minerals and aqueous species;
22 about 800 to 1000 minerals, 2000 to 2500 aqueous species.
23 The code is designed to deal with both equivalent continuum
24 and dual continuum models and the simulation I'll be showing
25 you later on is a dual continuum simulation. In many of the

1 cases that we're looking at right now, they're fully three
2 dimensional simulations representing resolution from tens of
3 centimeters to tens meters.

4 The activities we're currently focused on are
5 represented here. There are three things that are
6 particularly important when trying to understand the
7 expression of coupled effects in geological materials. One
8 is trying to understand how the assumptions that you've made
9 and how the features of the natural system are represented
10 feed into uncertainty in your calculation. We have a number
11 of simulations going on right now and have done a number in
12 the past looking at specifically this issue. Our concern is
13 in how one represents chemical complexity in the system and
14 how one represents reaction rates. It turns out that those
15 two variables can have a tremendous influence on the chemical
16 result one comes up with.

17 We're also conducting a number of large three
18 dimensional simulations trying to understand what kinds of
19 processes or consequences of coupled processes materialize in
20 short time frames of a few hundred to a few thousand years
21 and longer time frames. How did those differ and what kinds
22 of contrasts are there and responses of natural systems.

23 And, finally, we're trying to develop a database or
24 a knowledge base useful for designing or conceding
25 performance confirmation efforts. Particularly of interest

1 are the questions what is it you should measure, where should
2 you measure it, and what value should you expect in order to
3 have an efficient, cost-effective performance confirmation
4 effort. Simulations that deal with this particular question
5 are the ones that I will be showing you momentarily.

6 Long-term, where we want to go, at least as far as
7 application of this tool to Yucca Mountain issues, is through
8 the definition of what the near-field environment is that a
9 waste package will experience. This is a three dimensional
10 block through multiple drifts, multiple waste packages. What
11 we want to be able to do is represent at the centimeter scale
12 the kind of chemical conditions a waste package will
13 experience and feed that to the people who are doing the
14 materials testing and materials programs who can then
15 generate, as an example, probability distributions for
16 certain kinds of failures as a function of time.

17 In order to do that kind of thing requires that we
18 understand specific response of a repository-like setting in
19 terms of chemical and physical processes. On the left, both
20 of these figures are cross sections through a single drift,
21 and the figure on the right is just a blowup of this
22 particular region in this figure. These two figures harken
23 back to the processes I showed in that color viewgraph,
24 colored image that Dennis Norton did earlier, our
25 modification of it.

1 What's important are the processes that one has to
2 be concerned with. The movement of fluid within this
3 environment as a result of heat being deposited by the waste
4 package and either boiling or vaporizing/evaporating whatever
5 water is present, fluid moving to lower pressure, lower
6 temperature, environments condensing chemically interacting
7 with the rock, and the potential for the chemical evolution
8 of the fluid phase that could potentially get back into the
9 repository.

10 Another important process though that has to be of
11 some concern and consideration is the modification of the
12 physical conditions, porosity and permeability, in the
13 immediate vicinity of a waste emplacement drift.
14 Particularly important are the interactions that take place
15 along fractures which is what this is supposed to represent.
16 Fluid moving up along the fracture system as a result of
17 heat will eventually condense flow back down along the
18 fracture, but it's distilled water. It's chemically far from
19 equilibrium. It will react with the rock and the fracture
20 mineralogy picking up solutes, eventually depositing them at
21 the thermal front--whether it's a boiling front or just a
22 high temperature zone doesn't matter--precipitate what it has
23 and recycle. We need to understand those processes.

24 Now, what I wanted to show you are the results of
25 some simulations we've been doing of a 5 drift, 100 waste

1 package scenario. Each waste package has its own heat
2 output. So, each waste package can be treated discretely.
3 The chemical system is represented here and there are
4 approximately 50 aqueous complexes in that system. 34
5 minerals, I think, about 12 of those are primary mineral
6 phases, and the rest are potential secondary mineral phases.
7 The block of material that was simulated is a 2km x 2km by
8 about 760 km block of Yucca Mountain-like stratigraphy, 10 cm
9 resolution in the vicinity of the drifts, tens of meter
10 resolution further away from the drifts.

11 The heat output for the waste package, I want to
12 comment on this because it's important. The heat output was
13 constructed such that the drift wall never got above boiling.
14 We were interested in a low temperature system trying to
15 understand what kinds of interactions might take place under
16 those conditions. We were interested in the low temperatures
17 because that's one of the issues clearly of how to manage the
18 repository and operate it. We wanted to find out what
19 chemical interactions could take place under those
20 conditions.

21 What you will be seeing are a single drift out of
22 this 5 drift simulation that we did. The simulation will
23 cover 15 years from 85 years after waste emplacement to 100
24 years after waste emplacement. We were interested in that
25 time period because that covers the time period that, more or

1 less, represents the performance confirmation window. We
2 wanted to understand in this kind of situation, where we have
3 Yucca Mountain-like stratigraphy, but heterogeneous heat
4 output at low thermal conditions, what kind of responses
5 might one expect. Questions we were trying to answer was
6 what chemical parameters would be useful to measure, on what
7 time frames would they change, and which chemical parameters
8 would be of no significance. I shouldn't say of no
9 significance; what chemical parameters would not be changing
10 within that time frame.

11 What's shown here in green or this block is a small
12 section of the simulation. There's a single tunnel
13 represented along here. Let me rotate it a bit for you so
14 you can get some idea of the dimensionality of this. I
15 apologize for the slow response time of the computer. The
16 dataset is very large and the computer's memory is very
17 small. But, you can get some idea of what the three
18 dimensional form of this thing is.

19 Now, what I'll do is run it forward in time in, I
20 think, it's five year steps. There are two things that will
21 be changing here. There are two different surfaces,
22 parameter spaces that we're looking at. The green surface
23 encloses that environment within which the bicarbonate
24 concentration in any fracture water that's there is less than
25 10^{-5} molal. So, it's low bicarbonate concentration. The

1 yellow envelope that doesn't show up right now, but you will
2 see as the simulation proceeds, encloses that region where
3 the PH is approximately 9 or higher.

4 Let's try step through it manually. This is at 86
5 years and you can see that what's beginning to happen is that
6 what was a little bit of relief on the bicarbonate surface is
7 now separating out into fingers. Those fingers are quite
8 interesting from a simulation and from a measurement point of
9 view because the magnitude of the change that's taking place
10 and the spatial scale upon which it's changing is adequate to
11 do in-situ monitoring if it's possible to do in-situ
12 bicarbonate measurements or a sample and measure it. The pH,
13 you can see as the yellow lips under here and that moves
14 almost not at all; which means if you wanted to measure pH as
15 part of a performance confirmation program, there's not a lot
16 of information you would be able to gain from it because it's
17 not going to change much with time. Bicarbonate, on the
18 other hand, at least in this simulation, is showing a
19 substantial amount of modification as a function of a time, a
20 relatively short time period. It's the kind of thing that
21 gives you an opportunity to actually do some measurements and
22 see if the simulations that you have conducted, in fact,
23 represent what happened in the mountain. If they don't, it
24 gives you an opportunity to either reevaluate the way the
25 mountain is represented in the code or the way the code

1 operates or reevaluate what's happening in terms of the
2 response of the mountain, itself.

3 BULLEN: What causes the periodicity? Is it waste
4 package spacing?

5 GLASSLEY: It's waste package spacing and different heat
6 outputs, yes. So, the way this is set up, I should have
7 mentioned this. Thank you. It's a hot waste package, cold
8 waste package, hot, cold, hot, cold. This is just a part of
9 that 20 waste package drift.

10 The other thing that's interesting about this is
11 that you can see even though these waste packages have the
12 same heat--the hot ones have the same heat output in this
13 particular segment and the cool ones have the same heat
14 output. The response spatially is different. The reason is
15 that the heat output of the waste packages in this direction
16 and in that direction are not the same as this periodicity
17 here. So, there's some interaction as a result of that,
18 mainly expressed through gas phase circulation.

19 So, that's the nature of the kind of response you
20 can get in a complex system like this. We've done
21 simulations also where rather than looking in this case at
22 the central part of a drift, we've looked at the end of the
23 drift adjacent to mountain block itself where there are no
24 other waste packages and found an interesting response there.
25 Similar kinds of patterns evolve, but they're on a much

1 finer scale on the scale of tens of centimeters to a few
2 meters. The reason seems to be that the strong thermal
3 gradient that develops at the edge of the repository has a
4 very strong influence on the circulation patterns and
5 chemistry that result. So, the response would be quite
6 different from what you see here, but with a simulation tool
7 like this, it's possible to make predictions about what the
8 spacing of those various chemical reactions or responses
9 would be and go out and test that.

10 PARIZEK: Can I interrupt here?

11 GLASSLEY: Sure.

12 PARIZEK: In that green connections, the fingers between
13 the cooler and hotter waste packages, that could be also
14 focused flow or do you see any evidence that between packages
15 you could actually get water coming into the drifts because
16 of the thermal gradients of the ceiling, say?

17 GLASSLEY: For this time period, no, we don't see that.
18 We don't see of much of that kind of effect, at all. It's
19 very early on in the simulation. It's only 100 years after
20 the waste was emplaced and most of what we see appears to be
21 a response more to gas phase circulation than to differences
22 in liquid water distribution.

23 The direction we're going with this right now is to
24 examine at higher resolution the processes taking place
25 within the drift along the drift wall. We're also examining

1 the consequences for systems in which backfill may be used
2 trying to understand how backfill properties may evolve
3 through time. And, also, conducting long-term simulations
4 carrying this out to 250,000 years trying to understand if
5 you make a measurement in particular regions here during the
6 performance confirmation period, how much certainty can you
7 attach to long term projections from measurements here to
8 what the conditions will be 250,000 years into the future for
9 those various chemical components in the system. That's a
10 difficult thing to do. The complexity, particularly related
11 to the thermal regime, appears to make that somewhat
12 problematic.

13 So, in conclusion, there are a couple of points we
14 think are important about the availability of a simulation
15 tool like this. One is the fact that it's possible now to
16 take a representation of a mountain system like this and vary
17 any parameter you want and understand the long-term chemical
18 consequence and physical consequence and thermohydrological
19 consequence of that parameter variability. What we have
20 seen, so far, is that the things that appear to have the
21 strongest impact on what one considers to be the chemical
22 response are how one represents reaction kinetics and how one
23 represents the complexity of the chemical system. It's
24 extremely important that the chemical system be fully
25 represented. If it's not, much of the chemical variability

1 that is possible simply can't be represented.

2 In terms of reaction kinetics, one of the things we
3 found is that the response time of the mountain to a
4 perturbation appears to be something on the order of 10,000
5 to 20,000 years. Within that time period, kinetics dominate
6 the reaction process in the chemical system. Beyond that
7 time period, the system tends to approach a steady-state
8 condition and at that point, kinetics become much less
9 significant. Those are just two examples of how simulations
10 like this can provide you with a handle on what the
11 consequence is for uncertainty of certain variability in
12 particular parameters.

13 Using this kind of tool, it's also possible to
14 consider how best to design a performance confirmation
15 program and, in fact, with a tool like this, it's also
16 possible to actually do it almost real time. As you learn a
17 waste package and understand the hat output of that waste
18 package, you can run the simulation, decide where best to put
19 the sensors or probes or whatever it is you're going to be
20 using during your performance confirmation period around each
21 particular waste package. It's a way of optimizing the
22 performance confirmation data collection activity and a way
23 of minimizing cost.

24 So, that's essentially where we are with this. I
25 thank you for the time to present this material. I'd be

1 happy to entertain questions.

2 PARIZEK: Questions from the Board?

3 KNOPMAN: I have a bunch of questions, but I'll just ask
4 one now. That has to do with the capability of the
5 simulation tool to look at model--sensitivity to model
6 conceptualization, not just parameter changes. It seems to
7 me it is a very powerful tool here. It gives you a chance to
8 really examine the importance of coupled processes depending
9 on the way you choose to model coupled processes.

10 So, you know, you've got the circularity in the
11 analysis that has to be broken through a tool like this where
12 you can really start pushing these models into realms that
13 they'll start breaking down if they're not the right ones
14 that are best representational of the system.

15 GLASSLEY: Yeah. You're absolutely right. And, one of
16 the things we're very interested in doing is trying to
17 intelligently construct different conceptualizations and see
18 what is the consequence of that. There are a variety of ways
19 of doing it, whether it's how one simplifies the stratigraphy
20 or what one does with properties of materials or any of those
21 issues or even how one conceptualizes the linkage between
22 porosity and permeability. All of those things can be looked
23 at in a very straight forward way. The advantage of a tool
24 like this is that it can be done quickly. With, you know,
25 1200 processes to thwart a problem, you can do some very

1 complicated stuff pretty fast.

2 KNOPMAN: But, you could also be comparing TSPA
3 conceptualization of the system versus the underlying process
4 model kind of conceptualization to see what you lose in the
5 abstraction.

6 GLASSLEY: Yes, conceivably, that's possible, but I
7 think that would be an extremely difficult thing to do
8 because the simulations are so different. We've struggled
9 with how best to compare results that we can generate with
10 those that come from other kinds of simulation tools.
11 Because of the resolution, we can bring to it and because of
12 the fidelity with which we can represent the physical
13 processes, we can see things in such greater resolution and
14 detail that it's hard to compare. It's possible to do it,
15 but--

16 KNOPMAN: You could always aggregate.

17 GLASSLEY: Sorry?

18 KNOPMAN: You can always aggregate over your defined
19 model to get it up to the same comparable scale.

20 GLASSLEY: Sure, yeah.

21 PARIZEK: Priscilla Nelson?

22 NELSON: How long have you been developing this model?

23 GLASSLEY: We started in 1998.

24 NELSON: Okay. Do you plan on including heterogeneity
25 in the rock mass variability and pressure distribution?

1 GLASSLEY: Yeah, we're looking at the possibility of--or
2 we're trying to figure out how best to statistically
3 represent chemical-mineralogical heterogeneity within the
4 rock units and porosity/permeability distribution, as well.

5 NELSON: And, when might you be reporting on that?

6 GLASSLEY: That's a good question. We expect it would
7 probably be six months to a year before we can actually get
8 those simulations done.

9 NELSON: And, just one final question. It's been my
10 experience that as you make systems more complicated,
11 sometimes an extreme event of unanticipated impact might
12 occur. Something unexpected. Have you found any of those
13 for your more complex system and would you expect any?

14 GLASSLEY: We haven't found any. There's nothing we've
15 tossed around, so far, that is likely to do that. Most of
16 what we've done in the simulations or most of what we've seen
17 in our simulations suggests that the bounds the Yucca
18 Mountain Project has placed on certain properties of the
19 system, chemical responses, mineralogical changes,
20 thermohydrological effects, the results we have are well-
21 within those bounds. We've found nothing that would
22 represent an outlier or something that would suggest
23 something significant has been missed. What we tend to see
24 is just much more detail at much higher resolution. But,
25 most of the variables that we're finding, the values for the

1 variables, the ranges that we see, fall within the kinds of
2 ranges the project has talked about in the past.

3 RUNNELLS: Could you comment, generalize, I guess, in
4 terms of magnitude of the changes in porosity and
5 permeability that you have predicted from this model?

6 GLASSLEY: During the short time period, for example,
7 the performance confirmation time period, virtually nothing
8 happens. I mean, you see very, very tiny changes. It's
9 clearly not a variable that's going to be important for
10 performance confirmation. Long-term simulations going out
11 100,000 years kind of thing, we see very complex changes, a
12 spatially complex distribution of changes in porosity
13 associated with several specific regions around the drift.
14 One is along the base of the drift on the sides where the
15 fracture porosity tends to close up. We've seen changes on
16 the order of 20 to 30 percent.

17 The magnitude of the change, though, depends upon
18 what secondary minerals one puts in one's simulation. You
19 can end up with very little permeability change or porosity
20 change if one simplifies the chemical system. The alumino
21 silicate system, though, is very sensitive to a lot of local
22 conditions that generate on a fine scale in these models.
23 So, we do see over a long time period changes of 20 to 30
24 percent when the full chemistry is represented in the system.

25 Above the drift, we tend to see some ceiling and

1 regions where it opens up and they're opposed against each
2 other. So, there appears to be a spatial relationship there
3 where they're kind of feeding each other. It appears that
4 dissolution occurs above, fluid comes down, precipitates some
5 material, and that system slowly migrates away from the
6 drift. Magnitude of change above the drift is something on
7 the order of 10 percent over a period of about 100,000 years.
8 Along the sides, it's a much more complex distribution. It
9 depends upon the heat output of the waste packages.

10 RUNNELLS: Okay. And, one quick followup. You
11 mentioned that the kinetic expressions are very important and
12 that the mountain responds on the time frame of 10,000 to
13 20,000 years, I think you said. Then, you followed that
14 remark with something about beyond 10,000 or 20,000 years.
15 Could you repeat that, please?

16 GLASSLEY: Yeah. Let me put up a graph and perhaps it
17 will clarify some of this.

18 (Pause.)

19 GLASSLEY: This is one simulation we did trying to
20 understand what kinds of variations would one see in
21 chemistry in particular parts of the system. Now, the
22 absolute values that we have here probably aren't realistic.
23 We've refined these simulations. This was done on some
24 preliminary mineralogy and representation that we were
25 looking at, but this pattern is something that consistently

1 comes out regardless of the chemical environment you see.
2 During the first 10,000 years, the system--if you perturb it,
3 the system goes through a lot of variability, variation. The
4 response is complex. And, the reason is that we're looking
5 at many minerals, each with a very different dissolution rate
6 coming into importance during this perturbation, perturbed
7 period. But, after about 10,000 to 20,000 years, what tends
8 to happen is that the system reaches kind of a steady-state
9 response and just continues to evolve along a relatively
10 uniform response pattern. The changes aren't very
11 significant. This happens over and over again.

12 What this is suggesting to us is that during this
13 time period, if you want to have an accurate representation
14 of how this system is going to be responding, you have to
15 accurately represent kinetics. That's absolutely
16 fundamental. If you don't, then you could end up anywhere in
17 the system and it's difficult to say what your response--what
18 your chemical simulation actually means.

19 PARIZEK: Dan Bullen?

20 BULLEN: Just a quick followup to this one. You
21 mentioned that during the confirmatory testing period that
22 there really wasn't much change that was identified in your
23 code. But, if you wanted to benchmark the code to be able to
24 use it as a predictive tool, could you foresee, for example,
25 in the types of curves that you just saw an experiment that

1 you would run that you'd use to benchmark the calculations?
2 Maybe a cooler waste package with water, change the near-
3 field chemistry, and then try and predict the performance and
4 see if you accurately modeled that? Is that the type of
5 long-term experiment that you could do in the confirmatory
6 testing phase that would benchmark what you're doing?

7 GLASSLEY: Yes. Conceivably, you could come up with an
8 accelerated response kind of thing. We hadn't thought of
9 that, but that's a really interesting idea. You could do
10 that.

11 BULLEN: I guess the followup question is are you
12 severely limited by the kinetics because sometimes you just
13 can't push the kinetics to not make it go and so.

14 GLASSLEY: Well, if you have an experiment that's going
15 to go for a few decades or more, yeah, I think you could do
16 it. You can accelerate things sufficiently so that you'd be
17 able to see a response and be able to see if it's in the
18 place you expect it to, is it the right magnitude, and is it
19 the kinds of chemical changes that you expect?

20 Something that would compliment that, though, I
21 think is the natural analogue systems that are potentially
22 useful for doing this kind of validation activity. Those are
23 the only things we have access to that go for the kind of
24 time periods we're talking about. I think we have an
25 opportunity to really explore validation exercises with tools

1 like this using natural analogue systems. There are a number
2 of them out there. They've been talked about for a long
3 period of time. It's one of the things that we're very
4 interested in pursuing.

5 I should have mentioned that there is an ongoing
6 validation activity associated with this thing. One can
7 never completely validate a code like this. So, it has to go
8 on forever.

9 BULLEN: Thank you.

10 PARIZEK: Just following up on that point, do you have
11 any sort of simpleminded experiments like, you know, maybe
12 steam weld hole plugs with silica or something where you can
13 say, you know, in spite of its complexity, it will even
14 predict something simple that you actually have some
15 experience with?

16 GLASSLEY: There are actually some laboratory
17 experiments that already have been done that either have
18 already used the code to simulate the results and it comes
19 up--it's one of those rare experiences where you sit down and
20 you put in the parameters for a simulation, you turn it on,
21 run it, and come back a few hours later and it matches. You
22 didn't have to twiddle anything. It's scary.

23 Because experimental programs are difficult to set
24 up, we're trying to find places where experimental programs
25 already exist and tie in with them. One of the things that

1 we're looking at right now is a relationship with, of all
2 places, Denmark where they've done some or are in the process
3 of doing some low temperature geothermal work. We're
4 interested in linking with them to look at their natural
5 system and see what the response is when they perturb it and
6 do the simulation to see if it's consistent.

7 PARIZEK: These are like bricks. I mean, when you heat
8 up a brick, there's some mineral changes and the thing dries
9 out and, you know, something dumb like a brick making
10 factory, you know--

11 GLASSLEY: Yeah.

12 PARIZEK: Any other Board questions?

13 COHON: Do you talk with the people doing TSPA?

14 GLASSLEY: Yeah, on occasion, we do. I have to admit
15 this effort has been so intense, we have been in the trenches
16 doing this with our blinders on. We've communicated with the
17 project on numerous occasions letting them know where we are
18 and what we're looking at. I think, the communication,
19 although it hasn't been as complete as we would like, is
20 there in several different guises. We have individuals at
21 Livermore who are working on the Yucca Mountain Project who
22 interact with TSPA people. That added communication exists.
23 We've also talked directly with them.

24 COHON: What are the biggest data deficiencies from your
25 point of view or what would be the highest priority areas for

1 additional data collection for your modeling effort?

2 GLASSLEY: Well, thinking of the long-term response of
3 the mountain and from that perspective, there are probably
4 two things that are really fundamental limitations. One is
5 the thermodynamic data that are available describing
6 dissolution of all the mass action laws for various mineral
7 phases. The database for that is limited and the quality is
8 highly varied. The other is really understanding and having
9 data for dissolution and precipitation kinetics. That's a
10 real problem. From all the simulations we've seen, those are
11 the things responses are most sensitive to. The greatest
12 uncertainty seems to come from uncertainty in those datasets.
13 It isn't so much data for the mountain, the properties of
14 the mountain, local mineralogy or things like that. It's
15 more fundamental than that.

16 PARIZEK: Board advisors?

17 EWING: Just to follow up on that comment, you've listed
18 that the database for the kinetic reactions includes 800
19 minerals. Do you want to elaborate on that? I mean, my
20 impression is that number should be considerably smaller.

21 GLASSLEY: What we have done is take the data that
22 exists for laboratory measurements for dissolution and
23 precipitation--mainly, dissolution kinetics, very little on
24 precipitation kinetics. On the basis of mineral type and
25 mineral structure, assigned dissolution rates for those

1 minerals for which they haven't been measured. So, that
2 database exists.

3 EWING: So, there aren't experimental data on 800
4 minerals because that would be 20 percent of all known
5 minerals.

6 GLASSLEY: No, no. Absolutely no. Yeah, and that would
7 be wonderful.

8 EWING: Right. And, I just point out that the issue
9 here is the dissolution of spent fuel, and so for the
10 relevant uranium phases, I would say the number is five or
11 less with your data.

12 GLASSLEY: I think you're right about that, yeah.

13 EWING: Yeah. So, my last comment is this is exciting,
14 but I think the increased computational capacity has to go
15 hand-in-hand with increased fundamental database and site
16 characterization. Having resolution to a few centimeters is
17 not useful unless you have a description on an appropriate
18 scale.

19 GLASSLEY: I agree with you and I think one of the
20 things that's important about a tool like this is that it
21 gives you a chance to really understand what are the--given
22 that you need dissolution kinetics and precipitation kinetics
23 data for, say, 700 mineral phases, which of those really are
24 going to make a difference in the results you will be
25 generating? It provides you with a screening process. But,

1 I completely agree. The simulation tool like this at this
2 point is data limited and the data limitations that we have
3 are in the thermodynamic properties and the kinetic
4 properties of mineral phases.

5 MELSON: A real quick question. As complex systems are
6 looked at in chemistry and other areas, more and more chaos
7 shows up. How the hell do you take that into account? And,
8 secondly, do you have a phase rule check on your results?

9 GLASSLEY: Yeah.

10 MELSON: You do?

11 GLASSLEY: Yeah. I agree with you about chaos. We've
12 been really interested in--in fact, Tom Boulas (phonetic),
13 one of the people on the team, that's his expertise. He's
14 been very interested in looking at the results to see if
15 there is any evidence that we are getting into a chaotic
16 realm. So far, the things that suggested maybe we were
17 turned out to be numerical problems, not really chaotic
18 responses. Nothing we've seen, so far, appears to suggest
19 that we are, in fact, entering a chaotic environment, chaotic
20 regime. But, that doesn't mean it won't happen.

21 KESSLER: Perhaps at the risk of pushing an inference
22 from one of your statements too far, you had something about
23 one of the result, a fracture permeability reduction on the
24 order of what; 20 to 30 percent, you said? Maybe Bo or
25 somebody can get up and put that in context of what the

1 current variability uncertainties are in fracture
2 permeabilities now to understand whether a 20 to 30 percent
3 reduction is important or it's already in the noise of the
4 uncertainty or variability that's there.

5 BODVARSSON: Thanks a lot. The fracture permeabilities,
6 you know, vary by four orders of magnitude from something
7 like 10^{-14} meter squared to 10^{-10} meter squared. So, there is a
8 large variability.

9 GLASSLEY: Yeah, I think it's important to recognize,
10 too, that the coupling from porosity to permeability is very,
11 very sensitive. So, how that 20 to 30 percent change
12 translates into a permeability change is a matter of a lot of
13 debate.

14 PARIZEK: Questions from staff?

15 RUNNELLS: I just want to, I guess, repeat or
16 reemphasize what you have said; namely, that the thing is
17 data limited to two primary needs that you identified,
18 kinetic expressions and the thermodynamic data, and yet if
19 you look at the literature or you look at university research
20 or you look at Government research, there is precious little
21 of that kind of research being done. It is not sexy to
22 derive thermodynamic data. It's slow, the publications come
23 out slowly, and it's not admired to derive thermodynamic data
24 experimentally, real data. I think the kinetic expression
25 work is a little more sexy and we see a little more of that.

1 But, do you have any ideas on how to stimulate how to
2 enhance, how to generate real numbers from experimental work
3 anywhere that will feed into these increasingly sophisticate
4 thermodynamic kinetic models.

5 GLASSLEY: Offhand, no. What I hope long-term is that
6 as more and more simulations are done like this and more and
7 more people have access to machines like this and get their
8 hands dirty doing these kinds of exercises, there will be
9 more and more pressure, more and more interests, and it will
10 become more sexy to do those kind of measurements. But, it's
11 going to be--I think, we're going to be data limited in that
12 realm for a long time.

13 RUNNELLS: Increasing level of frustration may drive us
14 to it, right?

15 GLASSLEY: Exactly.

16 RUNNELLS: Okay.

17 KNOPMAN: Can I just clarify a point? The information
18 we've seen, so far, coming out of the project suggests that
19 coupled processes really are not that important in terms of
20 overall performance. Do you agree or disagree with that
21 statement?

22 GLASSLEY: I would have to disagree. I think there are
23 a couple of things that I think reactive transport and
24 coupled processes play a very important role in. The
25 performance confirmation activity, it seems to me, if it's

1 going to be successful and it's going to increase people's
2 confidence in repository models, will have to look at the
3 consequences of coupled processes because that's all you're
4 going to be able to measure. When dealing with long-term
5 radionuclide transport, flow pathways are going to be changed
6 through chemical interactions with the mineralogy. Secondary
7 mineral phases are going to form. The only way radionuclide
8 transport can really be rigorously represented is by
9 interactions of the fluid phase containing the radionuclides
10 with those secondary mineral phases, that's important.
11 That's part of my soapbox.

12 DIODATO: I can understand your concern importance of
13 getting the kinetic parameters for the minerals, getting a
14 better handle on those. Does that make sense? But, I'm a
15 little confused about downplaying the importance of
16 quantifying the heterogeneity and dispersivities (phonetic)
17 in the model domain because, it seems to me, that's kind of a
18 primary thing, controlling all flow even in the absence of
19 heat, you know, before adding heat.

20 GLASSLEY: I didn't mean to downplay it. Those are
21 important things. They do have a very strong influence on
22 the behavior of the system. I was thinking in terms of being
23 able to do long-term calculations--both short term and long-
24 term calculations looking at chemical parameters. For those
25 things, the kinetics and the thermodynamics really are

1 dominant and how one represents the thermohydrological system
2 is secondary.

3 When talking about flow on the other hand, it's a
4 different ball game. There, the thermodynamics and kinetics
5 still are critically important because those are the things
6 that will modify the flow pathways, but being able to
7 accurately represent those flow pathways is fundamentally
8 important. You need to have that framework in place before
9 you can do a realistic simulation.

10 DIODATO: Right. Because I mean the fundamental
11 questions that need to be answered by the project hinge on
12 the results of flow and transport calculations of
13 radionuclide transports.

14 GLASSLEY: Sure. Yeah, yeah. No, I would agree with
15 you.

16 PARIZEK: I think that concludes the section then on
17 scientific and technical issues and we appreciate the
18 comments. I hope for those members of the public who are
19 still with us, they'll understand why all of this review is
20 important because from now on, it's the total system
21 performance assessment discussions. That's where it all
22 feeds into the next level. Dan Bullen will chair that next
23 session.

24 BULLEN: In the interest of time, I actually thought
25 about truncating the speech that Leon Reiter wrote for me,

1 but it's a really great speech and it lays the groundwork for
2 what we're going to do next. So, I also just checked with
3 our Chair to get his prerogative, and since there's no public
4 comment period at the end of today, we're probably just going
5 to extend the schedule that will go until a little before
6 6:00 o'clock. I want to give every speaker for the rest of
7 the day the amount of time. So, just adjust by about 30 or
8 40 minutes the schedule that you see in front of you. With
9 that, I'll start the great speech that Leon wrote for me.

10 My name is Dan Bullen and I'm the Chair of the
11 first session on total system performance assessment for site
12 recommendation. In shorthand, we refer to this as TSPA/SR.
13 There have been, at least, four previous iterations of TSPA
14 for the Yucca Mountain site, the most recent of which was the
15 TSPA/VA, the performance assessment conducted for the 1998
16 viability assessment. Chairman Cohon has in his opening
17 remarks pointed out the significance of the current
18 iteration. It will indeed provide the primary technical
19 basis on which a decision of site suitability will be made.

20 TSPA is, by its very nature, a very complicated
21 and, sometimes, opaque model or group of models. There are
22 possibly thousands of input assumptions and parameters needed
23 to model the performance over thousands of years of this
24 complex mixture of geology and engineering. Whether we like
25 it or not, people think of TSPA as a giant black box with

1 many knobs that need to be turned and set before the results
2 can be calculated. It is incumbent on those carrying out the
3 TSPA to point out which knobs are being turned, which of
4 these are really important, what they are being set at, and
5 why the chosen settings are technically sound.

6 In addition, these assumptions will always be
7 associated with uncertainty. It is incumbent on those
8 carrying out a TSPA for decision-making purposes to carefully
9 describe, quantify, and display these uncertainties. At the
10 May Board meeting, we were informed that some input
11 parameters would be chosen to represent "conservative" or
12 "bounding" values. Choosing such a conservative value can in
13 certain situations lessen the need to articulate all of the
14 uncertainty. This, however, places a heavy burden on those
15 who claim conservatism to demonstrate that it indeed exists.
16 In addition, using a mixture of conservative, realistic, and
17 possible non-conservative assumptions can greatly complicate
18 efforts to assess overall uncertainty and conservatism. Such
19 estimates are needed for decision makers. It's a tough job
20 carrying out a TSPA for Yucca Mountain repository. The DOE
21 has shown great progress in its successive iterations. We
22 are looking forward to what this latest and most important
23 iteration can and cannot say. We hope that we can get some
24 answers to the issues that we have raised.

25 As you can see by your agenda, TSPA will occupy the

1 rest of today's meeting and most of tomorrow's. We will
2 start off today with a tag team presentation by Abe Van Luik
3 and Bob Andrews on the overall structure of the TSPA/SR and
4 its results. We've asked for a general discussion of the
5 models, the data, the results for the different time periods
6 and scenarios; for example, nominal and disruptive events,
7 the overall uncertainty and conservatism of these results,
8 and a comparison between TSPA/SR and its predecessor,
9 TSPA/VA. We would very much like to know what the analysts
10 believe are the potential uses and limitations of TSPA/SR.

11 Following their presentation, we will begin a
12 series of presentations on the individual components of the
13 TSPA, summarizing critical assumptions, underlying technical
14 bases, and sensitivity tests carried out to assess the
15 effects of different assumptions. These presentations will
16 continue tomorrow. Today, we will hear from Bo Bodvarsson
17 who will discuss the assumptions regarding unsaturated zone
18 flow and transport, Ernie Hardin who will discuss the
19 engineered barrier environment, and Pasu Pasupathi who will
20 discuss the waste package and drip shield.

21 Now, our first speakers. Abe Van Luik is senior
22 technical advisor to the assistant manager for licensing for
23 the Yucca Mountain Project and is responsible for the
24 application of TSPA to determine compliance with safety
25 standards and to help guide design and field investigations.

1 Abe is an environmental chemist by training and has emerged
2 as the DOE's chief spokesman on TSPA.

3 Bob Andrews is the performance assessment
4 department manager for the M&O. As such, he is responsible
5 for delivering a good TSPA to the DOE. He probably knows
6 more about the different aspects of TSPA/SR than anyone else.
7 Bob is a hydrogeologist by training.

8 And, with that, I turn it over to Abe and Bob for
9 our first set of presentations. Great speech, Leon.

10 VAN LUIK: I've got to talk to Leon more often because
11 my job title has changed. He didn't know it. It's correct
12 here.

13 Let's get right into it. Although, before I do, I
14 wanted to mention that I first became friends with Nick
15 Stellevato at a TRB meeting after I had given a talk. He
16 took me out in the hall after my talk and told me in no
17 uncertain terms that I was wrong and he disagreed with me,
18 and at the same time, we became friends. Now, I learned
19 something from that that I've been trying on my kids and
20 certain DOE staff and it doesn't work as well and you've got
21 to have a mixed personality to go along with the approach.

22 We're going to talk about regular regulatory
23 requirements, our objectives, major improvements, a few
24 things about the design, just list the process models, and a
25 very important statement on the current status of what you're

1 about to see.

2 Regulatory requirements. We're dealing with
3 proposed DOE, NRC, and EPA regulations, as you well know.
4 They require a TSPA to evaluate Yucca Mountain. Must include
5 all relevant features, events, and processes. Must analyze
6 performance in terms of individual protection requirement,
7 groundwater protection requirement, and human intrusion.
8 Individual protection must include both the probable
9 behavior, as well as the effects of potentially disruptive
10 low-probability, high consequence events like volcanism.

11 Some nice quotes mostly from the EPA proposed
12 standards. So, this is still subject to change. The only
13 thing I wanted to point out here is our position and intent
14 is that unequivocal numerical proof of compliance is neither
15 desirable nor likely to be obtainable. This is a direct
16 statement saying that they expect uncertainty in their look
17 at the system. The focus of our work should be on the full
18 range of defensible and reasonable parameter distributions,
19 something that Dan just said, and not on the tails of
20 distributions since the goal is to evaluate likely
21 performance and not unrealistic or low-probability
22 performance. I think these are nice concepts to keep in mind
23 when you listen to the presentations on TSPA.

24 TSPA/SR is one in a chain of project-conducted
25 TSPAs. I've already said that these are the things that

1 we're going to address because of the regulations. The EPA
2 standard also requires that we look at peak dose whenever it
3 occurs and report it in the EIS. And, it's important for you
4 to understand that the TSPA/SR evaluates the significance of
5 the quantified uncertainty in the underlying process
6 components.

7 We've made improvements since the TSPA/VA. We
8 actually have. We enhanced our models to address review
9 comments on TSPA/VA to the extent that we could in the
10 intervening two years. Models with major enhancements
11 include the climate and seepage models, coupled thermal
12 processes, waste package degradation where stress corrosion
13 cracking is now our major potential failure mode, and we have
14 modeled initialed defects and weld flaws in concert with
15 looking at stress corrosion cracking. Thanks to Nye County
16 work, we have a much better picture of the saturated zone and
17 I think we are doing consequence modeling for volcanism now
18 which we did not do for VA. We are also having to modify the
19 approach to address NRC and EPA draft requirements or
20 proposed requirements.

21 The process improvements, everything is now
22 controlled under common QA procedures. We're using analysis
23 and model reports to trace information flow. This is one
24 that really should be in both places, but for this TSPA, we
25 did an explicit evaluation of features, events, and processes

1 so that everything is traceable in terms of assumptions.
2 TSPA/SR model is used to assure that a person can track it to
3 the datasets that were used and the Q-status of all data,
4 models, and software is now being tracked. So, we feel that
5 there is great improvement and a lot of work has gone into
6 this between TSPA/VA and SR.

7 TSPA/SR is based on the site recommendation design.
8 The repository design considers an average thermal load a
9 little bit lower than VA of 62MTHM/acre--I love those units--
10 which is lower than the VA. It's important for you to
11 realize that there is no performance impact expected from
12 liquid water removed through heating. That was a VA thing.
13 it is no longer that way in the SR. We're expected 50 years
14 of ventilation, but that's a flexible parameter, as you heard
15 this morning. And, blending of fuel at the surface to
16 levelize the thermal load. Those are some of the operational
17 parameters that will help control the engineered system.

18 The system has a titanium drip shield placed over
19 waste packages, no backfill, and a line load of about
20 1.4kW/m.

21 The waste package design considers still waste
22 packages for commercial spent fuel and co-disposed defense
23 spent fuel and defense high-level waste. It's an outer layer
24 of corrosion resistant Alloy-22, 20mm, or with an inner layer
25 of stainless steel, 100mm worth. There's a Dual-Alloy 22 lid

1 closure weld. The outer lid closure weld stress is mitigated
2 by solution annealing and the inner lid closure weld stress
3 is mitigated by laser peening. You'll hear more about that
4 later.

5 In my humble opinion which is not so humble, we
6 have done a very good job this time of integrating from the
7 science and the engineering from the bottom up into the TSPA.
8 This is just to show you the process model category and the
9 process model report list on the right where all of this work
10 is documented. Of course, the analysis and model reports are
11 referenced in the process model reports. So, there's a
12 complete traceability all the way from the top to the bottom.

13 This is an important slide. The results, Bob
14 Andrews is actually going to show you some results. They are
15 preliminary and still subject to change. They're intended to
16 be used for general discussion of sensitivities and barrier
17 important analysis in this meeting, but they're still
18 undergoing checking. They are not suitable for making
19 regulatory compliance judgments of any type.

20 The calculations after checking and after we make
21 sure that they are the ones that we want to put into the
22 TSPA/SR Rev 00, are going to support the TSPA/SR Technical
23 Report, the Repository Safety Strategy Rev 04, and the SRCR.
24 There will be some updates of these calculations that Bob
25 will show you today and that will create a TSPA/SR Rev 01 and

1 that is what is expected to support the final SR.

2 And, now, I'd love to turn the time over to Bob who
3 will get into the technical details. I just wanted to set
4 the stage so there's no sense asking any questions. Thank
5 you.

6 BULLEN: Abe, I'd never let you off that easily.
7 Chairman Cohon, did you have a question or--

8 COHON: Yeah.

9 BULLEN: Okay. Go ahead?

10 COHON: Do you have a deadline for revisions that will
11 go into Rev 01?

12 VAN LUIK: I believe there is a deadline in the schedule
13 and Bob can correct me if I'm wrong, but isn't it about the
14 February time frame? December/January.

15 COHON: December/January. Sorry, this went by very
16 quickly, Abe.

17 VAN LUIK: Yes.

18 COHON: One thing you said or--yeah, on Slide 7, the
19 second bullet on repository design considers no performance
20 impact from liquid water removed through heating. I didn't
21 want that to go by unremarked because that seems a
22 significant conclusion or design consideration since moving
23 water through heat was a major part of the strategy up until
24 this morning. So, that's just a remark. That's not a
25 question. You know, you can respond to it if you want, but

1 it seems significant.

2 VAN LUIK: Well, that's the reason we put it up there.
3 We wanted you to make sure that we are no longer looking for
4 a positive performance impact from the heating, itself.

5 COHON: We are still moving water, however, through
6 heating. It's just that it's not a key part of the strategy.

7 VAN LUIK: Right.

8 COHON: Okay. That's all for now, but I'm sure I'll be
9 back.

10 BULLEN: Another followup question on this slide. Your
11 inner layer of stainless steel is now 100mm thick instead of
12 50mm thick. When did that change?

13 VAN LUIK: Okay. We need a waste package person to
14 raise their hand and tell me either that my slide is wrong or
15 that it changed at a certain point in time because these
16 numbers seem quite familiar to me.

17 PASUPATHI: I believe it's 40 to 50--

18 BULLEN: Pasu, identify yourself?

19 PASUPATHI: I'm sorry, you were saying it's 100?

20 BENTON: Our current design in the maximum one is 100mm
21 for structural purposes. It is not a corrosion barrier.

22 BULLEN: Hugh, don't go away yet. There's a quick
23 question I'm at. Is that for an extremely heavy waste
24 package and, on average, they're going to be 5cm or are they
25 all going to be 10?

1 BENTON: All the large ones are 10. The smaller ones
2 are lesser than that. We haven't got the exact number
3 because we've been focusing on the larger ones which from the
4 structural standpoint are the bounding ones. But, our 12 BWR
5 and 24 BWR will probably wind up to be less than 10. We want
6 to optimize that for reduced cost.

7 BULLEN: Okay, thank you. Paul Craig and then Debra?

8 CRAIG: Staying with Jerry Cohon's point of a moment
9 ago, could you clarify that no performance impacts? One of
10 the concerns in the past used to be the possibility that
11 mobilized water might reflux and produce corrosion effects.
12 Is that kind of consideration now no longer to be included?

13 VAN LUIK: That is the kind of consideration where we
14 selected this Alloy-22 material and there will be a later
15 speaker that will address these things in more detail. But,
16 we selected it because of its immunity to the type of
17 environments that would be presented by a trickle of water.
18 It doesn't matter whether you're over 60 percent relative
19 humidity or if you have a little water or a lot of water.
20 The behavior as it is modeled currently, if you believe the
21 model, is the same. So, there is no benefit. There's also
22 no detriment to moving some water around.

23 CRAIG: Okay. So, does that mean you're no longer
24 modeling water movement?

25 VAN LUIK: No, we are modeling it because it's part of

1 the overall picture of--

2 CRAIG: But, not taking credit--

3 VAN LUIK: Right. There's no--

4 CRAIG: Either plus or minus?

5 VAN LUIK: Yes.

6 CRAIG: So, if it should turn out that C-22 is impacted
7 by water, for example, because of lead as we heard this
8 morning, one might have to rethink this?

9 VAN LUIK: We will have to get the lead out.

10 BULLEN: Debra?

11 KNOPMAN: Abe, you'll regret having put that line up by
12 the time we're finished. It seems to me the word you meant
13 to put there instead of impact was credit and this is a huge
14 difference in meaning and I think that's what the Board is
15 reacting to here because you cannot assert there is no
16 performance impact unless you can have something to back that
17 up. Now, you can say you don't know or you're stilling
18 investigating it or you do know, but you're not taking credit
19 for it in terms of performance. A very large difference in
20 meaning. So, I know you're always updating and you're
21 editing your slides. I suggest you change that word there
22 because it gives off a very different meaning.

23 VAN LUIK: It's true that had I had my original intent,
24 it would have said credits, but I was reminded of a couple of
25 things. One is that the sensitivity studies that we have

1 done show no impact one way or the other because we are
2 talking about the first failure of the waste package. A very
3 long time like this would be a prehistoric event, a few
4 hundred years above boiling temperatures. And, the second is
5 that even with the VA design, if you look at the DEIS, from a
6 10,000 year performance point of view there was no impact.
7 So, those things added up to saying that there really never
8 was any impact.

9 KNOPMAN: Well, wait a second. We just went through a
10 discussion about coupled processes here and the PMR for the
11 unsaturated zone does draw a conclusion that there's
12 virtually no impact on flow and transport. Bill Glassley's
13 results suggest otherwise over a 10,000 year time frame.
14 There's a very big difference. One percent change in
15 porosity which is what's in the PMR versus a 20 to 30 percent
16 change. This doesn't seem trivial to me, at all. So, again,
17 I say you're not sure you want to stick with that statement
18 there given what we've just heard.

19 VAN LUIK: I'll be happy to change it to credit right
20 now and move on.

21 KNOPMAN: It's not just--I mean, it's a question of what
22 you think, what the project thinks.

23 VAN LUIK: But, the point is is that Bill Glassley's
24 modeling has not been verified in any sense. So, it's an
25 interesting indicator that in the long-term you may get a

1 little bit more effect. But, I don't know what his
2 assumptions were as the thermal loading, how long it lasted,
3 etcetera. I don't think--well, unless he has really
4 communicated with his own PA people at Livermore, I don't
5 think that this is the particular design that he was looking
6 at, this kind of thermal loading. But, I'm not sure. So, we
7 would have to investigate that.

8 I think this is an important point. At this point
9 in time from the modeling that we have done on the
10 assumptions we have made, it looks like it has no impact. If
11 it shows that the modeling has an error or the assumptions
12 were wrong, of course, we will have to revisit the issue.

13 BULLEN: Other questions from Board members?

14 (No response.)

15 BULLEN: Board advisors?

16 KESSLER: I think this is a comment directed at Debra
17 more than Abe. Why I asked Bill the question I asked him was
18 to say is there an impact and he said, well, there's about a
19 20 or 30 percent reduction. And, that's why I asked Bo to
20 get up and say, well, what is that in terms of the current
21 uncertainties that are being brought along? I'm led to the
22 conclusion that Bill's results suggest that there isn't that
23 much of an impact. So, I beg to differ.

24 COHON: Wait a minute, hang on. I'm really glad you so
25 did, John, because it reveals a very key point. TSPA is

1 filled--you know much better than I--with big and small
2 assumptions and conclusions of just that sort. And, they add
3 up and add up, accumulate and accumulate, and suddenly, you
4 don't know what you got. So, when there are specific aspects
5 of the system that are modeled in two different ways and you
6 get discrepancies and it's an important mechanism for the
7 mountain for the project, I think, you're got to resolve
8 those differences and not say, well, it doesn't really
9 matter.

10 So, here, we have a PMR that says there's no--this
11 is not--we're not interpreting or making something up. This
12 is a quote. The change in whatever the parameter is--I don't
13 want to get the wrong one--that Glassley was talking about is
14 one percent. And, he says it's 20 to 30 percent. Because
15 the way processes are represented in the model matters
16 hugely, if we can't explain differences like that, then we
17 won't be able--no one will be able--to rely on TSPA. So, I
18 don't think you can only look at the bottom line, you know,
19 the dose, because there's so much going on in the model.

20 Do you see my point? I mean, it's just like saying
21 coupled processes don't matter because we don't have coupled
22 processes in the model. So, I mean, how do you show that it
23 has any impact, whatsoever? That's an oversimplified version
24 of what I'm saying.

25 SPEAKER: I don't think I said that.

1 COHON: No, of what I'm saying; not of what you're
2 saying.

3 BULLEN: Jerry, Bo Bodvarsson is standing right there
4 ready to respond. Bo, you want to say a word or two?

5 BODVARSSON: I just wanted to clarify a little bit which
6 I think is a little premature to jump into comparisons of
7 those true results. Number one, the most critical factor
8 that controls the T-H-C processes in my view are the mineral
9 assemblages are not the fluids. They are the fracture
10 porosity and heterogeneity of the medium. The main reason
11 that the UCPMR concludes that this is not an issue based on
12 our current models is that measurements have indicated up to
13 one percent fracture porosity. That means out of the
14 mountain, a whole percentage is void space in fractures.
15 That's a huge void space. And, therefore, in order to pluck
16 it up, you require a huge amount of mobilization of water
17 that dissolves solids that then participates and fills this
18 void space in very small type volumes. So, the
19 recommendation that since we do not know Bill Glassley's
20 parameters, especially the critical ones with regard to
21 spacial variability and absolute values of fracture
22 porosities and stuff like that, there's really nothing we can
23 compare.

24 BULLEN: Other comments from Board advisors or Board
25 staff? Alberto Sagüés?

1 SAGÜÉS: Yeah, maybe I didn't quite understand. Do I
2 understand that the Alloy-22 is considered to be so corrosion
3 resistant that whether there is or there isn't water on it,
4 it really doesn't matter because corrosion would not take
5 place?

6 VAN LUIK: If I conveyed that impression, it's probably
7 an overstatement. The model actually does take into account
8 water, but it seems like the difference that we see for a
9 hundred or two hundred years in the seepage, whether we have
10 heating or after the heating, that is what doesn't make any
11 difference in the performance of the overall system. So, the
12 Alloy-22 is corrosion resistant to the point where if there
13 is a little water or over 60 percent relative humidity which
14 allows, you know, sodium nitrate to collect water around it,
15 it doesn't make that much difference. In fact, a little bit
16 more water would help wash off the salts, maybe. But, the
17 modeling takes into account the extreme resistance of this
18 material to the type of environment that we expect.

19 Now, this morning, we heard that, you know, there
20 are other environments that might have a very different
21 effect on that material, but we have another talk coming up
22 that's going to talk about the design and perhaps that
23 particular question could be given to a person that's an
24 expert in that area; I'm not.

25 SAGÜÉS: But, you're still referring--it seems to me

1 that that statement over there, does that refer to the very
2 beginning like the first couple hundred years or is that--

3 VAN LUIK: It's a statement of the impact on 10,000 year
4 performance that we see no difference when we vary through
5 the parameter space that describes the variability that is
6 introduced by the heat loading. We see no difference in
7 10,000 year performance, you know, the dose performance, from
8 whether or not we have water mobilized by the heating for the
9 first couple of hundred years. The real answer is that when
10 you have a waste package that lasts thousands of years, what
11 happens the first hundred years is just prehistoric. It's
12 the conditions over the very long term that determine how the
13 material behaves.

14 SAGÜÉS: Although, I would say if you that if you get
15 into a condition whereby you're going to have a jet of hot
16 water dripping on a container of this type for a couple
17 hundred years, that's a situation that would give many
18 corrosion engineers maybe good cause in thinking about what
19 may happen under those conditions. And, I don't know if that
20 could be dismissed so lightly.

21 VAN LUIK: Well, perhaps so, but don't forget that we
22 have the titanium drip shield to absorb that first few
23 hundred years of impact and to divert it. So, that's the
24 reason that--I'm reporting what the model is doing here. It
25 may be that in the scenario that you envision of hot dripping

1 water on an actual waste package that that would be a
2 slightly different story. I don't know.

3 SAGÜÉS: So, we'll see what the next presentations will
4 bring then.

5 VAN LUIK: Yeah.

6 BULLEN: Okay. I think we've grilled Abe enough. We'll
7 let him hand the microphone over to Bob. Well, until
8 tomorrow; Abe will be back tomorrow for an encore
9 presentation.

10 ANDREWS: Okay. We're going to walk through now in the
11 next--how much time do we have, Dan? Half an hour, is that
12 right?

13 BULLEN: Yes, Bob, about a half hour.

14 ANDREWS: Okay, good. Walk through the current status
15 of the TSPA/SR and I'm going to treat this, more or less, as
16 an introduction to the seven talks that follow. It's the
17 seven talks that follow starting with Bo and ending with
18 Kathy Gaither tomorrow morning that talk to the technical
19 bases for the analyses and the models that feed into the
20 TSPA. So, I'm going to give the overview now of all the
21 individual components piece parts, if you will, of the
22 TSPA/SR, walk through the preliminary results, try to give a
23 sense for what does move the needle and what doesn't move the
24 needle of those TSPA/SR results, give a preliminary
25 sensitivity analysis, and the following talks, the following

1 seven talks, will go into a little more individual
2 sensitivity analyses for their individual component part.

3 I would be remiss if I stood up here and tried to
4 represent this as all my work. There's an incredible team of
5 very hard-working people who are still back there in
6 Albuquerque and Las Vegas still working hard, still doing the
7 runs, still analyzing the runs, still doing the plots, and
8 still documenting the results and checking the results. A
9 very talented team, that team has presented to you in other
10 situations and, in fact, none of them are here. They're all
11 still back there.

12 I'm going to walk through the process, you know,
13 some of the attributes, put it into overall context, walk
14 through the system parts, and then get into the results.

15 Starting with Slide 3, who was it? Dan, was it
16 your quote or Leon's that talked about knobs or something to
17 that effect. So, now, we have the TSPA wheel, as opposed to
18 the waterfall diagrams that we had in the VA, for a lot of
19 different reasons. One, we want to talk about the process of
20 how a TSPA is created and talk about the individual piece
21 parts, the individual component models that are required to
22 feed into that TSPA.

23 We'll start with the upper right hand corner with
24 the features, events, and processes. You know, if you've
25 read and looked at draft Part 63 and even 197, it talks

1 through the TSPA process, a well-known process applied
2 internationally, applied on WHIP, and applied here in
3 previous iterations. In previous iterations, we formally
4 didn't do the screening of the features, events, and
5 processes to determine those that need to be included in the
6 models and analyses and those that, for whatever reason--
7 perhaps it's a probability reason, perhaps it relates to salt
8 and we don't have a salt site, perhaps it's a consequence
9 kind of criteria--that particular feature, event, or process
10 can be screened out of the models. Therefore, no need to
11 include. So, therefore, the very first place anybody who
12 wants to build some of the key underlying assumptions that
13 are fed into the TSPA/SR model would be the family of 10
14 analyses model reports that describe the features, events,
15 and processes relevant to that particular component and how
16 it was screened in or out. And, if it is in, where is it in
17 and how is it in? You know, what analyses model is that
18 particular component part included in the TSPA? And, that
19 stuff is summarized in the process model reports. There's a
20 chapter, two usually, of each of the process model reports.
21 It walks through for that part, you know, what features,
22 events, and processes are in the TSPA/SR and which ones are
23 out of the TSPA/SR.

24 We then have done a lumping of the component parts
25 into those parts that relate to pretty high-probability

1 expectation of likelihood of occurrence and we've called
2 those the nominal scenario. So, all the individual component
3 parts and models and analyses that we really think are likely
4 to occur with their uncertainty are incorporated in that
5 nominal scenario in Part 63, and in the NRC parlance, it's a
6 scenario class, but that's just a little definition issue.
7 For us, we'll call it a scenario in here. The other one are
8 the low-probability, you know, close to the regulatory
9 concern, 10^{-4} , 10^{-3} , over the 10,000 years. So, 10^{-8} , 10^{-7} , and
10 you head the one main one this morning which is volcanism.

11 So, we have volcanism scenarios or scenario
12 classes. We then have based on those scenarios each of the
13 individual pieces of the system. We start with UZ flow and
14 start, just as we did in the VA with how water moves through
15 the system, how mass moves through the system, how energy
16 moves through the system, how information in global sense
17 moves through the system. Start with unsaturated zone flow.
18 Bo will talk at depth about that later on, I think,
19 immediately following me.

20 We then talk to the engineered barrier system
21 environments. This includes the things that you guys were
22 grilling Abe about just a little bit ago. What happens in
23 the environments, in the drift, and around the drift? It
24 affects seepage, it affects chemistry, it affects the stress
25 state, it affects rockfall, etcetera. Ernie Hardin will talk

1 to that one in greater detail.

2 We then have the waste package and drip shield
3 degradation. Pasu Pasupathi will talk about that in greater
4 detail.

5 The waste form degradation, once the package is
6 degraded and the waste form, no matter what it is, whether
7 it's a glass or commercial fuel or Naval fuel or a MOX kind
8 of fuel, it will degrade. Christine Stockman will talk
9 tomorrow morning about that in greater detail.

10 We then have transport first through the engineered
11 barrier system and Ernie will talk about that. Then, through
12 the unsaturated zone, Bo will talk to that and the model
13 associated with that. Then, we get to the saturated zone and
14 Bruce Robinson tomorrow will talk about that one. The
15 biosphere, John Schmitt will talk about the conceptualization
16 of the biosphere, the critical group water usage of the
17 critical group, the assumptions there for the TSPA/SR.

18 And, finally, my volcanic scenario coming along
19 here impacts all of the above. If I have that event occur,
20 it's no longer what I think it is right now and how I think
21 it's going to be extrapolated over the next 10,000 years.
22 Other things happen, other processes occur, and Kathy Gaither
23 will talk to those. We've already talked this morning about
24 the probability aspects of the volcanic scenario; Kathy will
25 talk about the consequence aspect of the volcanic scenario.

1 I will marry those two things when I get to the results and
2 talk about the risk associated with that particular scenario.

3 We often decide we have this other one, human
4 intrusion. And, as Abe already talked to you about, there's
5 a number of different performance measures required in the
6 draft regulations on both the individual does, expected
7 annual dose, the groundwater protection, concentration in the
8 groundwater at the point of compliance, and the human
9 intrusion dose.

10 The next slide would put some of these same aspects
11 in words. I was going to skip over that.

12 What I have in the following five or six are just
13 kind of conceptual pictures, you know, to sort of orient
14 yourself to where the individual speakers, the next seven
15 speakers, are going to be. They're at their individual part
16 of the system and everything gets integrated in that wheel
17 that's in that total system model.

18 Starting first with the attributes, the attributes
19 are the same as we had in the repository safety strategy. We
20 have three which are the same as were in the VA. So, keeping
21 water off the waste, the package life time itself,
22 mobilization and transport, and finally the effects or
23 potential effects of disruptive events.

24 The next slide walks through, just as was done in
25 repository safety strategy, we have three and the VA. We've

1 broken the system not only into nine process model reports,
2 but into individual pieces that contribute to each of those
3 process model reports. In the repository safety strategy Rev
4 3, they were called the factors, I believe. In repository
5 safety strategy Rev 4 and in the TSPA/Sr being drafted right
6 now, we're trying to relate them as they're more models. So,
7 we're calling them process model factors.

8 Under each one of these process model factors are a
9 family of the analyses model reports. The entire family, I
10 believe, that TRB has been briefed on of 122 analyses model
11 reports are feeding into each one of these. You know, for
12 example, under this simple little bullet called waste package
13 degradation, there's probably, Pasu, I don't know, 19 or 20
14 analyses model reports on the individual component parts that
15 feed into that bullet. In in-drift physical chemical
16 environments, you know, what is the environment in the drift?
17 You know, what's the chemical environment, the hydrologic,
18 thermal environment, the stress environment, the degradation
19 of the rockfall environments? There's probably eight or 10
20 analyses model reports that provide the scientific bases and
21 all of the assumptions that are tied to it and there's lack
22 of some information that relate to the feeds into that--oops,
23 well, this is kaput now. So, we need some more batteries.

24 Walking through the individual parts, we have those
25 that Bo will talk about; you know, the water above the drift

1 and how much water gets in the drift, those aspects of the
2 total system. The next slide are the ones that Ernie is
3 going to focus in on. You know, the environments inside the
4 drift, what are those environments, what are the
5 uncertainties in the environments, what are the
6 conceptualizations and conservatisms, if any are included in
7 those environments.

8 Pasu will then talk to the degradation of what
9 happens inside the drift, the degradation of the engineered
10 barriers that are there; both the drip shield and the
11 package.

12 Christine has a lot to talk about. There's a lot
13 of complex processes that occur inside the package, chemical
14 processes, hydrologic processes, not so many mechanical, but
15 chemical and hydrologic and thermal processes that occur
16 inside the package before the waste is mobilized and
17 available for transport. She will walk through some of
18 those. Then, we have the transport back through the
19 engineered barriers, back through the natural barriers,
20 ultimately to the point of potential compliance which in the
21 draft regulations is at 20km downgradient from the repository
22 site.

23 Kevin talked a little bit about volcanism one this
24 morning. This is a conceptualization of some of the
25 processes occurring from the volcanic event. It can be

1 volcanic events that interrupt and intercept the repository
2 that degrade the packages and there can be volcanic events
3 that lead to direct extrusive events through a volcanic
4 conduit and then, you know, an ash deposition. Kathy will
5 walk through the aspects of the consequences given the
6 probability is sufficient to be of regulatory concern.

7 The next one is just a very schematic picture of
8 what happens in the human intrusion scenario which is a
9 requirement in 197 and 63 and 963. So, to give you a
10 conceptual idea of what's going on.

11 Before I get to the results, I think it's very
12 important--and I think the Board asked for this in Leon's
13 opening comments excellently read by Dan--to talk to the
14 uncertainty, and to the extent possible, some of the
15 conservatism included in the TSPA/SR model. It's hard to do
16 that in a few slides. It's probably even hard for the
17 individual presenters that follow me in 10 or 15 more slides
18 to give that adequate justice. Adequate justice is in the,
19 unfortunately, I hate to tell you--in the 122 analyses model
20 reports in which those assumptions are elucidated and
21 discussed. The significance of those assumptions may not be
22 elucidated and discussed in those. All the individual
23 analysts or principle investigator or scientist or modeler is
24 doing is saying these are the assumptions I have made because
25 of perhaps the complexity, because of perhaps lack of data,

1 or whatever. And, I think, they are reasonable because--
2 whatever their reason for because is. And, it's important to
3 point out that all of that uncertainty and all the
4 variability and all the conservatism if it's in there are
5 housed in that family of analyses model reports.

6 Within each of those component models, as
7 appropriate, the analysts then model or have decisions to
8 make. In the face of uncertainty in virtually every one out
9 there, there is some degree of uncertainty. That analyst or
10 modeler made some decisions, some judgments that are in that
11 analysis model report. Climate states, how many climate
12 states fully capture the range of possible climate states?
13 The assumption is three. It seems reasonable. They give a
14 nice, strong basis for it in the analysis model report
15 written by the survey of why three is adequate for the
16 regulatory time period and what those values are and the
17 uncertainty in those values.

18 How many infiltration states are appropriate?
19 Well, the answer again came to be three, a nice round number;
20 high, medium, and low. The bases for that again are in the
21 analysis model report from the survey. What range of
22 permeabilities are appropriate for evaluating seepage? You
23 know, every aspect of the system. How far above the drift do
24 you want to measure seepage before you evaluate how much
25 could seep into the drift? Could it be 1m, could it have

1 been 10m, somebody chose 5m, gave a basis for it in their
2 analysis model report. Does it make a difference? I'm going
3 to say, no, but can I show you a plot that shows that it
4 makes no difference today? No, I can't, unfortunately. So,
5 that degree of complexity, the degree of how the individual
6 analysis model report incorporated the uncertainty or in some
7 cases put some conservatism into the analysis because they
8 really didn't know or to put a full PDF encompassing what
9 they really felt from max to min, they had a hard time
10 justifying. So, they went with a conservative assumption and
11 there are some of those.

12 Although I can't do it justice in a few minutes,
13 what I've done in the next three viewgraphs is walk through
14 each of those component process model factors, which are
15 correlated to the attributes of repository safety or
16 attributes of the total system, and tried to give in a very
17 kind of bird'seye view with a little check mark is
18 uncertainty or variability in that particular component
19 included in the TSPA. And, I also have a very simple,
20 straightforward set of comments on aspects that relate to
21 some detail of that particular part.

22 Let's take an example. Probably the example Abe
23 just had on the board is as good an example as any with no
24 check marks. You know, you might say, my gosh, you have no
25 uncertainty in coupled processes and its effects on seepage?

1 No, that's not the case, at all. We have tremendous
2 uncertainty. I think Bill's presentation and a discussion we
3 just had a few minutes ago point to some of that uncertainty.
4 We have conceptual uncertainty, we have parameter
5 uncertainty, we have process uncertainty, we have scale
6 uncertainty, we have time uncertainty, we have every
7 uncertainty. We have thermodynamic uncertainty. We have
8 every uncertainty you might want to have to say, well, what
9 range of possible seepages could you get from all these
10 complex coupled processes? So, in that particular instance,
11 the analysis model report originators and there were probably
12 two or three of them in that particular area chose to take a
13 fairly simple and reasonable and also a little bit
14 conservative assumption. They said let me just take the flux
15 from my thermal-hydrology model which we have a 600
16 locations--you guys were presenting that all or, I guess, a
17 subset. Not the whole Board was involved in that video
18 conference, right; just a subset? Okay. A subset of you
19 were exposed to all 600 columns in their glory. Spatial
20 variability in thermal-hydrologic response, uncertainty in
21 the thermal-hydrologic response, all of which gets folded up
22 into a PDF of percolation as a function of space and time.
23 Now, which is uncertain? All the analysts did is say, okay,
24 for analysis purposes, I don't know whether the porosity
25 changes 20 percent or 1 percent or 5 percent and nor do I

1 really care because I'm going to take that flux well-above
2 that zone and apply it to that seepage model.

3 Is it unreal? Oh, my gosh, it's unreal. Do you
4 expect that to occur? No, I expect the drift scale test to
5 say what fraction of flux above the repository actually does
6 into the repository. Can I answer that question now with any
7 degree of confidence or could that--it's not me, it's the
8 analysis model report owner who has to do that; not me. And,
9 the answer was, no, it can't. So, the easiest thing to do,
10 the simplest thing to do and most appropriate thing to do was
11 to take that conservative assumption and that's what was
12 done. Do I know what the impact of it is? Do I know if it
13 was .1m or 10m or double the flux or quadrupled the flux?
14 Would that make a difference? No, I can't tell you the
15 answer to that right now. My gut is it's no difference, but
16 I can't show you a plot that shows no difference.

17 There's some other examples in here on the next
18 page. Not to steal Christine's thunder any, but for the DOE
19 spent nuclear fuel, a lot of uncertainty there. You know,
20 some good data, a lot of good data collected at PNL on waste
21 form characteristics and degradation characteristics,
22 particular of the N-reactor fuel, but some conservative
23 assumptions were made. A lot of complexity, tremendous
24 variability; there's 250 something waste fuel types. So, it
25 was just easier and more appropriate to bound the degradation

1 rates of all the DOE fuels and to take no credit for any DOE
2 fuel cladding. So, that's the assumption that's in TSPA/SR.

3 These individual ones, you can check me when Bo and
4 Pasu present whether they're going to capture the same checks
5 and comments. But, capture the uncertainty that's included i
6 the TSPA and some of the conservatisms that are also included
7 in the TSPA.

8 Let's go to the results. As Abe already pointed
9 out, these are preliminary with the exception of VA. Those
10 have been out for awhile, but we've put the same little
11 caveat words down at the bottom.

12 Let's start with VA. There's a lot of results in
13 TSPA/VA. The best comparable result to the ones I'm going to
14 be showing you from here on out are in Figure 4-28. We had
15 two different ways of showing doses in the TSPA/VA. If you
16 remember, that was in the middle of summer of 1998 and NRC
17 was in the process of preparing proposed Part 63. We had
18 some indications from presentations; I think, some of those
19 to the Board on the way of doing the calculation NRC expected
20 to put forward in Part 63. So, we did the calculation that
21 way once in the VA and it's that figure. I didn't give you
22 the page number, but it's that figure in TSPA/VA. All the
23 other plots of TSPA/VA are generated in a slightly different
24 way of doing the dose plots. So, this is equivalent that I'm
25 showing; 95th percentile, mean, medians, and 5th percentiles

1 based on the TSPA/VA design, the TSPA/VA models, and
2 assumptions and conservatisms if they were there. You know,
3 if you want to zero in on a few numbers, you know, the mean
4 of the dose out there at 80,000 or 90,000 years was 20mrem/yr
5 or so per year; 95th percentile, of course, above that.

6 The next plot is the first of the nominal scenario
7 class TSPA/SR results. I've done two things--actually, three
8 things differently. One is to show each of the individual
9 realizations that resulted in a dose consequence to that
10 critical group. That's all those thin little lines that are
11 kind of hidden behind the thick colored lines. The other
12 thing we've done is still show the 95th, mean, median, and
13 5th to give, you know, the audience a range for what kind of
14 range of possible outcomes are we talking about? You know,
15 what did all that uncertainty and all of those check marks
16 that were on the previous slides, what was--when you
17 propagate them through the system, what is the impact on dose
18 consequence and you can see--

19 BULLEN: Just a quick question in clarification since
20 this came up. How do you get the mean greater than the 95th
21 percentile? Is it heavily weighted on that 5 percent?

22 ANDREWS: Yep.

23 BULLEN: It really is then. So, those 5 percent really
24 drive everything that's--

25 ANDREWS: Yeah. Suppose you had 95 zeros and 5 non-

1 zeros.

2 BULLEN: Okay.

3 ANDREWS: Your mean is still non-zero and it's very
4 close to that, you know, 95th percentile. In fact, in many
5 cases, the mean is higher than the 95th percentile. So, low-
6 probability events or features are driving the mean. And,
7 when we get to volcanism, we'll see a very low-probability
8 event driving the mean of the dose response.

9 BULLEN: Okay, thank you.

10 ANDREWS: This is 300 realizations. Was that question?
11 Just as a clarification point, yeah.

12 Let's talk about the next slide. Slide 21 talks to
13 the nuclides--well, maybe I should have stuck. Well, I can do
14 it on here; that's okay. The mean of the dose response at
15 that 100,000 years--remember before it was 20mrem/yr or so--
16 now, it's 60 or 70, something like that, mrem/yr at 100,000
17 years. This plot, I'm sorry the colors didn't come in as
18 well on the screen, but hopefully they're a little better in
19 your handout. It illustrates another, you know, conclusion
20 that was reached in the VA. That at earlier times--and
21 early, of course, is point of some--to hear talk of all the
22 geologists as early as 70,000 or 80,000 years and for others,
23 maybe early, that's way out there in time. But, at earlier
24 times, the dose is dominated by the highly soluble, poorly
25 retarded, in fact, hardly retarded at all, nuclides like

1 iodine and technetium. Same as in the VA; iodine, technetium
2 are dominating the dose for the first tens of thousands of
3 years. After that time, it's the less soluble slightly
4 retarded, but not completely immobile nuclides; in
5 particular, neptunium 237 and the colloiddally transported
6 plutonium. These plutoniums, the 239 and we have the other
7 plutoniums in there, too, but this is the dominant one, are
8 being transported colloiddally through the system. So, again,
9 it's iodine and technetium early-on, neptunium and plutonium
10 later one just as in the VA.

11 The next one just to--because, you know, some
12 people might have said, boy, that curve still is kind of
13 rising, you know, to the right of the 100,000 year plot.
14 What happens as you go later out in time? And, you see the
15 dose is still rising for these preliminary analyses and
16 peaking at a few hundred mrem/yr for the mean out at a few
17 hundred thousand years. That's not that different than the
18 VA. The VA had, I don't know what it was, 200 or 300mrem/yr
19 at 300,000 years being driven by a glacial climate change
20 that occurred at that particular time.

21 This is an interesting plot because there's several
22 interesting things to pull off of here. One is--you know, if
23 I pick a particular time slice and let's pick the one at
24 100,000 years because I put the dashed line at 100,000 years,
25 the spread, the total variance of the possible outcomes is

1 probably six or seven orders of magnitude, you know, of
2 potential dose. It's a huge potential variability of does
3 attributed at that time period. As you go a little bit
4 further out in time, you know, out here at 200,000 or 300,000
5 years when now most of the packages have failed, you're
6 driven by two or three things. You're driven by neptunium
7 solubility, you're driven by how much water got in that
8 drift, and how much water got out of that drift. That's
9 about what you're driven by at peak. So, the variability,
10 the uncertainty has gone from seven orders of magnitude at
11 100,000 years to three orders of magnitude, roughly, and
12 maybe a little less than that, even; two orders of magnitude
13 at 300,000 years.

14 The nuclides shown on the next slide is all
15 neptunium, you know, at the peak or most of it is neptunium.
16 Some of the thoriums are coming in, some of the plutoniums
17 do come in, but it is dominated by neptunium.

18 The next slide, 24, everything up until now has
19 been nominal. So that what's likely to occur with
20 probabilities close to 1, like .9999, that kind of number,
21 now we come to the one that was talked about this morning,
22 probability of occurrence of about 1.6×10^{-8} per year or
23 1.6×10^{-4} over the 10,000 year time of regulatory concern.
24 And, we have two things going on here. Kathy, I think, when
25 she presents it tomorrow is going to break it out a little

1 bit better. This is more of an introduction for her talk
2 than to go into the details. The two things going on is over
3 the first, you know, 7,000, 8,000, 10,000 years were
4 dominated by the eruptive scenario event. So, the volcanic
5 event and true to the repository and continued on to the
6 surface, created a little ash cone or cone of some dimensions
7 and ash cloud which was transported 20 kilometers to the
8 south.

9 I should point out I think I have in my list of
10 assumptions on that three slides. There was a lot of
11 complexity about which way does the wind blow? Which way
12 does the wind blow when the volcanic event occurs? Well, who
13 knows? You have a wind rose, it's a reasonable wind rose.
14 You could factor that wind rose into your analysis, but this
15 particular set of calculations just says the wind blows
16 south. The wind blows south. So, that event occurred and
17 the wind blew south and the ash is sitting out there 20
18 kilometers and is respirable and is incorporated in the soil
19 and incorporated in the crops and it's breathed, etcetera.
20 So, that's the first, you know, 7,000 to 8,000 you're
21 dominated by that scenario.

22 After that, you're dominated by the intrusive
23 scenarios. The event occurred. It disrupted the package,
24 disrupted the drip shield, disrupted the cladding because the
25 temperature of that event, Kathy will tell you tomorrow, is I

1 don't know what, 1200 degrees C. My package wasn't designed
2 for 1200 degrees C to maintain its function, even though Hugh
3 is going to say, no, it can still behave fine and there's a
4 lot of uncertainty associated with that. The assumption here
5 is when it saw that 1200 degrees C, the package no longer
6 performed. It's gone and the cladding is gone and the drip
7 shield is gone.

8 WILLIAMS: Just a quick clarification. Why is this so
9 much less than the nominal scenarios? Why is this number so
10 much less than the nominal scenarios? It seems to be less
11 than a milligram compared to much bigger than that.

12 ANDREWS: Yeah, the main thing that's going on here,
13 this dose rate already has factored in the probability of
14 that event occurring. So, it's factored in the 1.6×10^{-8} per
15 year or the 1.6×10^{-4} over 10,000 years. By whatever
16 probability was sampled. As Kevin showed you, there's a PDF
17 of probability. There's uncertainty on the probability of
18 this thing occurring. That uncertainty is in that model.
19 So, that PDF is being sampled. So, you get this kind of dose
20 response; you know, the smooth curves being the eruptive
21 event, the more coarse curves being a randomly timing of the
22 intrusive event.

23 If we go to Slide 25, we see the effects of
24 essentially combining the two scenario classes, the
25 disruptive events with the low-probability and the nominal

1 features, events, and processes with the probability of close
2 to 1, but not exactly 1. So, you see the mean of the curve
3 does extend, you know, to prior to 10,000 years. That curve
4 is the mean of the curve driven by those low-probability
5 disruptive events. This one, Dan, going back to your
6 question, I mean, this one is far exceeding the 95th
7 percentile. 95th percentile is close to zero; in fact, it is
8 less than zero--not less than zero, it is zero; you can't be
9 less than zero. It is zero at 10,000 years, but the mean is
10 significantly above that because you're driven by a low-
11 probability, high-consequence event.

12 Okay. That's just one part of TSPA showing a few
13 curves and, you know, some squiggly lines, but that's only
14 the first part. I think the Board has been instrumental and
15 pushing, and I think correctly so, to understand
16 fundamentally what drove it. In Leon's opening remarks read
17 by Dan, it was what moved the needle or what knobs moved
18 things? They're doing a lot of different things, you know,
19 to try to evaluate that within the context of the models and
20 analyses that are incorporated in the TSPA/SR.

21 First, we're doing just normal statistical analyses
22 and a lot of different ways of doing those statistical
23 analyses; simple regression type analyses and more
24 sophisticated analyses to look at what drove the extremes of
25 the distribution. Those are very illuminating. To

1 understand what drove the top 10 percentile to be that top 10
2 percentile, it's called classification analyses and there's
3 regression that can be done after that. So, you can attack
4 this thing from different angles to try to understand within
5 the parameter space that you have--and there's 240 or so
6 parameters that are uncertain and being sampled in these
7 distributions. What is making it contribute to the variance
8 and what drives the highs and lows of distribution?

9 Another thing that we're doing and you'll see some
10 plots of these by the individual presenters are sensitivity
11 analyses very analogous to what we did in the VA, except now
12 every time we do any analysis, we're doing multiple
13 realization analysis. We're doing it in the way Part 63
14 asked us to do it, not in the way we did it in the VA. So,
15 it's the expected value of the output, not the expected value
16 of the input. It's the expected value of the dose
17 consequence or dose risk, not the expected value of input
18 parameters that drove it. It's a key distinction. It just
19 adds a little computational burden. We don't have 1200
20 processors like Bill does, but we have enough processors to
21 do this efficiently over the time frame that we've been
22 allotted.

23 Then, we get to some barrier importance analyses,
24 very elucidating, to understand the individual barrier
25 contribution, you know, to total system. How much does the

1 overall UZ flow, not just an individual part of it, but the
2 overall UZ flow, how much did that barrier contribute to
3 overall system performance whether you degrade it or whether
4 you enhance it. You know, what kind of range of things do
5 you have? And, some of these will be discussed in the
6 individual process model talks that follow starting with Bo
7 and going on. I want to give those guys a little out right
8 from the get-go. They have plots in there and they're TSPA
9 plots of what moves the needle. They saw the plots when we
10 saw the plots which was two weeks ago or a week ago. Well,
11 we have Bo his a little late, but everybody else had them
12 quite a while ago. So, understanding what is exactly causing
13 the move of a needle, you know, the subsystem contributions
14 to moving a needle, we haven't done all those analyses yet.
15 I mean, as Abe pointed out, this is work-in-progress trying
16 to give you the benefit of that work-in-progress, but the
17 work is not done. So, if you get hard on Bo, I'll stand up
18 and try to defend him as he maybe doesn't understand exactly
19 the curves. And, we maybe not have fully analyzed some of
20 the curves and there's still other analyses going on. You
21 know, we're neutralizing things, we're still evaluating
22 significance of individual component barriers.

23 The last type of barrier importance analyses has
24 been reserved for a special talk tomorrow right after lunch,
25 I think, Dennis, right, on the current status of the

1 repository safety strategy Rev 4. And, just as in Rev 3 and
2 a little bit in Rev 2, a barrier neutralization analyses have
3 been used to try to elucidate what's driving the system and
4 what's important to the overall system response. Dennis will
5 talk to that.

6 One example of the regression analyses are taking
7 those 300 curves that we had for the nominal performance and
8 doing simple regression analyses on them. When we do that,
9 the first five parameters pop up as explained, the spread,
10 the variance of the results. Of those five, four of them
11 relate to the package and each one of those four relates to
12 what's going on at the weld and the degradation of the weld.
13 It's the stress profile at the well and the corrosion rate
14 of the base metal in the vicinity of that weld.

15 With that kind of information, we then go in and
16 do--and I'm going to have an example of how we do a barrier
17 importance analysis. There's uncertainty in every one of
18 those aspects and more, you know, associated with the
19 package. So, we go into those particular component parts
20 that drive the uncertainty and the degradation of the package
21 and uncertainty in the rest of the system, too, but let's
22 just focus on one example which is the package example, and
23 we look at the 95th and 5th percentiles of those
24 distributions and then rerun, you know, the whole model.
25 When we do that, as an example, we get Slide 29. That black

1 line is the mean of the curve that I showed you before. The
2 red line shows what happens if I choose these things at their
3 95th percentile which is at the worst end of their
4 distribution--not at the worst, it's towards the worst end.
5 And, if I went to the 5th percentile, I'd have no packages
6 failing. So, if I really reduce the uncertainty in the
7 stress profiles and some of those other parameters that
8 relate to the package, I'd have no packages from the models,
9 from the analyses model reports that are incorporated in the
10 TSPA, no packages failing in the first 100,000 years. Kind
11 of the Swedish concept.

12 Okay. The next slide just talks to some of the
13 barrier importance analyses that will be presented in the
14 following talks. And, because the list was changing, this
15 might not be the final list that actually is going to be
16 presented, but they kind of give you an idea of the types of
17 analyses that will follow to help to explain what drove the
18 system response.

19 Abe already talked to the technical improvements on
20 Slide 32 and the process improvements on Slide 33. I just
21 want to reiterate on Slide 34 that it's a work-in-progress.
22 Clearly, we haven't stressed everything in the system yet.
23 Every issue or uncertainty that we can evaluate probably has
24 not been evaluated yet. It might be in there, but we haven't
25 maybe evaluated the significance of it. I mean, that's work

1 still to be done. But, I think that's probably as good a
2 point as I need to stop and entertain any questions.

3 BULLEN: Thank you, Bob. We'll start out with questions
4 from the Board. I'll start with Jerry.

5 COHON: There's a lot to digest here and it's also
6 complicated enough that it's hard sometimes to put into
7 intelligible statements just what it is I'm trying to get at.
8 So, please, be patient with me as I try to get to the core
9 issues.

10 First of all, I guess, I have a question about
11 nomenclature. All of your horsetail diagrams have as their
12 vertical axis dose rate, but you really mean some kind of
13 expected value of dose rate, don't you?

14 ANDREWS: The mean curve on there--I forget what color
15 we made that; black, in the end, I think--the mean curve is
16 the expected value of the dose.

17 COHON: Dose, okay. Let me get specific. Let's talk
18 about the volcanic scenario. Is that dose rate in the same
19 sense that you use dose rate for the nominal case?

20 ANDREWS: Yeah.

21 COHON: Even though it's weighted by the probability of
22 the occurrence of a volcano?

23 ANDREWS: Yeah, because in a nominal, I took those
24 curves and the correct mathematically down to the fourth
25 decimal point, would be to take those nominal curves multiply

1 them by .9999.

2 COHON: All right. Well, that's another question.

3 ANDREWS: As opposed to 1.

4 COHON: Oh, okay. Well, let me go back. I would never
5 use nominal in that way. I mean, nominal means, to me, and
6 we're getting I think partially into nomenclature and I'm not
7 sure it's a technical issue, but nominal means to me in some
8 sense an expected outcome, a normal outcome. Doesn't it mean
9 that to you?

10 ANDREWS: I think it means--to me, it means it's my
11 expectations of the models, the highest probability models.
12 But, each one of those has uncertainty. That's the whole
13 family of horsetail.

14 COHON: Right. No, no, no, wait a minute. The nominal
15 case, I'm assuming, means you take your 200 and some odd
16 parameters and each one has a nominal value. Is that what
17 that means?

18 ANDREWS: No, not in this--

19 COHON: No?

20 ANDREWS: No.

21 COHON: No, of course not, because you're sampling from
22 a distribution.

23 ANDREWS: I'm sampling from that distribution. I mean,
24 I could call that one case, you know, the expected value of
25 the input, the expected value of my models and parameters.

1 COHON: Yeah. No, you're right. Okay, good. I just
2 clarified or we clarified together one of my confusions. The
3 sense that that's nominal is only nominal in that it's not
4 volcanic, right?

5 ANDREWS: That's correct.

6 COHON: I don't like nominal. I really think it's a bad
7 word. I just do.

8 ANDREWS: I appreciate--I mean, it may be--

9 COHON: I'm not arguing with what you're doing; I'm
10 arguing with what you're calling it.

11 ANDREWS: The semantic, okay. Can you think of a
12 better--we tried base case in the VA and base case left
13 people kind of queasy, too.

14 COHON: All right. But, you see my point about how
15 nominal is interpreted?

16 ANDREWS: Yeah.

17 COHON: Dan, I've just got one or two more.

18 BULLEN: Go ahead, that's fine. We've got a lot of
19 time.

20 MR. COHON: Oh, yeah? Okay. I'll keep floundering
21 around here. Why 300 realizations?

22 ANDREWS: We did 100, 300, and 500 and the means are not
23 dissimilar; they're all on top of each other. They're not
24 exactly on top of each other, but statistically they're on
25 top of each other. So, we chose 300 as the most

1 representative. And, also, 300 was the most meaningful for
2 getting statistical regression output. When we were running
3 100, even though the mean was stable from the total system
4 perspective, the mean was stable. Doing the regression
5 analyses was giving us spurious statistical regressions. So,
6 300 was giving very meaningful regressions and 500 was giving
7 the same results as 300. So, 300 became computationally
8 efficient, yet sufficient for our purposes.

9 COHON: Could we go to #15? This is your table with the
10 check marks which I think is going to be very useful. But,
11 actually, what I want to talk about is, in particular, the
12 issue with regard to the coupled effects on seepage. Now, I
13 want to make sure I understand this. When you choose the
14 percolation flux at 5m above the crown of the drift, are you
15 then assuming all of that enters the drift?

16 ANDREWS: No.

17 COHON: Oh.

18 ANDREWS: No, that's--

19 COHON: What are you doing with it?

20 ANDREWS: I take that flux which is now a certain number
21 of millimeters per year of average water which is a function
22 of time because I've heated the system, I apply that to the
23 seepage model.

24 COHON: Okay.

25 ANDREWS: And, the seepage model has fracture

1 characteristics and uncertainty and variability and fracture
2 characteristics like permeability and suctions and things
3 like that--

4 COHON: It's just isn't in coupled processes.

5 ANDREWS: Not coupled, yeah.

6 COHON: Okay, fine. I'm done. Thanks.

7 BULLEN: Priscilla Nelson?

8 NELSON: No.

9 BULLEN: Oh, no? Priscilla Nelson?

10 NELSON: My questions are too stupid.

11 BULLEN: No, there are no stupid questions.

12 NELSON: Yeah, there are. Okay. This was a joint
13 question. I need help. On Page 28, I've been trying to
14 grapple with this barrier importance analysis and understand
15 what uncertainty importance factor is. But, on 28, when you
16 have a case of a mean being graded in the 95th percentile,
17 what do you do then when you're doing this analysis? Do you
18 use the mean?

19 ANDREWS: Let's see, on any of my input--this is an
20 input to TSPA. I'm not sure in my input distributions I have
21 a mean that's greater than my 95th percentile. I do not
22 believe we do, but I should go check. It is possible that
23 the distribution is so long distributed that the mean is
24 greater than the 95th percentile. I don't think I have any
25 of those, but I will ask the folks back in Las Vegas and

1 Albuquerque whether that occurs. I don't think it does.

2 NELSON: But, if you did, you would use the mean instead
3 of the 95th?

4 ANDREWS: No, we probably would have said go use the
5 95th percentile. In the methodology that we chose, we said
6 let's go with the 95th percentile. I probably should check
7 that, though. Good point.

8 NELSON: Okay. Can you tell me on the preceding slide,
9 tell me again what is the uncertainty importance factor as
10 you've calculated it there?

11 ANDREWS: This is--what we're trying to do is describe
12 what drove the total variance on the output where the
13 variance in this case was the 100--well, we did it at each
14 successive time after 40,000 years. So, I had a total
15 distribution of dose at each time slice; 40,000, 60,000,
16 80,000, 100,000 years. So, I have total variance. Now, I'm
17 trying to explain what parameter variance helps explain that
18 total dose variance the best.

19 RUNNELLS: They don't have to add up to 1?

20 ANDREWS: No.

21 RUNNELLS: This is Priscilla's question. They don't
22 have to add up to 1?

23 ANDREWS: No, that isn't what we're--the first case is
24 other parameters that didn't pass a certain screen that are
25 not plotted; you know, kind of in the noise here. When

1 you're in the noise, you don't know whether it's real noise
2 and means something and you should look at it as meaning
3 something or whether it's just statistical noise.

4 BULLEN: I have a couple follow-on. Do you want to go
5 to just the immediate previous slide, #26, and maybe we can
6 talk a little semantics here to sort of straighten my mind
7 out. I understand a sensitivity analysis where you can set
8 individual parameter to the 5th or the 95th percentile and
9 then take a look at the response of the total system to that
10 calculation. When you do a barrier importance analysis or a
11 barrier neutralization analysis, I guess, the question that I
12 have for you is then are you picking, for example, all 5th
13 percentiles that would mean that you're driving it all in one
14 direction or are there cases where the 5th percentile of one
15 and the 95th percentile of another counteract each other and
16 so you kind of ended up with a 50 percentile, anyway?

17 ANDREWS: Yeah. What we have to do is look at each
18 parameter and say which one? Is it the 5th percentile that's
19 worse or is the 95th percentile that's worse? Sometimes,
20 it's 95th, 95th, 5th, 95th that you're combining to get the
21 worse performance. It just depends on distribution.

22 BULLEN: Okay.

23 ANDREWS: On the neutralization, you're going outside of
24 those statistical distributions to begin with. You are
25 outside the bounds of the zero to 100 percentile.

1 BULLEN: And, maybe Dennis will explain this tomorrow
2 when we talk about RSS Rev 4, but when you talk about a
3 barrier neutralization, is the barrier completely removed or
4 is it--how do you handle a barrier neutralization or will
5 that be better explained tomorrow?

6 ANDREWS: Oh, I think, Dennis might go through that
7 tomorrow. We're removing the function of it; we may not be
8 removing it physically, but the function of it.

9 BULLEN: Okay. That again will be something we'll look
10 forward to because sometimes we have difficulty grasping
11 those concepts.

12 Knopman and then Wong?

13 KNOPMAN: Bob, on 15, 16, and 17, I just want to make
14 sure I understand the significance of a check mark. If
15 there's a check mark in the column for quantified uncertainty
16 or quantified variability, that means if not used someone
17 else could give us the order of magnitude or the range of
18 uncertainty surrounding a particular parameter or set of
19 parameters that describe the--that's somehow associated with
20 that process model. Is that right?

21 ANDREWS: That's correct.

22 KNOPMAN: So, we can do that with you. We could get a
23 whole--we could fill in these blanks?

24 ANDREWS: Yeah. One of the things I put in the backup
25 was kind of a list also by process model factor of the key--

1 it's not the complete set--but the key input parameters and
2 the uncertainty is at the parameter level, you know. That
3 little check mark is just kind of a rollup, you know,
4 simplifications, you know, shorthand. But, the key is down
5 at the parameter level in developing the PDFs or the
6 variability down there.

7 KNOPMAN: All right.

8 ANDREWS: So, yeah, in the AMRs or the individual
9 presenters as they come up, you know, could go into which
10 ones of these were uncertain and which aspect of the
11 parameter was an uncertain input parameter.

12 KNOPMAN: So, these are all parameter uncertainties as
13 posed--these charts are not intended to try to represent any
14 model uncertainty?

15 ANDREWS: Well, you know, now, we're going to get into a
16 little semantics. The infiltration--as far as PA is
17 concerned, it's incorporated as a parameter. If you say what
18 underlies that distribution--you know, climate is as good an
19 example as any--you might say really was uncertainty that he
20 had, Rick Forester of the Survey had, in his model, in his
21 representation, but as far as its incorporation in TSPA, it
22 becomes parameterized. The probability is X of this climate
23 state, Y of this climate state. So, parameterize, you know,
24 in the abstraction.

25 WONG: Priscilla felt bad about her question. So, my

1 question is intended to make you look good.

2 A number of Board meetings ago, Mark Nutt gave a
3 presentation on GOLDSIM (phonetic). It was portrayed at that
4 time that GOLDSIM was designed to be a simplified model for
5 the public to use or maybe even for me to use to understand
6 what's going on. And, yet, in here, I see you've used
7 GOLDSIM to do the calculations. So, has GOLDSIM increased in
8 its importance or complexity or have you decided to choose a
9 simpler route?

10 ANDREWS: No, I think--let's make a distinction, I
11 think, between GOLDSIM, the piece of software that we are
12 using and a lot of other people are using; WIPP is using it
13 now a little bit, the Spanish are using it, the French are
14 using it. The GOLDSIM software can be as complex as the
15 science dictates or requires. It can be very simple; you
16 know, a simple response surface kind of representation or it
17 can be very complex with a lot of complex models that are
18 being called. In this particular application for TSPA/SR, it
19 is pretty complete. Those 122 AMRs which are supporting this
20 thing are kind of fed in through about 30 or 40 AMRs that are
21 the final leads into TSPA. In order to honor those 122, it
22 had to be a fairly complete and, in fact, fairly complex
23 integrated system. All those little arrows of how
24 information flows ended up being fairly complex. Each one of
25 those component parts could be boiled down to a more simpler

1 representation. You know, SZ transport that Bruce will talk
2 to you about tomorrow is a fairly complicated representation.
3 UZ transport is probably even more complicated that Bo will
4 talk to you. It could have been dramatically simplified and
5 significantly reduced the computational burden, if you will,
6 but in so doing, you would have cut the length a little bit
7 and become a little less traceable back to the science that
8 underpins it.

9 So, each application in this one because one of the
10 main goals to that traceability back to the science, back to
11 the data, back to the quality status of the data, was
12 crucially important, you know, for TSPA/SR. So, it ended up
13 being a fairly complex TSPA model. But, it can be simplified
14 to the one that Mark Nutt showed you guys, I don't know, six
15 or eight months ago.

16 WONG: Thanks.

17 ANDREWS: And, maybe, they will do that again, you know,
18 this fall or next spring or something. I don't know what the
19 plans exactly are.

20 SAGÜÉS: Yes. I'm trying to understand a little bit #27
21 which we have alluded to once. So, that's sort of a
22 sensitivity to a given--and you're using the results of this
23 to identify which parameters should be better characterized
24 or what is the objective of this, first of all?

25 ANDREWS: Well, the principal objective was to figure

1 out what drove the total spread of dose outcomes. What drove
2 that six or seven orders of magnitude? What parameters that
3 are uncertain were most driving it?

4 SAGÜÉS: With what purpose? To maybe change the design
5 of the repository or of the waste package or whatever to make
6 that--

7 ANDREWS: No, just to understand the significance of
8 that particular--of the whole system, what significantly
9 drove the performance.

10 SAGÜÉS: Okay. But, presumably, by understanding the
11 significance, then you can do something about it?

12 ANDREWS: Yes, that's true.

13 SAGÜÉS: Okay.

14 ANDREWS: So, it is a feedback to the waste package
15 folks and there were discussions about stresses at the welds
16 and--

17 SAGÜÉS: So, this will allow people to tweak the design
18 or whatever considerably or at least to find out what they
19 can indicate in more detail to--okay. So, now, having said
20 that, I was just trying to figure out the formula that was
21 used or the question that was used to trace those curves.
22 And, I figure what you do is you sit--for example, you sit at
23 100,000 years and then you see the whole spread of dose rates
24 that you have and then you calculate, I don't know, some
25 standard deviation of that or some such--and then, you go to

1 the one parameter; for example, the Alloy-22 outer median
2 general corrosion rate and you go ahead and you take that one
3 and you see what is its evaluation and it's sigma, for
4 example. Then, you would be doing like the ratio of the two
5 sigmas and then you would--

6 ANDREWS: Essentially.

7 SAGÜÉS: I see.

8 ANDREWS: It's a little more statistics than even that
9 though. That's essentially--

10 SAGÜÉS: Uh-huh. Now, the problem with that is
11 certainly doing what the equivalent of what they were calling
12 small sigma analysis. Like, what I'm saying is that
13 sensitivity may depend on the absolute value of those things.
14 For example, if there is more information that shows that
15 the corrosion rate for Alloy-22 now is two orders of
16 magnitude greater than what was before anticipated, now maybe
17 there may be a much lesser number now, but it's importance
18 may paradoxically become smaller because maybe it now has
19 avoided dispersion.

20 ANDREWS: That's true.

21 SAGÜÉS: So, this is a very relative kind of--

22 ANDREWS: Yep, it's--that's why I started out--I mean,
23 it's true. It is relative and it's relative based on, you
24 know, the analyses and model reports that are directly
25 feeding into the TSPA. Those distributions that are in there

1 which--and there are distributions for stress dates and
2 corrosion rates and MIC factors, et cetera, in the analyses
3 model reports are in here; you know, not evaluating outside
4 of those bounds. In the neutralization, we do evaluate
5 outside those bounds, but for these, I'm sticking with the
6 bounds that are in the input PDFs that have been given.

7 SAGÜÉS: Right. Like a forward sort of linear, if you
8 will, then I think that this would have a much more absolute
9 meaning, but if--

10 ANDREWS: Yes.

11 SAGÜÉS: --then the whole picture may change even with
12 all the same problems?

13 ANDREWS: Yeah.

14 SAGÜÉS: Okay.

15 ANDREWS: I mean, an excellent point, you know, on this
16 particular stress date. In the supporting AMRs, there are I
17 believe three or four--I don't know if, Pasu, you're going to
18 talk about this. There's different numbers. There's
19 different models essentially of the uncertainty of the stress
20 date right now in the supporting AMRs. So, in the TSPA/SR,
21 those are treated as totally separate runs. I'm only showing
22 you one here, but we have a whole family of alterative models
23 for stress dates at the welds and the impact of those
24 alternative models on the TSPA results.

25 COHON: Bob, I just wanted to emphasize something that

1 you said earlier in your presentation about the role of
2 judgment by modelers in developing the parameter
3 distributions. As a demonstration of that, I'd like to look
4 at 29, just briefly. First, I want to make sure I understand
5 its implications. Do I read the graded case curve to--can I
6 infer from that that no package fails before 8200 years or
7 something like that?

8 ANDREWS: It's a little before that because the natural
9 system has a few thousand years. So, it's, I don't know,
10 probably 6,000 or 7,000 years, something like that.

11 COHON: And, when does the first package fail in the
12 enhanced case which is off this curve because it's after
13 100,000 years?

14 ANDREWS: It's after 100,000. I don't know.

15 COHON: You don't know.

16 ANDREWS: We couldn't get that. I haven't looked at
17 that result.

18 COHON: And, I can interpret this as--I'm tempted to
19 infer from this that I've got an underlying waste package
20 life distribution that says that there's an equal probability
21 in my view of a package failing before 7,000 years and no
22 package failing until after 100,000 plus years; it might be
23 300,000 years for all we know.

24 ANDREWS: That is statistically correct and that is a
25 technically correct statement, but a bit misleading probably.

1 COHON: Oh, well, why?

2 ANDREWS: Because I go back to the previous slide--John,
3 if you can go back to 28. We fixed in this case seven
4 parameters at either their good or their bad.

5 COHON: Oh, good. Okay. Got it.

6 ANDREWS: The probability of hitting those seven
7 parameters out at those two tails is $.05^7$ or whatever.

8 COHON: Is a much lower probability, right.

9 ANDREWS: Somebody with a calculator--a small
10 probability. So, half of those ends are outside--

11 COHON: So, you only have a waste package-like parameter
12 or distribution. We've got several other parameters
13 distributions when taken together.

14 ANDREWS: When take together, yeah. Does that help?

15 COHON: All right, thanks.

16 ANDREWS: Okay.

17 BULLEN: Any more questions from Board members?

18 (No response.)

19 BULLEN: Board advisors? Rod Ewing?

20 EWING: I'd, at first, like to get some sense of the
21 scale of the total calculation. So, I just have some quick
22 questions. What's the total number of input parameters for
23 this analysis?

24 ANDREWS: That are sampled?

25 EWING: No, just total input parameters?

1 ANDREWS: Oh, I don't know. 500, something like that.
2 In parameter types, it's probably--
3 EWING: Fixed values sampled, all the input?
4 ANDREWS: The sample ones are those 240, right.
5 EWING: Right.
6 ANDREWS: The face values are probably, I don't know,
7 200 or 300. So, the total is 600, 700.
8 EWING: For the WIPP, I think it was 1500. So--
9 ANDREWS: We have a much simpler system than WIPP.
10 EWING: All right. So, 300 and then for those
11 parameters sampled over a range, several hundred?
12 ANDREWS: Yeah.
13 EWING: Right? And, how many individual models in the
14 total models of subsystems or their--
15 ANDREWS: I think you can--those little circles or the
16 little lines here, I think, are probably as good a way of
17 disparatizing it. So, it's probably on the order of 30.
18 EWING: Right. That was 25, but then you mentioned 122
19 analyses models reports. Are those separate?
20 ANDREWS: Well, those are--the 122 includes those 30
21 that are the final inputs to TSPA, but it also includes the
22 other 90, if you will, that are process model and analyses
23 understandings of each of the individual component parts.
24 EWING: So, just to be sure I understand, there's maybe
25 300 or 400 input parameters. Of those, approximately, half

1 are sampled over a range?

2 ANDREWS: Yeah.

3 EWING: And, what percentage of the 300 or 400, do you
4 think, are ultimately based on expert opinion? Is that a
5 sampling over a range or--

6 ANDREWS: Let's break out this--we have to define what
7 we mean by expert opinion probably here. Those that are
8 formally elicited expert opinions are generally confined to
9 the probabilistic volcanic hazard and the probabilistic
10 seismic hazard. So, there's a seismic effect here and a
11 volcanic effect here. Those where the analysts or modeler
12 applied, in addition to data, applied some judgment, you
13 know, to those data either extended the bounds or added some
14 conservatism, I'm just going to take a--maybe I shouldn't
15 even take a guess. You know, there's some judgment in all of
16 them, but I'm not sure this judgment--who was that, Leon?
17 No, Leon's talking again. There is some judgment in all of
18 them, but I think the number that don't have--and, I think
19 all of them have some data. It may not be project-specific
20 data, but analog kind of information, but there's judgments--

21 EWING: Sure, right. Well, even expert elicitation are
22 based on data to some extent. So, would it be fair to say
23 that approximately half are sampled and that sampling over a
24 range involves some judgment either by the analysts or expert
25 elicitation?

1 ANDREWS: Yeah, okay. I think so.

2 EWING: And, changing from that, could we look at Figure
3 22? Right, thank you. You know, in your presentation, the
4 variation between the 95th and 5th percentile, you equated
5 that with, let's say, a qualitative measure of uncertainty.
6 Right?

7 ANDREWS: Of the dose.

8 EWING: Of the dose, right. And, the fascinating thing
9 to me to consider is that the uncertainty decreases with time
10 if you think of it that way and that could be because certain
11 radionuclides decay and are no longer important, certain
12 processes are important or aren't over different periods of
13 time, but is that a fair assessment of the uncertainty in the
14 following sense? Actually, if you take a series of models,
15 sampling over variables and extrapolate through time, in all
16 of my experience the uncertainty should increase as a
17 function of time.

18 ANDREWS: If all of those models were important, that
19 would be the case. I mean, at the peak--and this is
20 something we observed in the VA. It's not been new in this
21 observation. But, at the peak, there's very few parameters,
22 very few models that are really affecting the peak.

23 EWING: But, let's--you know, you have to educate me.
24 Let me take a simple example, the weather. You have a higher
25 probability of getting tomorrow's weather right than a

1 thousand years from now. In other words, the uncertainty
2 increases dramatically with time because the coupling between
3 the variables and the range of variables that you may
4 eventually get given a longer period of time, that range
5 widens, right? So, why don't you see that kind of
6 uncertainty in this analysis? Why doesn't it increase?

7 ANDREWS: Well, suppose weather was driven by the
8 probability you were in El Nino. That was the main driver on
9 weather, nothing else really--or which way the wind was
10 blowing. If the wind was blowing from the west and yesterday
11 was sunny and you're in Michigan it's probably going to be
12 sunny tomorrow. Pretty high probability.

13 EWING: Right.

14 ANDREWS: That's what we have here. We have one or few
15 parameters that are driving that peak. Abe wants to--do you
16 want to add anything, Abe?

17 EWING: Just to continue, the decrease in uncertainty is
18 in this analysis a result of fewer parameters being important
19 in the models as a function of time?

20 ANDREWS: Yeah.

21 VAN LUIK: The only thing I wanted to add to the
22 discussion was to say that one of Bob's slides made it very
23 clear that he is showing the results of calculations that
24 evaluate quantified uncertainties. There are also
25 unquantified uncertainties and I'll get into that a little

1 bit tomorrow. So, the unquantified uncertainties could
2 actually give you a different spread on the outcome in the
3 long-term. They could.

4 EWING: Well, I would maintain quantified or
5 unquantified projected over time, I expect to see the
6 uncertainty increase.

7 VAN LUIK: Except, as Bob said, the processes that are
8 highly uncertain go away after a certain time and what's left
9 then is the natural system variability without the additive
10 of the waste package variability at the bottom.

11 BULLEN: I'm going to exercise some chairman's
12 prerogative and give John Kessler the last question. Then,
13 we're going to break so we can get done before 9:00 Eastern
14 Time.

15 KESSLER: Bob, on this same figure and on 24 which, I
16 guess, is the one before 10,000, at roughly the peak there
17 where the uncertainties do decrease again, you'd mentioned
18 that in some cases you substituted conservatisms for poorly
19 understood uncertainty ranges. I'm assuming, therefore, that
20 you're saying that there aren't any non-conservatisms in the
21 current SR model. Yes?

22 ANDREWS: Uh-huh.

23 KESSLER: Okay. Okay. And then, the next question
24 would be are there any significant conservatisms that are
25 affecting the magnitude of that peak, as well as--and then,

1 the same on 24, what are the major conservatisms that are
2 affecting the pre-10,000 results for the volcanism,
3 presumably?

4 ANDREWS: Okay. That's an excellent question. I'm glad
5 you had a chance to ask that because I probably should have
6 gone into that as I was going through it. On 23 on the
7 nominal case on the conservatisms that are--oops, 22, sorry--
8 that are affecting the peak and this is something observed
9 also in the VA, you know, the solubilities or secondary
10 phases that can form when the fuel is altered and the
11 degradation characteristics of those secondary phase,
12 secondary uranium phases, can be a very significant
13 contributor to long-term, in fact, peak dose performance
14 because the neptunium solubility is not this which is
15 different than the VA, but is significantly lower than that
16 because of the secondary phases. In the VA when we did those
17 secondary phase analyses, it was essentially reducing the
18 peak by about a factor of between 10 and 30. I mean, 10
19 seems kind of like the best estimate number. On those
20 secondary phases, it's one of the things I have in the table
21 on the spent fuel degradation. The secondary phases are not
22 included in the nominal TSPA/SR model and that is a
23 conservatism. You know, it's about that factor of 10 or so
24 conservatism.

25 This is also driven by the amount of water that

1 seeps in, and therefore, contacts the waste at those
2 particular times. The amount of water that seeps in is quite
3 uncertain. It's variable and uncertain. There are some--and
4 I don't know if Bo is going to talk to it, but some recent
5 indications that would indicate that perhaps we're a little
6 conservative on the seepage representation that we've
7 incorporated in here.

8 So, you know, those two aspects is really, because
9 it's driven by neptunium and driven by a solubility-limited
10 release, it's impacted by those two parameters, those two
11 component piece parts.

12 On the volcanism one, the conservatism more lies in
13 the degradation characteristics of the engineered barrier
14 once the event occurs. Right now, there's no credit. Once
15 the event occurs, there is no credit taken for any of the
16 engineered barriers for the package, for the drip shield, or
17 for the cladding.

18 That's a fairly, you know, conservative assumption.
19 But, most of the other assumptions that really impact peak
20 either volcanic peak or nominal or base case peak, they don't
21 impact as much. I mean, so these three or four things are
22 dominating conservatism driving the peak doses.

23 BULLEN: Thank you, Bob. In the event of time, I think
24 we're going to have to wrap this session up. Before I close,
25 I guess, I should point out that maybe my speech reading is

1 an indication of why we should elect the speech writers
2 instead of the politicians when they give their speeches.

3 I will call a break right now and I would like
4 everyone back here in 12 minutes which is going to put us at
5 4:40. We're going to be out of here by 6:10 which is 9:10
6 Eastern Time.

7 (Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.)

8 BULLEN: I actually waited to make these remarks because
9 I want the Board members to hear them explicitly as a
10 reminder of how the last three sessions of the day or three
11 presentations of the day are going to go. These
12 presentations are met to cover a lot of details. We have a
13 very limited amount of time available which means we're not
14 going to get out of here until 9:15 Eastern Time. So, I want
15 to limit the questions from the Board members and perhaps
16 from the experts if we have time to questions of
17 clarification only. So, the three presentations today and
18 the four additional presentations tomorrow will be followed
19 up with a panel discussion at which point we can go into more
20 details. But, I wanted to give each of the presenters 30
21 minutes as an opportunity to present the details that we've
22 asked them to present.

23 Our first presentation is by Bo Bodvarsson from
24 Lawrence Berkley National Laboratory. He's the lead for the
25 Yucca Mountain Project and the Nuclear Waste Program for the

1 U.S. Sciences Division at LBNL. His research includes
2 geothermal reservoir engineering and nuclear waste disposal.
3 He also is the lead for the unsaturated zone. Bo has a new
4 microphone coming right up.

5 BODVARSSON: I'm going to talk about the unsaturated
6 zone flow and transport models and I'm going to try to use
7 this thing here. Next slide, please?

8 And, these are the some of the models I'm going to
9 talk about. Then, I'm going to put them on the side here
10 also so that you can see them when I go from one to the other
11 and you don't be too confused. There's a lot of models here
12 starting with the climate infiltration models. Then, we go
13 into flow models and the thermal effects on flow. Then, I'm
14 going to go into seepage models and then the thermal effect
15 from seepage and thermal-hydrological-chemical effect on
16 seepage, and finally end up with the transport models. All
17 of those feed TSPA. Next slide, please?

18 So, these models--this is a slide from Bob Andrews.
19 This kind of lists the model that we use for TSPA. The
20 climate models provides climate states and the timing and net
21 infiltration, infiltration rates, unsaturated zone flow, flow
22 fields, coupled effect, percolation flux affected by thermal
23 effects, seepage into emplacement drifts, seepage flux,
24 percolation flux, functional location, waste type, time, and
25 climate, coupled effects on seepage. This is a very popular

1 topic with the seepage flux and seepage fraction as a
2 function of percolation flux. And then, how it's affected by
3 thermal effects. Next slide?

4 Final model is the transport models and they are
5 used directly also in TSPA and these are the main things that
6 we use, main parameters. They use the flow fields from the
7 flow models, they use fracture apertures and spacings, K_d
8 because you use the K_d approach, matrix diffusion, colloid
9 parameters. Next one?

10 So, let's start with the first model. That first
11 model is two models, climate and infiltration. I'm going to
12 go through them fairly quickly. I'm going to tell you for
13 all of them the objectives of these models. I'm going to
14 tell you what they'll be used for, what the results are, then
15 the uncertainties and some of the important factors that
16 dominate the results of these models.

17 Start with the climate, we look at climate for
18 10,000 years and then after that for 100,000 or longer, the
19 estimate mean, upper and lower bounds. Just like
20 precipitation just like Bob mentioned, that provides input to
21 the infiltration model. Then, infiltration model uses all
22 these processes, surface processes and near-surface
23 processes, to estimate spatially-distributed time-averaged
24 estimates of net infiltration. And, that, of course, is used
25 in the UZ flow and transport model as a boundary condition on

1 the surface. Next slide, please?

2 The main assumptions are a climate analysis based
3 on examining paleoclimate records and the climate is cyclical
4 with several alternating glacial and interglacial periods.
5 Infiltration assumptions, model infiltration through root-
6 zone only and then it uses a simplified "bucket-model" which
7 is a fairly large assumption. You see here in this graph
8 some of the main issues regarding climates, the location of
9 some of the sites used for climate estimates, for glacial
10 transition, monsoon and modern and then some of the results;
11 same with the infiltration model. Next slide, please?

12 Some of the results for the climate, we have
13 modern, monsoon, and glacial transition. These are the time
14 durations and these are the mean precipitation rates based on
15 the climate AMR of Joel Forester. Infiltration based on
16 these climate states, you have mean infiltration rates,
17 modern 4.6, monsoon 12.2, and glacial transition 17.8mm/yr.
18 Next slide?

19 Uncertainty, of course, there is a lot of
20 uncertainties in all these models as everybody understands.
21 The uncertainty climate is not directly used in TSPA, but
22 used through infiltration and the effect of UZ flow model.
23 There is substantial uncertainty in climate changes, the time
24 periods, and of course, the magnitudes of precipitation.
25 Infiltration is included indirectly as a boundary condition.

1 Monte Carlo simulations by varying important parameters in
2 infiltration models are used to get the variability of this
3 model. Of course, the bucket model approximation is an
4 important uncertainty. And then, the weight climate scenario
5 histogram which is shown here for sampling in TSPA
6 simulations. Next one?

7 Next one is UZ flow. So, we have done climate, we
8 have done infiltration. They feed the UZ flow as a boundary
9 condition on the surface and now we want to calculate the
10 flow of water through the mountain and through the saturated
11 zone at the bottom. Objectives of the UZ flow model
12 certainly is to integrate all the available data into a
13 comprehensive 3-D model. It is to develop submodels and
14 quantify the flow of water, flow of gases, and flow of heat
15 in the unsaturated zone, and provide, of course, TSPA with
16 three-dimensional steady-state flow fields. It should be
17 mentioned here that UZ flow is not abstracted very much. We
18 basically take directly the three-dimensional flow fields and
19 use them directly in total system performance assessment.

20 You see here some of the main issues regarding UZ
21 flow with regard to variation in percolation flux, PTn
22 effects, flow through vitric zones, lateral diversion,
23 perched water issues, and things of that sort. Next slide,
24 please?

25 Major assumptions. We use dual-permeability model

1 with Darcy's law and Richards' equation. We use the geology
2 based on the geological framework model. That, of course, is
3 approximated, the geological data, from all of the boreholes
4 and the tunnels. We assume that the ambient unsaturated flow
5 can be approximated by isothermal steady-state flow fields.
6 Steady-state flow fields, we don't use transient flow fields.
7 And, perched water occurrence is due to permeability barrier
8 effect is another assumption. This is the mountain, this is
9 the extent of the model, this is the model as it is currently
10 with the repository horizon right here. Next slide, please?

11 Results. Some of the results from this model are
12 we've done a lot of calibrations against a bunch of different
13 datasets including pneumatics, saturations, temperatures, et
14 cetera. We have developed several submodels to look
15 specifically at big important issues like faults and PTn in
16 Calico Hills in perched waters. We then calculate
17 percolation fluxes at the repository and these are used for
18 the seepage model, the variability and percolation flux at
19 the repositories, and fracture and matrix components of flow
20 based on different climate states. Most important factors/
21 conservatisms/optimisms are the surface net infiltration
22 rates are very important, obviously. The heterogeneity of
23 the hydrogeologic system is very important, as has been
24 pointed out by various members of the Board. And, we are
25 finding more and more the importance of faults that the

1 results, for example, of flow and transports are very much
2 dominated by assumptions made regarding properties of faults.

3 Next slide, please?

4 Now, we go from the flow model now to the thermal
5 effects on flow which is basically we take the basis three-
6 dimensional flow model and we add heat to it and then we
7 compare the flow patterns in the three-dimensional model with
8 and without the effect of the repository, the effect of the
9 repository heat. So, objectives of this one generally is to
10 evaluate the effects of heat on liquid and gas distributions
11 to see if we need to modify the three-dimensional flow fields
12 to take into account the effect of heat. To evaluate global
13 large-scale temperature changes such as how much does the
14 temperature of the perched water rise, what are the effects
15 of boiling on the perched water, how much does the Calico
16 Hills and the water table rise in temperatures and things
17 like that. Here on the right hand side, you have a location
18 at the repository. This is typical temperature sequences,
19 time sequences. You start off with the geothermal gradient
20 and at times zero, you put in the heat load, the thermal load
21 ventilation, and it starts to heat up, starts to heat up, it
22 starts to heat up more. It boils around here. Then, it
23 starts to cool down more and more. And, you see, of course,
24 maximum temperature around 96 or a little bit higher. In low
25 infiltration areas, you'll get peaks that's significantly

1 higher than the boiling point for water getting up to 120
2 degrees Centigrade at the drift walls, something like that.

3 What you see here then is over all of a bunch of
4 different drifts, these kilometers and we have a bunch of
5 drift here. This is a cross-section and it shows how the
6 temperature rises and increases to a boiling temperature
7 except at the fuel location with infiltration rate so small
8 that it's not sufficient to cause continuous boiling, but
9 rises above that to super heated conditions.

10 Assumptions, uniform heat distribution at the
11 repository, ventilation removes heat only, constant flow
12 properties in layers, no hysteresis effect. Hysteresis may
13 be very important for thermal loading issues because you
14 change the saturation and matrix block very significantly.
15 Fixed temperature at the ground surface, this is a good
16 approximation, and one kilometer into the saturated zone.
17 You have to model this below the water level, obviously,
18 water table. The modeling approach is supported by
19 geothermal analogs and drifts scale heater test. Next slide,
20 please?

21 Results shows the following two-phase zone around
22 the drifts is generally confined to 10m to 20m. Temperature
23 can get higher than 96 up to 120 degrees close to low
24 infiltration areas. Temperature at the midpoint of the
25 pillars between drifts is 80 to 85 degrees; 70 to 75 degrees

1 in the Calico Hills and there we worry about zeolites and the
2 effect of temperature on the sorptive capabilities of
3 zeolites; and, it rises to 67 to 70 degrees at the water
4 table. Liquid flux and the high fracture permeabilities,
5 this is a very important point here. High fracture
6 permeabilities allow for easy and rapid drainage in pillars
7 between drifts, and I will come a little bit more to that a
8 little bit later. Liquid flux towards drift may exceed a
9 very large value, as has been discussed before, because when
10 you dry out the soil around the drift, you create tremendous
11 capillary suction or water coming towards the drift and that
12 can generate very large fluxes. Of course, very little or
13 any of that is going to go into the drift; it's all going to
14 be vaporized.

15 Factors that may impact predictions of works like
16 this is lateral variation or properties between layers,
17 focusing and channelizing of flow, changes in long-term
18 distribution of surface infiltration and effects of climate,
19 and certainly the fact that on a mountain scale
20 thermohydrology you do not have a large-scale test that can
21 give you confidence in a large-scale model like that. The
22 largest test we have is the drift scale model over 80 meters.
23 Here, we are talking about a mountain scale thermohydrology
24 model. So, the only confidence builder you can get is really
25 geothermal analogue studies.

1 What you see here on the right hand side is
2 selected five drifts and this is a rather complicated time
3 history of fluxes between the pillars. The reason it's so
4 complicated is because during this period not only are we
5 boiling water and remobilizing it and moving it around, we
6 are also changing the climate state going to better and
7 better climates that results in higher and higher fluxes.
8 Now, if you look at this carefully and look at the AMR that
9 backs this up, you will probably reach the same conclusion
10 that TSPA and us process modelers reached and that is the
11 thermal effects on flow are very small on a large-scale
12 global sense. There is more effect from seepage, but less on
13 large-scale, three-dimensional flow in the mountain.
14 Therefore, it was neglected in this TSPA/SR. Next slide,
15 please?

16 Now, we are going into the seepage route here into
17 the seepage model that, of course, uses the calibrated
18 properties models that calibrates all the properties in the
19 mountain, uses infiltration scenarios in the flow models, but
20 it's concentrated on predicting how much water will seep into
21 the drifts. As you can see here on the right hand side, this
22 is a highly heterogeneous model and Priscilla's question was
23 very good. We need very much when we look at flow and
24 transport properties, we need to look at the variability and
25 heterogeneity in the formation which is extremely important.

1 And, I think this model is truthful to or obeys all of the
2 air injection data around the niches, and is calibrated and
3 constrained and based on those datasets. If then it's
4 calibrated against all the seepage data where we put water
5 above the drift which is included in this model and calibrate
6 how much goes into the drift, that is the fraction of water
7 that enters the drift as a function of the total amount
8 applied.

9 The objectives then are certainly to determine the
10 fraction of waste packages affected by seepage. This is an
11 important parameter for PA. Determine seepage flux at the
12 inner locations as a functional--percolation, flux, climate,
13 and based on different other things. Major assumption is
14 that we use the heterogeneous fracture continuum. We use
15 flow focusing; that is to say we assume that there's not
16 uniform flow at different locations, but flow tends to focus,
17 to be more conservative. We assume no way of operation or
18 condensation within the drifts after post-closure which is a
19 conservative assumption. We include explicitly partial drift
20 collapse. We also include the effect of permeability
21 enhancement due to mechanical changes in permeability next to
22 the drift because that comes out of the calibration
23 exercises. And, we have large variability in parameter
24 uncertainty because, mainly, we have only tested seepage in
25 the middle non-lithophysal. We have not tested in the lower

1 lithophysal 75 percent of the rock which we are doing now or
2 the other deeper units. So, we have a large
3 variability in uncertainty. Next slide, please?

4 Results. The seepage-relevant parameters, like I
5 said, are determined by seepage experiments called mix
6 experiments and we calculate seepage fraction and seepage
7 flux for a large range of parameters. Let me explain this a
8 little bit. We cannot measure seepage as a function of all
9 possible percolation fluxes because the flow through the
10 mountain is very slow. It will take us years and years and
11 years to do mix experiments at low fluxes. We, therefore, do
12 them at higher fluxes, calibrate, and then extrapolate the
13 models to give us response surfaces, a figure like this that
14 Mike Wilson of Sandia developed which shows percolation flux
15 and a seepage fraction or a seepage rate, a mere two per
16 year, as a function of this very important parameter,
17 permeability of the fracture system divided by Jack Bailey's
18 favorite constant, the Von Knuckten factor (phonetic). So,
19 this is a very important plot that I'll come back to a little
20 bit later.

21 The factors that must control this behavior are
22 percolation flux, the assumed focusing effect that we assume
23 to be conservative, the effective capillary strength of
24 fractures, and the fracture permeability. Let me just tell
25 you something now about this. Mark Peters in his

1 presentation this morning told you that the effective
2 permeability of the lower lithophysal which is the main
3 repository rock is an order to an order and a half higher
4 than that of the middle non-lithophysal. You also saw from
5 his picture that the dye around the borehole went in a
6 circular fashion and not in a vertical fashion like it does
7 in the middle non-lithophysal. What does that mean? That
8 means that when it goes vertically down, as it does in the
9 middle non-lithophysal in our studies in the ESF, that
10 process is gravity driven. The capillary suction in the
11 fractures is not sufficient to overcome gravity. It wants to
12 float down. The gravity forces exceed capillary forces. The
13 dye results that we see in the lower lithophysal show much
14 stronger capillary forces because there are much more smaller
15 fractures that are interconnected with much more suction and
16 that overcomes total gravity forces.

17 Why is that good? That is good because that means
18 that this one knuckten-alpha value which is the measure of
19 the capillary strength of this medium is approximately, based
20 on our estimation, an order of magnitude higher for that
21 medium than it is for the middle non-lithophysal. So, that
22 makes this term two orders of magnitude higher than it is now
23 for the middle non-lithophysal which goes into the zero
24 seepage rate here by two orders of magnitude. So, this is
25 very promising results from a very limited study. And, I was

1 going to warn you about that. One caveat about that is that
2 we haven't done enough seepage studies that, even though the
3 fracture permeability data are very promising, the alpha
4 parameter is very promising, we do not know yet what the
5 lithophysal cavities are going to do to the overall seepage.
6 So, that's what we are testing for now.

7 Conservatism/optimism. We use, we believe,
8 conservative parameter values and I think Bob Andrews
9 mentioned that before. We mentioned this before. We ignore
10 ventilation/evaporation effect which is conservative. WE
11 ignore in-drift condensation. That may be optimistic. Next
12 slide, please?

13 Now, we are going into the thermal-hydrological-
14 chemical. This is a slide that Leon asked me to add about
15 again these 5m above the drift so that the Board can practice
16 on all of us and give us all a hard time. This is my little
17 version about this. The percolation flux 5m above the drift
18 is used in the seepage model and nobody has shown this curve.
19 This is actually how it looks like. This is the 100m that
20 shows a lot of percolation flux. Then, with time it goes to
21 higher and higher values. The 5m above the drift is a fairly
22 operative value, as you have mentioned. We just recently did
23 studies that are plotted out; .2m, I think it was, 1m, 3m,
24 5m, 7m, 9m to kind of bracket it, and as far as I'm
25 concerned, this is fairly conservative with respect to that.

1 But, the points that the Board makes and I tend to agree
2 with and I may not be popular for this and that is the
3 following. You take this pulse of water from a homogeneous
4 model. You don't take it from a heterogeneous variable
5 property model that is based on actual data from the science.
6 Therefore, how can you justify that you're conservative?
7 What is the basis for this? I think that's a very valid
8 point.

9 What we are doing now is to do a stochastic
10 variability in a permeability field that shows hereafter 100
11 years with stochastic variabilities and permeabilities on the
12 right hand side here looking at this effect and how much it
13 can be decreased. So far as everybody has guessed, there is
14 no seepage with about three or four realizations. We need to
15 do a lot more with this.

16 Another point I want to make here and that's the
17 following. You look at the scale here and the fact of the
18 matter is that based on this model results, you never get
19 saturated conditions in the fractures except at greater
20 localized conditions because the permeability is so high you-
21 -basically, right when it increases mobility of the water,
22 the model just flows down. It just flows down very rapidly
23 in the fracture system. Then, whatever is above here and
24 condenses, it wants to go down again, but it can't, gets
25 revaporized, mobilized, and then eventually flows laterally.

1 And, I think we ought to show when the study is done is that
2 we're using Monte Carlo simulation and stochastic variability
3 and that this may not be very much of an issue. Next slide,
4 please?

5 NELSON: Wait. Can you just say what SL is?

6 BODVARSSON: Saturation of liquid in the fractures.
7 This is the liquid saturation in the fracture medium. Zero
8 means that this is all dry. There is no single drop of water
9 in the fractures next to the drift. This means that there is
10 enhanced water in the fractures. The ambient in this unit,
11 you have different colors and different units initially. The
12 ambient saturation of the fracture is roughly 3 or 4 percent
13 and it increases to some 10 percent that allows it to flow
14 laterally and most of the drainage occurs on 10m away from
15 the drift based on these realizations.

16 SAGÜÉS: But, what is the drift? What is the wide
17 rectangular feature in the--

18 BODVARSSON: That's the drift. This is the drift. But,
19 you look at the aspect ratio. The aspect ratio is very bad.
20 So, this figure it not very good. But, basically, it is a
21 5m drift just like a regular 5m drift.

22 SAGÜÉS: Okay. Is it simulated by a square cross-
23 section?

24 BODVARSSON: Yeah, it's simulated by a square cross-
25 section which is very conservative, too, because that allows

1 water to go in it easier, but it has no effect because of the
2 boiling zone around here in this case.

3 Any other question on that to clarify that?

4 NELSON: Is that result for non-lith?

5 BODVARSSON: This is the result based on the--no, it's
6 not from non-lith. This is the middle non-lithophysal
7 because we have most of the permeabilities there. When we
8 get to permeabilities from the lower lith, then we will use
9 that. Good question.

10 NELSON: Okay. In which case, there is matrix porosity
11 which can be saturated or closer to saturation outside. This
12 is just the fracture saturation?

13 BODVARSSON: Yeah, yeah, yeah. You're absolutely right.
14 There could be water in the matrix around here that is not
15 fully dried off, but the simulations show that most of the
16 water around here, even in the matrix block, is also dried
17 off because of boiling.

18 Next slide? Now, I'm going to go--sorry about
19 that. Now, we're going to go into THC model. As you know,
20 Bill Glassley made a presentation of this kind of model
21 before. The objectives of this model is to predict the
22 chemistry of water and gases that will seep into a drift and
23 evaluate changes in hydrological properties due to mineral
24 precipitation/dissolution and this is what Bill discussed a
25 lot in his talk. Calibrate/validate model using the chemical

1 evolution of the drift scale test. So, we are calibrating
2 this test against the result of the drift scale test and then
3 we predict what we get and use for PA.

4 Dual permeability assumptions, initial water
5 chemistry, geochemical systems considered is adequate for the
6 ambient system. And, that goes to the question of how many
7 minerals do you need to use? This is just some of the main
8 features of the model that is shown here. Next slide,
9 please?

10 You have seen these results before. Mark Peters
11 showed them. We are quite pleased that the model is able to
12 represent all of the changes in chemistry in the drift scale
13 model in a very reasonable fashion without calibration and I
14 want to emphasize this. There is no calibration here. This
15 is a prediction without any calibration. And, it predicts
16 very well the increases in CO₂ content and the decreases in
17 pH that agrees with the observed data.

18 The main results from this model, predictions over
19 the long-term, were as follows. pH will vary between 7.5 and
20 9 on the average. We will not see a lot of salts close to
21 the drift wall like has been hypothesized and simply because
22 the water is so dilute, you don't have enough salt in the
23 water to accumulate next to the drift even though you boil
24 the heck out of the water. There's just not enough salts in
25 the waters, very dilute water.

1 The porosity and permeability changes over the
2 first 10,000 years are small and the effects on flow fields
3 is minimal. I want to say a few words about this. I really
4 feel strongly that the fracture porosity is a key to thermal-
5 hydrological-chemical processes. I feel more strongly that
6 it's more key than the mineral assemblages that are used or
7 the kinetic data. And, why do I say that? We get the best
8 results from this model using "a simplified mineralogy" with
9 just the essential clays in the feldspars and zeolites
10 present. When we go into more complex 25 minerals rather
11 than the 10 or 12 used as the base minerals, the comparison
12 is not as good to the data. And, why is that? My view is
13 that the limited knowledge about thermal chemical,
14 thermodynamic processes of multi-species medium are very
15 limited and I recall one experiment on silica precipitation
16 done at Menlo Park. They thought it was pure silica in the
17 water and they ran it through a core and the core sealed up
18 like crazy much sooner than they expected. After a huge
19 amount of work, they figured what caused it was a tiny, tiny
20 concentration of aluminum in the water. Now, this just is a
21 very simple system. Anyway, I'm generally in favor of
22 simplified models. Next slide?

23 Conservatisms/optimisms. Initial water chemistry,
24 of course, we feel is rather conservative because we use more
25 concentration water than is actually present. We also think

1 that perhaps the permeability and porosity changes could be
2 underestimated because of more localized mineral
3 precipitation and dissolution. That's where we want to
4 exercise this model against the lab experiment like I told
5 the Board before. Next slide, please?

6 Finally, UZ transport, this one right here.
7 Objectives, develop a model to investigate radionuclides
8 transport and this shows--this is a mountain scale model.
9 This shows at the water table after some time the
10 radionuclide presence. And, you see when you look at these
11 figures and you look at the AMR very strong effects on
12 faults. So, they really dominate the behavior of the
13 radionuclide transport models to some extent. Flow
14 components, the same as the UZ flow model. Governing
15 equation is already known. Next one?

16 Result/important factors. Faults dominate, matrix
17 diffusion and sorption are very important. The plutonium 239
18 decay chain products are very important. They need to be
19 considered in TSPA and I think they are. The plutonium 239
20 goes to uranium 235 and something else. And, uranium 235 has
21 a long half-life, and therefore, they need to be considered.
22 Colloids transport could be important. It is very hard to
23 say if they are or not because it depends so much on the
24 filtration process and what you assume regarding the size of
25 the colloids and things like that.

1 And, finally, the current PA transport model may be
2 very conservative. I want to mention that a little bit.
3 There are two figures here. This figure shows the transport
4 of technetium which is a conservative species for the three
5 climates; the upper bound, lower bound, and the mean climate.
6 You can see the breakthrough curves at the water table based
7 on these different climates. This lower one compares the
8 current PA model which is shown here, the FEM particle
9 tracker model to another partical tracker. There are very
10 large effects here due to different assumptions regarding
11 dual-permeability versus dual-porosity case. We think this
12 is fairly conservative and we are now working with PA to try
13 to fix this, to make it less conservative. Next slide?

14 Now, I'm done with what I know and now I'm going to
15 talk about the TSPA results which I don't know anything
16 about. That should be interesting. I'm going to talk about
17 the sensitivity studies to this 95 percent and 5 percent
18 cases. Dan's question was very good, what does it all mean?
19 Priscilla's question was very good, what does it all mean?
20 And, sometimes, I don't understand it well enough, sometimes.
21 But, I'm going to go through it anyway.

22 Let's take infiltration barrier sensitivity
23 analysis first and this is two cases, degraded barrier and
24 enhanced barrier. And, this is simple enough; I can
25 understand this. We take in one case high infiltration case

1 throughout the model and lower infiltration case throughout
2 the model in the other case. That's fairly simple.

3 So, let's see the results. This is what you see.
4 This is Bob's TSPA curves and what this shows us is that even
5 if we make it a lot wetter with very high infiltration, it
6 really doesn't get any worse. If you make it a lot drier, it
7 makes substantial difference on the order of order of
8 magnitude at 100,000 years. Why is that? One explanation is
9 that the mean infiltration for this case is about 18mm or
10 19mm/yr, and the high one is something like 38. So, it's a
11 factor of 2. But, the low one is only about 2 which is a
12 factor of 10 times less. Therefore, it should make a lot
13 more difference since it's 10 times less than 2 times more.
14 Does that make sense to you? Now, it makes sense to me to a
15 certain extent. Now, let's go into this a little bit more.

16 Certainly, these releases here at the early time
17 must be technetium and iodide. Those are the only ones
18 coming in at an early time, but what happens here, I'm not
19 really sure about because this should then actually not
20 become so important anymore because you will see on a
21 subsequent slide that the retarding radionuclides don't get
22 improved at all. It only seems to be the non-retarding ones.
23 So, I can't explain that to a large extent, but we'll learn
24 more about this later on. But, there is significant
25 improvements there. Next slide, please?

1 Now, we go into the seepage barrier sensitivity,
2 degraded barrier, and enhanced barrier. This again is the
3 95th percentile that is chosen for a couple of factors here.
4 One is the flow focusing factor and the other one is that
5 graph you saw, Mike Wilson's graph, on the uncertainty
6 analysis and seepage as a function of percolation flux and
7 the K over alpha variability. Let me tell you what I know
8 about this or understand about this and then Bob can correct
9 me and all the rest of you.

10 That is when you do this 95 percent and 5 percent
11 analysis, there are several things that enter the picture.
12 (A), if you see a lot of difference in the curves, that must
13 be an important parameter, right? (B), if you see a lot of
14 differences in the curve, this could only also reflect the
15 uncertainty in that variable. If 5 percent and 95 percent is
16 pretty much the same and there is no uncertainty, the curves
17 would overlap, right? Number 3, it also depends on how that
18 model is used with respect to other models, conceptual models
19 in TSPA. Because if you're very conservative with respect to
20 one model so the effect of this model doesn't count, then
21 that must be also looked at. So, there are several
22 complicating factors here.

23 So, let me go into the next one which is--

24 COHON: Bo?

25 BODVARSSON: Yeah?

1 COHON: I'm sorry. What is the 95th percentile seepage
2 flux? Do you happen to know the number?

3 BODVARSSON: No. Let me answer it this way. I think
4 that in the repository block about 90 percent of the waste
5 packages don't see seeps, about 10 percent will see seeps.
6 And, I guess, that's in the area of the high percolation flux
7 at the crest. You'll correct me if I'm wrong, Bob. That
8 must be the area where you have high infiltration, we attempt
9 to focus flow, and we get a lot of seepage. A lot of the
10 packages will not see seeps under this scenario.

11 So, I can't really answer it. So, my guess would
12 be and again, Bob, you'll correct me, if you take 5 percent
13 and 95 percent seeps, I would say the 5 percent would be that
14 perhaps 5 percent of the waste package will see seep and
15 maybe 15 percent for the 95 percent case? Because I think
16 what we are seeing here is not really the variability in how
17 many respects to you see seep. That's my problem in one
18 extent. It's more what do these factors show?

19 So, sorry. Do you want to explain it a little bit
20 better, Bob?

21 ANDREWS: I don't know. We'd have to look at the actual
22 intermediate result distribution which is I think what your
23 question was. How much do you really change the seepage or
24 the seepage fraction when you change these input parameters.
25 And, that's the kind of intermediate result. And, as I said

1 earlier, we're starting to look at these and these kinds of
2 questions of, okay, this is the change. Bo is going to show
3 you the change in dose, but what led to all of the steps that
4 led to that change of dose are still being analyzed right
5 now.

6 COHON: Right, right.

7 BODVARSSON: Next slide, please? Now, this show the
8 three cases. One is then the degraded barrier which it shows
9 here and enhanced seepage barrier which is shown here. To
10 me, this is fairly small changes. If I were to explain them,
11 I would do it in the following way and again Bob will correct
12 me. I'll explain in the following way.

13 If 90 percent of the waste packages show no seeps
14 and then you vary the flow focusing factor or something on
15 this graph, so maybe going from 10 percent to 5 percent and
16 50 percent, you are not really evaluating how important
17 seepage is. You are evaluating what is the uncertainty of
18 the seepage for the conditions that you have. To evaluate
19 the importance of seepage, you must seep on all waste
20 packages because that tells you the effectiveness of the
21 seepage barrier, if I understand this analysis correctly.

22 Therefore, I would conclude in my ignorant way that
23 the reason you don't show anything here is because you're not
24 increasing a lot of the waste packages that seep; you are
25 basically having fewer seeps which is the red curve because

1 of the flow focusing factors and more waste packages seeing
2 seeps in this blue one. And, if you have more water coming
3 in, you are worse off is my explanation.

4 Why doesn't it make a bigger difference? There are
5 several other possible reasons. One is that seepage--the
6 waste package corrosion rates do not depend on seepage. They
7 don't depend on seepage, at all. The waste mobilization and
8 waste form degradation doesn't depend on seepage. That
9 depends on the relative humidity and the pH depends on
10 seepage, but the waste mobilization does not depend on
11 seepage.

12 The transport in the invert and this comes back to
13 other conceptual models. The transport in the invert is
14 diffusion dominated even if you have seepage because of very
15 conservative diffusion approximation that have diffusion at
16 the bottom of the drift as a zero concentration boundary and,
17 therefore, you have huge diffusion. So, whatever seeps
18 doesn't affect the EPS, as Ernie will show you a little bit
19 later on, because it is all diffusion dominated. Those are
20 some of the reasons. I don't know. You want to--I don't
21 know. That's what my knowledge is. Next one?

22 What I proposed to PA actually was to do a case
23 where you actually put seepage into all of the drifts so you
24 can see the effect of seepage. UZ transport barrier
25 sensitivity analysis and this again we did the 5 percent and

1 95 percent. 5 percent were Kds, 95 percent were Kcs to
2 maximize, therefore, the colloid transport. 5 percent for
3 matrix diffusion or 95 percent for fracture apertures. All
4 of this is bad for transports; all of this is good for
5 transports. So, your question before, Dan, was that if it is
6 5 percent and if it is bad, you make that with the 95
7 percent. Next slide?

8 What this shows here, if I understand this
9 correctly again, is that you have in the degraded case, you
10 have americium colloids giving you a high dose initially, but
11 since the half time is only 7,000 years, it disappears after
12 some time, and then you go back to the baseline. And then,
13 later on, because the Kds are lower, you get a degraded UZ
14 transport barrier. But, like I told you before, when you
15 look at the infiltration, we see no improvement in transport,
16 at all. Even if you enhance the use of transport by
17 increasing Kds or getting rid of colloids, there's no effect.
18 Partly, the reason for that is, I think, the very
19 conservative, perhaps, transport model that we use that could
20 shift these curves considerably down when we use a more
21 realistic transport model. The PA is currently working.
22 That is up there, Bob? I don't know. Next one?

23 Now, I guess we do both of them, degraded UZ
24 transport and degraded infiltration barrier. So, I assume
25 that we take high and low value infiltration and assume that

1 we take high or low values of Kds. We throw out the colloids
2 or we add the colloids and off we go. Right? Next slide?

3 Now, that shows very similar things to what we
4 showed before. If you remember correctly, lower infiltration
5 gave us better performance, but it didn't affect transport.
6 And, you add them together, again, you have better
7 performance because the lower infiltration, the transport
8 doesn't do anything for you. Same thing with the red curve
9 here. If you remember correctly, increasing infiltration
10 didn't make it any worse, but again having colloids and
11 reducing Kds did to some extent early-on. That's what this
12 curve is. So, it's basically to me a super position of two
13 effects that is clearly unrelated.

14 I guess, that's it. Any more?

15 BULLEN: Thank you, Bo. Now, at the risk of asking this
16 question, just for clarification purposes only, are there any
17 questions from the Board only?

18 SAGÜÉS: Okay. I'm sorry, but I want to go to #16,
19 please. Okay, thank you. First of all, the time scale
20 there, where is--the zero years will correspond to the moment
21 in which the repository is closed or is--it looks like the
22 curve starts at exactly 50 years. Is that--

23 BODVARSSON: Oh, no. It's--

24 SAGÜÉS: Yeah, when does the time scale--

25 BODVARSSON: The time scale starts at zero, right here.

1 SAGÜÉS: But, what is zero, the moment in which
2 emplacement has finished and the--

3 BODVARSSON: Is that right, Bob? This is a TSPA curve.
4 I guess, zero would be the time when you close--or you start
5 the ventilation. Right? You start by putting the waste
6 emplacement times zero, right?

7 ANDREWS: Yeah, and then ventilation is a 50 period and
8 then ventilation is turned off.

9 BODVARSSON: Right.

10 ANDREWS: So, I think things start after ventilation is
11 turned off.

12 SAGÜÉS: Starts after ventilation. But, then, that's
13 when the drifts begin to warm up, correct?

14 BODVARSSON: No. Well, they are still warming up here,
15 but you know, because of ventilation, you remove a lot of
16 heat, but they are still warming up.

17 SAGÜÉS: But, there's not a lot of--I mean, there is a
18 lot of water displacement in that period. Indeed, there
19 would be water being removed from--

20 BODVARSSON: Right. It's because there's a lot of heat
21 removed. So, basically, a lot of heat starts to enter the
22 picture right here. You're right.

23 SAGÜÉS: Okay. So, now, then you close the drifts and
24 this begins to heat up now and then you stir moving water out
25 from the surrounding of the drifts?

1 BODVARSSON: Yeah, of 5m. This is a 5m location above
2 the drift.

3 SAGÜÉS: Uh-huh. Now, does that mean you still--does
4 that flow downwards then?

5 BODVARSSON: Yeah, yeah. Here is the drift. It is
6 capillary driven towards the drift, yes.

7 SAGÜÉS: Uh-huh. So, even though the drifts are
8 beginning to get real hot, you still want to have all the
9 time in net downward flux? You never drive water upward from
10 the drift?

11 BODVARSSON: No, no, no. It's because what happens when
12 you dry out around the drift, you dry out the rock. So, the
13 capillary suction becomes more and more and more. And,
14 therefore, water is flowing towards the drift. Is always
15 going towards the drift at all times. The gas phase is
16 always going away from the drift at all times because the gas
17 pressure increases. But, basically, the water flux is always
18 towards the drift because of capillary suction.

19 SAGÜÉS: Uh-huh. So, this is going to be very
20 rudimentary. So then, the heat doesn't dry the environment
21 around it?

22 BODVARSSON: No, what happens is this is the flux. This
23 is the flux here, okay; 5m above the drift.

24 SAGÜÉS: Yeah.

25 BODVARSSON: What really happens is it goes in here and

1 will all be vaporized. It moves up, it moves laterally.
2 Some will go back down again, vaporized again, but eventually
3 all flow around the pillar.

4 SAGÜÉS: And, that evaporation boundaries, they are
5 pretty close to the--I mean, if I were to go only like one
6 foot over the surface, then in that case, I wouldn't--

7 BODVARSSON: No water. You see no water. You see no
8 water there.

9 SAGÜÉS: No water. So, what is the break point?

10 BODVARSSON: This will--what?

11 SAGÜÉS: What is the break point, 1m, 2m?

12 BODVARSSON: Well, it depends on time because the
13 boiling sort of moves outwards with time. And, you start
14 with any location. Like 1m above, you have capillary suction
15 of water going towards the drift starting earlier around 5m.
16 Then, the boiling point moves out. Then, at 5m that we're
17 showing here, it is this location. Closer to the drift would
18 be here. Further away from the drift, it would be here.

19 SAGÜÉS: But look, for example, at the heated drift
20 test. Right now--I don't know certainly where we are right
21 now, but we are pretty--we're dry for a couple of meters over
22 the drift now, right, or not?

23 BODVARSSON: Yeah.

24 SAGÜÉS: But then, the net flux of water, I guess--the
25 next flux of water is up, not down?

1 BODVARSSON: No, it's always towards the drift. You're
2 talking about drift scale test or--

3 SAGÜÉS: Yeah.

4 BODVARSSON: Yeah. See, what happens is this. You
5 know, water moves towards the drift, but steam after it boils
6 moves away. That steam condenses here further away. So,
7 maybe, that is what you are thinking about is that when the
8 water is boiled, steam moves away, moves outwards here, and
9 it condenses and forms water here that then wants to flow
10 towards the drift again. Is that what you're thinking about?

11 SAGÜÉS: Yes. And, I'm just trying to figure--so,
12 forget about the seep flow and just get whatever--let's get
13 number of moles of water per unit time per unit area net. Is
14 it moving down or moving up?

15 BODVARSSON: It's moving down here, it's moving sideways
16 here, it's moving up here all towards the drift. The net
17 component if you take the whole system, net component order
18 is there. This is where the water flows. But, locally,
19 flows like that; steam flows out, condenses, some of it goes
20 like that, some of it wants to move again, and steam
21 vaporizes, moves off and condenses again, and eventually a
22 global effect is this. The small scale effect occurs close
23 to the boiling region.

24 SPEAKER: When you're saying water, though, you mean--

25 BODVARSSON: Oh, you mean, liquid--

1 SAGÜÉS: Water as--liquid plus gas, yeah. The overall
2 flow of water is--

3 BODVARSSON: Oh, you mean liquid and gas?

4 SAGÜÉS: Yes?

5 BODVARSSON: Just the water compound?

6 SAGÜÉS: Yes.

7 BODVARSSON: Oh, the water compound--the net effect of
8 water compound is away. Steam flow is more than liquid flow.

9 SAGÜÉS: Okay. So, you're saying that there is a
10 liquid--there is a liquid flow of water downwards, molecular
11 water, and that water goes even in areas where we're above
12 boiling, where dynamically--no, that doesn't make sense.

13 BODVARSSON: It goes into a hotter area. It boils off
14 and then steam goes out.

15 SAGÜÉS: Okay. And then, some of the water makes it all
16 the way down to the drift even though the drift is, for
17 example, 200--

18 BODVARSSON: No, I don't think any other water will get
19 going through drift.

20 BULLEN: I'm going to exercise some chair prerogative
21 here and take this conversation offline and you guys can do
22 this outside the room. We need to finish the last two
23 presentations and I'll ask one last time are there any
24 questions of clarification?

25 (No response.)

1 BULLEN: Seeing none, thank you both. By the way, Bo,
2 you will be back tomorrow and you'll have your viewgraphs.
3 When we have the panel discussion, we can delve into this in
4 a little more detail and perhaps you could talk offline with
5 Alberto or other Board members.

6 Right now, I will just introduce Dr. Ernie Hardin
7 and state that he's going to talk about engineered barrier
8 system supporting models and analyses and leave it at that.

9 HARDIN: I have the privilege of presenting to you work
10 done by some 15 or 20 people, too numerous to mention, but
11 I'll try to call out some of the contributors as we go
12 through the material.

13 This is sort of a table of contents of this
14 presentation. I'm going to talk a little bit about how we
15 predict relative humidity and seepage during the thermal
16 period, how we predict water composition in the drift, touch
17 on flow loads and breaches in the drip shield and waste
18 packages, talk about EBS radionuclide transport. That would
19 be primarily the diffusion barrier. And, give you a brief
20 overview of the TSPA abstractions that are used to control
21 the in-drift environment, and finally, touch on FEPs. We
22 have the opportunity to talk about two of them here. And,
23 after that, we'll talk a little bit about uncertainty
24 analyses and I have a couple of Bob Andrews' sensitivity
25 slides. What I do not have time to talk to you about today

1 are microbial effects in the drifts, effects of introduced
2 materials, such as cementitious materials that would be used
3 in ground support, and the production of colloidal iron in
4 the drifts from the use of iron ground support.

5 I'm going to leave this slide up here and go to the
6 next one. This is one of Bob's slides, as well. And, these
7 are TSPA input parameters that I'm going to speak to you
8 here. I should point out that some of these are variables
9 and vary over a specified range in the implementation of the
10 TSPA run, the probabilistic run. And, some of them are, for
11 example, fraction of the drip shield that is wet is set to 1.
12 So, they come in different flavors. Next slide, please?

13 This is another slide which gives the invert
14 diffusion model or the EBS transport model input parameters.
15 Next slide, please?

16 Okay. So, now, I'm going to jump right to how we
17 predict temperature and relative humidity in the drifts. The
18 Board has been briefed on the multi-scale thermohydrology
19 model. I recall Tom Buschek did this in 1998. That model
20 basically combines 3-D, 1-D, and 2-D models with the purpose
21 of representing heat flow due to thermal conduction in the
22 rock on a three-dimensional large scale. In addition, it
23 represents the heat transfer coupling effects from multiple
24 waste packages and then it brings in the thermohydrology
25 effect by using 2-D, TH model here. Now, the approach is

1 roughly analogous. I certainly don't have time to explain
2 the details of this approach here, but I can tell you that it
3 is roughly analogous to a product solution and heat transfer
4 theory where you have a one-dimensional solution which you
5 actually multiply by a two-dimensional to give you a three-
6 dimensional solution. And, I think that analogy is, more or
7 less, correct for the thermal part for the hydrology part.
8 Next slide, please?

9 For the hydrologic effects, those are limited to
10 two dimensions in the current implementation of the multi-
11 scale model. And, we are currently working on a three-
12 dimensional TH model to incorporate in this process. Okay,
13 next slide, please?

14 These are some representative results from the
15 multi-scale model. These are 170 different temperature
16 histories representing average surface temperature on the
17 waste package. These 170 happen to have been chosen from 610
18 all together based on the range of infiltration at those 170
19 locations. So, in the very long-term then, the infiltration
20 is in the range of 10 to 20mm/yr for these locations. And,
21 the mean of those is plotted in red. Okay. Next slide?

22 Now, Leon Reiter also asked me to talk about
23 thermally perturbed seepage and I'll take a crack at it. The
24 multi-scale TH model prediction for liquid flux 5m above the
25 drift is used. It's used to key into an algorithm developed

1 by Bo and his colleagues at LBL. This is Mike Wilson's of
2 Sandia plot from his abstraction AMR. Basically, what we're
3 doing is we're calculating the flux and we're entering a
4 curve like this with that flux value to calculate seepage
5 fraction. Now, seepage fraction is defined here as
6 proportion of waste package locations that will be exposed to
7 seepage. The min, max, and peak correspond to the limits and
8 the peak of the probabilistic distribution function that's
9 used in TSPA to represent the k bar over alpha parameter that
10 Bo was talking about earlier. Bottom line is we're
11 calculating a percolation flux in the rock 5m above the
12 drift. We're drawing an analogy between that and the ambient
13 percolation flux in this sense and we're using this model
14 which is based on the development of the seepage model that
15 Bo described earlier. Next slide, please?

16 Okay. So, somebody asked earlier what are the
17 thermally perturbed fluxes that you would get and we're
18 talking about fluxes here at the 5m horizon. Using this
19 approach, you get fluxes in the range from 4mm to 120mm/yr.
20 Those are averages and there's some additional variability
21 that's associated with waste package to waste package
22 differences in the thermal hydrology. For comparison, the
23 ambient percolation flux during the present day period--
24 that's zero to 600 years from present--ranges from 0.7 to
25 38mm/yr. So, this approach then is generating something like

1 a three or four fold increase at the upward end.

2 Okay. What does the approach does not do and Bo
3 has pointed this out is it does not include the effects of
4 dryout within 5m of the drift opening and that is true.
5 However, it also does not accommodate the fact that at
6 certain times, very early during the post-closure thermal-
7 hydrologic history, you may have a flux that's greater than
8 the flux calculated at 5m. So, on balance, we think that
9 this approach is reasonable and conservative. I would also
10 point out that the extent of dryout around the drift openings
11 depends. As Bo pointed out, it depends on the time. So, we
12 develop a dryout zone and then over time, over thousands of
13 years, it gradually diminishes back onto the drift wall.
14 That's for a typical case. But, if you take a high
15 infiltration location that has high flux and you're looking
16 at the repository edge or even in the corner of the
17 repository, then you get somewhat cooler temperatures. In
18 effect, you may not develop a dryout zone that's bigger than
19 a fraction of a meter. So, in that sense, dryout zone is not
20 an issue. Enough said about that.

21 The point here that I'd like to make to you is
22 that, after 600 years which is when we have our climate
23 change and also corresponds to significant diminution of the
24 thermal output of the waste packages, is that this approach
25 to estimating thermal perturbed seepage generates results

1 which are indistinguishable from the background approach
2 where you would use the ambient percolation flux in the
3 seepage model. So, after a couple of hundred years, no
4 difference. And, Bo stated this differently, but what we're
5 saying here is that the effect on the TSPA dose rate model
6 from this several hundred year approximation is pretty slim.

7 Next slide, please? This is a calculation done
8 using this approach. It's based on a 2-D thermohydrologic
9 model. The model inputs represent the geographic center of
10 the repository and we're using the mean infiltration here.
11 What we're comparing here is the downward liquid flux at a
12 horizon 5m above the crown of the drift and one 0.2m above
13 the crown. You see in very early time at this location--this
14 is a pretty typical location--we're going to get some
15 movement of water close to the drift according to this model.
16 After 600 years of so that the curves pretty much track the
17 background percolation flux.

18 Next slide, please? Okay. Switch gears and talk
19 about water composition. The available models for
20 calculating and predicting water composition have determined
21 the approach that we use in process modeling in support of
22 the TSPA. These approaches are available to us. We have an
23 empirical approach which we use for very dry conditions. I
24 would point out to you that the little bullet at the top
25 there--I need the pointer. Thank you. Okay. This bullet

1 belongs here, my mistake. So, the empirical approach, we use
2 for very dry conditions as certain salts deliquesce at a low
3 humidity. And, we really don't have predictive models that
4 tell us what, for example, sodium nitrate does in a saturated
5 brine at a humidity of 55 percent when the strength of sodium
6 nitrate in solution might be 15 molal. We don't have real
7 good models for that. What we can do is we can say, look, we
8 know the constituent salts that are present in the
9 environment, we know when they start to deliquesce. We can
10 treat them independently and look at the first one that
11 deliquesces and that would be the nitrates, and then as
12 others deliquesce, other components gradually come into
13 solution. We'll get to a point as relative humidity
14 increases where they've all basically dissolved into
15 solution. You now have a brine that contains all the
16 components. That point is selected as 85 percent relative
17 humidity which is in reasonable agreement with other things
18 that we know about the relationship between molality of these
19 salts and relative humidity.

20 At that point, the approach kicks in a Pitzer
21 Formulation which is an approximate model that is supported
22 at the dilute end by some laboratory evaporation tests. At
23 the concentrated end, we compare that model to tabulated
24 solubilities for pure salts. The Pitzer model takes you
25 right on up in relative humidity towards 100 percent. And,

1 as you get up to relative humidity above 98 percent, it's
2 possible to use the more familiar Debye-Huckel family of
3 models. We do not do that in the PA because the approach--
4 the Pitzer approach is adequate as an approximate model for
5 the purpose at hand.

6 Okay. So, the output from this process that I've
7 described consists of pH, ionic strength, chloride
8 concentration as a surrogate for all the soluble components
9 that develop as relative humidity increases in the presence
10 of salts. Those are predicted over ranges of temperature,
11 RH, and P_{CO_2} which is the partial pressure of CO_2 . The
12 approach allows you to look at the effects if you have salts
13 in the environment, no seepage. Just a little bit of salts,
14 let's say you evaporate some pore water on the surface of the
15 drip shield, you never see seepage, but it's exposed to the
16 relative humidity. The approach allows you to look at that,
17 as well as what happens if there is seepage during that
18 period. The seepage comes in, part of it evaporates, it
19 interacts with the salts.

20 Next slide, please? And this is an example of
21 results output from the Pitzer model. This is based on Paul
22 Mariner's (phonetic) calculations, his AMR, and this shows
23 what happens to the pH of a sodium bicarbonate water with the
24 composition of J-13 water as Rh increases from 85 percent to
25 above 99 percent. So, pH is basically dropping towards

1 neutral as RH increases. The approach is used to generate
2 response surfaces that are then used to look up tables when
3 the GOLDSIM model is run.

4 Next slide, please? Switching gears again, what
5 kinds of breaches or holes can we develop in the drip shield
6 or the waste package? We recognize that water can occur in
7 different ways in the EBS. For example, humidity can
8 interact with solid surfaces and you can develop very thin
9 films of water. Those are not thought to be significant for
10 advective flow; however, they may be--once a breach forms in
11 the waste package, a breach of any type, that water vapor can
12 get inside the package and then interact with the surfaces
13 and you can get a thin layer of water. We're talking
14 angstroms of water. That water can support the molecular
15 diffusion of solutes from the waste form along a circuitous
16 path that would result in a release. That is accommodated in
17 the TSPA.

18 In addition, a stress corrosion crack would be a
19 very small thin crack on the order of hundreds of microns in
20 aperture. A stress corrosion crack in either the waste
21 package proximal to one of the closure welds or possibly on
22 the surface of a drip shield damaged by rockfall could behave
23 in that way, could allow water vapor to penetrate the waste
24 package. In addition, both the waste package and the drip
25 shield are allowed to undergo general corrosion and in the

1 model that eventually results in something called patch
2 through which you can have capillary flow or droplet flow in
3 the case of seepage.

4 Next slide, please? Okay. Now, we're going to
5 talk a little bit about the EBS transport model. The EBS
6 transport model is basically a one-dimensional advective,
7 dispersive, diffusive model, represents a one-dimensional
8 vertical pathway from the surface of the invert to the rock
9 below. We do not take credit for radionuclide sorption in
10 the invert. We have undertaken several studies in the past
11 to look at the possibility of doing that; perhaps, even
12 engineering radionuclide getters into the invert. We have
13 elected not to do that.

14 So, in the current design, conceptual design, there
15 is no sorption of either colloids or solutes, but there is
16 advection. So, you have enough water in the invert. If the
17 water content is high enough then under the impetus of
18 gravity, you can have a flux which represents the velocity
19 that is able to transport those nuclides from the surface to
20 the rock. Now, if that velocity is very low and this would
21 occur if the invert were relatively dry, then that flux would
22 be vanishing small and you would not get releases except that
23 you can have molecular diffusion through traces of water in
24 the invert material and that molecular diffusion could result
25 in a calculable release. Now, when the invert is very dry,

1 you need to know what the molecular diffusion coefficient is.
2 That process, we refer to as our invert diffusion model.
3 It's one-dimensional and it relies on experimental
4 characterization of diffusion coefficients. That's done
5 using electrical analogue. We take granular material, such
6 as gravels or crushed tuff, and we put them in a centrifuge,
7 acclimate them to known hydrologic conditions, volumetric
8 water content, measure the electrical conductance of the
9 sample, and then equate that through a classical
10 thermodynamic formula into solute diffusion.

11 Now, this plot here shows the experimental data
12 support for the invert diffusion model. The data points were
13 all generated by Jim Konka (phonetic) and Judith Wright
14 (phonetic). These are published data. We see that the
15 diffusion coefficient here is normalized to the self-
16 diffusion coefficient of water. Basically, we have a power
17 loss that's no surprise because behavior has been known to
18 oil/fuel geophysicists for years; I think it's Archie's Law.
19 The red plot is a classical form of Archie's Law over-
20 plotted on these data. So, basically, for TSPA, what we're
21 doing is we're taking the--we're using these experimental
22 data to support a conservative fit down to 1.5 percent
23 volumetric water content which gives us a normalized
24 diffusion coefficient in this range.

25 Next slide, please? Okay. This is the overview of

1 TSPA abstractions for the in-drift chemical environment.
2 What we have included is interaction between aqueous and gas
3 phases, primarily CO₂ because CO₂ has an important effect on
4 the pH. The evaporation of seepage, the evaporative
5 concentration of it is taken into account, as well as
6 potential condensation effect through the TH model which
7 gives us an input to the calculation of water composition.
8 We allow salts to form and dissolve in the drift. We
9 calculate ionic strength which can be used to infer the
10 stability of colloids; that is as ionic strength increases,
11 colloid stability decreases. That has not been done before
12 in previous TSPA approaches in quite this way. Finally, we
13 have our EBS radionuclide transport model.

14 We had excluded influences on the bulk chemical
15 environment for microbial effects, from cement-water
16 interactions, and from corrosion products. Each one of those
17 is associated with a series of arguments that I can only
18 refer to at the moment.

19 Next slide, please? This is sort of a depiction of
20 that. Multi-scale model gives us flux above the drift, gives
21 us T and RH conditions at all points of interest within the
22 drift. We get the seepage model used in conjunction with
23 that boundary condition and is used to calculate actual
24 seepage flow into the drift during the thermal period and
25 then after the thermal period. The THC, the drift scale THC

1 model that Bo described which I'm not really going to talk
2 about is used to describe the composition of water at the
3 drift wall and that's used as the incoming composition. So,
4 we now know the flow rate and the composition of that water
5 and the THC model also gives you P_{CO_2} , but you have the
6 necessary conditions to calculate water composition,
7 evolution of water in the drift.

8 Okay. Next slide, please? Several of these things
9 that are talked about represent improvements over past
10 implementations of TSPA.

11 Next slide, please? Switching gears a little bit
12 here and talking about FEPs, features, events, and processes,
13 that need to be considered in performance assessment, for
14 condensation under the drip shield, we have reached a bottom
15 line that condensation could occur if the invert becomes wet
16 enough. The method that we use to do this is approximate.
17 We used NUFT which is a porous medium simulator. We
18 calibrated to analytical solutions to represent the air space
19 between the drip shield and the waste package. We then put
20 those pseudo properties into a model, a TH model, and
21 incorporated all the percolation conditions and the
22 infiltration boundary conditions and rock properties and so
23 forth. We looked for evolution of humidity under the drip
24 shield that could lead to condensation and, yes, it is
25 possible. However, I think we can conclude from this

1 exercise that with the invert remaining unsaturated that the
2 vapor pressure there will be rather low, but we will get a
3 vapor pressure lowering effect because the water is at a
4 negative potential and the end result of that is that
5 condensation under the drop shield is rather unlikely. It is
6 not taken into account explicitly in the PA.

7 Next slide, please? Another area I'd like to talk
8 about here is rockfall. The approach that we've used to
9 address rockfall is key block theory. This photograph shows
10 a key block that was observed in the cross-drift. It's a
11 block bounded by fractures with certain orientations that
12 allows it to fall out of the drift wall under the force of
13 gravity. There have been a great many data collected on
14 fracture frequency and orientation which gives you the
15 ability to predict when conditions like this could occur.

16 Next slide, please? This is a summary of those
17 predictions. They include changes in the outline or the
18 profile of the drift opening. The plot here shows a CDF
19 cumulative distribution plot of block size. The analysis has
20 been extended to seismic conditions by incorporating seismic
21 acceleration in addition to gravity, which of course changed
22 direction, as well as the resulting magnitude. In addition,
23 the fracture data are available for different units. So, we
24 have an idea of the frequency of rockfall that can be
25 expected in the different areas of the repository.

1 Next slide, please? Okay. I'm about to boldly go
2 where I've never been before and talk about the EBS transport
3 sensitivity calculation.

4 Next slide? This is a comparison of the base case
5 or the nominal scenario with a degraded EBS barrier and an
6 enhanced one. The graded EBS barrier is defined as we show
7 over here. We've used a different invert diffusion model.
8 Instead of using the one based on the data, we've gone to a
9 first order fit. In addition, the solubilities for plutonium
10 are pegged at the 95th percentile of the distribution. The
11 chemistry in the invert is assumed to be the same as it is
12 inside the waste package which means that during a certain
13 period of time when the waste package internals are first
14 corroding, the pH is a little lower and neptunium solubility
15 is higher. And, maximized colloid stability and maximized at
16 the 95th percentile, the distribution coefficient for
17 radionuclide sorption onto colloids. That gives you the red
18 curve over here.

19 The enhanced barrier uses a very low value of the
20 diffusion coefficient which would plot near the bottom of the
21 plot that I showed you previously. And, it also uses the
22 converse of the solubility and colloid stability and
23 chemistry conditions that I talked about. So, bottom line is
24 this behavior right here appears to be highly favorable to
25 performance and, in fact, it is. It requires a diffusion

1 coefficient on the order of 10^{-11} cm²/sec. We have no measured
2 any coefficients that low. That's partly because when you
3 get down to transport behavior of that nature, very slow
4 transport, it's difficult to observe.

5 Next slide, please? This sensitivity study is for
6 backfill and these two curves represent the same--I believe,
7 they represent the same nominal scenario result except that
8 for the backfill case, we've used a previous set of multi-
9 scale thermohydrology model runs which incorporate backfill.
10 But, the seepage is the same, virtually everything else
11 about the model is the same. And so, that means that the
12 effects here differ primarily in the temperature at the waste
13 package surface for the first few thousand years. Not that
14 the curves are really that different, okay? I think you
15 could question whether these are significantly different
16 results. So, given the way that the TSPA is set up, I think
17 what's happening here is that differences between these
18 results are limited probably to temperature sensitive
19 cladding performance.

20 Okay. Next slide, please? Last slide, summary of
21 major points. Temperature and relative humidity are the
22 master variables in this approach to predicting the in-drift
23 chemical environment. Temperature and relative humidity are
24 fairly straightforward to predict. Relative humidity is a
25 pervasive measure of the environment inside the drift. That

1 is the gas phase is highly communicative. So, we use these
2 in a way--combine them with chemical modeling in a way that
3 allows us to predict water compositions given a reference
4 composition as J-13 water or a chloride sulfate bore water.
5 In addition, we can calculate water composition at various
6 places within the drift. We've combined inputs from various
7 other models. This is an integration of models for the
8 purpose of calculating response in the drift.

9 And, a final point about water compositions, I
10 would expect the water compositions will be heterogeneous,
11 both spatially and temporally. Temporally as the hydrologic
12 boundary conditions change and as the thermal perturbation
13 changes; and spatially because we have spatial heterogeneity
14 in the mountain. We have identified different compositions
15 for waters; bicarbonate water, chloride sulfate water. Both
16 are considered in this approach.

17 That's all I have.

18 BULLEN: Thank you, Dr. Hardin, especially for keeping
19 it to 26 minutes. That was outstanding. Now, I'm going to
20 allow just one from Dr. Parizek, a clarifying question, and
21 we'll invite you back tomorrow to discuss whether or not
22 backfill has an effect and we'll ask you to bring your slides
23 and we'll investigate that further at the panel discussion.

24 Dr. Parizek?

25 PARIZEK: Brines and Bodvarsson says the dilute, dilute,

1 dilute water. I hear it from brines to dilute water. So, I
2 just want to know where the brines are and it's with small
3 amounts or what. But, that's just a--you can answer that
4 tomorrow. It just seems inconsistent with what Bo mentioned
5 earlier.

6 HARDIN: Sure. Yeah, I could take Bo's dilute brines
7 and bring them into the drift and evaporate them. That
8 results in--

9 PARIZEK: On waste packages then?

10 HARDIN: Yeah, on the drip shield or in the invert.

11 BULLEN: Thank you very much.

12 Our final presentation of today is on waste package
13 and drip shield degradation by Pasu Pasupathi and we'll just
14 start without further adieu. Pasu?

15 PASUPATHI: What I should say is most of the past models
16 we've been talking about, one by Joe Farmer and his Livermore
17 gang and the abstraction models were done up by Jung Lee
18 (phonetic) and the PA team. You know, if Joe Farmer were
19 here, he would be worried with the project. He would be
20 standing there making the presentation; instead, you got me.

21 First slide, please? Okay. This is another one
22 of Bob Andrews' slides. It simply shows the different
23 attributes and process model factors for the drip shield and
24 the waste degradation. We've got a bunch of these model
25 parameters. For example, in the drip shield, there's a

1 hydrogen induced cracking initiation threshold, hydrogen
2 concentration profile thresholds, a profile that gives you
3 the critical hydrogen concentration before the hydrogen
4 induced cracking occurs. And, in the case of waste package,
5 you have the parameters for the size of material,
6 manufacturing defect flaws, stress and stress intensity
7 factor profiles, and SCC initiation threshold, SCC crack
8 growth rate.

9 Next slide, please? This presentation is going to
10 touch on TSPA, VA, and how much improvement or how many
11 models that have been added in the TSPA/SR. So, the design
12 for the waste TSPA/VA has changed considerably. We used to
13 have a carbon steel outer corrosion allowance barrier.
14 That's been eliminated in the SR design. Alloy-22 used to be
15 the inner barrier. It is still there, but now it's moved to
16 the outer barrier position. Instead of the carbon steel for
17 structural material, we have 315 stainless as the nuclear
18 grade stainless steel inside Alloy-22 shell. And then, we
19 added drip shield made of titanium.

20 Next slide, please? This has been projected lots
21 of times before. One thing I want to point out is these
22 arrows here are all misplaced. This is really the inner
23 barrier and this is the outer barrier. Somewhere along the
24 line when the transfer of files happens, you know, the arrows
25 are not in the right places. But, anyway, the inner barrier

1 is Alloy-22. It's got just one single lid on both ends.

2 The next slide, please? This is the current SR 21-
3 PWR waste package configuration. You have the outer barrier
4 with Alloy 22, the stainless steel inner shell and there are
5 two--there's a stainless steel lids and there are two lids on
6 Alloy-22, the one on the inner lid and outer lid. These are
7 on the top. On the bottom, we have only a single lid of
8 Alloy-22.

9 As I mentioned earlier, because of these design
10 changes, we have added a lot of new degradation models. The
11 TSPA/SR now includes stress corrosion cracking model and that
12 includes the effects of manufacturing flaws and we have added
13 aging and phase stability effects, microbiologically
14 influenced corrosion effects, and the potential for
15 radiolysis. And, in addition, we have looked at the bounding
16 environmental condition on the waste package and drip shield.

17 The TSPA/VA because of the corrosion allowance
18 material, we have included the general and localized
19 corrosion that included humid air corrosion. The corrosion
20 rates were based on published data. In the TSPA/SR, we do
21 not have any corrosion zone material.

22 This applies to general and localized corrosion
23 model applied both to drip shield and waste package outer
24 barrier of Alloy-22 barrier. In the TSPA/VA, we have the
25 general and localized corrosion. We have in the SR dry

1 oxidation, humid air corrosion, and aqueous phase corrosion.
2 In the VA, we looked at the range of water chemistry in the
3 crevice, but assumed the worst case to be due to the Ferric
4 chloride formation. Whereas in the case of SR, we have
5 environment on the surface based on the evaporative
6 concentration which Ernie Hardin talked about. The other
7 item is the model parameters and corrosion rates were based
8 on expert elicitation and published data. These data were
9 not particularly relevant to the repository conditions. In
10 the SR, we have primarily the experimental data from the
11 long-term corrosion test facility and the short-term cyclic
12 polarization data. In addition, we do use published data as
13 a corroborative purpose.

14 The models that we have for all of the degradation
15 models and source corrosion and general and localized
16 corrosion, all of them get fed into a code called WAPDEG,
17 which is the waste package degradation code, and that
18 conceptually treats the waste package. It divides it into
19 about 1,000 patches. We have different patches, different
20 conditions for different patches. For example, here's
21 dripping water. All of these patches see drips. The
22 associated welds are identified separately and this one is
23 for the closure welds. And, here the pH and the chloride of
24 the water contacting the waste package and drip shield are
25 coming out of the EBS chemical environment model abstraction.

1 Then, what's coming to the drift is from the UZ T&H models.

2 Again, continuing with this general and localized
3 corrosion of the drip shield and Alloy-22, in the VA, we have
4 the same situation with 1000 patches per package and also in
5 the SR. We do not have a drip shield in the VA. This plot
6 here as relates to this one, the maximum general corrosion
7 rate, we have--we are assuming for Alloy-22 is .73 microns
8 per year. This is the upper bound of the two year data and
9 this is the curve that you get when you plot the CDF for the
10 two year data. This is from the long-term corrosion test
11 facility. For titanium drip shield, the general corrosion
12 rate is .325 microns per year and this is also the upper
13 bound of the measured data.

14 Again, continuing with this general and localized
15 corrosion of drip shield and Alloy-22, this plot here is a
16 different way of saying what Ernie Hardin was talking about.
17 This particular point here is 120 degrees C, 50 percent
18 humidity. That is the highest temperature, we believe, you
19 can sustain an aqueous film on a salt deposit or uprooted
20 geometry. And, this is based on the deliquescing point of
21 sodium nitrate. As you go up in relative humidity and lower
22 in temperature, other salts come into the picture, you get
23 into the chlorides and sulfates dissolving along with the
24 sodium nitrate.

25 I mentioned the .073 as the highest general

1 corrosion rate we are assuming in the TSPA. Added on top of
2 that are a whole bunch of factors and this is one of them.
3 This is to account for the silica deposits we have seen on
4 surfaces and some of the coupons we take out--took out of the
5 long-term corrosion test facility. The deposits were
6 analyzed and looked at and then we are assuming a uniform
7 deposit based on the thickness, the density, and all that.
8 It translates to about .063 microns per year bias as a
9 maximum. So, we use zero to .063 as a distribution added on
10 to the general corrosion rate.

11 The other two bullets relate to the localized
12 corrosion aspects. We have taken out samples from the long-
13 term corrosion crevice samples and--well, in the crevice
14 sample, we have seen no evidence of localized corrosion.
15 These test media in the long-term corrosion test facility go
16 from 10x, 100x, and 1000x J-13. pH range is from 2.7 to
17 about 9 or 9.5. In addition, we did cyclic polarization
18 tests on both Alloy-22 and titanium on four different media
19 at 60 degrees C and 90 degrees C and we still don't see any
20 localized corrosion.

21 BULLEN: Pasu, would you just clarify, the .073 is added
22 to the .063?

23 PASUPATHI: .063 is added to .073, right.

24 BULLEN: And so, you actually get a corrosion rate
25 that's conservative--silica up to .13?

1 PASUPATHI: Yes, right.

2 BULLEN: Okay. Thank you.

3 PASUPATHI: Okay. The next one is MIC. There was no
4 consideration of MIC in the TSPA/VA. In the SR, we have--we
5 evaluate MIC with electrochemical techniques. The samples
6 were tested in the sterile and inoculated test media, J-13
7 based. I think they were based on simulated concentrate
8 water. That's about 1000 x J-13. Based on the short-term
9 tests that corrosion rate and angstrom factor, 1 to 2 was
10 determined. So, this enhancement package is also applied to
11 the general corrosion rate. We're continuing to work with
12 this. Long-term tests are going on with the different media
13 and so we'll update the results as we go along. And,
14 titanium is still considered to be immune to MIC.

15 The radiolysis effect, we did no consider
16 radiolysis effect in TSPA/VA. Here again, we have done
17 short-term cyclic polarization tests, added hydrogen peroxide
18 to the test media up to 72 ppm. After that, it seemed to
19 stabilize. So, there was no point in adding more. The
20 corrosion potentials were measured and based on this, we
21 concluded that radiolysis does not change the corrosion rate
22 significant. So, it's been screened out of TSPA at this
23 time.

24 Aging and phase stability, then we did not consider
25 aging and phase stability in TSPA/VA. In the SR, we have a

1 fairly extensive program ongoing on aging and phase
2 stability. We are using some of the samples that have been
3 aged by Haynes (phonetic) as a corroborative measure. We
4 have our own samples going through the aging process. We
5 have only limited data at this time, but based on that, we
6 have the functional relationship between temperature and the
7 fraction of grain boundary coverage where the precipitation
8 occurs due to aging. The limited data shows that aging and
9 phase stability will not be important if the surface
10 temperature of the waste package stays below 260 degrees C.
11 Again, as I mentioned, this is based on the base metal in the
12 annealed condition and we're continuing work with core work
13 and welded samples.

14 Based on the data that we have, this was again a
15 short-term cyclic polarization test. We determined an
16 enhancement factor of 2.5 is appropriate for again. This is
17 a fully aged sample. These two photographs show the effect
18 of aging. This is at about 650 degrees C, 100 hours of
19 aging; and this is the same temperature, 1000 hours of aging.
20 So, you can see the difference in the amount of the invert
21 precipitation. We are assuming no aging effect on titanium.

22 Early failure, this is a significant difference in
23 this particular model. In TSPA/VA, it was assumed that one
24 waste package failure, 1000 years for base case.
25 Probabilistic case of 1 to 10 was assumed. The upper bound

1 was based on British pressure vessel data, 17 defect-related
2 failure in 20,000 and so it comes out at about 8.5 for
3 10,000. The lower bound was based on a conservative
4 interpretation of Midland reactor vessel. So, this gives
5 like 6×10^{-6} per waste package. And, the time of occurrence of
6 these failures was pretty much arbitrary.

7 Whereas in the case of TSPA/SR, we have a review of
8 early failure literature on welded metallic containers. This
9 included tin cans and fuel rods and pressure vessels and
10 cesium capsules and every kind of welded material you could
11 think of. And, for the types of defect that can occur and
12 subset applicable to the waste package. You know, not all of
13 them are, but a couple. So, for each defect type, estimate
14 probability of occurrence per waste package and the
15 consequences of these defects. And, manufacturing and
16 handling induced errors and defects, these are human factors
17 induced. Defects were also assumed. This particular model,
18 we believe, is much more defensible and more applicable to
19 the waste package in repository conditions.

20 As I mentioned, in addition to the weld defects, we
21 consider a lot of other things, such as improper heat
22 treatment and the surface contamination. This assumes
23 somebody uses to clean up the waste package surface and then
24 leaves contaminant in there and then any handling damage,
25 thermal mis-load of waste package, drip shield emplacement,

1 all of these things were included and our conclusion was that
2 only weld flaws have the potential to lead to early failures
3 through the SCC. So, these flaw sizes and size distributions
4 were included in the SCC model.

5 This is another big one now, a big change from
6 TSPA/VA. We recognize that, always recognize, the SCC
7 incredible mechanism for Alloy-22 under certain conditions.
8 It was not analyzed in the VA because we did not have data or
9 the models to do that. The SR, we have two different models.
10 One based on the stress intensity factor threshold and the
11 other one based on what we call the--diffusion model. This
12 model was selected in the TSPA/SR because it is much more
13 defensible and it assumes the stress to show for initiation
14 of SCC crack. This again, as I mentioned earlier, the SCC
15 model for Alloy-22 includes manufacturing defects present in
16 the closure lid welds. We did not include the SCC model for
17 titanium in the SR in the early version of our AMR mainly
18 because we are backfilling the design and titanium was
19 protected from rockfall by backfill. And, we had planned on
20 annealing all of the titanium welded structures prior to
21 installations. But now that the backfill is not in the
22 design, we have a model to look for titanium stress corrosion
23 cracking based on rockfall into the stresses and that is being
24 put into the SR model.

25 So, the recent tests that the project had done both

1 at General Electric Center and in Livermore show that Alloy-
2 22 and titanium are both susceptible to SCC. So, looking at
3 the three parameters we need for SCC, the environment, the
4 susceptibility, and stresses, we would that we don't have a
5 whole lot of control over environment. At least, the
6 material is shown to be susceptible. So, the only thing we
7 can do is to deal with the stresses. So, stress mitigation
8 is the planned approach right now to eliminate or delay SCC.

9 And, we also have added a second lid to the design
10 to give us additional margin. So, this is what the schematic
11 looks like. This is the outer lid and this particular area
12 of the weld will be induction annealed to relieve the
13 stresses. This one is the inner lid and this particular one
14 is a Philip weld and stress will be mitigated by laser
15 peening. And this inside is the 316 nuclear grade weld and
16 we are not planning to do anything with that.

17 Okay. We're looking at several sets of conditions
18 for the outer closure lid. I don't have--I have similar
19 curves for the inner lid, but in the interest of time, I just
20 put in only these two. This particular curve shows--this is
21 the hoop stress distribution. And, when you look at the
22 stress mitigated layer, this one is--the positive stress
23 intensity factor goes around about 12mm. What this says is
24 that you must corrode through 12mm of material before SCC
25 cracks propagate. And, we believe the hoop stress is the

1 dominant stress driving radial SCC crack. The radial
2 stresses do cause crack, but they cause circumferential crack
3 of the cracks by the time the stress distribution--by the
4 time the cracks grow part wall, the stresses are not
5 conducive to propagation of these cracks. So, they don't go
6 through wall.

7 Next slide, please? This one is assuming a
8 different set of stress distribution uncertainties. Here,
9 we're looking at 10 percent, 15 percent, 30 percent
10 uncertainty band about the stress distribution in the
11 material. And, this is the stress intensity factor
12 associated with that. Again, when you look at the
13 conservative case of 30 percent bound, the positive stress
14 intensity factor is around 4mm. So, the decreased minimum
15 thickness of the compressive zone to about 6mm to before you
16 can--you have to corrode to that much.

17 Okay. Next slide, please? These are waste package
18 lifetime. This is the integrated model that WAPDEG puts all
19 of its current degradation modes into that. And, in the case
20 of TSPA/VA, the first failure of the waste package was due to
21 localized corrosion of the two barriers. Assuming the high
22 pH on carbon steel and then Ferric chloride concentration of
23 the crevice and going through a localized corrosion, the
24 number was about 2700 years. In the SR, we have significant
25 model enhancement incorporated and the first waste package

1 failure is a conservative estimate of about 11,000 years.
2 This is based on 100 realizations and looking at the worst
3 case of 100 realizations.

4 Next slide, please? Let me do what Ernie did.
5 I'll put this up on the viewgraph machine and we can compare.
6 These are the degraded drip shield barrier sensitivity.
7 These are the 95th percentile for the degraded barrier and
8 the 5th for uncertainty-variability partition. So, in other
9 words, these are assuming the worst case for the degraded
10 condition and then the best or best estimated case for the
11 5th percentile cases and the favorable conditions for the
12 enhanced barrier. There's not a whole lot of difference in
13 here, as you can see. If there are any more questions, Bob
14 probably can answer better than I can.

15 Next one, please? Okay. Again, this is the
16 degraded barrier and the enhanced barrier, the same
17 situation. Some of these have beaten to death already. I
18 think, Bob has addressed most of these things. But, the key
19 thing is to look at the 5th percentile manufacturing defect
20 probability and then uncertainty-variability partitioning and
21 the 5th percentile of Alloy-22 corrosion, 5th percentile of
22 Alloy-22 inner stress profile indices. All of these things
23 are in the favorable condition. These are all in the most
24 unfavorable condition.

25 Next slide, please? So, again, you see this. The

1 failure time for waste packages come down quite a bit and I
2 think Bob mentioned 6,000 years or so. Yeah. But, the other
3 thing I wanted to point out is that even with all of these
4 early failures occurring, you're not exceeding even 10mrem
5 for about 30,000 years or so. So, that's what it really--

6 COHON: Excuse me, I just want to ask you a question
7 while this is up. Two or three slides ago, didn't you just
8 say that the earliest possible failure is 11,000 years.

9 PASUPATHI: Yes, right. Right.

10 COHON: So, how do you reconcile the--

11 PASUPATHI: The two differences--the WAPDEG runs based
12 on 11,000 years are a stochastic approach. This is
13 artificially forcing everything to the worst condition or the
14 best condition. Isn't that right, Bob? That's the way it
15 was explained to me. In other words, in the WAPDEG cases,
16 you take about 100 realizations and take--

17 COHON: No, but wait a minute, wait a minute. You're
18 staying inside all of your distributions. You're not going
19 outside of them.

20 PASUPATHI: Right.

21 COHON: If I understood what you said before, you said
22 the earliest possible failure is 11,000 years.

23 PASUPATHI: When you do a stochastic analysis using
24 WAPDEG, some of them may be not so unfavorable, some
25 parameters. So, when you run 100 realizations, the left-most

1 curve is what you're looking at.

2 COHON: So, when you said earliest possible, you meant
3 in the context of this model?

4 PASUPATHI: Yes, exactly. Stochastic was the force fit
5 worst case. Am I saying it right?

6 ANDREWS: I think that's right, Pasu. I mean, this is
7 forcing that at a very low-probability of occurrence. I
8 mean, I think you asked the same or similar question before.
9 You know, if I take this .05 to the whatever, 7th power,
10 this is well outside our distribution of what we expect to
11 occur, but it's--you know, trying to force a system to
12 barrier failure.

13 PASUPATHI: I think that's all I have.

14 BULLEN: Thank you, Pasu. And, we'll just entertain one
15 or two quick questions. I see Alberto has his hand up. For
16 clarification only, please?

17 SAGÜÉS: Yeah, a clarification.

18 BULLEN: Does this one have to go out in the hall, too?
19 Go ahead, Alberto?

20 SAGÜÉS: Do I understand then that localized corrosion
21 is--other than for stress corrosion cracking is completely
22 out, is not a concern?

23 PASUPATHI: Right. Right.

24 SAGÜÉS: It is not going to happen.

25 PASUPATHI: Currently, it is not. Yes, right. In fact,

1 our failures occur by stress corrosion only at this time.

2 SAGÜÉS: Thank you.

3 BULLEN: John?

4 KESSLER: Maybe, it was just the same question. I just
5 want to make sure I confirm that the failure is occurring at
6 the closure welds?

7 PASUPATHI: Right.

8 KESSLER: And, that where would--would general corrosion
9 occur anywhere in the center of the package any time--

10 PASUPATHI: Yes, it will continue to occur so long as
11 the conditions are right. If there's water, film, and
12 whatever, it will continue to occur, but the rate is so slow
13 that, you know, this particular failure scenario dominates.

14 KESSLER: Okay. So, it's much, much later before you
15 start getting failures over the body of the container?

16 PASUPATHI: Right. In fact, if you apply .073 plus the
17 bias and whatever other factors you do, still it's lower than
18 what --.

19 BULLEN: I would like to thank all the speakers today
20 and also to thank the audience for their adherence and
21 tenacity to stay around for the duration. I would also
22 invite everyone to take a look at the handouts that we have
23 to ask their questions tomorrow during our panel discussion.
24 Now, I'd like to turn it back over to our Chairman who will
25 close today's session.

1 COHON: We're adjourned. We reconvene tomorrow at 8:30.
 2 (Whereupon, at 6:30 p.m., the proceedings were
 3 recessed.)

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